Tomorrow (25 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1233^rd session in New York, on the margins of the 79^th session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. This ministerial-level meeting will address the theme ‘New Security Threats in Africa and the Future of the PSC’, as one of two agenda items.

Lejeune Mbellla Mbella, Minister of External Relations of Cameroon and PSC Chairperson for September, will preside over the session. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission is scheduled to deliver opening remarks, with Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security expected to provide an overview on the theme of this particular agenda. It is also envisaged that a representative of the UN will make a statement.

As a theme crafted as part of the 20-year anniversary of the PSC, tomorrow’s session builds on the discussions from the high-level colloquium held on 25 May 2024 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to mark the 20th anniversary of the PSC. It is to be recalled that this event, chaired by Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan, culminated in the adoption of the Dar es Salaam Declaration, which outlined key peace and security challenges facing the continent and proposed actions to address them. According to the concept note, the objective of tomorrow’s session is to ‘exchange views on the future of the PSC,’ ‘to re-commit to bolstering intervention in all the countries in conflict and collectively explore policy approaches for proactively addressing emerging complex threats.’

Twenty years after its operationalisation, the PSC is facing a new wave of security threats, while older challenges such as inter-state tensions, military coups, and internal armed conflicts are resurfacing with renewed intensity. Africa, particularly the Sahel region, has become a global epicentre of terrorism, witnessing not only a surge in attacks and fatalities but also an alarming geographic expansion of extremist activities. Meanwhile, emerging security threats—from new technologies and pandemics to climate change and increased foreign interference in African conflicts—are reshaping the security landscape, posing serious challenges to a peace and security architecture originally designed to address issues like civil wars and inter-state conflicts.

The prominence of new security dynamics in Africa poses significant challenges to the PSC and its peace and security architecture. Africa’s security landscape has evolved dramatically since the establishment of the AU and the creation of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 20 years ago. Initially, inter-state conflicts and civil wars dominated, with little anticipation of asymmetric warfare involving terrorist groups becoming primary security concerns. Consequently, many AU tools, like those of the United Nations, such as mediation and peace support operations, were primarily tailored for addressing civil war scenarios. Notably, the current framework for the deployment of the African Standby Force (ASF), a key element of APSA designed for rapid crisis response across the continent, did not envisage non-conventional and asymmetric warfare involving terrorist groups as the main target of its development and preparations for deployment.

The rise of asymmetric warfare, coupled with the lack of preparedness of APSA structures for a speedy response to the emergence of such threats as the major conditions undermining peace and security in Africa and the resultant vacuum this produced, have led to the emergence of ‘improvised’ security responses, characterised by the proliferation of ad hoc security arrangements and regional deployments such as MNJTF, G5 Sahel Joint Force, SAMIM, and SAMIDRC. This growing reliance on ad hoc security arrangements has led to the increasing marginalisation of the AU and the PSC. Additionally, it also risks fragmenting the collective security system anchored on the APSA, as more peace operations are undertaken outside, and without the application, of the APSA norms and policies.

Other security threats such as emerging technologies, public health emergencies, and climate change, also present unchartered challenges that existing continental security frameworks or peace and security tools struggle to address. The current security architectures are ill-equipped to manage or keep pace with such complex, rapidly evolving threats.

Meanwhile, the rise of geopolitical rivalries on the international stage has intensified foreign involvement by both old and emerging powers in conflicts in Africa, further complicating their resolution. This growing interference by foreign powers is not only shaping conflict dynamics and political behaviour but also undermining the agency of regional and continental policymakers in addressing conflicts and political crises.

These changing dynamics demand that the AU’s peace and security architecture adapt to remain relevant and fit for purpose. While instruments like the PSC Protocol and the AU Constitutive Act may not be perfect, effective responses to these new security threats in Africa neither depends on nor requires perfecting them. As the experience of the UN with respect to the UN Charter illustrates, the focus should be on updating and adapting the existing peace and security tools, approaches and processes as well as harnessing the role of development, financial and technological instruments to make them fit for the continent’s emerging realities and challenges.

Tomorrow’s session presents the opportunity for PSC Members to deliberate on the necessary shifts in light of the changing security dynamics and their implications for the APSA.

One key area for reflection is the need to prioritise conflict prevention over conflict management and resolution. Despite the cost-effectiveness of prevention and the emphasis on its prevention mandate in the PSC Protocol, the PSC has often taken a reactive approach, engaging in crisis management only after situations have escalated into full-blown security crises. While the rhetoric and normative recognition of the importance of conflict prevention are well established, the PSC’s actions have not consistently reflected this commitment. Its track record in anticipating and preventing crises before they fully erupt leaves much to be desired. The continental early warning system should be strengthened by addressing the technical, operational and political limitations, including through the restoration of a dedicated division for conflict prevention and early warning and bridging the gap between early warning and early response.

In light of the deteriorating security situation in Africa, coupled with the rising global geopolitical tension and a weakened multilateral system, AU should also reinvigorate its robust diplomacy as the primary tool for maintaining the continent’s security challenges and navigating complex political transitions. Apart from its role in reducing polarisation and establishing common ground between rival powers as highlighted in UN Secretary-General’s New Agenda for Peace, in the African context, the effective functioning of the PSC and the APSA and for the mobilisation of collective action for peace and security depend on mobilisation of consensus and the political will of member states for supporting such collective action. Reinvigorating diplomacy is a strategic imperative for the AU to contain the tide of these new and increasingly serious threats to peace and security. This requires the reaffirmation of the commitment of member states to AU instruments and to work collectively and for the AU Commission to enhance close working relationship with and the trust of member states on the basis of the obligations that member states assumed under AU instruments.

While the primacy of politics and diplomacy in addressing conflicts on the continent is imperative, Peace Support Operations (PSOs) involving peace enforcement mandate also remain key component of the AU’s conflict management toolkit. However, even in this context, there is a need to shift from a security-heavy approach to a comprehensive strategy that underpins the primacy of politics, particularly in addressing the scourge of terrorism in the continent. Over the years, a noticeable trend in the PSC approach to the surge in conflicts has been an increased emphasis on hard security measures. While security measures are undoubtedly critical in addressing the immediate threat posed by terrorists and in creating an enabling environment for non-military measures, it has become evident, as established in the Amani Africa report (EN & FR), that no amount of force alone will fundamentally alter the terrorism landscape in Africa. What is required is a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that moves beyond a security-first approach, placing greater emphasis on a human security-centered political strategy. This approach should address the structural causes of terrorism, such as marginalisation, governance deficits, and socioeconomic grievances. Equally important is the use of negotiation and national reconciliation to facilitate the surrender and rehabilitation of fighters, alongside efforts to achieve political settlements that tackle the underlying conflict dynamics enabling the rise of terrorist groups.

Indeed, the evolving nature of conflicts and shifting peace and security dynamics in Africa call for a ‘reconceptualisation’ of the AU’s approach to PSOs. A key element of this shift involves viewing military operations as one part of a broader, comprehensive strategy that goes beyond purely military solutions and encompasses non-military approaches that address the root causes of conflict and violence. Given the complexity and fluidity of conflict situations on the continent, PSOs should also incorporate a combination of peace enforcement, stabilisation, and peacebuilding capacities with a clear exit strategy. These need to be complemented with the introduction of PCRD instruments including the expansion of legitimate local governance structures that deliver services and the use of livelihood support and development tools.

Regarding emerging technologies and climate change, it is imperative to develop a system within the continental early warning system to track and report risks and threats to peace and security posed by these emerging security threats to facilitate timely response. Strengthening institutional capacities, legal and policy frameworks, and enhancing collaboration with relevant stakeholders including Member States, RECs/RMs and international partners also remain important to mitigate security risks of emerging technologies. The rise in the impact of these unconventional security threats necessitates the introduction of new tools and approaches that emphasise non-security instruments including livelihood-supporting interventions, socio-economic and development instruments, adaptation measures as well as the systems and infrastructure as well as the institutional guardrails for containing the threat posed by new technology including AI.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to highlight the various emerging security threats and how they are changing the security dynamics in the continent and impacting AU’s peace and security architecture. In taking the agenda forward, the PSC may consider tasking the AU Commission, in collaboration with key stakeholders, to articulate a ‘New Agenda for Peace in Africa, drawing inspiration from the UN’s ‘New Agenda for Peace’. This initiative would take a comprehensive look at the evolving nature of security threats and shifting dynamics, identifying the necessary adjustments to the peace and security architecture in response to these challenges. Such a move would mark a significant step in advancing the role of the PSC and the APSA in view of these new security threats and changing peace and security environment.

Tomorrow (18 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1232^nd session to discuss civil-military relations in Africa as an important factor for enhancing conflict management in the continent.

Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of September, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Parfait Onanga Anyanga, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the AU and Anselme Nahmtante Yabouri, Director of the United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament (UNREC), are also expected to deliver statements.

Although the PSC planned to discuss this topic in 2022 and 2023 during Cameroon’s chairship, the session could not be held as scheduled. Hence, tomorrow’s meeting presents the PSC with the opportunity to have a dedicated deliberation on this theme.

While this is the first time that the PSC has dedicated a session on civil-military relations as a standalone thematic agenda, it would not be the first time for the PSC to address some aspects of the theme of tomorrow’s session. Some of these issues received PSC’s engagement, particularly in the context of the recent resurgence of military coups in the continent. For example, at its sessions on unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) such as the 1000^th session convened following the 24 May 2021 coup in Mali and the 1030^th session addressing the 5 September 2021 coup in Guinea, PSC has urged the militaries of each of these concerned member States to refrain from interfering in political processes, suggesting that political affairs fall outside of the scope of military powers. PSC’s request at its 1041^st session for the Sudanese military to respect their constitutional mandate following the military takeover of power on 25 October 2021, as well as the requests at its 1016^thsession on the situation in Chad and 1064^th session on the situation in Guinea for the members of the militaries of these Member States to abstain from taking part in elections at the end of the transition periods are illustrative of PSC’s appreciation of the boundaries on the role of the military.

Civil-military relationship touches on a wide range of issues pertaining to the governance of the security sector and the role of the military in a state. While it was a subject of major policy and scholarly attention in the 1970s and 1980s, it has acquired particular policy significance in recent years on account of a range of developments. These include the increasing reliance of governments on military and other security forces for repressing dissent, political opposition and protests, the eruption of conflict pitting various elements of the security forces or various parts of the armed forces of a country (Ethiopia, Lesotho, South Sudan and Sudan, among others), the entanglement of the military in the political and economic processes of the state. During the past three years, the spate of military coups has put civil-military relations in the spotlight.

Tomorrow’s session offers an opportunity to debate such wider issues and challenges in the governance of the security sector as well as the resultant poor state of professionalism of the military including in terms of weak adherence to the military code of conduct and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law as well as its constitutional obligations. On the other hand, weak civilian institutions, the absence of democratic governance and constitutional checks and balances, result in the weakness of the accountability structures that can effectively manage and mediate civil and military relations. Such deeper reflection is critical to address the kind of politico-constitutional and security ills arising from the types of problematic relationships that compromise the professionalism and impartiality of the security sector and entangle it into the contested terrain of political power struggle.

As such, one of the features of civil-military relations in Africa which may draw PSC’s interest is the prevalent politicisation of the military. Such politicisation entrenches the army deep into politics, thereby depriving it of its independence from and impartiality to political power struggles between rival political and social forces in society. This also creates the interests of members of the army in being involved in politics as a means of advancing particular political ambitions. Similarly, the engagement of the army in economic activities also leads to its embeddedness in pursuing economic gains and exposure to corruption and unprofessional conduct.

Indeed, the heavy reliance of civilian political leaders on coercion and the use of security institutions including the army for purposes of guaranteeing regime security and survival presents a major challenge to civil-military relationships. Not only do such practices blur the lines of military mandates and lay a fertile ground for the oppression of citizens and violation of basic human rights and freedoms, they also can lead to the fragmentation of the army by giving rise to different factions. This underscores the importance of clarifying the boundaries and limits of the control of the civilian authority over the military. Of significance in this respect is respect of constitutionally established rules that are key to guarantee both the constitutionality of the orders that the army is expected to follow from civilian leadership and maintain the army’s integrity and impartiality. As important is the adoption of minimum legal standards properly outlining the type and scope of law enforcement activities which fall within the mandates of the military and identifying the circumstances upon which armies may be deployed for managing internal security challenges.

The importance that is attached to this subject can also be gleaned from the AU’s Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Policy and AU’s Security Sector Reform Policy. Of particular note in this respect is the PCRD policy’s stipulation calling for the establishment of ‘mechanisms for the democratic governance and accountability of the security sector’ and the creation of ‘appropriate and effective oversight bodies for the security sector, including parliamentary committees, national ombudsperson, etc’.

In some cases, as demonstrated in the recent coups in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger, there is also the issue of the loss of confidence of their militaries in civilian leaders when they fail to provide them with the necessary material and moral support. Such leadership failures, in the context of heavy casualties suffered by members of the army due to terrorist attacks, lead to deepening frustrations and resentment against the civilian leadership. This can easily boil over when the civilian leadership is also perceived to be engaging in or tolerating corruption that diverts resources away from supporting the work of the army. For example, in the case of Burkina Faso, the lack of effective leadership by the democratically elected leaders in addressing terrorism, insurgency and instability that has gripped the country and reports of corruption were presented as justification for the military’s intervention through overthrowing the elected civilian leaders.

Management of security sector reform (SSR) processes in member States undergoing transitions is also an essential part of averting potential relapse as experienced in member States such as Mali and Sudan. While the speedy restoration of constitutional order in member States undergoing transitions is well within the spirit of AU norms banning UCG, restoration of constitutional order without the necessary SSR that tackles the security sector governance issues that precipitated the coup would lead to a repeat of the coup, as the experience in Mali after the 2012 coup aptly illustrates. The importance therefore of implementing and making use of the AU SSR Policy as a critical instrument for achieving constitutionally sound civil-military relationship cannot be overemphasised.

The AU SSR Policy recognises ‘the linkages between an effective and democratically governed security sector and peace and security.’ With respect to professionalism, it envisages the importance of ‘the provision of transparent, accountable and equitable recruitment mechanisms, appropriate training, equipment and gender compliance.’ The provision in the policy for ‘strengthening of (transparent) procurement policy and procedures for the purchase, supply and disposal of all security equipment’ is also critical for addressing issues of corruption. One recent analysis echoed Transparency International’s rating that roughly half of all security sectors that face critical or very high level of risk of corruption are in Africa.

The management of civil-military relations is of importance not only in the context of UCG and to member States in transition, but also with respect to broader governance issues. The implementation of codes of conduct that are in line with the constitutional obligations and the international human rights and international humanitarian law standards is key. Also of significance is the need for regularly updating the professional standards, the provision of the requisite supplies and benefits and the technical competence of the military. It is therefore critical to consider the crisis in civil-military relations as part of AU’s framework for early warning and conflict prevention.

The outcome of tomorrow’s session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC may emphasise the need for paying particular attention to civil-military relations as a critical component of advancing institutional stability, constitutional rule and peace and security. It may also underscore the need for careful design of the civil-military relations dimension of peace agreements and due attention to the implementation of this aspect of peace agreements as a critical element of preventing the relapse of countries in transition back to instability and conflict. The PSC may also call for the updating by member States of existing military codes of conduct to make them up to date and compliant with standards of impartiality and independence from politics, and basic human rights and international humanitarian law standards. It may underscore the imperative of protecting the military from being dragged into political contestation between various political forces and preventing its politicisation by those in power. It may also underscore the need for integrating issues in civil-military relations as part of AU’s framework for early warning and conflict prevention. The PSC may call for the use of the AU SSR Policy formwork in countries that experienced military coups as a basis for ensuring successful SSR to prevent the recurrence of coups. PSC may also seek advice from the Military Staff Committee (MSC) on how AU norms and policy instruments can be utilised to provide guidance in addressing issues relating to civil-military relations in the continent.

Tomorrow (2 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1230^th session focusing on the Protection of Journalists and Access to Information in Situations of Armed Conflicts in Africa.

The Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of September 2024, Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, will deliver opening remarks followed by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). It is anticipated that Ourveena Geereesha Topsy-Sonoo, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to information in Africa of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights will make a presentation alongside Omar Faruk Osman, President of the Federation of African Journalists (FAJ) as well as Lydia Gachungi, UNESCO Regional Adviser on Freedom of Expression and Safety of Journalists. A representative from the ICRC is also expected to make a statement.

As highlighted below, while there were sessions that raised aspects of the issues expected to feature during this session, this is the first time the PSC is considering this theme as framed for this session. This open session coincides with the 10^th anniversary of the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists (IDEI). As it’s to be recalled, in 2013, during its 70^th plenary meeting, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/163 in which it decided, on page 3, to, among other things, ‘…proclaim 2 November as the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists.’ In this regard, to commemorate this anniversary, the AU and UNESCO are jointly planning to hold a global conference in Addis Ababa from 6 – 7 November 2024 under the theme of ‘Safety of Journalists in Crises and Emergencies.’ 28 September 2024 on the other hand, will also mark the International Day for Universal Access to Information (IDUAI) as decided during the 74^th UN General Assembly, in October 2019. During its commemoration in 2021, the AU reiterated its commitment to promote the right of access to information despite the challenges faced at all levels.

Within the framework of the AU, one of the entities that has carried out various initiatives for the protection of journalists and access to information is the Banjul-based AU’s human rights body, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). Consistent with AU’s strategic plan, Agenda 2063, specifically Aspiration 3 and 4 which speak of “An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law’’ and “A peaceful and secure Africa’’, respectively, and Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Commission) during its 67^th Ordinary Session held from 13 November to 3 December 2020, adopted the ‘Resolution on the Safety of Journalists and Media Practitioners in Africa’. This resolution builds on the ACHPR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa (the Declaration). This declaration provides a framework for African countries to follow as it contains establishments and principles for anchoring the rights to freedom of expression and access to information in conformity with Article 9 of the African Charter which guarantees individuals the right to receive information as well as the right to express and disseminate information. The Model Law on Access to Information, the ACHPR adopted in 2013, provides specific guidelines for African countries to fulfill their legal obligations under the African Charter regarding the right of access to information. Reports have further indicated that as of 2024, 29 African countries have adopted Access To Information (ATI) laws, while 26 others have yet to have the ATI law in Africa.

While journalists operating in conflict areas face inherent dangers, they are more vulnerable to direct violence as conflict parties seek to impose control on what is reported during conflicts. Thus, despite the provision of certain protection that is accorded to journalists under the international humanitarian law (IHL), such as immunity from military attacks and prisoner of war status for those accompanying armed forces, these protections are not always respected and journalists continue to face a wide range of threats, including censorship, harassment, arbitrary detention and even killings.

Recent reports indicate a rise in journalist killings in conflict-affected countries, reversing a previous trend of declining violence against media professionals. Although countries in conflict are not among the top countries with the worst records in the treatment of journalists as recorded in the Press Freedom Index in Africa 2022-2024, situations in which incidents of violence including the killing of journalists have been reported include the Sahel, Cameroon, DRC, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan among others. Incidents of attacks and violence on media practitioners and journalists have also been reported in recent protests staged in Kenya and Nigeria. In Somalia, in the course of 2023, a report from the Somali Journalists Syndicate (SJS) documented numerous violent attacks, threats, and instances of persecution against media workers in the country. Somalia is widely regarded as one of the most dangerous places for journalists to work.

It is worth noting that women journalists and media practitioners face much higher levels of danger on account of the gendered nature of conflicts and crises. Apart from compounding the already small number of women media practitioners, such a gendered nature of attacks on women journalists has even greater adverse consequences in terms of giving voice to and capturing the disproportionately higher levels of dangers that women and girls are exposed to in conflict settings. In addition to these, the stigmatisation and stereotypical portrayal of women in conflict and crisis reporting, lack of women-owned media, underrepresentation of women in leadership roles, unethical reporting practices, and a failure to engage with survivors of violence, especially women and girls are more examples of challenges of journalism in the gender-inclusivity context. As it is to be recalled, the PSC during its 635^th meeting held on 20 October 2016, dedicated to the theme ‘The role of the media in enhancing accountability on women, peace and security commitments in Africa’, stressed the need for, among other things, ‘…media reporting to be context-sensitive, as well as to take into consideration existing gender and power relations.’ This was followed by the launch of the Network of Reporters on Women, Peace and Security jointly by the AU Commission and UN Women on 21 October 2016, an initiative to recognise media as a key partner in advancing the women, peace and security agenda.

Taking note of the growing challenges of misinformation and disinformation as well as hate speech in the context of new digital technologies and the acuteness of these challenges in crisis and conflict settings, the session will underscore the importance of the protection of journalists and factual reporting. In the same context, the session is expected to reflect on the positioning, status and treatment of new forms of media namely bloggers, vloggers, content creators, influencers and a myriad of new media actors in the collection, treatment and diffusion of information in crisis contexts and emergencies. In this context, on 4 August 2022, PSC’s 1097^th session dedicated under the theme of ‘Emerging Technologies and New Media: Impact on Democratic Governance, Peace and Security in Africa,’ highlighted ‘the need for the AU Commission to comprehensively and systematically address the immediate issues that arise from emerging technologies and new media, including the use of such emerging technologies and new media by actors engaged in terrorism and organised crime, the misuse of social media for propagation of hate, and the use of such technologies for surveillance, repression, censorship, online harassment and orchestrating cyber-attacks.’ Moreover, the session requested ‘the AU Commission in collaboration with relevant stakeholders to undertake a comprehensive study on Emerging Technologies and New Media: Impact on Democratic Governance, Peace and Security in Africa and the policy options available for harnessing the advantages and for effectively addressing the security threats associated with the use of these technologies and new media in Africa, based on available resources and to report back to Council.’

While there are six ‘Group of Friends for the Safety of Journalists’ globally, there is none in Africa. The six Group of Friends have been formed by permanent missions at the UN Secretariat in New York, UNESCO in Paris, OHCHR in Geneva, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna, the Council of Europe (CoE) in Strasbourg and the Organisation of American States (OAS) in Washington. As such, tomorrow’s session may serve as an opportunity for the establishment of the Group of Friends for the Protection of Journalists in Africa, building on the Network of reporters on Women, Peace and Security launched in 2022 as noted above.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the plight of journalists and other media practitioners in active conflict situations. In this regard, it may stress the important role that the media can play as an agent of peace through factual and professional reporting. The PSC may commend the rich jurisprudence and elaboration of soft laws on freedom of expression, access to information and the protection of journalists by the ACHPR and urge AU member States to draw on and respect these soft laws and the decisions of the ACHPR. The PSC may further stress the need for member states to create an enabling environment for media including through the adoption and implementation of the law on access to information in accordance with the Model Law as a critical step for enabling journalists and media practitioners to play their role of informing the public and providing factual information critical to policy making including factual information and reporting critical to the planning, designing and implementation of initiatives for peace and for fighting misinformation, disinformation and hate speech, thereby contributing to the achievement of Agenda 2063 and the goal of silencing the guns in Africa by the year 2030. The PSC may also call on AU member states to further strengthen their legal frameworks, combat impunity against journalists and guarantee the safety and security of media personnel. It may also reiterate its 635^th session on the need for media reporting to be context-sensitive, as well as to take into consideration existing gender and power relations. PSC may also call for the adoption of targeted measures for the protection in particular of women journalists and media practitioners considering the disproportionately higher level of risk facing women media practitioners and their small number. The PSC may also call for the formation of a ‘Group of Friends for the Safety of Journalists in Africa’ similar to other continents, with the objective of enhancing multilateral cooperation, preventing violence, protecting journalists at risk, prosecuting perpetrators and creating a safe environment for media workers. The PSC may also call on all member states, which have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the AU Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (Malabo Convention).

Tomorrow (5 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1220^th meeting to brainstorm on the Summit of the Future. The meeting is expected to be held as an open session.

Following opening remarks from Miguel Cesar Domingos Bembe, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Angola to the AU and PSC Chairperson for July 2024, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to deliver a statement. Emilia Ndinelao Mkusa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the AU is also expected to make a statement alongside Stephan Auer, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Ethiopia and representatives from the United Nations (UN) Office to the AU (UNOAU) and the European Union (EU) Delegation to the AU.

The meeting is being convened following the adoption of UN75 Declaration by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2020 which tasked the UN Secretary-General António Guterres to give prospective recommendations to enhance global governance following the exponential  threats and minimum progress in implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. This subsequently led to the secretary-general releasing the report, ‘Our Common Agenda’ on 5 August 2021, which gave an outfit of his vision for the future of multilateralism, in which he proposed to have the ‘Summit of the Future’, which is to be convened in September 2024 in New York.

Under the theme, ‘Summit of the Future: Multilateral Solutions for a Better Tomorrow’, the upcoming summit is expected to converge leaders from across the world, to enhance efforts to accelerate progress on current global commitments and address emerging challenges, with the aim of revitalising the multilateral system. The summit will culminate in the endorsement of a negotiated document called the ‘Pact for the Future’ – to be adopted by consensus – which will focus on Sustainable Development and Financing for Development; International Peace and Security; Science, Technology and Innovation and Digital Cooperation; The Rights of Youth and Future Generations; and Transforming Global Governance. The Pact for the Future is a global commitment to address the importance of human rights, gender equality and the ‘need to leave no one behind.’ The zero draft Pact of the Future additionally calls for increased funding for sustainable development and peacebuilding efforts and highlights the need for new models of peace operations to address the evolving nature of conflict. To achieve this, the Pact calls for increased funding for sustainable development and peacebuilding, alongside new approaches to peacekeeping that can adapt to the changing nature of conflict.

The developments leading into the Summit of the Future have been led by Germany and Namibia. They released a starting point for zero draft of the Pact of the Future in January 2024. Before that, there were discussions in late 2023 where many countries and other groups gave their ideas. In July 2023, the UN Secretary-General proposed a new approach to peace and security (“A New Agenda for Peace” – NA4P) which underscored the need to strengthen the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, recognising that regional organisations, like the AU, are the critical building blocks of multilateral cooperation and central to conflict prevention, management and resolution. UN Secretary-General highlighted the significance of peace support operations as a key area of cooperation between the UN and AU and emphasised the need for reliable, predictable and sustainable funding for such operations.

Noteworthy, the AU has a number of existing policies and common positions that can be adapted to assist in drafting a common position for the Pact for the Future. It is important for the AU to highlight these to its member states to enable the region to negotiate as a collective bloc, which would benefit Africa’s overall development. Specifically, the AU can draw from the following:

Chapter 1: Sustainable Development and Financing for Development:

• Agenda 2063 – The AU’s strategic framework for socio-economic transformation.

Chapter 2: International Peace and Security:

• AU’s understanding on Resolution 2719.
• Common African Position on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Chapter 3 – Science, Technology, Innovation and Digital Cooperation

Chapter 4 – Youth and Future Generations

Chapter 5 – Transforming Global Governance:

• Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations (Ezulwini Consensus)

Over and beyond, stakeholder engagements have occurred, offering insights for developing common positions among African States and exploring AU positions. From 9 to 11 May 2024, a UN Civil Society Conference took place in Nairobi, Kenya which provided preliminary discussions and data ahead of the Summit of the Future. UN outreach efforts were also conducted at regional and country levels between February and April 2024, including regional fora. Furthermore, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) hosted the tenth Africa Regional Forum on Sustainable Development (ARFSD-10) from 23 to 25 April 2024 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to, among others, mobilise Africa’s priorities and inputs for the Summit of the Future. In conjunction with the Pact for the Future zero draft, a Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations was developed. Co-facilitated by Sweden and Zambia, the Global Digital Compact underwent informal consultations from February to May 2024. Notably, it underwent three readings: the first on 5 April 2024, the second on 2 May 2024 and the third on 16 May 2024. The Netherlands and Fiji originally co-facilitated the Declaration on Future Generations, with Jamaica succeeding Fiji as co-facilitator and the informal consultations took place in January 2024 and virtual consultations with stakeholders on the 15 and 16 January. Written inputs were provided by 26 February enabling a zero draft on the Declaration, which was circulated in March. To date, there have been four readings, the first reading on 8 April, second reading on 14 May, third reading on 10 June and the fourth reading on the 26 June 2024.

In relation to this, Amani Africa has also been instrumental and resourceful in contributing to the developments leading to the Summit of the Future, with publications and organising events. Its Policy Brief titled: Africa and Peace and Security Diplomacy in a Time of the New Agenda for Peace, released in June 2023, provided thoughts on crisis management (peace and security) diplomacy in the changing global order through the prism of what this means for Africa and its role. The policy brief recommended a multifaceted approach to peacebuilding that extends beyond military solutions. An approach that should leverage regional organisations, development tools and non-military means for conflict prevention, such as early warning systems and addressing the root causes of conflict. The policy brief further emphasised the importance of strong regional partnerships and a networked multilateral system for effective peacebuilding efforts. In addition, it was also recommended that peacebuilding efforts extend beyond conflict resolution to include delegitimising war economies, supporting local communities and fostering regional cooperation in post-conflict situations. The policy brief also acknowledged the emergence of new threats like pandemics and climate change, necessitating the development of updated diplomatic strategies, and called for strengthened arms control efforts to address traditional threats like nuclear weapons. It also underscored the critical role of robust humanitarian diplomacy in protecting civilians caught in conflict and maintaining legitimacy in a complex global landscape. This emphasis included utilising frameworks like Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Youth, Peace and Security (YPS), alongside broader civilian protection measures.

Building on this, in February 2024, Amani Africa released a Dispatch on Why Africa needs a new strategy on how to position itself in the face of tectonic global shifts and the quest for reform of multilateralism. In addition Amani Africa’s Special Research Report: Africa and the Summit of the Future: Seizing the New Window of Opportunity for the Reform of the UN Security Council, released in June 2024, dissected the renewed push for the reform of the UNSC, and how Africa comes in, in this push for reform. In general, the special research report highlights the historical point of view of Africa not being well-represented when the UN was formed, and today, the continent lacking permanent seats in the Security Council, and having limited non-permanent ones. The desired outcome however from the recommendations of the research outlined that Africa wants a UNSC that is: more just: Fixes the historical imbalance in representation; more effective: Addresses global peace and security challenges better; and more reflective of today’s world: Represents the rise of multipolarity (more than just a few powerful countries). In this regard, Amani Africa underscored that the Summit of the Future will not change how the Security Council works, rather it will be a stepping stone for future reforms.

Subsequently, Amani Africa has organised a series of events on this discourse since July 2023 under the Joint Namibia and Amani Africa high-level panel of experts on Africa and the reform of the multilateral system project. On 17 to 18 July 2023, Namibia and Amani Africa jointly convened the meeting of a High-Level Panel of Experts on Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System held in Windhoek, Namibia, which brought together experts to deliberate on the nature of the multidimensional changes or transformations taking place in the world, the challenges and opportunities these developments present for Africa in its engagement in the multilateral system and the negotiating position that Africa needs to articulate to secure its interest in the ongoing varied processes for the reform/transformation of the multilateral system, including for redressing the historical injustice of Africa’s exclusion from the UN Security Council. This led to the adoption of a strategic document articulating the objectives, methodology and program of work of the panel of experts towards elaborating a report on ‘Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System.’

On 26 September 2023, at the sidelines of the UNGA 78, the continuation of the series of events of the High-level Panel took place in New York with the Africa and the transformation of the Multilateral System – Side Event in which the discussion centred on Africa’s desired outcomes from the reform of the multilateral system. The core concerns from the event were how to ensure Africa has a strong voice and can achieve its development goals. These included reforming financial and trade structures, as well as securing a more just and influential role in the UN Security Council, potentially including permanent membership. Beyond just a veto on the Council, the discussion explored other ways for Africa to contribute meaningfully to global peace and security. Amani Africa also convened a Dialogue on the New Agenda for Peace: Reimagining the UN-AU Partnership in Peace and Security on 12 December 2023 which converged stakeholders from the UN, AU and other independent entities in the space of peace and security in Africa, to discuss how to strengthen the partnership between the UN and AU in maintaining peace and security in the continent.

On 14 to 15 December 2023, Amani Africa convened the joint Namibia-Amani Africa High-Level Panel of Experts on Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System in Nairobi, Kenya, which served as a platform to consider the draft report of the High-Level Panel on the reform of the multilateral system. The Final Convening of the Joint Namibia-Amani Africa High-Level Panel on Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System was held on 18 to 19 March 2024 in Addis Ababa which saw discussions delving into reflections on global digital architecture and Africa’s place in shaping norms for the regulation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other Transformative Technology; Reflections on Reform of Global Financial Architecture and Establishment of AU Financial Institution; Reflections on UNSC Reform – which focused on options and pathways for Africa’s equitable representation. The high-level panel also focused on multilateral negotiations on Climate Change and enhancing Africa’s negotiation architecture on climate change; and Reflections on ‘AU as a pillar of reformed multilateralism’ with a particular interest in Resolution 2719 and AU at G20 as signifiers. This convening provided the platform for the finalisation of the High-level report on the reform of the multilateral system.

Tomorrow’s meeting therefore will serve as a platform for the AU to involve its member states and other stakeholders to discuss on how to address current and future challenges, and restore trust in multilateralism ahead of the ‘Action Day(s)’ on 20 to 21 September 2024, which will prompt additional action and commitments from member states, civil society and other stakeholders. The cardinal elements that will guide the AU to augment Africa’s peace and security priorities will be the push to reform the UNSC; A new peace operation doctrine that surpasses traditional peacekeeping in favour of the realities on the ground; A reaffirmation of the primacy of politics – which involve resolving conflict through dialogue and not militarily. More so, the discourse on the reform of the Global Financial Architecture (GFA) is of significance, alongside (a just) climate change agenda; a global digital architecture; an Effective Representation of Africa in the G20; and women and youth representation. In this regard, a reformed multilateral system should be guided by a number of principles which include representation, in essence, having a seat the decision-making table. Second, equity, fairness and justice. Third, equality of the dignity of all nations and peoples; transparency; and lastly, the reaffirmation of commitment for the principles of the UN Charter and international law.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique or a summary record. Council may commend the contributions of member states, partners and civil society for their contribution to the preparation to the Summit of the Future, and particularly extend its appreciation to Namibia and Germany who are co-facilitating the Summit. Council may also call for strengthened cooperation and coordination among member states to address current and emerging peace and security challenges on the continent. Council may also raise awareness of the preparations for the Summit of the Future and mobilise the member state’s contribution to the draft Pact of the Future in addressing Africa’s priorities and common positions to be included in the Summit of the Future on peace and security and global governance. Council may urge AU member states to actively engage in the Summit of the Future and promote common positions to increase the voice of Africa as a region and also to renew multilateral system support to the realisation of the AU’s Agenda 2063 aspirations and silencing the guns flagship project. Furthermore, the meeting may provide guidance on approaches Africa should adopt to reflect its interests and voice in the Pact for the Future.

Tomorrow (15 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will be convening an open session, within the framework of the 20^th anniversary of the official launch of the PSC, which aims to afford the opportunity for reflecting on the implementation of the Protocol Establishing the AU PSC (PSC Protocol).

As usual, the PSC will commence the session with opening remarks by the Chairperson for the month, Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is also expected to deliver introductory remarks. Professor Timothy Murithi, Head of the Peacebuilding Interventions Programme, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) will be facilitating tomorrow’s stocktaking PSC session and will also be delivering a presentation. Being the major research institutes engaged in the work of the PSC, Amani Africa Media and Research Services and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) are also invited to deliver presentations.

In addition to PSC member states, tomorrow’s session is expected to bring together representatives of all other AU member states as well as representatives of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).

The open session is expected to explore various issues pertaining to the implementation of the various parts of the PSC Protocol. In this respect, it is expected that the session will identify the aspects of the PSC Protocol that have not been implemented, those other areas that are poorly implemented and those parts whose implementation doesn’t align with the spirit and letters of the Protocol. It is recognised even on the part of the PSC that two decades after its operationalisation the implementation of the various parts of the Protocol is uneven. This is not completely surprising nor is it uncommon in other similar bodies.

Considering that the PSC only have very finite resources and limited institutional capacity, the issue that is of strategic importance for the credibility and effectiveness of the PSC is how it utilises its time, diplomatic resources, legal powers and moral and political authority to deliver on the core of its mandates – prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The cases where the PSC engaged successfully indicate that the PSC is effective when it makes effective use of the key tools of conflict prevention, management and resolution. For example, in 2012 the PSC exercised its conflict prevention role successfully through a decision that articulated a robust framework for averting the descent of South Sudan and Sudan into a full-fledged war following skirmishes over the Heglig oil fields. PSC’s decision not only pulled the two countries from the brink but also provided the impetus for the peace process that led to the signing of a peace agreement on various outstanding issues post the independence of South Sudan.

Tomorrow’s session thus affords the PSC and the wider AU Member States to engage in critical reflections on how to enhance, consolidate and activate the implementation of those aspects of the PSC Protocol central to the delivery of its core mandates. The peace and security landscape of the continent is such that rather than seeking to implement all parts of the PSC Protocol particular attention should be given to rationalising the work of the PSC for prioritising the effectiveness of early warning and early response, preventive diplomacy and the mobilisation of sustained and robust conflict management and resolution strategy dedicated to each of the various hotpots on the continent with focus on the major one in the Sahel, Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions. Such a dedicated strategy with effective follow-through is a prerequisite for containing and mitigating the spread and escalation of conflicts and creating conditions for their resolution. This underscores that while it is worthwhile to map out the gaps and inadequacies in the implementation of the various parts of the PSC, enhancing and fully implementing those aspects of the PSC Protocol central to the core mandate of the PSC merits prioritisation.

No outcome document is expected to be adopted from tomorrow’s stocktaking session.