Briefing on the situation in eastern DRC
Briefing on the situation in eastern DRCDate | 27 November 2025
Tomorrow (28 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to meet to receive a briefing on the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Council last discussed this issue in February during its summit-level meeting. Since then, there have been several developments, both regarding the security situation on the ground and ongoing mediation efforts aimed at finding a lasting solution to the longstanding crisis in eastern DRC.
The session is expected to commence with opening remarks from Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November, followed by an introductory statement of Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Representatives of DRC and Rwanda, as countries concerned, are also expected to make a statement in the open segment of the session. It is also expected that the representatives of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Eastern Africa Community (EAC), as concerned RECs/RMs and the UN, are also expected to make statements.
Since January, the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group has expanded its control over territory in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, capturing strategic cities including Goma and Bukavu, and the respective provincial capitals. Not only did the M23 expand its territorial control, but it also went on to institutionalise its control through the establishment of its own administrative structures in the territories under its control. This has created concerns over the threat of territorial fragmentation of the DRC.
In the PSC’s summit meeting on 14 February 2025, it ‘unequivocally condemned the activities of M23 and its supporters, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and other armed groups’ and called for ‘the immediate withdrawal of all uninvited foreign forces, armed and terrorist groups operating in the DRC.’ On 21 February, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2773 on the situation in eastern DRC, which, among other elements, demanded the immediate cessation of further M23 military advances, calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, and expressed the Council’s readiness to consider additional measures against those contributing to the continuation of the conflict in eastern DRC.
The security situation in eastern DRC has continued to deteriorate, with further fears that the M23 will expand its territorial control into Uvira. Tension between DRC and Rwanda also continues, with both countries persisting in trading accusations. In his 23 September address during the General Debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly, President Tshisekedi accused Rwanda of deliberately obstructing peace efforts and continuing its support for the M23, and he called for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory. Speaking at the General Assembly on 25 September, Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Olivier Nduhungirehe, accused the DRC of renewed militarisation and ongoing collaboration with ‘genocidal and sanctioned armed groups,’ including the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) —an ethnic Hutu armed group active in eastern DRC that was implicated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda—and Wazalendo militias.
As peace efforts from continental initiatives face setbacks, efforts have been underway to reorganise continental efforts. In March, the joint EAC-SADC Summit appointed a Panel of Facilitators composed of five former Presidents to support the DRC peace process. On 1 August, the Co-Chairs of the Joint EAC-SADC Summit met the Panel in Nairobi and adopted a framework to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes. They also decided on the immediate merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. The Summit further called on the AU Commission to ensure all other initiatives and stakeholders align with this African-led process. The operationalisation of this process remains slow.
Despite the setbacks faced in the Luanda process and attempts to reorganise continental efforts, new peace efforts emerged, albeit outside of the AU and African regional bodies. Following the collapse of the meeting of the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda in December 2024, on 18 March, the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, facilitated a meeting in Doha between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame. According to a joint statement issued afterwards, the two leaders ‘reaffirmed the commitment of all parties to an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.’
On 25 April, US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, hosted DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and La Francophonie, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, and Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Olivier Nduhungirehe, in Washington, D.C. During the meeting, he facilitated the signing of a Declaration of Principles aimed at supporting a ‘pathway to peace, stability, and integrated economic development in the eastern DRC region and the resumption of normal bilateral relations.’
Negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda under US auspices ultimately led to the signing of a peace agreement on 27 June in Washington, D.C. The two parties agreed, among others, to refrain from acts of aggression; to immediately and unconditionally end state support to non-state armed groups; and to implement the Harmonised Plan for the Neutralisation of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda—an outcome of the Luanda process. To support implementation, a Joint Oversight Committee—composed of the two parties, the US, Qatar, Togo (as AU facilitator), and the AU Commission—has been operationalised and has convened four meetings so far.
The US has been working through the mechanisms established under the 27 June agreement to ease tensions and help the DRC and Rwanda translate their commitments into concrete action. Most recently, the fourth meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism was held in Washington, D.C., on 20 November. This mechanism is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the harmonised plan to neutralise the FDLR and to facilitate the disengagement of forces and the lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda. According to a joint statement issued after the meeting, the DRC and Rwanda reaffirmed their commitment to what is referred to as the Operations Order (OPORD), developed as the implementation plan for advancing the CONOPS.
On 7 November, the Joint Oversight Committee—established under the peace agreement to resolve any disputes arising during implementation—met in Washington, D.C. According to a joint statement issued after the meeting, the parties committed to refraining from any hostile actions or rhetoric that could undermine the full implementation of the 27 June peace agreement. They also initialled the text of a Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF), which outlines key areas for fostering economic cooperation and development between the two countries. During the meeting, Qatar provided an update on the ongoing negotiations in Doha, including progress on prisoner exchanges and the first meeting of the Doha ceasefire monitoring mechanism, established in October to oversee implementation of the ceasefire between the Congolese government and M23.
Meanwhile, following a first direct encounter between representatives of the Congolese government and the M23 in Doha under Qatar’s facilitation, the two sides issued a joint declaration on 23 April reaffirming their ‘commitment to an immediate cessation of hostilities, a categorical rejection of any hate speech, intimidation, and call on local communities to uphold these commitments.’
Since then, negotiations have continued in pursuit of a comprehensive peace agreement. Several contentious issues have emerged. For example, the M23 insisted on implementing confidence-building measures—such as the release of prisoners of war—as a precondition for further progress, while the Congolese government maintained that such measures could only be considered once an agreement is signed, including on the restoration of state authority. Other sensitive matters, including the restoration of state authority and broader governance arrangements, have reportedly elicited strong reactions from both sides.
Nonetheless, Qatar has continued its facilitation efforts, and both the Congolese government and the M23 remain actively engaged in the process. Ultimately, the two parties agreed on a prisoner exchange mechanism, under which the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will oversee the identification, verification, and safe release of detainees held by both sides.
On 19 July, the Congolese government and M23 signed a Declaration of Principles in Doha, including a commitment to a ceasefire. Subsequent Qatari-led negotiations paved the way for the signing of the Doha Framework for Peace on 15 November. Under this framework, the parties affirmed their commitment to addressing the root causes of the conflict through structured dialogue, confidence-building measures, and a phased approach to de-escalation and stabilisation. The Doha Framework for Peace is intended to serve as the foundation for a comprehensive peace process, with a series of protocols, annexes, and technical arrangements to be negotiated in due course. These are expected to address specific issues, including the consolidation and verification of the ceasefire, modalities for troop disengagement, humanitarian access, reintegration, and support for national dialogue. Media reports have indicated a planned summit this month between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Washington, D.C. The signing of the Doha Framework could provide the necessary momentum for this summit.
The situation was a subject of deliberation in the consultative meetings, both between the PSC and the UNSC and the PSC and the European Political and Security Committee (EUPSC). In the joint communiqué of the PSC and the EUPSC, which, unlike the PSC-UNSC joint communiqué, contained substantive elements that reflect the current policy thinking on the state of the situation in Eastern DRC. First in relation to the M23, the PSC-EUPSC joint communiqué, reaffirming ‘the imperative obligation to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC’ as essential to resolving the country’s conflict, expressed grave concern over M23’s military operations and territorial expansion, and called for the ‘dismantlement of the so-called ‘parallel administration’ by the rebel Movement of M23.’ Second, the joint communiqué called ‘for foreign armed forces not invited by the DRC to unconditionally withdraw in line with UNSC Resolution 2773 (2025).’ While the EUPSC-AUPSC avoided naming who ‘uninvited foreign forces’ refers to, the reference to UNSC Resolution 2773 leaves very little doubt about who it refers to.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express concern over the continuation of the conflict in Eastern DRC and the tension between the DRC and Rwanda. It may reiterate the imperative for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and its call for unconditional cessation of hostilities. The PSC may also welcome the various peace processes, including the signing of agreements in Washington, D.C., and Doha and call on the parties to the peace processes to abide by the commitments they have made. It may also underscore the need for coordination of the peace processes led by the US and Qatar with the efforts of the AU mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators for the DRC. It may also welcome the decisions of the joint EAC-SADC Summit and the merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. In this respect, the PSC may also call for the activation of the joint secretariat under the AU for enhancing the role of the continent in peace efforts in Eastern DRC.