9th Annual Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and the UNPBC

9^th Annual Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and the UNPBCDate | 20 October 2026

Tomorrow (21 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) will hold their 9^th Annual Consultative Meeting in New York, United States.

The meeting will be co-chaired by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for October 2026, and Omar Hilale, Permanent Representative of Morocco to the UN and PBC Chair, who will deliver the welcoming remarks.

Convened under the theme ‘Advancing synergies and regional approaches in support of nationally owned peacebuilding priorities in Africa’, the meeting precedes the PSC’s engagements with the UN Security Council. It builds on the 8^th consultation, which reaffirmed national ownership, inclusion and regional cooperation, while emphasising the need for systematic follow-up. The consultation will consider three interrelated agenda items: strengthening follow-up to previous commitments, advancing regional peacebuilding and prevention, and financing and partnerships. The central question running through these discussions is how the two bodies can translate existing commitments into sustained and coordinated action that strengthens regional prevention, supports nationally led peacebuilding priorities and ensures effective follow-up.

The first agenda item is expected to take stock of commitments from the last two consultations, including achievements, outstanding recommendations and impediments to implementation. Following the emphasis on the need for a follow-up on previous commitments and conclusions outlined in Amani Africa’s review of the 2023 informal consultation, at the 7^th joint consultation in October 2024, the two bodies agreed that annual meetings should be preceded by ‘at least one preparatory meeting of the experts of the AUPSC and PBC’ to assess implementation of previous commitments. The 8^th consultation subsequently called for regular sharing of outcomes and systematic follow-up, welcoming the designation of focal points linking the AUC’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) structures and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). Of particular significance is whether these arrangements have led to regular information-sharing, joint analysis and identifiable country-level engagement. The two bodies could accordingly identify priority country contexts or thematic areas for mutually reinforcing action, including a possible joint field visit, subject to national consent, and a defined activity between the AUC’s PCRD structures and PBSO with clear responsibilities and timelines. Periodic exchanges between the Chairs and mid-year updates could sustain momentum despite rotating leadership.

A major development since the previous consultation is the conclusion of the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review, which lends further impetus to strengthening institutional follow-up. The PBC’s report on its nineteenth session identifies ‘focusing on United Nations coherence and follow-up’ and ‘emphasising accountability’ among the priorities of its 2025 programme of work. More importantly, Security Council resolution 2805 (2025) encourages the PBC to strengthen its partnership with the PSC and ‘to create a mechanism, within existing resources, to follow up on the implementation of relevant recommendations’ from annual consultations. The broader value of practical AU–UN cooperation was also reflected in the 27^th AU–UN Joint Task Force consultation, which highlighted ‘joint learning and the exchange of knowledge and expertise’ in operational support. At its 26 March 2026 expert-level meeting, PBC members called for a ‘clear roadmap for continued engagement’ on implementing the review, while the 15 May informal retreat reflected interest in a ‘shift from discussion to implementation’. These developments bring into sharper focus the need to move beyond reiterating commitments. A modest implementation matrix setting out priorities, focal points, deliverables and reporting timelines could help the PSC and PBC to make this shift from discussion to implementation through existing arrangements, rather than establish additional structures.

The second agenda item, central to the meeting’s theme, will consider how regional peacebuilding and prevention approaches can reinforce nationally owned priorities, particularly in West Africa and the Great Lakes. The discussion is expected to explore support by the AU, Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), and the PBC to Member States, upon request, in developing voluntary national prevention strategies and responding to transboundary challenges. At its 1369^th ministerial session on 23 September 2026, the PSC underscored the need to address the ‘structural root causes and enablers of terrorism and violent extremism’, while calling for ‘integrated approaches to border governance’ that link security with development, local governance, and social cohesion. This approach aligns with the revised AU PCRD Policy of 2024, which extends PCRD to prevention, institution-building, and recovery, and calls for ‘enhancing complementarity, fostering concrete synergies where feasible’ with UN partners. The AU annual report on PCRD and peacebuilding further highlights efforts to operationalise the PSC Sub-Committee on PCRD, engage RECs/RMs and strengthen the PCRD Centre. The practical challenge is to bring together the PSC’s political engagement and regional knowledge with the PBC’s advisory, convening and resource-mobilisation comparative advantage around gaps identified by countries themselves, without creating parallel arrangements.

Recent country-specific engagements of the PBC illustrate both the scope for nationally led peacebuilding and the importance of aligning external support with national priorities. In January, Mauritania presented its Strategy for Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion with World Bank participation, emphasising ‘alignment between international assistance and Mauritania’s evolving peacebuilding priorities’. The Gambia’s April engagement focused on translating ‘existing commitments into tangible outcomes for victims and communities’ through transitional justice. At an Amani Africa–Cameroon (PSC Chairperson for November 2025)–UNOAU policy dialogue on peacebuilding held on 18 November 2025, The Gambia’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Salimatta Touray, observed that ‘the legitimacy of regional and international organisations is not a zero-sum game’, while pointing to weak national coordination and conflicting external advice as impediments to effective interventions. In June, São Tomé and Príncipe returned to the PBC to report on progress in implementing its National Conflict Prevention Strategy, with the participation of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), highlighting the importance of sustained engagement and regional support for nationally owned conflict prevention efforts. The May visit of the PBC’s Liberia Configuration similarly highlighted reconciliation and decentralisation, with its Chair stressing that ‘[p]eacebuilding must be inclusive, nationally owned and locally led’. These experiences suggest that the added value of regional and international engagement rests less on creating new initiatives than on reinforcing nationally defined priorities and avoiding fragmented or competing interventions.

The Sahel, Lake Chad Basin and Great Lakes region demonstrate the difficulties of pursuing peacebuilding amid persistent insecurity and fragile state–society relations. Part of the challenge is how to address security threats while also working on the underlying economic, social, governance and environmental conditions driving conflicts and insecurity. At its 1347^th session, the PSC welcomed regional priorities and action plans under the adjusted Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR 2.0), while its 1344^th session called for stronger cross-border cooperation on natural resource governance and a review of the AU’s Sahel strategy drawing on lessons from the Lake Chad Basin. At the UN Security Council’s 14 July 2026 briefing on West Africa and the Sahel, UNOWAS Head Leonardo Santos Simão emphasised that ‘investments are needed in the social, economic, and environmental foundations of peace’. In the Great Lakes, the February 2026 regional retreat in Kampala sought to strengthen coordination on disarmament and repatriation in support of the Doha and Washington peace processes on the eastern DRC conflict. The PBC’s 19 May expert-level meeting on DDR also highlighted the importance of linking reintegration with reconciliation, livelihoods and inclusive participation. The challenge for AU–PBC cooperation is therefore to reinforce existing regional initiatives with coordinated support for civilian protection, essential services and livelihood recovery, without duplicating programmes or substituting such interventions for political mediation.

Equally important is ensuring that regional peacebuilding efforts are informed by the concerns of the communities most affected by conflict. Their participation should not end with initial consultations but extend to implementation of programmes. The previous consultation emphasised that peacebuilding approaches should reflect ‘the priorities and needs of communities’. This resonates with the AU’s Inaugural Continental Dialogue with Traditional, Inter-Faith and Judicial Leaders, held in Accra in June 2026, which underscores the imperative of a whole-of-society approach. In this regard, the consultation could emphasise the meaningful involvement of traditional and religious leaders, women, youth, displaced communities and local authorities in identifying risks, shaping interventions and assessing results, particularly in borderlands.

The third agenda item concerns financing and partnerships, an area in which the gap between commitments and available resources continues to constrain peacebuilding. The previous consultation acknowledged persistent financing challenges, underscoring that ‘voluntary contributions should remain the primary source of funding’, while recognising assessed contributions as reflecting Member States’ shared commitment to peacebuilding. It also welcomed initiatives under Window II of the AU Peace Fund, including Quick Impact Projects and capacity-building. The UN Peacebuilding Fund’s (PBF) 2025 report recorded a US$69.5 million portfolio covering 16 cross-border initiatives, including cooperation among Mali, Mauritania and Senegal using ‘inclusive water governance as an entry point to prevent conflict’. Yet, an analysis of the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review notes the absence of stronger commitments to predictable financing, with implementation qualified by the requirement to operate ‘within existing resources’. The implications of sustained financing needs are illustrated by the PBC–PBF joint visit to the Central African Republic from 28 March to 3 April 2026, which highlighted initiatives addressing land disputes, documentation for returnees and community reconciliation. In his subsequent 23 June briefing to the Security Council, the PBC Chair underscored that ‘adequate and predictable financing will be essential’ for reintegration efforts, stressing complementarity between the PBF and MINUSCA in addressing funding gaps. The consultation therefore offers an opportunity to explore how the AU Peace Fund, PBF, bilateral partners and international financial institutions, including the African Development Bank, could better align support through country-led financing dialogues identifying priorities, existing resources and gaps.

The expected outcome is a joint statement. The two bodies are expected to reaffirm their commitment to African-led peacebuilding, implementation of the AU’s PCRD agenda and support for regional, sub-regional and voluntary nationally owned prevention strategies. The meeting is also likely to underscore national ownership and leadership, as well as the meaningful participation of affected communities, including women and youth, and emphasise stronger cooperation with RECs/RMs in addressing transboundary drivers of conflict. It may further call on international partners, including the UN system and international and regional financial institutions, to align financing with nationally identified peacebuilding priorities and sustain support during political and security transitions. The two bodies may agree on priority country or regional contexts for joint engagement, including the possibility of a joint AU PSC–PBC field visit subject to national consent, and arrangements for regular information-sharing and systematic follow-up with defined responsibilities and timelines.