Briefing on the activities of AUSSOM
Briefing on the activities of AUSSOMDate | 9 November 2026
Tomorrow (10 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will meet to receive a briefing on the activities of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The meeting comes amid significant developments in Somalia’s political and security landscape, as well as mounting funding challenges that threaten the mission’s sustainability and future.
Following opening remarks by Antonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for November, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), will deliver a statement. The representatives of Somalia and the United Nations (UN) are also expected to deliver statements. El Hadji Ibrahima Diene, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia and Head of AUSSOM, is expected to brief the Council.
It is expected that tomorrow’s session will focus on the immediate existential crisis facing the nearly two-decade-old AU mission in Somalia and take policy decisions on ensuring orderly drawdown and exit of AUSSOM on an accelerated timeline while minimising risk of major security vacuum. Tomorrow’s meeting also comes ahead of the Security Council’s private meeting on AUSSOM scheduled for 18 November in advance of the reauthorization of AUSSOM’s mandate in December.
While the financial crisis facing AUSSOM is not new, the mission’s existential crisis is associated with its imminent loss of the logistics and operational support it receives from the UN. In contrast to the financial crisis, which does not endanger the immediate end of the mission, the end of the UN’s logistics support will automatically cripple AUSSOM given the lack of any comparable arrangement to replace the UN’s support. Although there were warnings the AU mission should plan for its possible early exit, it took a US decision opposing the renewal of the mandate on UN support to AUSSOM to set clear timeline on end of UN logistics support, putting the continuity of the mission beyond end of its current mandate in to serious question. In a letter dated 1 July 2026, the United States (US) Mission to the AU (USAU) notified the AU of the US decision to discontinue its support for the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond the current AUSSOM authorisation period, which expires on 31 December. Given UNSOS’s mandate to provide logistical and operational support to AUSSOM, the end of UNSOS at the expiry of its current mandate would freeze AUSSOM’s operations. This triggered the convening of the AUSSOM troop-contributing countries (TCCs) extraordinary summit in Kampala, Uganda, from 29 to 31 July to discuss the situation. According to the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the summit, the TCCs, among other things, ‘stressed the need for an orderly, coordinated and phased exit of AUSSOM.’ The summit also underscored the need for sustained support to the mission for a period of 18 to 24 months ‘to enable the implementation of agreed milestones, strengthen the capacity of Somali security institutions and facilitate the orderly transfer of security responsibilities.’
The summit’s outcome was expected to be submitted to the AUPSC for endorsement and subsequent transmission to the Security Council. However, the AUPSC is only meeting tomorrow to discuss AUSSOM for the first time since the Kampala summit.
The US, in a letter dated 1 September 2026, did not agree to the AUSSOM TCCs’ request for sustained support over 18 to 24 months, indicating instead that it is only prepared to allow UNSOS sufficient time to liquidate its operations through a 12-month drawdown process until the end of 2027. According to the US, this would also give AUSSOM time to prepare for the withdrawal of UNSOS support.
Against this backdrop, the AUPSC’s deliberations tomorrow are likely to shape decisions on the mission’s future beyond December. The most likely option is a final one-year renewal of AUSSOM’s mandate, bringing forward its originally scheduled exit, which had been envisaged for the end of 2029. In this regard, the AUPSC faces the daunting challenge of ensuring the mission’s drawdown and eventual exit without undermining the political and security gains achieved over the past two decades at enormous human and material cost. The key objective over the coming year will be to facilitate an orderly transition and drawdown, ensuring the handover of security responsibilities to Somali security forces without creating a security vacuum.
During the annual consultations between members of the United Nations Security Council and the AUPSC, held in New York from 22 to 23 October, identifying and optimising resources and support for AUSSOM was among the issues discussed. AUPSC members once again proposed invoking the resolution 2719 framework to address the mission’s financial constraints. However, the joint communiqué adopted by the two Councils contained only a broad reference to the issue, underscoring the importance of identifying and optimising future resources and support mechanisms for AUSSOM, as well as the need for an orderly, coordinated and phased transition of the mission. It also reaffirmed the primary responsibility of the Somali federal government for ensuring security in the country.
During their stay in New York, AUPSC members also met with Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support Atul Khare to discuss the logistical and operational support UNSOS provides to AUSSOM, particularly in light of the US decision to suspend its contribution to UNSOS at the end of this year.
Meanwhile, Uganda has begun withdrawing its forces from Somalia, starting with those deployed under bilateral arrangements. Ugandan forces serving under AUSSOM are reportedly also expected to withdraw in phases next year. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited Kampala in an effort to persuade Uganda to maintain its military presence but appears to have been unsuccessful. Ugandan troops have been deployed in Lower Shabelle and Mogadishu, and their withdrawal could have significant implications for the federal government’s security efforts. Reuters reported that, in a 31 October letter to UNSOS, AUSSOM warned that ‘the withdrawal of Ugandan forces could leave parts of the Lower Shabelle region to Al-Shabaab attacks’. Recognising this impending risk, it seems that Somalia is engaging with its bilateral partners to fill the void.
On the political front, the constitutional and political crisis in Somalia has continued to deepen. Disagreements between the federal government and federal member states over the extension of presidential and parliamentary terms, as well as the modalities for holding national elections, have escalated into a major political crisis. Two days ago, Somalia’s Supreme Court invalidated the extensions of the presidential and parliamentary terms, which had been approved in March through a constitutional amendment adopted by the federal parliament. The extensions had been a major point of contention between the federal government and the opposition, which maintains that the mandates of parliament and the president expired on 14 April and 15 May, respectively. Following the court’s ruling, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reportedly dismissed Chief Justice Bashe Yusuf, further escalating political tensions. The Supreme Court rejected the move, arguing that the President’s move was intended to obstruct the implementation of its decision.
Meanwhile, the Somali electoral commission announced a new electoral calendar last month, scheduling parliamentary elections for 15 April and the presidential election for 15 May. However, the Somali Future Council, a major opposition alliance, rejected the proposed timetable, arguing that it had been established without inclusive consultations with Somalia’s key political stakeholders. On 26 October, President Mohamud called for a national dialogue with the opposition, scheduled to take place from 14 to 18 November. While the Supreme Court’s ruling called for negotiation, it specified that elections should be held in 90 days.
The political divide is further compounded by tensions between the federal government and two federal member states, Puntland and Jubaland, both of which suspended relations with Mogadishu in 2024. The federal government’s attempt to resolve its differences with Jubaland through military force in late 2024 appears to have backfired. Meanwhile, relations with Puntland remain strained, with the two sides locked in a significant political and military standoff. Clashes between the federal government and Puntland forces have been reported over the past months.
In Southwest State, the federal government removed the region’s president by force in March. He has since mobilised his forces, known as Darwish, and retook several towns in the region encircling Baidoa, the regional capital. Tension is also rising in Hirshabelle state, mainly driven by clan dynamics and disputes with the federal government over regional elections. The regional state was formed in 2016 by the merger of two regions, Hirraan and Middle Shabelle. Major clans in the Hirraan region feel it is their turn to assume the presidency of the Hirshabelle state. These clans are trying to emulate the Darwish forces in the neighbouring Southwest State to put up resistance against the federal government. Tensions are escalating rapidly, with the federal government deploying forces near the residence of traditional leader Ugaas Yusuf Ugaas Hassan Ugaas in Beledweyne, the capital of the Hiraan region.
Al-Shabaab has sought to exploit the political crisis to recapture lost territory and further undermine the federal government. AUSSOM continues to support the federal government’s offensive operations against Al-Shabaab in accordance with its mandate. However, with the mission left with only a maximum of one year after the end of its current mandate on 31 December 2026, there is a need to find a replacement for its role in backstopping efforts of Somali forces to fend off Al-Shabaab’s push to gain territories under government control and avoid the emergence of the Afghanistan scenario in Mogadishu.
These developments are unfolding against the backdrop of rapidly shifting geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which have made Somalia a battlefield for geopolitical competition involving major powers, Arab and Gulf states, and regional actors. And yet, Somalia is not receiving the international attention it warrants, as competing and pressing crises elsewhere divert attention. However, any further deterioration in its political and security situation could have far-reaching implications for the wider region, which is already grappling with multiple crises.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may commend the contributions of AUSSOM and TCCs for the stabilisation of Somalia under very difficult circumstances. It may reiterate its concerns about the financial crisis affecting the effective functioning of the mission and may urge the AU Commission to sustain efforts for mobilising additional funds to fill the huge funding shortfall facing AUSSOM. The PSC may also appeal to all partners, including those who played a leading role in funding AUSSOM, to provide further funding to the mission to enable it to execute its mandate effectively for the remainder of its mandate to be renewed in December in a way that ensures that no major security vacuum emerges and the Afghanistan scenario is prevented in the event of its accelerated withdrawal. Taking note of the letters from the US, the PSC may also commend UNSOS for the logistics support it provides to AUSSOM and may request, in this context, the UNSC to extend the support of UNSOS to AUSSOM for the duration of the mandate of UNSOS beyond December 2026. In view of the fundamental changes that the end of UNSOS at the end of December 2027 introduces on the timelines of AUSSOM’s continuity in Somalia, the PSC may request the AU Commission to prepare and present a transitional plan for the accelerated drawdown and exit of AUSSOM, along with a Concept of Operations on the operation of the mission for the duration of the process of drawdown and transition. It may also request that the transitional plan put forward proposals on ways of preventing the emergence of a security vacuum, including through facilitating the retention of some AUSSOM troops beyond the end of 2027 on a bilateral basis, with some support from the AU. The PSC may also express its grave concern over the deteriorating political and constitutional crisis that is accentuating the security crisis in Somalia. In this regard, it may urge Somali political forces to respect the decision of the Supreme Court of Somalia and use the decision as an opportunity to exit the deepening security and constitutional crisis and negotiate an agreement on the holding of elections within the framework of the guidelines set in the Court’s decision.