At a fragile moment for the African Union’s support to the country, Somalia’s weakest link strikes, again

Date | 8 June 2026

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

Zekarias Beshah, Senior Researcher, Amani Africa

The weakest link in Somalia’s quest to end the protracted conflict is the fragmentation and infighting between the political elites of the country. The constitutional revision process and the conduct of elections have become major sites of power struggle and confrontation between rival political elites, although these are not the only sites of confrontation between these elites.

Five years ago, the expiry of the terms of parliament and the president in December 2020 and February 2021 respectively, without any political consensus on the time and modality of elections plunged Somalia into a constitutional crisis and political uncertainty. In a development that mimicked the resultant violent confrontation of April 2021, Somalia’s weakest link struck again as political leaders failed to agree on a constitutional amendment and the modality for holding parliamentary and presidential elections.

On 3 June, fighting erupted in Mogadishu between government forces and armed groups loyal to opposition leaders near the residences of former Prime Minister Hassan Khaire and former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The clashes occurred ahead of a planned protest scheduled for 4 June against the one-year extension of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term, which opponents argue expired in mid-May. The confrontation continued into 4 June before subsiding following mediated talks.

The latest violence is the culmination of months of growing tensions between the FGS and opposition forces organised under the Somali Future Council—a coalition established in October 2025 by the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland, together with other opposition figures, to coordinate positions on major national issues, including constitutional amendment, notably those relating to electoral reform and the role of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) vis-à-vis Federal Member States (FMS).

Five years ago, Somalia plunged into political and security turmoil after the lower house of Somalia’s parliament adopted a bill extending its own term of office and that of the President and President Farmaajo’s assenting of the bill into a ‘Special Election Law’ purporting to return Somalia to a one-person one-vote electoral model. The latest eruption of political showdown and armed confrontation in Mogadishu followed, as in April 2021, the adoption by Somalia’s bicameral Federal Parliament of amendments to the 2012 Provisional Constitution, among others, extending the terms of the Federal Parliament and the President from four to five years and introducing a highly contested direct electoral system. Just like former President Farmajo, President Mohamud did exactly what he opposed five years ago and signed the constitutional amendments into law on 8 March. As in 2021 (which sought to extend elections by two years), the constitutional changes extended the incumbent president’s tenure by one year beyond its expiry on 15 May and postponed federal elections until 2027.

As in 2021, opposition groups have strongly rejected the constitutional changes. They argued that the changes were adopted unilaterally and without the broad political consensus required for such fundamental reforms. Consequently, they do not recognise the extension of President Mohamud’s mandate and maintain that his constitutional term ended in May.

The political impasse that these amendments and Mohamud’s continuation in power after the expiry of his term in May eventually escalated into armed confrontation, when opposition groups sought to stage protests on 4 June. It was against this backdrop that the opposition sought to organise demonstrations in Mogadishu on 4 June, but the deployment by the Government of security forces to the residences of the former Prime Minister and former President amid rising tension tipped the situation into armed confrontation.

The confrontation has alarmed both domestic and international actors because of the risk that the escalation could spiral into a broader and less controllable conflict. Such an outcome would have profound implications for Somalia’s fragile stability and could undermine years of hard-won security gains achieved in the fight against Al-Shabaab. There are growing concerns that the militant group could exploit political divisions and security vacuums created by the crisis to expand its influence and operational reach.

International and regional actors responded swiftly to the violence. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission called on all parties to cease hostilities immediately, exercise maximum restraint, protect civilians, and avoid actions that could further escalate tensions. The Chairperson also urged Somali stakeholders to resolve their differences through dialogue and established constitutional mechanisms. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) called for de-escalation to protect Somalia’s stability and future. Similarly, the United Nations Secretary-General issued a statement, underscoring the urgent need for all stakeholders to resume dialogue and identify a way forward to preserve the progress Somalia has achieved over recent years.

Although the immediate violence appears to have subsided following intense mediation efforts by traditional leaders and international actors, the underlying political disagreements remain unresolved, leaving open the possibility of renewed escalation.

Beyond the immediate security implications, the crisis constitutes a major test of Somalia’s state-building project, the resilience of its institutions, and the maturity of political actors in managing disputes before they evolve into wider conflict. The developments also warrant close attention from international partners, particularly the AU, which has deployed peace support operations in Somalia since 2007 and secured substantial, albeit fragile, security gains through the sacrifice of the lives and limbs of thousands.

The timing of the crisis is particularly concerning given the challenges facing the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The mission is currently grappling with significant political, operational, and financial constraints as it seeks to preserve security gains and support the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somali forces.

For years, Somali political actors have continued to defer the assumption of full responsibility, as they continue to outsource security responsibility with their heavy reliance on AU-led security support. Despite notable progress, Somalia, on account of the weakest link in the equation for its stability, has yet to develop the level of institutional and security capacities necessary to fully assume responsibility for its own security. The latest political confrontation, if not resolved promptly, undermines confidence about progress for achieving a level of organisation and capability of Somalia’s security institutions for them to assume full security responsibility.

The crisis also reinforces a broader lesson for the AU: security interventions alone cannot provide a sustainable solution to Somalia’s challenges. Without an accompanying political strategy capable of addressing the underlying causes of instability and fostering political consensus, even significant security achievements remain vulnerable to reversal. AU’s interest and role are not just that of any third party. It has a direct and major stake in what is unfolding in Somalia and as such cannot afford to simply limit its engagement for de-escalating the situation and securing agreement on the holding of elections at the level of issuing statements.

First, as it did during the April 2021 political crisis, the AU Peace and Security Council could convene an emergency session to provide strategic guidance and adopt firm and principled policy decisions for urgent consensus on the holding of elections. In 2021, the PSC condemned the extension of the mandate of the president and the parliament. Second, the Chairperson of the AU Commission could undertake a high-level diplomatic mission to Mogadishu to engage directly with key stakeholders and encourage a negotiated resolution to the crisis. Third, the AU could work with IGAD, the United Nations, and international partners with leverage on Somali political actors—including the United States and Türkiye—to establish a coordinated mediation framework aimed at establishing a consensual and mutually acceptable arrangement for holding elections, while creating conditions for a broader political settlement that permanently ends Somalia’s weakest link.

In the short term, one of the intriguing questions is whether the incumbent, President Mohamud, would succeed in what his predecessor, former President Farmajo, tried and failed five years ago. This will determine the trajectory of the political dimension of Somalia’s protracted conflict.