Africa at a Crossroads: Pan-Africanism, Global Disorder and Collective Security

Africa at a Crossroads: Pan-Africanism, Global Disorder and Collective SecurityDate | 27 February 2026

El-Ghassim Wane

Africa today faces not simply a difficult moment, but a structural turning point. The issue is not whether the world is becoming more unstable and messy — it clearly is. The real question is: What does a disorderly world mean for African security?

My core argument is straightforward: The erosion of the global order is transforming Pan-Africanism from a political aspiration into a security imperative.

Let me start with few remarks on the changing global environment and why this matters specifically for Africa.

Many of the trends now worrying the world are not new to Africans and to the Global South more broadly. For decades, stakeholders in the Global South warned about selective application of international law, unilateral action, and power politics.

For Africa, this carries a host of consequences.

First, frequent violations of international law and the increasing use of coercion, including force, in pursuit of national interests affect all states, but weaker states are affected more severely. African countries depend disproportionately on rules because they lack comparable hard power. When rules weaken, their vulnerability increases.

Second, while the current multilateral system is imperfect and unbalanced — and was designed with very little African input — it has nonetheless provided some clear advantages: coalition-building, forums to address global challenges, mediation frameworks, peacekeeping operations. As multilateralism weakens, Africa loses diplomatic leverage to advance its interests and conflict-management tools simultaneously.

Third, declining external support is not just a development issue. It is a security issue. Peace operations, DDR programmes, elections support, humanitarian assistance and even state administration in some fragile states have depended heavily on external financing.

Fourth, with heightened geopolitical competition inside Africa, the continent’s conflicts are becoming increasingly internationalized (see also here). External actors increasingly shape battlefield dynamics, while African institutions struggle to influence outcomes.

Clearly, Africa is entering a period in which it is more exposed to instability while simultaneously losing the external mechanisms that had so far contributed to manage instability. In other words, the trends described earlier do not merely create a more dangerous world — they remove the external pillars that helped African mechanisms function.

It is important here to keep in mind that Africa’s conflict management system was designed as part of a cooperative international security framework — one only needs to look at the provisions of the Peace and Security Council Protocol, especially those concerning its relationship with the United Nations and other international partners. That framework is now less predictable, less available and, in some cases, internally divided.

This raises an important question: Can African institutions maintain stability if external stabilisers become inconsistent or absent? That is the crossroads Africa is now approaching — not a philosophical choice about Pan-Africanism, but a practical challenge of collective security.

Pan-Africanism has often been treated as history, memory, or political sentiment. Today it is becoming a functional necessity. In many ways, this vindicates Kwame Nkrumah. In the early 1960s, he argued that unity was not primarily ideological — it was a condition for sovereignty in an unequal international system.

Howard French, the author of the book Born in Blackness: Africa, Africans, and the Making of the Modern World, 1471 to the Second World War and of the more recent book The Second Emancipation: Nkrumah, Pan-Africanism, and Global Blackness at High Tide, captures this well. He writes: ‘With no one in the world serving up favors to the continent, Nkrumah’s insight about the gains to be had through federation is as salient as ever. What is lacking is sufficient action. The time has come for a continent cut loose in the world to take the next step.’

And this is precisely the issue. At the very moment when the international environment is becoming more hostile, African states are not acting with the level of collective cohesion that the situation requires. And more broadly, we see a weakening reflex of continental solidarity.

The result is predictable: fragmented bargaining power, unequal deals, and diminished leverage (see also here). In peace and security, this situation also complicates the search for lasting solutions that require engagement within a coherent continental framework.

Against this backdrop, what collective security actually requires in practice?

The starting point is simple: unity is no longer an emotional or rhetorical ideal. It is strategic necessity. It determines the continent’s negotiating power, its ability to manage conflicts, and ultimately its political survival in a more competitive international environment.

So what does that mean concretely for African countries?

First, it entails deepening our collective investment in the institutions we have created. Our leaders cannot be more present at summits with external partners than at AU meetings. That sends a message — to others and to ourselves. As Désiré Assogbavi recently remarked, ‘As the world order shifts, summits in foreign capitals make the continent look like a guest at its own table.’

Second, it means cooperating fully with African conflict-management institutions. Africa already has one of the most elaborate peace and security architectures in the world: norms, institutions and expertise exist. The PSC Protocol is explicit — Member States are expected to support and cooperate with African efforts to resolve conflicts. This does not mean excluding external partners. Our crises are connected to global dynamics. But external support must reinforce African leadership, not replace it.

Third, it means honoring a commitment our leaders themselves made at the launch of the Peace and Security Council in May 2004: No African conflict should be ‘out of bounds’ for the AU, and when grave abuses occur ‘Africa should be the first to speak and the first to act.’ If we do not act when crises unfold on the continent, we should not be surprised when others step in.

Fourth, collective security does not mean isolation. It requires close partnership with the United Nations and other international stakeholders. Already in 1990, Salim Ahmed Salim, then OAU Secretary-General, argued that while Africa must strengthen its ‘inner strength’, it should continue to prioritize the UN as the principal multilateral forum through which it defends its interests internationally. That remains true today. Africa should be at the forefront of efforts to reinforce the UN and make it more fit for purpose.

Finally, collective security is also a question of responsibility. Everyone in the AU ecosystem — governments, institutions, and officials — must recognize the seriousness of the moment. Africa is entering a more demanding international environment. Routine approaches will not suffice (see here). This period requires commitment, discipline and steadfastness.

How, then, do we operationalize this ambition? What role should the AU Commission play in moving it forward ?

Stronger political commitment will clearly be required. At present, the level of collective resolve does not fully match the demands of the moment. This is a reality we must acknowledge.

But paradoxically, this makes the role of the AU Commission — which is not only an administrative body (the Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and several other instruments are clear in this respect) — more important, not less. Political will does not simply appear. It has to be generated, encouraged, nurtured.

In periods of geopolitical transition, tensions among Member States and inward-looking approaches as countries focus primarily on their domestic challenges, institutions matter more than ever. The Commission must act as the engine of collective action. It must engage proactively, build coalitions around sensitive issues, and create the conditions in which states feel both empowered and compelled to act.

To conclude, the world is becoming more dangerous and less structured. For Africa, the consequence is clear: external stabilizers are weakening at a time of rising internal vulnerabilities. Therefore, the question before us is not ideological. It is whether African states will face insecurity individually or manage it collectively.

Pan-Africanism, in this context, is about survival and agency. Africa can either become an arena where global competition plays out or an organized actor capable of shaping its own security environment. The decisions taken in the period ahead will determine which of the two it becomes.