11th AUPSC–UNSC Informal Joint Seminar

11^th AUPSC–UNSC Informal Joint SeminarDate | 21 October 2026

Tomorrow (22 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) will hold their 11^th informal joint seminar, ahead of the 20^th annual joint consultative meeting on 23 October 2026.

The seminar will be co-chaired by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and PSC Chairperson for October, and Aghi Balta, Permanent Representative of Greece to the UN and UNSC President for October.

Ahead of the seminar, the PSC is scheduled to hold consultations with the African Group and the three elected African members of the UNSC (A3) on 21 October. The 9^th PSC–UN Peacebuilding Commission consultative meeting will also take place that day. A fireside consultation is envisaged at the Greentree Foundation in Manhasset, New York, to facilitate more interactive exchanges between the Councils.

The seminar will address five thematic issues: the review of AU Peace Support Operations and UN Peace Operations, including the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2719; Youth, Peace and Security; AU–UN joint efforts to address and counter terrorism in Africa, including in the Sahel region; Children and Armed Conflict; and illegal exploitation of natural resources as a factor that exacerbates armed conflicts in Africa.

Agreement on the agenda was largely uncontentious, except for the natural resources item. Initially proposed by the PSC as ‘Natural Resources Management as a factor that exacerbates armed conflicts’, Russia suggested reframing it as ‘Root causes of conflict in Africa and the exploitation of natural resources’, reportedly opposed by European Council members of the UNSC. The Councils eventually agreed on ‘Illegal exploitation of natural resources as a factor that exacerbates armed conflicts in Africa’.

On the review of Peace Support Operations and UN Peace Operations, including the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2719, Ethiopia, Cameroon and Uganda will serve as PSC co-lead speakers, while Pakistan, France and Somalia will lead from the UNSC side. Discussions will address the respective roles, complementarity and division of labour between AU PSOs and UN peace operations, and progress in operationalising Resolution 2719, adopted on 21 December 2023 to establish a framework for financing AU-led PSOs through UN assessed contributions.

The discussions come amid important developments concerning peace operations. On 20 August, the UN Secretary-General submitted a review of UN peace operations, calling for recalibration amid growing geopolitical divisions and emphasising peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, host-state partnerships, and focused mandates. The PSC is expected to draw on its 1341^st session of 27 April, the August Luanda Summit and the ongoing African Peace and Security Architecture Review. At its 1341^st session, the PSC reaffirmed the importance of PSOs while stressing prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding, alongside ‘lean, targeted, and time-bound missions’ in light of mounting challenges sustaining large-scale operations.

The Councils may therefore emphasise clearer division of labour based on comparative advantages, the primacy of political solutions and viable exit strategies. Another priority will be assessing progress under Resolution 2719 ahead of its envisaged UNSC review in December 2026. The AU–UN Task Team met in New York from 13 to 16 October to assess implementation progress of Resolution 2719. Although the framework remains unoperationalised, progress under the October 2024 joint roadmap includes developing modalities for joint planning, decision-making, reporting and mission support.

Outstanding questions concern its practical application. Last year’s consultative meeting exposed disagreements over applying Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM, as well as language concerning sustainable, predictable and adequate financing for AU PSOs more broadly. It remains to be seen how this year’s consultative meeting will address the issue. Some PSC members may also raise the possible application of the framework to sub-regional PSOs and ad hoc security arrangements, particularly in light of PSC’s 1318^th session that requested the AU Commission to consider the application of the Resolution to the financing of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).

On Youth, Peace and Security (YPS), Morocco, South Africa and DRC will co-lead for the PSC, while DRC, Panama and Colombia will represent the UNSC. YPS has been a standing PSC agenda item since November 2018, with annual open sessions. The AU has institutionalised the agenda through Special Envoys on Youth since 2018 and the Continental Framework on YPS, adopted at the PSC’s 933^rd session in June 2020 to promote meaningful youth participation in peace and security processes.

In 2024, African Youth Ambassadors for Peace held regional and continental consultations to advance YPS under the New Agenda for Peace and presented the outcomes to the PSC on the sidelines of the PSC–UNSC consultative meeting. Building on these initiatives, the Councils may emphasise accelerating implementation of the Continental Framework, supporting the Network of African Youth in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (WiseYouth Network), and strengthening meaningful youth participation and leadership in prevention, mediation and peacebuilding.

On AU–UN joint efforts to address and counter terrorism in Africa, including in the Sahel region, Algeria, Somalia, Ethiopia and Nigeria will co-lead from the PSC, while Liberia, Bahrain, Russia and Denmark will represent the UNSC.

The PSC may highlight efforts to strengthen Africa’s counterterrorism architecture, including the AU Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Countering Terrorism in Africa (2026–2030), and initiatives to establish an African Arrest Warrant and a database of terrorist groups and their supporters. However, growing mistrust among neighbouring states and regional fragmentation continue to undermine cooperation against transnational terrorism. These concerns prompted the PSC’s ministerial session on ‘Good Neighbourliness and Regional Response to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa’ during the 81^st UN General Assembly in September. At its 1354^th session, the PSC also expressed concern over declining international cooperation and withdrawal of technical and financial support for African PSOs amid shifting priorities and geopolitical fragmentation.

Against this backdrop, discussions may explore stronger AU–UN counterterrorism cooperation, particularly in the Sahel, where regional divisions and diminishing international support have complicated collective responses. The Councils may also consider the independent strategic review of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel, led by former Ethiopian President Sahle-Work Zewde, which is expected to inform UNSC consideration of adapting UN engagement to the region’s evolving political and security landscape. The review offers an opportunity to strengthen coordination and promote coherent regional responses. Both Councils may further emphasise aligning counterterrorism measures with political strategies addressing underlying drivers of terrorism and violent extremism, including governance deficits and local grievances.

On Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Uganda, Morocco, Benin and Sierra Leone will co-lead for the PSC, while Greece, the United Kingdom and Latvia will represent the UNSC.

CAAC has been a standing PSC agenda item since 2014, with the AU appointing a Special Envoy in February 2026. The PSC now holds two sessions annually, most recently on 2 September, while the UNSC is expected to hold a briefing later this month. Despite being among the most developed thematic agendas, serious challenges persist. The UN Secretary-General’s June 2026 annual report verified 38,558 grave violations affecting 24,174 children, the highest number affected since the establishment of the children and armed conflict mandate by the General Assembly in 1996. For the first time in three decades of UN monitoring, state and government forces accounted for more violations than non-state armed groups. In Africa, the DRC (4,114), Nigeria (2,560) and Somalia (2,195) recorded the highest numbers, ranking among the five worst-affected situations globally.

Against this alarming backdrop, the Councils may underscore that the central challenge lies less in the absence of normative frameworks and mechanisms than in inadequate political will to implement them. Discussions may therefore emphasise stronger accountability and full compliance by all conflict parties with international humanitarian and human rights law.

On the illegal exploitation of natural resources as a factor that exacerbates armed conflicts in Africa, Gabon and DRC will represent for the PSC, while the United States and China will co-lead for the UNSC.

Both Councils have long recognised the relationship between illicit resource exploitation and insecurity. The issue has acquired renewed importance amid intensifying global competition for critical minerals, driven by the energy transition, technological advances and strategic rivalry among major powers.

The DRC, where resource exploitation and insecurity remain closely intertwined, has prioritised the issue across both Councils. During its November 2024 PSC chairship, it convened a session on armed and terrorist groups’ growing involvement in illicit resource extraction and trade. During its July UNSC presidency, it organised an Arria-formula meeting on 13 July and a high-level debate on resource governance on 22 July. Other Council members have also brought attention to the issue. Sierra Leone convened an Arria-formula meeting on the global race for critical minerals and resource-driven insecurity in Africa, while the United States held a briefing on energy, critical minerals and security during its March UNSC presidency.

The DRC has particularly advocated shifting attention towards resource governance. At the July debate, Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner proposed a new international doctrine placing resource governance at the centre of peace and security. This reflects the understanding that resources are not inherently sources of conflict or prosperity; their impact depends on governance.

The Councils may consequently assess existing mechanisms addressing illicit exploitation and its links to conflict, including the Kimberley Process, international due diligence standards and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region’s Regional Certification Mechanism. Although these mechanisms have improved accountability and traceability, implementation gaps, uneven enforcement, weak cross-border coordination and sophisticated smuggling networks continue to undermine effectiveness. Discussions may therefore prioritise stronger implementation of existing frameworks and closer AU–UN cooperation on the conflict-related dimensions of natural resource governance.