Briefing on the Situation in Libya
Briefing on the Situation in LibyaDate | 8 June 2026
On Tuesday (9 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1352nd meeting to receive an update on the ‘Situation in Libya’. Since its last meeting in July 2025, the country has witnessed some political and security developments.
The session will commence with opening remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for May, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Libya, Ambassador Wahida Ayari, will also brief the Council. As a concerned country, Libya’s representative is expected to make a statement. As per the usual practice of the PSC, Hanna Tetteh, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), is also expected to deliver a statement. A representative of Congo may also make a statement as Chairperson of the AU High-Level Committee on Libya.
Libya’s political transition remains stalled, with key stakeholders continuing to disagree on the legal, constitutional, and institutional arrangements necessary for holding national elections. As a result, the elections originally scheduled for December 2021 remain indefinitely postponed, perpetuating the country’s political fragmentation and the existence of rival institutions.
Beyond the indefinite postponement of the elections that left Libya in a transitional limbo, the 2020 peace process that ended the civil war has not been able to overcome the political and security fragmentation that has become the characteristic feature of the political and institutional landscape of Libya. Libya continues to operate on the basis of two rival governments. The internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) is based in Tripoli, while the Government of National Stability (GNS), aligned with the House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) under General Khalifa Haftar, operates from eastern Libya. Each command has some influence in the political and economic spheres and is supported by rival local and external backers.
In a renewed push for breaking the continuing political impasse, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has been exerting diplomatic efforts and has proposed a political roadmap aimed at helping Libyan stakeholders overcome their differences. The UN roadmap aims to facilitate the adoption of a viable electoral framework for presidential and legislative polls; unify institutions under a new government; and pave the way for the holding of elections. To this end, the mission launched a structured dialogue among Libyan stakeholders in December 2025 to advance implementation of the roadmap. But there has been little progress toward meeting the major milestones set out in the roadmap to pave the way for the unification of institutions and the holding of elections. In her briefing to the UN Security Council, Tetteh reported the lack of tangible progress in implementing the political roadmap and announced a new ‘two-step approach’.
In a statement that he issued on 30 August 2025, the AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, welcomed the UN-backed political roadmap. The statement emphasised ‘the importance of coordination between all regional, continental and international actors to ensure the necessary political support to implement the roadmap.’ While the signing of the Libyan Reconciliation Charter by some political actors in mid-February 2025, on the margins of the 38th AU Summit and under the auspices of the AU’s High-Level Committee on Libya under the leadership of President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, constituted a milestone in efforts to restore peace and stability in the country, not all significant Libyan actors signed the Libyan Reconciliation Charter of February 2025. Despite the fact that the head of the Presidential Council was in Addis Ababa, he did not sign the Charter. The Government of National Unity also did not send a representative to sign the reconciliation charter. Indeed, the persistence of the fragility of the situation became evident when a military confrontation that erupted in Tripoli in May 2025, prompting the PSC to hold an emergency session.
During its last session of the 1291st meeting, the PSC welcomed the adoption of the Charter and appealed to all signatory parties to ensure its full implementation. The Council also urged those stakeholders who had not yet endorsed the document to join the consensus without delay, emphasising the importance of an inclusive reconciliation process as a foundation for lasting peace and stability in Libya. A notable development occurred in January 2026 when the President of the Presidential Council, Mohamed al-Menfi, formally signed and approved the Charter. In a press release issued on 14 January 2026, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, welcomed the decision, describing it as an important step towards advancing national reconciliation and achieving durable peace in Libya.
Despite this positive development, however, implementation of the Charter has remained limited. Persistent political fragmentation, the continued existence of rival institutions, and the absence of consensus among key stakeholders on the future political and governance framework have hindered progress.
Meanwhile, the US appears to have intensified its diplomatic engagement in Libya, including through its Senior Advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos. For the first time in a decade, Boulos facilitated an agreement on Libya’s first unified budget, which was signed on 11 April. This was hailed as a major success in bridging differences between the Libyan political actors. However, his apparent efforts to broker a power-sharing deal by proposing Sadam Haftar, son of commander Khalifa Haftar, who is an influential figure in eastern Libya, as head of a new presidential Council, while keeping the Tripoli-based Prime Minister Abdel Hamid Debeibeh in power, faced strong opposition by various Libyan political and military factions.
Although Boulos reiterated US support for UNSMIL’s ongoing efforts to advance the UN political roadmap, facilitate national elections, and promote Libyan unity, his parallel engagement with Libya’s rival political leaders generated mixed reactions. Concerns are raised, including from some of the major actors, that the initiatives risk undermining the framework established under the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement (the Skhirat Agreement), which remains the cornerstone of international efforts to support a unified and inclusive political transition in Libya. Critics argued that any political arrangement negotiated outside established UN mechanisms could weaken the legitimacy of the UN-led process and reinforce elite-driven bargaining at the expense of broader national consensus. In meetings held in January and May 2026 of the tripartite framework of neighbouring countries of Libya involving Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, the foreign ministers of these countries emphasised their support for developing the political process under the auspices of the United Nations and rejecting all forms of foreign interference.
Nevertheless, the US appears to be pursuing a broader strategic agenda in Libya that extends beyond support for the political process. Libya’s substantial energy resources, strategic location on the Mediterranean, and importance for regional security appear to have drawn significant attention in Washington. Reports of growing US interest in expanding energy cooperation, including opportunities for American companies in Libya’s oil and gas sector, underscore the economic dimension of the deal that Washington successfully brokered.
At the same time, the US has sought to strengthen security cooperation with Libyan actors. In April, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) conducted its annual special operations exercise in Sirte, bringing together military personnel from eastern and western Libya alongside participants from 11 other countries. The exercise aimed to enhance coordination on counterterrorism, border security, and crisis response while promoting confidence-building between Libya’s divided security institutions. The participation of personnel from both eastern- and western-based forces was seen as particularly significant given the country’s continuing political and military fragmentation.
Regarding the security situation, the 2020 ceasefire continues to hold, with no major nationwide violations. However, on 8 May, armed clashes between state security forces affiliated with the Tripoli-based government and local armed groups led to the temporary shutdown of Libya’s largest oil refinery in Zawiya. The incident left three civilians and one refinery security officer killed, while injuring several others.
The death of General Mohammed Ali Ahmed al-Haddad, Chief of the General Staff of the Libyan Army, along with four other senior Libyan military officials, in a plane crash near Ankara, Türkiye, in December 2025, was a major security incident. The delegation had been in Ankara for official discussions with Turkish counterparts on bilateral security and military cooperation. The aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff while en route to Tripoli, resulting in the loss of all those on board. The incident represented a serious setback for Libya’s military leadership and raised concerns about its potential implications for ongoing efforts to unify and reform the country’s fragmented security institutions.
Another notable development occurred on 3 February, when Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, was reportedly killed in Zintan by unidentified assailants. Libyan authorities subsequently issued arrest warrants for three suspects in connection with the incident, although their identities have not been publicly disclosed.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express its concern about the risks of the persistence of the political stalemate and the institutional division in Libya, and may, in this regard, condemn and call for accountability for the assassination of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. It may urge the various Libyan stakeholders to engage constructively towards the formation of a unified transitional authority and agree on the parameters, processes and timelines for holding elections. The PSC may reiterate its concern about the plight of migrants from other parts of the continent and urge the AU Commission, working within the framework of the tripartite mechanism, to facilitate an end to the attacks and dehumanising treatment that they are subjected to. The PSC may welcome the political roadmap the UN proposed and urge all stakeholders to support and extend full cooperation for its implementation to bring the protracted division to an end. The PSC may echo the AU Commission Chairperson in welcoming the signing of the Reconciliation Charter by the President of the Presidential Council, Mohamed al-Menfi, in January 2026. It may also express support for the efforts of the Chairperson of the AU High-Level Committee on Libya and reiterate its call on those Libyan actors who did not sign the Reconciliation Charter to sign and join the Charter. The PSC may emphasise the need for all actors to commit to a Libyan-owned processes and extend full cooperation and operate in full alignment with and in support of the UN roadmap and UNMSIL’s role. The PSC may also reiterate its call on external actors to end interference in the affairs of Libya and cease their support of rivalry among contending Libyan actors. It may also reiterate its plan for undertaking a field mission to Libya and the decision to move the AU office to Tripoli.