

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

AMANI AFRICA

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Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
1	2	3 Consideration and Adoption of the Report of the Activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12 Briefing on the Situation in Sudan, Briefing on the Situation in Somalia	13	14
15	16	17	18	19 Open Session on Climate, Peace and Security	20	21
22	23	24 Consultation meeting with FAO, WFP, and IFAD on the nexus between Food, Peace, and Security	25	26	27 Informal Consultation with Member States in Political Transition	28
29	30	31				

FEBRUARY
2 0 2 6



TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE MONTH AT A GLANCE.....1

PSC REVISES DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION OF REPORT ON
EXTERNAL ACTORS SUPPORTING PARTIES TO THE SUDAN CONFLICT.....1

PSC URGES SOMALI POLITICAL ACTORS TO ESTABLISH REGULAR AND
STRUCTURED DIALOGUE AS REGIONAL LEADERS ARRIVE IN MOGADISHU FOR TALKS.....4

PSC CALLS FOR THE FINALISATION OF THE CAP-CPS BY THE SECOND HALF OF 2026.....7

PSC MOVES TO INTEGRATE FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS INTO CEWS AND
THE THREAT MATRIX, WHILE REGULARISING BIENNIAL CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS.....11

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES DURING THE MONTH.....15


 Informal Consultations.....15

 Committee of Experts (CoE) Meetings.....15

THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In February, under the chairship of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled Provisional [Programme of Work](#) (PPoW) consisting of four substantive sessions, covering five agenda items. All four substantive sessions happened as planned, including two informal consultations.

Out of the four substantive sessions, one session, had two agenda items, focused on country-specific situations, while the rest addressed thematic issues. The two agenda items were the only sessions held at the ministerial level during the month, while the rest were conducted at the level of permanent representatives. It is also worth noting that, among all the sessions, only one was held in an open format.



Over the course of the month, the PSC PPoW underwent only one revision. The first change saw the postponement of the sessions on the situations in Sudan and Somalia from 10 February to 12 February. This was then followed by the postponement of the field visit, which was initially on the programme; however, no further details were provided.

Except for the summary records adopted following the informal consultations with countries in political transition, all the other remaining sessions adopted communiqués as outcome documents.

PSC REVISES DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION OF REPORT ON EXTERNAL ACTORS SUPPORTING PARTIES TO THE SUDAN CONFLICT

The PSC's 1330th session, held at ministerial level on 12 February 2026, discussed the situation in Sudan as one of its agenda items, alongside the situation in Somalia and the operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).¹ Ahead of the session, the chair of the month, Egypt, also facilitated an informal consultation between the PSC and Sudan. This was intended to provide a platform for the Sudanese authorities, who cannot engage with the PSC during formal sessions due to Sudan's suspension in place since the October 2021 military coup, to interact with the Council. Accordingly, Sudanese Foreign Minister Mohieddin Salem addressed the

1 Egypt's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Badr Abdelatty, presided over the session, while the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, delivered the introductory statement. Representatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States, and the United Nations also delivered statements during the session.

Council during the informal consultation, reportedly calling on the AU to lift the suspension of his country's membership. The formal session then proceeded.



Figure 1: 1330th Meeting of the PSC on the 'Situation in Sudan,' 12 February 2026 (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#)).

One of the key highlights of the [communiqué](#) adopted during the session is its call for the 'expeditious and full restoration of a democratically elected and civilian-led government in line with AU instruments and decisions.' This is particularly significant given the Sudanese authorities' repeated requests for the lifting of the suspension, including during the PSC's field visit to Port Sudan in October 2024. It appears that, in the view of the Sudanese authorities, the continued suspension delegitimises them and places them on a similar footing with the other party to the conflict—the RSF (Rapid Support Force). As such, lifting the suspension is critical to their effort to reinforce the narrative that they are the sole legitimate state authority confronting a rebel group. Against this backdrop, the communiqué's call for the 'expeditious and full restoration of a democratically elected and civilian-led government in line with AU instruments and decisions,' appears to signal a subtle rejection of attempts to secure the lifting of the suspension while the full restoration of constitutional order remains distant in the current context.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1218th meeting, 21 June 2024, [[PSC/HoSG/COMM.1218 \(2024\)](#)]:

The PSC:

- Mandated the AU and its relevant Organs, in collaboration with the High-Level Panel on Sudan and IGAD, to regularly monitor and report heinous crimes committed throughout Sudan, develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation, as well as develop a plan for the protection of civilians.
- Directed the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions to liaise with the AU Commission and CISSA to identify all external actors supporting the warring factions militarily, financially and politically, as well as make proposals on how to contain each of them within a stipulated timeframe not exceeding three months from June 2024.
- Proposed the convening of an extraordinary summit of the AU to consider the situation in Sudan.
- Requested the AU Commission, in consultation with the Chairperson of the Union, to consult on the date and venue of the aforementioned extraordinary summit.

1308th emergency meeting, 28 October 2025, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1308 \(2025\)](#)]:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to:
 - Regularly monitor and report such heinous crimes committed throughout Sudan.
 - Develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation.
 - Develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations to the PSC within three weeks.
 - Urgently convene a meeting of

the AU, UN, IGAD and the Quad on the situation in Sudan, to ensure coordination of efforts, and to put in place a coordination mechanism.

- Directed the Chairperson of the AU Commission to urgently engage with the Members of the PSC Presidential Ad-hoc Committee to facilitate the negotiation process between the leaders of the SAF and the paramilitary RSF, including the holding of an AU Special Summit on Sudan.

1319th meeting, 16 December 2025, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1319 \(2025\)](#)]:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to establish an Inter-Departmental Task Force to coordinate humanitarian efforts and related activities such as post-conflict recovery, leveraging existing AU structures and inviting key regional partners.

Echoing the statement of the Chairperson of the AU Commission issued on 30 December 2025, the PSC also welcomed the Sudanese National Initiative for Peace unveiled by the Prime Minister of the Transitional Government of Sudan during the 22 December 2025 briefing to the UN Security Council (UNSC) on Sudan. The initiative calls for a comprehensive ceasefire under joint monitoring by the UN, the AU and the Arab League, alongside the withdrawal of the RSF from the territories under its control. During the session, the PSC called for the full implementation of the initiative in alignment with the AU Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan. However, the Council's backing of a peace initiative advanced by one party to the conflict may prove problematic and could raise questions about its impartiality, particularly at a time when the AU is seeking to position itself

more actively in efforts to address the conflict.

The other key aspect is the PSC's call for the revitalisation of an inclusive inter-Sudanese dialogue through the facilitation of the Quintet—a recent configuration in Sudan's peace efforts that brings together five organisations (AU, IGAD, UN, the Arab League, and the EU) with the aim of anchoring the political and civilian peace process under AU leadership. This arrangement appears to replace the role previously played by the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan, which had been working to convene preparatory meetings for an Inter-Sudanese Political Dialogue among Sudanese civilian and political actors, but whose role has recently faded from view.

On the other hand, the session also served as an opportunity to follow up on the implementation of previous decisions. An interesting element in this regard was the reiteration of its request made to the AU Commission at its 1218th session in June 2024, in coordination with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), to submit a comprehensive and updated report of the joint [fact-finding mission](#) on the human rights situation in Sudan for consideration by the PSC. This request came in a context where the PSC had failed to consider and act up on the fact-finding report released by the ACHPR in October 2025, which documented atrocities committed by the warring parties since the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023. Although the fact-finding mission was initiated pursuant to, and within the framework of, the PSC's decision at its 1218th session, the PSC has yet to consider the report, notwithstanding that the ACHPR formally submitted it to the Chairperson of the AU Commission during a meeting held on 19 November 2025. The PSC also followed up on its earlier request to the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions to identify all

external actors supporting parties to the armed conflict and to propose measures to contain their involvement within a stipulated timeframe not exceeding three months from February 2026. This report is long overdue, as the initial request was made during the PSC's 1218th summit-level session in June 2024, with a submission deadline set for September 2024. It remains to be seen whether the revised timeline will be met. In addition, the Council reiterated the urgent need to reopen the AU Liaison Office in Sudan and to undertake a field mission to the country.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Called for an expeditious and full restoration of a democratically elected and civilian-led government in line with the AU Instruments and Decisions.
- Reiterated its call for the revitalisation of an inclusive inter-Sudanese dialogue imbued with a spirit of reconciliation and the search for a political compromise solution through the facilitation of the Quintet.
- Requested the PSC Sub-committee on Sanctions, to expedite the implementation of the PSC Communiqué [[PSC/AHG/COMM.1218 \(2024\)](#)] adopted on 21 June 2024, working in collaboration with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), to identify all external actors supporting the parties to the armed conflict militarily, financially and politically, and make proposals on how to contain each of them within a stipulated timeframe, not exceeding three months from February 2026.
- Reiterated its request in line with

PSC's 1218th Communiqué for the AU Commission in coordination with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) to submit a comprehensive and updated report of the joint fact-finding mission on the situation of human rights in the Republic of Sudan to the PSC for consideration.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Briefing on the situation in Sudan, Insights on the PSC](#), 11 February 2026.
- [Sudan's Crisis is Africa's Crisis - And Its Responsibility](#), Policy Brief, 22 January 2025.
- [Sudan At The Zero Point: Why Seventy Years of Independence Demand New Political Thinking](#), Ideas Indaba, 2 January 2026.

PSC URGES SOMALI POLITICAL ACTORS TO ESTABLISH REGULAR AND STRUCTURED DIALOGUE AS REGIONAL LEADERS ARRIVE IN MOGADISHU FOR TALKS

The other agenda item discussed during PSC's 1330th session was the situation in Somalia and the operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).²

² Egypt's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Badr Abdelatty, presided over the session, while the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, delivered the introductory statement. Representatives of Somalia, troop contributing countries, IGAD, the League of Arab States, and the UN also delivered statements during the session.



Figure 2: 1330th Meeting of the PSC on the ‘Situation in Somalia and the Operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM)’ 12 February 2026 (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#)).

The discussion appears to have focused primarily on condemning Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. The [communiqué](#) adopted at the session largely reiterates the communiqué issued at the [1324th](#) session held on 6 January and contains a few new elements, with significant portions reproduced verbatim. In this regard, the session rejected all forms of external interference; condemned any action that undermines the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Somalia; ‘strongly’ condemned and rejected Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and called for its immediate revocation, characterising the recognition as ‘null and void’; and warned of the implications of such recognition for the peace and stability of the continent and the dangerous precedent it may set. These positions essentially restate those contained in the communiqué adopted at the [1324th](#) session.

On internal political developments, while commending the efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to accelerate the realisation of key national priorities, the PSC also underscored the need for the FGS to establish regular and structured dialogue with Federal Member States (FMS)—including Jubaland and Puntland— as well as with opposition parties and other key stakeholders, with a view to building consensus on national priorities. This emphasis came in the context of the

return to Mogadishu of the regional leaders of Jubaland and Puntland, both of which had suspended relations with the federal authorities, after several months, in order to engage in dialogue with the FGS on key national issues, particularly disagreements relating to electoral and constitutional reforms.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has been pushing for the introduction of a one-person, one-vote electoral system. However, critics—including the leaders of Jubaland and Puntland as well as opposition figures organised under the Somali Future Council—have called for indirect elections to be held in May, when President Mohamud’s current term is due to expire. Although the travel of the two regional leaders to Mogadishu was initially perceived as a sign of renewed willingness to engage in dialogue—particularly against the backdrop of earlier escalating tensions—the various engagements between the opposition and the FGS in February did not yield a breakthrough. Talks ultimately collapsed as the parties failed to agree on the electoral model for the forthcoming elections.

Meanwhile, the political rift between the FGS and some FMS, as well as opposition groups, widened further in early March following the approval of a new constitution and constitutional amendments by the Federal Parliament, formally bringing to an end the long-standing 2012 Provisional Constitution, and the subsequent signing of the new constitutional framework by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. While the federal leadership has characterised the development as a ‘historic step’ in Somalia’s state-building process, oppositions have criticised the move as a unilateral action undertaken without adequate consultation or consensus.

These developments—occurring in the context of President Mohamud’s term set to expire in May without political agreement on the electoral modality and timeline, and against the backdrop of broader geopolitical contestation in the region further intensified by Israel’s recognition of Somaliland—suggest a challenging period ahead, with potential repercussions for the peace and stability of Somalia and the wider region.

In relation to AUSSOM, the communiqué similarly contains little that is new and largely reiterates previous decisions. In this regard, the PSC once again recalled its directive issued at its 1317th session in December 2025, requesting the Commission, in consultation with FGS, to convene a meeting of AUSSOM troop- and police-contributing countries at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces. The purpose of the meeting is to deliberate on the three options concerning the future of AUSSOM proposed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and to submit a report with recommendations for the Council’s consideration. However, as in the previous communiqué, no specific timeline was attached for the submission of this report. On the other hand, the PSC urged the United Nations, in coordination with the AU, to expedite the deployment of Egypt’s contingents and to facilitate the repatriation of Burundi troops, as well as that of the Ghana Formed Police Unit. Yet, despite the expression of readiness, it remains unclear when the deployment will actually take place.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1317th Session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1317 \(2025\)](#)], 15 December 2025:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to submit to this Council a detailed report on the proposed options, including their implications on the sustain-

ability of AUSSOM and its operations.

- Requested the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss the three options, and submit their recommendations for Council’s consideration.

1287th Session, [[PSC/MIN/COMM.1287 \(2025\)](#)], 3 July 2025:

The PSC:

- Requested the Chiefs of Defence Forces of the TCCS plus Somalia to work out a comprehensive plan to deter, degrade and eliminate Al Shabaab.
- Requested the AU Commission to update the CONOPS with regard to the increased number and location of Forward Operating Bases, and their logistical support and aviation requirements of the operation, and submit these new requirements to Council within six (6) weeks for consideration and transmission to the UN Security Council.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Directed the AU Commission, in consultation with FGS, to convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss the three options on the future of AUSSOM in line with the 1317th meeting of December 2025, including the implications on the sustainability of the Mission and its operations and to submit the report of the meeting with recommendations for Council’s consideration.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and the Operations of AUSSOM, Insights on the PSC](#), 11 February 2026.

PSC CALLS FOR THE FINALISATION OF THE CAP-CPS BY THE SECOND HALF OF 2026

On 19 February, the PSC convened for its 1331st meeting, on ‘Climate, Peace and Security,’ which was held as an open session.³




Figure 3: 1331st Meeting of the PSC on the ‘Climate, Peace and Security,’ 19 February 2026 (Source: X @ [AUC_PAPS](#)).

From the adopted [communiqué](#) of the session, the PSC began by welcoming progress made toward the finalisation of the Common African Position on Climate, Peace and Security (CAP-CPS) and reiterated its request for the AU Commission, in consultation with Member States, Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs), the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), and the UN, to expedite the process. It underscored the importance of a unified

³ A statement was read on behalf of Moses Vilakati, AU Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE). In addition, the meeting also received statements from Parfait Onanga Anyanga, Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General to the AU; as well as from AU Member States.

and coherent African common position on climate, peace, and security, and called for the finalisation of the document by national experts across all Member States prior to its validation by the Council, which was targeted for completion during the second half of 2026.

Still in the development of the Common African Position, the Council emphasised the need to ensure alignment with national and regional realities supported by a clear conceptual framing that centers on addressing climate-related security risks and challenges through existing mechanisms by further strengthening adaptation frameworks, advancing early warning and anticipatory action systems, and accelerate the implementation of national adaptation plans, all while ensuring the process remained consultative and iterative to foster broad consensus and ownership.



On the other hand, regarding addressing climate vulnerability and structural barriers, the PSC took note of the adverse effects of climate change, including its impact on the health and livelihoods of individuals through sea-level rise, drought, desertification, and natural disasters. It underlined that ‘African countries, despite their low contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions, lack the capacity and appropriate technology to implement adaptation and mitigation measures while increasingly challenged by rising debt, narrowing fiscal space, trade protectionism, [and a] weaker implementation of international climate commitments.’ In this connection, the Council underscored the need to ‘develop inclusive, effective, and equitable climate adaptation and resilience strategies that mainstream women and youth for sustainable development.’

It also highlighted the necessity of integrating ‘climate multi-hazard analysis into preventive diplomacy frameworks and ensuring conflict sensitivity within the Continental Early Warning System.’ [Amani Africa’s briefing to the PSC](#) in September 2025 highlighted that strengthening early warning systems is a strategic climate, peace and security measure for anticipating how climate variability interacts with fragility and conflict drivers as there is a need for ensuring that climate indicators such as rainfall anomalies, drought cycles, sea level rise, shrinking of water, pasture and other resources on which communities depend for their livelihoods and migration flows are systematically incorporated. Without this, early warning remains reactive rather than predictive. Relatedly, there is a need to enhance and leverage early warning capacity through investment in climate data collection, satellite monitoring, and localised reporting networks that can capture the lived realities of vulnerable communities, as well as close coordination and

coherence between climate early warning systems and conflict early warning systems.

With regard to financing and international cooperation, the PSC encouraged enhanced collaboration and coordination among Member States, RECs/RMs, and the AU Commission through platforms designed for sharing experiences and best practices on climate adaptation, climate resilience, and climate disaster risk reduction. In this vein, it tasked the AU Commission to ‘expedite the operationalisation of the African Humanitarian Agency and the Continental Civil Capacity Mechanism for preparations towards and response to disasters, in particular climate disasters.’

Council went further and emphasised the need to ‘frame climate adaptation as a strategic imperative for sustainable development in Africa,’ and stressed the importance of aligning climate adaptation finance with conflict prevention and resilience-building efforts. This alignment is designed to ensure that climate investments yield tangible dividends in terms of peace, security, and stability across the continent.

Regarding advancing climate adaptation and sustainable resource management on the continent, one of the decisions saw Council emphasising the importance of ‘strengthening Africa’s resilience, through practical adaptation and mitigation measures, including climate-smart agriculture, the development of irrigation schemes, renewable energy, and improved water resources management and sustainable agriculture,’ and in this context, encouraged Member States to ‘further enhance collaboration and cooperation in managing transboundary natural resources.’

The discussions further touched on scaling up climate finance and adaptation support for Africa, with the Council underscoring

the need to ‘fully implement the commitment to triple adaptation finance by 2035.’ This effort must be supported by readiness assistance and strengthened capacity-building, the Council emphasised. Such measures are essential to ensure that dedicated climate adaptation resources effectively reach the most vulnerable communities and countries affected by climate change, including coastal and island countries, as well as those in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions. In this regard, the PSC emphasised the importance of improving access through measures aimed at enhancing direct access options, simplifying procedures, and strengthening alignment with national priorities.

In addition, the PSC appealed to international partners to significantly scale up the mobilisation of adequate, sustainable, and predictable financing for climate adaptation, mitigation, and resilience. It reaffirmed the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and equity, while emphasising the need to take into account differing national circumstances. The Council further called for enhanced and predictable support to African countries through climate finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building, particularly in areas such as early warning, conflict-sensitive climate adaptation, and natural resource governance.

It also emphasised the importance of strengthening African climate financing mechanisms and ensuring the adequate capitalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund through the implementation of existing commitments. As captured in our [analysis](#) of the session, the previous sessions of the PSC, particularly the [1301st](#) session of September 2025, were notable for situating climate change firmly within a broader climate policy framework anchored in development, justice, and equity, focusing

on loss and damage, adaptation financing, and the differentiated vulnerabilities of least-developed and conflict-affected African states.

In this regard, this saw the PSC, in this 1331st meeting, encouraged the international community to discharge its responsibilities by tailoring its climate change response to the specific needs and realities of the African continent.

Broadly, Council also welcomed the COP30 reaffirmation that climate measures should not constitute arbitrary discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade. This acknowledged the establishment of the mandated dialogue on enhancing international cooperation and trade, as reiterated by the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) during its session on 16 February 2026 on the margins of the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1301st Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1301 \(2025\)](#)], 17 September 2025:

The PSC:

- Reiterated its call for the AU Commission to expeditiously develop the CAP on the nexus between Climate, Peace and Security in consultation with Member States to ensure their ownership.
- Highlighted the need to accelerate the operationalisation of the Continental Mechanism of Civil Capacity for Disaster Preparedness and Response, building on existing early warning systems and multihazard approaches to fill gaps in risk knowledge and response capacity.

1263rd Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1263 \(2025\)](#)], 6 March 2025:

The PSC:

- Looked forward to the finalisation of the Common African Position on Climate Change, Peace and Security, following due process and taking into consideration the contributions from all AU Member States, the AGN and RECs/RMs, or subsequent incorporation in the national and regional policies and frameworks.

1114th Session [[PSC/MIN/COMM.1114 \(2022\)](#)], 18 October 2022:

The PSC:

- Reiterated the call for the establishment of a Climate Change Fund.
- Underlined the imperative for enhanced collaboration and cooperation between the Africa Multi-hazard Early Warning System and Early Action (AMHEWAS) Situation Room and the Continental Early Warning Situation (CEWS) Room.

1079th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1079 \(2022\)](#)], 21 April 2022:

The PSC:

- Requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to consider elevating the Climate Change Unit into a full-fledged Division.
- Called for the acceleration of the implementation of the Assembly decision 718 adopted during the 32nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly in 2019, which requested the AU Commission to ensure the protection, the census and the registration of refugees and IDPs and the protection of their camps against any form of militarisation and to maintain their civilian character.
- Requested the AU Commission to expedite the finalisation of the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Study on the nexus between Climate Change, Peace and Security in the Continent pursuant

to the Press Statement adopted at Council's Open Session held on 21 May 2018.

- Highlighted the importance of a Common African Position on Climate Change and reiterated the need for mobilising predictable and sustainable climate financing, including the establishment of an African Climate Fund.

1051st Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1051 \(2021\)](#)], 26 November 2021:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to expedite the finalisation of a climate-related security risks assessment study, in consultation with Member States and to define the varying security impacts of climate change on the African continent while taking steps towards mobilising a common African position towards climate change and security.

Finally, the PSC acknowledged the work of the UN Climate Security Mechanism in Africa in support of AU Member States and RECs/RMs, including through the provision of technical assistance, capacity building and early warning support to more effectively prevent and address climate, peace and security risks. It (Council) encouraged Member States to 'take all necessary measures to enhance the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions and National Adaptation Plans by strengthening climate governance to ensure the effectiveness of their climate actions.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission, working through its relevant departments, to expedite the operationalisation

of the African Humanitarian Agency and the Continental Civil Capacity Mechanism for preparations towards and response to disasters, in particular climate disasters.

- Called for the finalisation of the study on the assessment of climate-related security risks and the implementation of the PSC Matrix of threats to peace and security on the continent, adopted in August 2025.
- Underscored the need to fully implement the commitment to triple adaptation finance by 2035, supported by readiness assistance and capacitybuilding to help ensure that dedicated climate adaptation resources reach the climate-change vulnerable communities and countries that need them most, including the coastal and island countries, and the countries in the Sahel region and Lake Chad Basin region while also improving access through measures aimed at improving direct access options and simplified procedures in addition to alignment with national priorities.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Open Session on Climate, Peace and Security](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 18 February 2026.
- [Amani Africa Briefing to the PSC](#), 17 September 2025.
- [Open session on the Nexus between Climate Change, Peace, and Security in Africa](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 16 September 2025.
- [Climate Change: Challenges to Peace and Security in Africa](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 5 March 2025.

PSC MOVES TO INTEGRATE FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS INTO CEWS AND THE THREAT MATRIX, WHILE REGULARISING BIENNIAL CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS

The last substantive meeting of the PSC was its 1332nd meeting held on 24 February, which was a consultation with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), World Food Programme (WFP) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) on the Nexus between Food, Peace and Security.⁴

The outcome of the session, a [communiqué](#), is notable for firmly placing food security within the Council's peace and security agenda rather than treating it solely as a development or humanitarian issue. By framing food insecurity and conflict as mutually reinforcing dynamics, the session reflects the Council's growing recognition that addressing food insecurity requires linking peace and security frameworks with technical, humanitarian, and agricultural policy tools through a more predictable and sustained institutional partnership. In this vein, the PSC expressed deep concern over how these interconnected challenges continue to undermine food systems and nutrition. It stressed that Member States must strengthen their agricultural sectors and improve governance of natural resources to ensure sustainable food security and to prevent conflicts driven by competition over scarce resources.

⁴ Janet Edeme, Head, Rural Development Division, made a presentation on behalf of Moses Vilakati, Commissioner for ARBE. Further presentations were made by Abebe Haile Gabriel, Ag. Director General of FAO, Lydie Kouame from the WFP, and Sara Mbado-Bhunu from IFAD.



Figure 4: 1332nd meeting of the PSC on ‘Consultation with FAO, WFP and IFAD on the Nexus between Food, Peace and Security,’ 24 February 2026
(Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#)).

The Council further discussed the ‘bi-directional causality and intertwined relationship between conflict and food security,’ noting that instability and violence are both causes and consequences of hunger on the continent. Amani Africa’s edition of [Insights of the PSC](#), prepared to inform this PSC session, highlighted conflict as a ‘primary driver of hunger, as violence displaces farmers, destroys crops and infrastructure, and disrupts supply chains.’ At the same time, conflict and insecurity worsen food insecurity by ‘impeding response and humanitarian access, including the use of humanitarian access as a weapon of war.’

Furthermore, the PSC emphasised that conflict-induced food insecurity increases the risk of famine and, to address this, called on all parties to armed conflict to ‘comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law regarding respecting and protecting civilians and taking constant care to spare civilian assets, and refrain from attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless assets that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.’

Recognising that long-term stability depends on addressing root causes, the PSC called on Member States to ‘comprehensively’ tackle the structural drivers of violent conflict and instability. It urged countries facing prolonged crises to pursue political solutions to their conflicts and give peace a chance. At the same time,

the Council commended the efforts of the AU Commission, particularly its Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (ARBE), for working closely with international partners, such as FAO, WFP, and IFAD, to provide technical support aimed at strengthening food security across Member States.

The PSC also welcomed continental initiatives, particularly the Feed Africa Strategy and the African Risk Capacity (ARC), which provides innovative mechanisms, such as climate risk insurance, to help African governments respond swiftly to droughts and other shocks. These efforts are critical in preventing food crises from escalating into full-blown humanitarian disasters.

Relatedly, the most consequential operational decision in the communiqué is arguably tasking the AU Commission to ‘incorporate food security indicators within the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and to include food insecurity in the Matrix of Threats to Peace and Security in Africa adopted in August 2025.’ It is worth recalling that the PSC’s [1298th](#) session considered a briefing on the CEWS, titled ‘Mapping Risks and Threats,’ held on 27 August 2025. The significance of this request lies in its potential to elevate food insecurity from a background condition to a systematically monitored risk within the PSC’s preventive and analytical framework. If implemented effectively, it could enable both the PSC and the Commission to detect deteriorating conditions early, before they escalate into large-scale humanitarian or security crises. However, its impact will ultimately depend on whether the AU translates this commitment into operational tools, such as measurable indicators, regular reporting, and clear triggers for preventive action, rather than allowing it to remain a

largely declaratory step.

Moving on, the Council drew attention to the gendered dimensions of food insecurity, emphasising that women and children are disproportionately affected. It called for policies that empower women through improved access to land rights, finance, agricultural inputs, technology, and leadership roles in food resources management.

In addressing recovery and resilience, the PSC stressed the importance of aligning peacebuilding strategies with agricultural recovery programmes in conflict-affected regions. In this vein, it further highlighted the need for 'debt relief considerations for all countries where violent conflicts are exacerbating hunger and food insecurity.' Member States were encouraged to prioritise investments in climate-smart agriculture, sustainable land use, and integrated water resource management, while also fostering private sector participation to mitigate resource-based and food-related conflicts and enhance adaptive capacity.

The Council also called for accelerated implementation of frameworks such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to boost regional food self-sufficiency. From the language in the Communiqué, we can see that the Council links the discussion to the AU theme for 2026 on 'Assuring Sustainable Water Availability and Safe Sanitation Systems to Achieve the Goals of Agenda 2063,' the 2025 Kampala 'CAADP Declaration on Building Resilient and Sustainable Agrifood Systems in Africa,' the 2022 AU Year of 'Nutrition and Food Security,' and earlier continental frameworks on agriculture and fertiliser production. This layering of references suggests an attempt

to connect peace and security deliberations with long-standing AU agricultural and development agendas. It also signals that the PSC is seeking to treat food security less as a peripheral matter and more as an issue requiring cross-sectoral continental policy coherence.

Strengthening intra-African agricultural trade and value chains was identified as a key step towards reducing dependency on external markets. In this regard, the PSC emphasised the importance of investing in regional fertiliser production, strategic grain reserves, storage infrastructure, and agro-processing industries to shield African economies from global market volatility.

To protect vulnerable populations, the Council encouraged Member States to enhance safety nets, strengthen subsidy mechanisms, and implement policies that cushion households from food price shocks and economic instability. It also reiterated the importance of diversifying energy sources and investing in renewable energy 'to reduce the impact of rising oil prices on food production systems.' Furthermore, the PSC promoted the adoption of 'home-grown school feeding programmes' that integrate agriculture, health, and education, and are complemented by the supply of nutrient-dense (emergency food), particularly in conflict-affected areas where access to nutritious food is critical.

Finally, the PSC stressed the need to link emergency food responses with investments in rebuilding agricultural infrastructure damaged by conflict, including irrigation systems, storage facilities, and dams. It called for stronger and more structured collaboration between the AU, particularly ARBE, the PSC, and the Rome-based agencies through joint planning, coordinated interventions, and pooled resources. To ensure

sustained impact, the Council decided to institutionalise these consultations as a biennial event, alternating between Addis Ababa and Rome, with the first session proposed to take place in Rome in October 2027, on World Food Day.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1083rd Meeting, 9 May 2022, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1083 \(2022\)](#)]:

The PSC requested the AU Commission to:

- Support Member States to implement and familiarise with the Common African Position to accelerate the implementation of the Decade of Action to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.
- Undertake a study and propose to Member States recommendation on the strategies to boost food production in Africa and submit to the PSC for consideration.
- Strengthen the linkage between humanitarian assistance, development, and peacebuilding, with a view to enhancing greater cooperation and coordination between actors in humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peacebuilding.
- Regularly brief the Council on food security and conflict.

Notably, although the PSC's May 2022 session called for regular briefings on food security and conflict, this session remains the only standalone PSC meeting in nearly four years specifically devoted to the nexus between food insecurity and conflict, pointing to inconsistent follow-through on that earlier commitment.

From an analytical purview, this 1332nd PSC meeting communiqué reflects an effort to balance immediate protection concerns with longer-term structural responses. On the one hand, it calls on parties to armed

conflict to comply with international humanitarian law and refrain from attacking assets 'indispensable' to civilian survival. On the other hand, it urges member states to 'address the structural root causes of violent conflict,' invest in climate-smart agriculture, strengthen land and water governance, enhance regional food self-sufficiency through 'CAADP and the AfCFTA,' expand fertiliser production and grain reserves and build stronger social protection mechanisms. It further highlights women's access to land, finance, agricultural inputs and leadership, recognising that the burden of food insecurity falls disproportionately on women and children. Taken together, these provisions demonstrate that the PSC is attempting to frame food security not just as emergency relief, but as part of a broader resilience and statecraft agenda.

Particularly noteworthy is the communiqué's recognition that peacebuilding and agricultural recovery need to be linked in conflict-affected contexts. The call for 'alignment between peacebuilding strategies and agricultural recovery programmes,' alongside the reference to 'debt relief' considerations for countries where violent conflict is worsening hunger, indicates a more politically aware reading of food insecurity. This is significant because it suggests that the PSC is not only concerned with food supply, but also with the fiscal and governance conditions that shape post-conflict recovery. Still, the communiqué stops short of clarifying how such alignment is to be operationalised or which AU organs will lead it.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to incorporate food security indicators within the AU CEWS; and to also in-

clude food insecurity in the Matrix of Threats to Peace and Security in Africa that was adopted in August 2025.

- Decided to institutionalise and regularise the joint consultative meeting with the Rome-Based Agencies as a biennial event every two years, with the hosting alternating between Addis Ababa and Rome and proposed to hold the first session in Rome in October 2027, on the occasion of World Food Day.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Consultation meeting with FAO, WFP, and IFAD on the nexus between Food, Peace, and Security, Insights on the PSC](#), 23 February 2026.

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES DURING THE MONTH

Informal Consultations

In addition to the substantive sessions, on 12 February (as captured in the segment on Sudan above), the PSC held an informal consultation with Sudan’s Foreign Minister regarding the situation in the country. A meeting that preceded the substantive PSC meeting on the country’s situation.

Moreover, on 27 February, the Council held another [informal consultation](#) with Member States currently undergoing political transitions, namely Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Sudan. This was the fifth of such consultations since the PSC institutionalised this format within its working methods following the [14th Retreat](#) on its Working Methods in November 2022.



Figure 5: 5th Informal Consultation with Countries in Political Transition, 27 February 2026 (Source: X @AUC_PAPS).

Committee of Experts (CoE) Meetings

Council’s subsidiary body, CoE, also met three times during the month. On 5 February, the experts met to prepare for the ministerial-level sessions on Sudan and Somalia. Two weeks later, on 20 February, they also met for the ‘Inaugural Meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.’



Figure 6: Inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-committee on PCRD, 20 February 2026 (Source: X @AUC_PAPS).

The last convening of the experts was on 23 February for a 'briefing by the AU Artificial Intelligence Advisory Group on Governance, Peace and Security.'

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