Briefing on the Sahel region

Briefing on the Sahel regionDate | 29 September 2025

Tomorrow (30 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene a ministerial-level session to receive a briefing on the situation in the Sahel region.

The Chairperson of the PSC for September 2025, Angola’s Minister of External Relations Amb. Tete Antonio is expected to preside over the session and deliver the opening statement. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security (PAPS), is also expected to make a statement. Additionally, the Special Representative of the AU Commission for Mali and the Sahel, and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), Mamadou Tangara, may brief the PSC.

Since its last meeting on the issue in May 2023, conditions in the region have not improved. The threat facing the countries from the raging conflict involving terrorist groups remains existential. Armed groups and terrorists have intensified their attacks, involving increased use of advanced weaponry, including drones and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) undertook major attacks during May 2025 across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. In Burkina Faso, the deadly attack that claimed the lives of more than 300 people led to the seizure by JNIM of the capitals of two regional provinces, Djibo in the Soum province and Diapaga in the Tapoa province. Throughout the first half of 2025, militant groups also launched major assaults on military barracks in several other towns. In April, the military junta led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré claimed to have foiled a coup plot, accusing neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire of involvement.

The dire security situation in Mali has also shown intensifying persistence, with a surge in attacks by Tuareg rebels and Islamist militant groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), particularly in the northern and central regions of the country. On 15 September, at least 40 fuel tankers were reportedly destroyed when al-Qaeda-linked insurgents—who had declared a blockade on fuel imports—attacked a convoy of over 100 vehicles under military escort. JNIM’s takeover of the strategic town of Farabougou in central Mali in August was also seen as a huge setback for the Malian Junta. Since July, JNIM has intensified its operations near Mali’s borders with Niger and Mauritania, targeting military and security infrastructure in the western part of the country. JNIM’s attacks on the Dioura military camp in the Mopti region, reportedly killed at least 40 soldiers.

In neighbouring Niger, the Tillabéri region—bordering Mali and Burkina Faso—has seen a sharp rise in terrorist attacks in recent months. Earlier this month, an ambush in the region resulted in the deaths of 14 soldiers, according to the Nigerian Ministry of Defence. In another incident, 22 civilians were killed during an attack on a baptism ceremony. In June, Islamist militants attacked a mosque, killing more than 70 people and injuring at least 20 others. In March, Niger announced its decision to withdraw from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which combats the terrorist threat in the Lake Chad Basin.

Terrorism and violent extremism are increasingly spreading from the Sahel states to coastal West Africa with a surge of cross-border attacks affecting several countries, including Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo, among others. In light of this development, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has decided to activate its standby force to combat the growing threat and regional insecurity. This issue was also raised during a meeting between the PSC and the ECOWAS mediation and Security Council in May, in which the two sides agreed to expedite the operationalisation of the AU Standby Force and the ECOWAS Standby Force.

Although there had been tensions between ECOWAS and the three Sahelian States that decided to withdraw their membership from the regional bloc, ECOWAS has been seeking to maintain constructive engagement with them. In May, the foreign ministers of the three countries met with the President of the ECOWAS Commission in Bamako to prepare for negotiations on future relations. The ECOWAS Summit in June decided to appoint a Chief Negotiator to lead the discussions with the three countries to ensure an orderly withdrawal. In recent months, regional leaders have also undertaken visits to the Sahel states. This includes Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama, who visited Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso in May, and Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio, who travelled to Burkina Faso earlier this month in his capacity as the current Chair of ECOWAS.

Despite differences over military seizure of power in these countries, there is increasing recognition that the threat facing these countries represents a threat to the entire region and needs to be faced collectively. During their annual consultative meeting in May, the PSC and ECOWAS expressed deep concern over ‘the worsening insecurity resulting from the spread of terrorism and violent extremism in West Africa, particularly, in the Sahel region, with potential expansion to the littoral states.’ Going beyond expression of concern and perhaps for the first time in recent years, PSC and the ECOWAS Council agreed ‘to develop a security cooperation framework involving the AU and ECOWAS engagement with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, in order to more effectively address insecurity in the West Africa Region.’ (emphasis added) However, this recognition has yet to be translated into a shared strategy and the deployment of measures for containing the threat posed by the terrorism menace afflicting these countries. Indeed, this is an area that offers an opportunity for ECOWAS and the AU to work with these countries and restore trust and create the conditions for the restoration of constitutional order.

The three countries have intensified efforts toward forming a confederation focused on diplomacy, defence, and development. In April, their Chiefs of Defence Staff met in Ouagadougou to discuss enhanced defence and security cooperation, including plans to establish a joint confederation force. They also held consultations with Russian officials in Moscow aimed at forging a strategic defence, and security partnership. In June, the Wagner Group, the Russian private security company which suffered numerous casualties in a series of attacks in Mali, withdrew from the country. It was replaced by the Africa Corps, a force directly under the command of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Captain Traoré has reportedly enlisted the services of another Russian military contractor, known as the Bears Brigade, for his personal protection. Russia has also deployed military instructors and an air defence system in Niger. However, the three countries appear keen to avoid overreliance on a single partner and are actively working to diversify their international engagements. Arab and Gulf states have become increasingly active in the region, driven by economic, security, and geopolitical interests. In July, U.S. officials visited Bamako and reportedly offered support to Mali in countering the growing terrorist threat, in exchange for access to the country’s mineral resources.

The escalating security situation has further worsened the humanitarian and human rights crisis in the region, with civilians bearing the brunt of increasing violence and instability. Numerous reports have documented human rights abuses and crimes committed by various actors, often with widespread impunity. Against this backdrop, the three Sahel states announced their decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) on 23 September. In their joint statement, they accused the ICC of serving as ‘an instrument of neo-colonial repression in the hands of imperialism’ and expressed their intention to establish ‘indigenous mechanisms for the consolidation of peace and justice.’

All three countries have been undergoing political transitions; however, these processes appear to have experienced major setbacks. Mali promulgated a transitional charter granting General Assimi Goïta a five-year mandate until 2030. This move triggered protests in the capital, Bamako, for the first time since 2020, with opposition parties, civil society organisations, and other groups denouncing what they view as an attempt by the junta to entrench itself in power. Burkina Faso took a similar path last year, when Traoré’s mandate as transitional president was extended by five years. Following a failed coup attempt in April, Traoré reportedly consolidated his control by purging potential rivals. In March, Niger also adopted a new transitional charter, extending General Abdourahamane Tchiani’s rule until 2030. The military junta dissolved political parties and granted amnesty to individuals involved in the 2023 military coup.

Beyond and above the decision of the PSC and ECOWAS last May for developing a joint security cooperation framework for engagement with Sahel countries, the AU also took further steps reflective of a change of policy approach towards the Sahel countries that is not confined to unconstitutional changes. In May, the Chairperson of the AU Commission met with representatives of the three countries in Addis Ababa to explore avenues for renewed engagement aimed at restoring constitutional order. Subsequently, Angola’s Minister of External Relations visited the three countries as a special envoy, delivering messages from Angolan President and current Chairperson of the AU, João Lourenço, reaffirming the organisation’s commitment to stability and security in the Sahel, as well as its support for the fight against terrorism in the region. In July, the Chairperson of the AU appointed President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi as Special Envoy for the Sahel. Additionally, the Chairperson of the AU Commission appointed former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara as his Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel, and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), based in Bamako.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to express concern over the dire security situation in the Sahel, the threat it poses to the countries and the region and the slow pace of the transitional process in these countries. It may also condemn the continuing terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger that are threatening institutional and territorial cohesion and stability of the countries. It may also welcome measures that are being taken by the AU and ECOWAS for engagement with the Sahel countries and the appointment of the AU Special Representative. The PSC may reiterate the decision with ECOWAS ‘to develop a security cooperation framework involving the AU and ECOWAS engagement with Burkina Faso’ and call on the AU Commission to take follow-up steps in this respect.