Briefing on the situation in Sudan

Briefing on the situation in SudanDate | 11 February 2026

Tomorrow (12 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will meet at ministerial level on the margins of the AU Summit to discuss the situation in Sudan, as agreed during its last meeting on the country in December.

The session commences with the opening address of Badr Abdelatty, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Chairperson of the PSC for February. This will be followed by the statement that the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, introducing his report on the situation. Representatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations are also expected to deliver a statement.  While Sudan, as a country concerned, will not participate in the session due to its suspension, there was a plan for an informal consultation by the PSC with the representative of Sudan before this session. Among the issues expected to feature are PSC’s support for the National Initiative for Peace proposal presented by the representative of Sudan to the UN Security Council in December 2025.

Since the last PSC session in December, the war has intensified across multiple fronts, with both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seeking to gain the upper hand by consolidating territorial control. The latest round of fighting has centred on the Kordofan region, though clashes continue elsewhere in the country. Last month, the SAF reportedly captured Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, and Dilling, the region’s second largest and strategically important town, both of which had been under siege by the RSF for nearly two years.

The RSF has recently intensified its attacks on El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, which remains under SAF control. It is also seeking to consolidate its hold over Darfur following its capture of El-Fasher in Northern Darfur in October, while the SAF is attempting to regain lost territory. Meanwhile, the security situation in Blue Nile State, bordering Ethiopia and South Sudan, has deteriorated as the RSF and its allied forces have increased their presence in an apparent effort to open a new front against the SAF, with the bordering region in Ethiopia reportedly being used for facilitating the movement of RSF and allied forces into the region.

The regional ramifications of the war have been a major concern since its outbreak three years ago. There have been reports of some neighbouring states implicated for allowing the use of their territories or supporting one of the sides. There have been reports of the use of Ethiopian territory in facilitating support to the RSF. In the aftermath of the seizure by the RSF of El Fasher and the resulting de facto division of Sudan, some countries, notably Egypt, expressed serious concern and objection to any threat to the territorial integrity of Sudan, deeming it a direct threat to their security. While it has allegedly provided logistical and technical support to the SAF, it has also reportedly conducted targeted air strikes against the RSF over the past six months.

External intervention has come to be a major driver of the conflict in Sudan, with the UAE in particular reported for its extensive supply of weapons to the RSF. With Mogadishu cancelling all its bilateral agreements with Abu Dhabi and countries denying the latter flight permits, the UAE appears to be facing growing challenges in sustaining its support for the RSF. There are growing fears that the widening rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has transformed the war in Sudan into an intense proxy competition, with Riyadh backing the SAF and Abu Dhabi continuing to support the RSF. Riyadh has reportedly mobilised several countries from the region and beyond in an effort to shift the military balance. This dynamic has become more evident on the battlefield in recent months, with the SAF gaining the upper hand in the ongoing fighting in the Kordofan region.

At its last meeting, the AUPSC strongly condemned the involvement of external actors in the conflict and tasked its Sub-Committee on Sanctions, in close coordination with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), with identifying those actors and recommending appropriate measures for consideration by the AUPSC. However, almost two years after the PSC adopted a similar decision, there has been no progress.

As fighting in Sudan has escalated, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated sharply. On 5 February, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)—a global, multi-partner initiative that informs urgent humanitarian response—confirmed that famine-level malnutrition is spreading in North Darfur after nearly three years of conflict, warning of catastrophic, life-threatening, and man-made starvation conditions. According to humanitarian actors, some 21 million people across Sudan require emergency assistance, making it the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. Over the past three years, the conflict has forcibly displaced an estimated 11.7 million people, including seven million internally displaced persons and 4.5 million refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries.

The appalling human rights situation in Sudan has been another major concern, with serious atrocities and crimes allegedly committed by the parties to the conflict. During his visit to Sudan in January, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk stated that ‘the war has plunged the country into an abyss of unfathomable proportions.’ He further noted that ‘the proliferation of advanced military equipment, in particular unmanned aerial vehicles—or drones—across Sudan has enhanced the military capabilities of both the RSF and the SAF to inflict vast damage, prolonging hostilities and deepening the crisis for civilians.’ At its last meeting, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) underscored the need to document atrocities being committed in Sudan and requested the AU Commission to regularly monitor and report on crimes across the country. It also commended the continued engagement of the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, Adama Dieng, with Sudanese authorities and national human rights entities in this regard. Despite the finalization of an investigation report undertaken by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights carried out upon the request of the PSC, there has been no reference to and consideration of this report which presented widespread and grave violations of human and peoples’ rights, indicating that the scale and nature warrants the invocation of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.

As Security Council President in February, the UK intends to focus on Sudan. The UK Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, who visited Addis Ababa earlier this month to consult with regional countries and the AU on steps to halt the fighting and alleviate the suffering of the Sudanese people, will chair a Council meeting on Sudan on 19 February. In April, Germany and the UK are also expected to convene an international conference on Sudan in Berlin.

The humanitarian crisis was also the focus of a meeting convened by the United States on 5 February, aimed at mobilising $1.5 billion to respond to Sudan’s urgent humanitarian needs. At the meeting, the US reportedly indicated that it has been working with other members of the Quad on a Sudan peace plan. The Quad—comprising the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—has been advancing a roadmap first outlined in September last year, which called for an initial three-month humanitarian truce to enable the rapid delivery of aid across Sudan, followed immediately by a permanent ceasefire. At the time, the SAF rejected the initiative, citing concerns over the UAE’s involvement, while the RSF—widely condemned by the international community for committing mass atrocities and war crimes—welcomed it in what was widely seen as a tactical move to rehabilitate its image.

The peace plan, which is expected to be announced soon, reportedly includes measures to address the humanitarian crisis; protect civilians and coordinate their safe return; transition to a permanent ceasefire; launch a political process toward a civilian-led government; and support reconstruction. At its last meeting, the AUPSC welcomed the establishment of the Quintet—comprising the AU, UN, EU, and the League of Arab States—under AU leadership to enhance coordination of mediation efforts aimed at convening an inclusive inter-Sudanese political dialogue. It also reiterated its call for the Quintet and the Quad to work closely together to avoid duplication and ensure a coherent approach to achieving a negotiated and lasting solution to the conflict in Sudan. At tomorrow’s meeting, Egypt, which presides over the AUPSC in February, may highlight the consultative meeting it convened in Cairo last month. The meeting brought together several bilateral and multilateral partners.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reiterate its grave concern over the escalating fighting in Sudan. It may condemn the atrocities being committed in the course of the escalating violence, including those perpetrated particularly by the RSF since the PSC’s last meeting. Welcoming the Fact-Finding report of the ACHPR and noting the mission undertaken by the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities, the PSC may reaffirm the need for continuous documentation of the atrocities and violations being perpetrated in the course of the War in Sudan. including the AU, IGAD, the UN, and the EU, to discuss the situation in Sudan. The PSC may welcome the role of the Quintet and the AU’s leadership role in that context, particularly in advancing the convening of the political dialogue. The PSC may also take a decision to undertake a field mission to Sudan.