Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and the operations of AUSSOM

Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and the operations of AUSSOMDate | 11 February 2026

Tomorrow (12 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1330th session at ministerial level to receive a briefing on the situation in Somalia and the operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), as one of its agenda items.

Badr Abdelatty, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Chairperson of the PSC for February, will deliver opening remarks, followed by an introductory statement from the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. Statements are expected from the representatives of Somalia, as the concerned state, and Djibouti in its capacity as Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as from the representatives of the League of Arab States and the United Nations (UN). The representatives of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are also expected to deliver statements.

The consideration of Somalia and Sudan under a single session may signal a deliberate effort to frame the discussion around the growing risk of state fragmentation in the Horn of Africa and its broader implications for regional peace and stability. The ministerial session will also discuss progress in the operationalisation of AUSSOM, the challenges it continues to face, and ways forward. The discussions on AUSSOM are likely to build on PSC’s 1317th session held on 15 December 2025 and the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission submitted to that session.

Tomorrow’s session is also likely to situate the discussion within the context of the evolving geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, particularly following Israel’s recognition of the self-declared region of Somaliland in December, as well as the increasingly visible rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

On 26 December 2025, Israel announced its recognition of Somaliland—a move that was strongly rejected by many states and regional and international organisations, including the AU and the League of Arab States. Beyond its legal and political ramifications, the decision has intensified regional geopolitical tensions. Emerging alignments among external and regional actors appear to be taking shape, with potentially serious consequences for peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa and beyond. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, Djibouti, and several other states firmly opposed the recognition. By contrast, the UAE— the first Arab state to formally sign the Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020—is widely perceived as having facilitated Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.

Against this backdrop, on 12 January, the Federal Government of Somalia terminated all agreements with the UAE relating to port operations, government institutions, and security and defence cooperation. This decision followed Somaliland’s recognition by Israel and the transit of a pro-UAE separatist figure from Yemen through Somali airspace without Mogadishu’s knowledge. Meanwhile, Israel’s Foreign Minister visited Somaliland in January to consolidate relations, while Somaliland authorities publicly expressed expectations of concluding a trade deal with Israel and indicated willingness to grant access to valuable mineral resources as part of a broader arrangement.

The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which has been simmering for some time and has become more pronounced amid divergences over developments in Yemen, now appears to be drawing countries of the Horn of Africa more directly into its orbit. In this context, Somalia risks becoming an arena within a wider geopolitical contest. The emerging alignment around Saudi Arabia appears particularly opposed to the normalisation of parallel political entities that undermine state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

It is recalled that the PSC convened its 1324th ministerial session on 6 January, dedicated to the preservation of Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and stability. The Communiqué adopted at that session strongly condemned and rejected Israel’s unilateral recognition of Somaliland and called for its immediate revocation. The PSC further emphasised that such a declaration is null and void and without legal effect under international law, warning that it risks undermining peace and stability on the continent, particularly in the Horn of Africa.

Tomorrow’s ministerial session will therefore be confronted with the challenge of how to mitigate the growing risks posed by intensifying regional rivalries as they play out in Somalia. These external pressures are compounded by Somalia’s internal political and security challenges, especially as the current government mandates are set to expire in May 2026. Persistent disagreements over electoral models and proposed constitutional amendments—both among Somali political actors and between the Federal Government and some of the Federal Member States, notably Puntland and Jubaland—remain unresolved.

In December, district council elections were conducted peacefully in the Banadir region, including Mogadishu, marking the first implementation of direct elections in the capital in over five decades. This development aligns with the Federal Government’s stated objective of transitioning to a nationwide one-person, one-vote electoral model. However, while the Government has reiterated its intention to extend district elections to Federal Member State capitals and secondary cities, opposition leaders, along with the authorities in Puntland and Jubaland, continue to reject a shift toward direct elections and any extension of the current government’s mandate beyond May. In the absence of inclusive dialogue with Mogadishu, they have threatened to proceed with their own electoral processes, further heightening political uncertainty. Meanwhile, the Presidents of Puntland and Jubaland arrived in Mogadishu on 10 February for high-level talks on contentious issues, including the upcoming elections.

The second aspect of tomorrow’s discussions is expected to be AUSSOM. At its last session, held on 15 December, the PSC considered the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, which highlighted progress and challenges in the implementation of AUSSOM’s mandate during the period from July to December 2025 and outlined three options regarding the future of the Mission.

AUSSOM continues to face a range of serious complications. First, the Mission has been unable to secure multi-year, predictable, and adequate financing, despite the AU’s efforts to convince the UN Security Council to activate its Resolution 2719 for AUSSOM. Troops have gone extended periods without receiving stipends, likely to affect morale and operational readiness, while compelling troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to subsidise the Mission—an arrangement that is fundamentally unsustainable. The estimated budget for the period from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 stands at approximately USD 190 million, in addition to substantial financial liabilities inherited from ATMIS, including unpaid troop allowances and outstanding reimbursements for contingent-owned equipment (COE). While there are indications that the European Union (EU) may commit to covering up to 85 per cent of troop stipends, the sustainability of this support, as well as the availability of additional funding to address the remaining budget gap, remains uncertain. PSC members are therefore likely to seek clarification on the status of the disbursement of the USD 20 million allocated by the AU for the Mission, as a follow-up to its 1317th session, which directed the Commission to fast-track the release of these funds and report on their implementation at the subsequent meeting.

A second major complication arises from the United Nations’ liquidity crisis and its implications for the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which is funded through the UN peacekeeping assessed budget and mandated to provide logistical and related support to AUSSOM. UNSOS has faced a 25 per cent budget reduction—approximately USD 130 million—from its approved USD 520 million budget for the current financial year (June 2025 to July 2026). This reduction is expected to have significant repercussions for AUSSOM’s core operational capabilities, particularly aviation support, COE management, force sustainment, and broader logistical support.

Operational challenges have also emerged in relation to troop realignment. The transition of AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM was expected to be completed by the end of June 2025 and required the repatriation of Burundian forces alongside the deployment of Egyptian troops. Pending the latter’s deployment, the PSC has been compelled to suspend the repatriation of Burundian contingents. The Chair of the PSC for the month may brief the Council on progress toward deployment, including the technical assessment conducted in August 2025 in preparation for deployment planning, as well as updates on AU-UN coordination efforts. Meanwhile, uncertainty over the future of the mission has been further compounded by a public statement posted on 26 January by Uganda’s army chief, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, indicating an intention to withdraw Ugandan forces from Somalia after 19 years of engagement. Although it remains unclear whether this reflects official government policy, the statement underscores growing uncertainty surrounding the Mission’s future.

Against this backdrop of financial, logistical, operational, and political constraints, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, in his report to the 1317th session, outlined three options for the PSC’s strategic consideration regarding the future of AUSSOM.

The first option envisages maintaining the status quo with respect to AUSSOM and UN support structures, under which the AU and UN would continue implementing the UNSOS contingency plan and absorb the mandated USD 130 million reductions, resulting in the continued accumulation of deficits with no certainty regarding resource predictability. The second option entails transforming the AU mission into a regional cooperation framework based on bilateral deployments, whereby some military or police components currently under AUSSOM would be replaced or supplemented by regional or bilateral arrangements between the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners. The third option proposes an organised mission withdrawal and transition to full Somali ownership, involving a jointly planned and orderly withdrawal of AUSSOM at the end of the CONOPS lifespan, supported by a detailed exit framework, clear timelines, and close coordination with TCCs and PCCs.

Rather than providing immediate strategic direction, the PSC requested the Commission to submit a more detailed report on the proposed options, including their implications for the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations. The Council also requested the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of AUSSOM TCCs and PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces to deliberate on the three options and submit their recommendations for the PSC’s consideration. As highlighted above, the financial, logistical, operational, and political challenges confronting the Mission have reached a critical point, requiring serious consideration of the options proposed by the Chairperson of the Commission. Tomorrow’s engagement is therefore expected to follow up on PSC’s request for a detailed report by the Commission on these options.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is likely to reiterate its condemnation of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and reaffirm its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Somalia. It may further urge Member States and international partners to refrain from any action that undermines Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The PSC may also express its concern over the geopolitical competition among regional and global powers in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea and its potential in turning Somalia into a geopolitical theatre with serious repercussions to its peace and security. It may reiterate its call on the Federal Government of Somalia, Federal Member States and political actors to engage in an inclusive political dialogue to address outstanding issues on the election model and constitutional amendments and the importance of such dialogue for the conduct of a credible election. In this connection, the PSC may welcome the high-level talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States on the upcoming elections. On AUSSOM, the PSC is expected to follow up on its request for a detailed report on the three options outlined by the Chairperson of the Commission on the future of the mission, based on consultations with the TCCs/PCCs, and to provide strategic guidance on the way forward.