Briefing on the situation in Sudan
Briefing on the situation in SudanDate | 3 August 2025
Tomorrow (4 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) will hold its first session of the month to consider the situation in Sudan.
The session will commence with an opening remark by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for August 2025. This is followed by introductory statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. A representative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is also expected to make a statement. It is also envisaged that the PSC receives a statement on the humanitarian situation, including access to humanitarian assistance and food insecurity, from Haneed Nuru, Director of the World Food Programme African Union Global Office. Since Sudan is suspended following the October 2021 coup that laid the foundation for the eruption of the conflict in April 2023, it would not accordingly be invited to make a statement during the session.
There have been major developments since the PSC’s last substantive session in February 2025. The frontlines of the fighting and the territorial control of the major parties to the war – the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have substantially shifted. At the end of March, the SAF succeeded in wresting control of Khartoum from RSF. On its part, the RSF expanded its offensive in May to the East by launching long-range drone attacks that targeted various cities, including Port Sudan. These attacks targeted key civilian and military infrastructure, including the international airport, a military airbase, fuel depots, and power stations.
Despite shifts in the battlefield dynamics, the warring parties remain entrenched in their positions and appear determined to pursue a military solution. As each tries to consolidate its respective areas of control and inflict loss on the other, the focus of the terrain of fighting has shifted. As a result, the fighting now appears to be shifting southward into Kordofan and eastward in Darfur. The ongoing fighting in Kordofan has reportedly resulted in the massive displacement of people and the collapse of essential services. As the RSF shifted its focus to consolidate its control in Darfur, it intensified its siege and attacks on North Darfur’s capital, El Fasher, through shelling, drone strikes, and ground operations, exacerbating the already dire humanitarian and hunger conditions in the besieged city and its environs. In July, the United Nations called on the warring parties to agree to a humanitarian pause in the besieged city. While the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) reportedly accepted the proposal, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) rejected it. Indicating further expansion of the war front, in June, the RSF claimed control of the tri-border area of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, both to expand the supply line through Libya and extend the fighting into the Nile Valley and Northern State.
With the war showing no sign of abating, the dire humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, as the statement from the WFP representative would make clear. Indiscriminate attacks against civilians continue. The RSF long-range drone attacks targeted not only military targets but also civilian infrastructures, including the 10 May 2025 bombing that attacked the central prison in El Obeid, reportedly resulting in the death of 29 prisoners and injuring dozens more. In an incident attributed to the SAF, the bombing on 21 June on the Al-Mujlad hospital in West Kordofan reportedly resulted in the killing of more than 40 people, including six children and five healthcare workers. Sudan remains the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, with over 30 million people in need of assistance.
As they both deepen their effort to consolidate their respective territorial control, they are also seeking to translate territorial control into political influence. SAF has regained control over parts of the east and centre of the country, including the capital, Khartoum. Meanwhile, RSF is working to consolidate its hold in the west and south, particularly in Darfur and South Kordofan. In May, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, appointed Kamal Idris as the new prime minister. Idris subsequently dissolved the existing government in June and is currently consulting on the formation of a new cabinet. On 26 July, the RSF-led coalition, known as the Tasis Alliance, also announced the formation of a parallel government, with RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo appointing Mohamed Hassan al-Ta’ishi as prime minister.
The emergence of rival governments in the respective territorial spheres of influence of the two rival warring parties has raised renewed fears of Sudan’s potential fragmentation, drawing comparisons to the situation in Libya. It is against this backdrop that tomorrow’s session is scheduled. The UN Security Council is also set to hold closed consultations on the situation in Sudan on the same day.
Tomorrow’s session comes less than a week after the PSC issued a statement. The statement, issued on 29 July, was issued in direct response to and with exclusive focus on the 26 July 2025 announcement by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of the establishment of a parallel civilian administration, referred to as the Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis) in areas under its control. This is not the first time the PSC has issued a statement condemning the RSF’s initiative for establishing a parallel government. Condemning the announcement on the establishment of such a parallel government by the RSF, in an earlier statement issued on 11 March, the PSC warned that ‘such action carries a huge risk of partitioning of the country.’ While both statements explicitly stated that the PSC does not recognise the parallel government, reaffirmed the unity and territorial integrity of Sudan and urged all AU member states and the international community not to recognise any parallel government, the 11 March statement additionally reaffirmed the AU’s ‘unwavering commitment to continue to collaborate with all Sudanese stakeholders towards finding viable and durable solutions towards silencing the guns permanently in Sudan’ on the basis of the AU roadmap (emphasis added). By contrast, in a clear departure from this ‘commitment to continue to collaborate with all Sudanese stakeholders’, the 29 July statement asserted that the ‘African Union only recognises the Transitional Sovereign Council and the recently formed civilian transitional government.’ The ‘civilian transitional government’ that this statement makes reference to is the appointment by Chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council, General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) chief, of Kamil al-Tayeb Idris as a civilian Prime Minister. The PSC’s recognition of the so-called ‘civilian transitional government’ follows the statement of 30 May 2025 by the AU Commission Chairperson, who described the appointment of the prime minister ‘as a step towards inclusive governance’.
There are fears that this shift in the policy position of the PSC and the AUC may resuscitate the agenda of lifting the suspension of Sudan from the AU. However, there is no inclusive political process and national dialogue involving diverse political and social forces of Sudan, nor is there any transitional roadmap developed through such a political process and national dialogue. With the war raging on with no end in sight, neither national constitution-making nor general national elections are on the horizon. As the recent experience in Gabon illustrates, even with such processes and a roadmap, the constitutional order is not considered to have been restored before the convening of general national elections. As such, any lifting of the suspension of Sudan at this point could not happen without breaking the AU norm on unconstitutional change of government.
Despite the worsening security and humanitarian situation in the Sudan, ongoing mediation efforts aimed at reaching a diplomatic resolution have made limited progress, with little prospect of securing a ceasefire. The involvement of multiple actors in these initiatives has further complicated the peace process. In May, the United Nations, African Union, and the League of Arab States held a tripartite meeting in Baghdad, Iraq, aimed at promoting greater synergy in their engagement on the Sudan file. They apparently intend to include IGAD in future meetings under this format. In June, the European Union convened a consultative meeting in Brussels on enhancing coordination of peace initiatives and efforts for Sudan, bringing together several key actors involved in the peace process. The next meeting is expected to take place in Addis Ababa.
In the meantime, the United States appears to be shifting its focus to Sudan, building on its recent success in mediating between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. It had planned to host a meeting of the Quad—comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—in Washington, D.C., on 30 July, with the aim of advancing the Sudan peace talks. However, the meeting was reportedly postponed due to disagreements over the anticipated outcome. Similarly, an earlier conference on Sudan convened by the United Kingdom in London in April failed to produce results, also due to disagreements over the terms of a joint declaration.
The ongoing conflict in Sudan has been further complicated by the involvement of external actors and the use of modern warfare technologies, including unmanned aerial vehicles. Despite the existing UN arms embargo, the flow of weapons into the country has continued unabated, fueling the violence and having a devastating impact on civilians. The conflict has also had far-reaching consequences for the broader region.
All seven of Sudan’s neighbouring countries have been affected to varying degrees. In particular, the situation in Abyei—a disputed border area between Sudan and South Sudan—has significantly worsened. The conflict has exacerbated intercommunal tensions, increased displacement, and undermined ongoing peace efforts. The spillover effect has also been evident in the presence of RSF elements across borders and a sharp increase in cross-border movements, including refugees and returnees. Recent fighting in the tri-border area of Sudan, Libya, and Egypt involving SAF, RSF, and armed groups affiliated with the Libyan National Army—led by General Khalifa Haftar—has raised concern that it could spark another regional tension.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its grave concern over the continuation of fighting in Sudan without any sign of a major breakthrough for peace. It may reiterate its earlier calls on the imperative for ending the fighting in Sudan, calling for a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. It may also condemn the indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians, including the incidents that led to civilian deaths in El Obeid and West Darfur, and state that those responsible for violations against civilians will be held accountable. The PSC may also call for an end to hostilities in Kordofan and the lifting of the siege that the RSF imposed on El Fasher, worsening the dire humanitarian and hunger crises in the city and its environs. It may also reiterate the imperative for unhindered and safe humanitarian access to ameliorate the humanitarian catastrophe and urge the parties to ensure civilian protection. It is expected that the PSC will restate its position expressed in the 11 March 2025 and 29 July 2025 statements, rejecting and condemning the establishment of parallel governments by the RSF and calling on all AU member states and the international community not to recognise the establishment of the parallel government announced by the RSF on 26 July 2025. While the PSC may not return to its 11 March 2025 statement in which it expressed AU’s commitment to continue to collaborate with all Sudanese stakeholders, it may make it clear that its recognition of the Transitional Sovereign Council in pursuit of safeguarding the territorial integrity of Sudan does not dispense with the need for a political process for the establishment of an all-inclusive transitional government and for finding diplomatic resolution of the current conflict. It may, in this regard, reaffirm its commitment to the May 2023 AU roadmap for the resolution of the conflict in Sudan and that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Sudan. The PSC may also affirm the need for an all-inclusive political process and national dialogue for developing a transitional roadmap, covering constitution-making and holding of general national elections, in order to achieve restoration of constitutional order, for which bringing the war to an end is essential. On the peace process, the PSC is expected to call for the integration of all initiatives for peace in Sudan into a single process. It may also call for the AU to assert a leading role in facilitating such a single peace process for Sudan.