On 1 July, the United States (US) Mission to the African Union (AU) (USAU) informed the AU that when the renewal of the mandate of the African Union (AU) Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM) comes up in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December 2026, the US would not support the renewal of the mandate ‘if it includes UNSOS (UN Support Office in Somalia) or any UN logistical and operational support.’

This announcement represents a death knell for a mission that already faces an existential crisis. Yet, depending on how the end of AUSSOM is managed and the level of greater responsibility that Somali leaders are willing to assume, safeguarding the fundamentals of the security gains and avoiding disorganised exit are not impossible.

AUSSOM is the latest iteration of AU’s long-running and largest peace support operations, which came into existence nearly two decades ago in March 2007. Operating in an environment where the UN was unable and unwilling to deploy, the mission, as the primary security entity for the maintenance of international peace and security in Somalia, received UN logistics support from UN assessed contributions since 2009, delivered through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) until 2015 and UNOAS successor, UNSOS, from November 2015 to date.

UNSOS provides a wide range of supplies critical to the functioning of the mission, ranging from life support and operational services, fuel and maintenance, movement and transportation support to reimbursement of contingent self-sustainment costs, all of which are critical to the survival of the mission. Arguably, in the face of the huge financial deficit facing AUSSOM, it is not clear how the mission can survive without these critical supplies from UNSOS.

An operation that registered substantial gains, with immeasurable price, that Somalia struggles to consolidate  

AUSSOM and its predecessor missions made substantial contributions in Somalia. Most importantly, they paved the way for the re-establishment of state institutions and authority across a large swath of territory. This was realised by wresting control of such territories from the armed militant terrorist group, Al Shabaab, with several thousand women and men that served under the AU flag for advancing international peace and security paying an immeasurable price with their lives and limbs.

After 19 years, Somalia’s failure to mobilise and deploy security forces capable of consolidating the territorial gains secured by the AU mission at the required scale and pace has resulted in a mission creep, as the AU’s operation had to cover for the responsibilities of both Somalia and the international community. As pointed out in an earlier analysis, the result is that the military approach has come to take primacy and the prolonged presence of the AU peace operation is used to perpetually shortchange the required investment in a political strategy and the effective rebuilding of Somali security forces.

With the mission rendered incapable of pursuing a realistic mission exit plan that can be implemented within agreed timelines, it found itself in the unenviable position of continuing its operations against Al Shabaab not only in the absence of a workable political strategy but also with ever-shrinking sources of funding.

The announcement by the US has come at a time when financial, operational and political sustenance of the mission has increasingly become a major area of policy concern on the part of the AU, as revealed in the analysis of the 1342^nd session of the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

Financially, despite the conservative $166.5 million budget of the mission for the June 2025 to July 2026 period, only a fraction of the budget was raised, even after various efforts. To make matters worse, AUSSOM inherited substantial debt from its predecessor, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Outstanding arrears owed to TCCs from 2022 to 2024 amount to $93.9 million. The mission had to find ways of accommodating the $130 million reduction from the approved UNSOS budget of $520 million for the financial year June 2025 to July 2026.

Not surprisingly, this was one of several areas of major concern that the PSC expressed during its most recent meeting relating to AUSSOM during its 1342^nd session. Expressing deep concern over the lack of predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for AUSSOM, the PSC recommended the use of part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment, including the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), to ‘substantially’ contribute to addressing funding gaps in the mission’s 2025 and 2026 budgets.

Following the communication from the US and the resultant near unviability of AUSSOM without UNSOS, any amount of such manoeuvre on the part of the AU is unlikely to save the mission beyond December 2026.

Politically and strategically, the slow pace of mobilisation and deployment of Somali security forces has been the centre of major concern. When the summit of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) was held in Kampala in April 2025, this led the summit to propose the TCCs plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism as an oversight, accountability, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of AUSSOM and the Somalia Security and Development Plan. However, this proposal was left out of the final outcome of the summit due to opposition from Somalia.

This persisting lack of the requisite progress in organizing, building and deploying security capability for taking over responsibility led the PSC at its 1342^nd session to once again urge the government ‘to enhance force generation, regeneration and capacity building, including the recruitment of Community/ Local Defence Forces (LDFs), and mobile forces to hold areas, and undertake operations as part of the clear, hold and build strategy, so as to preserve the gains made and as an overarching factor to inform the exit strategy.’ Recognising the inadequacies on the part of Somalia in holding areas liberated from Al Shabaab, the PSC additionally urged the Government ‘to support effective stabilisation programs in the areas liberated from Al Shabaab…as well as the establishment of effective state institutions.’

These issues correspond with the explanations the US gave for its position that the USAU communicated to the AU in its letter of 1 July 2026. The US stated that ‘[d]espite more than a decade of international support, Somalia has been unable to sustain progress against al-Shabaab, take ownership of its security functions, or undertake serious security sector reform.’ It went on to state that ‘[i]nternal rivalries and political infighting continue to undermine the fight against al-Shabaab and ISIS, and the benefits of international support will remain limited until Somalia’s leaders unite to address the country’s security and governance challenges.’

The options for AUSSOM policy makers

It is anticipated that the letter from the US could trigger the convening of an urgent meeting of the TCCs and the PSC. On 3 July, AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) convened ‘an information briefing’ for the Defence Attachés of the TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) of AUSSOM.

Ironically, the US letter may end up being the catalyst for the implementation of the call that the PSC made including during its 1342^nd session ‘for the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss on the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit detailed report with their recommendations for Council’s consideration.’ However, the new dynamics that the US letter introduced are sure to necessitate the updating of the options prepared in 2025.

In terms of the next course of actions, the first of the steps that could be taken is to develop a contingency plan for an orderly exit of AUSSOM. The remaining six months should provide the window that the AU could use for revising and implementing the exit plan of the mission.

To avoid major reversal of the gains secured by AU operations, the AU along with the UN and TCCs/PCCs as well as host country would need to develop a plan for a short transitional arrangement of providing security support beyond December 2026. Parallel to that, consideration should be given to enable Somalia in how to leverage the growing bilateral support from countries such as Turkey that Somalia has come to rely on more heavily (see here and here) for filling in some of the vacuum that the departure of AUSSOM may induce. This is also likely to include mobilisation of support for the sustenance and possible expansion by some of the TCCs of AUSSOM of their bilateral deployment.

However, such a shift from a multilateral to a bilateral arrangement would not resolve the fundamental issues that inhibited the translation of the security gains that the AUSSOM and its predecessor missions secured into strategic success in Somalia.

Thus, beyond managing the consequences of the end of UNSOS, the notice that the US gave could be used as an opportunity for the much-needed shift of the primary focus of AU support to be on the primacy of politics in the search for resolving the crisis in Somalia. This would mean adopting as part of the existing plan a strategy for transitioning AUSSOM into a political mission in the same way the AU transitioned its mission in Mali into the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHL).

While the US plan to unplug UNSOS would cripple AUSSOM and induce a short-term policy crisis, paradoxically, it may also end up being the catalyst for ending the complacency and opening up space for putting in place a workable peace plan that both commands the firm support and commitment of various Somali political and social forces and ensures the sustained and well-paced mobilisation and deployment of national security forces for taking over security responsibility. Indeed, such a shift, along with the prioritisation of political strategy, may induce Somalia’s political and social forces to extend far greater support for and invest more resolutely in prioritising national reconciliation and inclusive political settlement than advancing partisan self-interest, thereby perpetually outsourcing national responsibility.

Zekarias Beshah, Senior Researcher, Amani Africa

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

The weakest link in Somalia’s quest to end the protracted conflict is the fragmentation and infighting between the political elites of the country. The constitutional revision process and the conduct of elections have become major sites of power struggle and confrontation between rival political elites, although these are not the only sites of confrontation between these elites.

Five years ago, the expiry of the terms of parliament and the president in December 2020 and February 2021 respectively, without any political consensus on the time and modality of elections plunged Somalia into a constitutional crisis and political uncertainty. In a development that mimicked the resultant violent confrontation of April 2021, Somalia’s weakest link struck again as political leaders failed to agree on a constitutional amendment and the modality for holding parliamentary and presidential elections.

On 3 June, fighting erupted in Mogadishu between government forces and armed groups loyal to opposition leaders near the residences of former Prime Minister Hassan Khaire and former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The clashes occurred ahead of a planned protest scheduled for 4 June against the one-year extension of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term, which opponents argue expired in mid-May. The confrontation continued into 4 June before subsiding following mediated talks.

The latest violence is the culmination of months of growing tensions between the FGS and opposition forces organised under the Somali Future Council—a coalition established in October 2025 by the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland, together with other opposition figures, to coordinate positions on major national issues, including constitutional amendment, notably those relating to electoral reform and the role of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) vis-à-vis Federal Member States (FMS).

Five years ago, Somalia plunged into political and security turmoil after the lower house of Somalia’s parliament adopted a bill extending its own term of office and that of the President and President Farmajo’s assenting of the bill into a ‘Special Election Law’ purporting to return Somalia to a one-person one-vote electoral model. The latest eruption of political showdown and armed confrontation in Mogadishu followed, as in April 2021, the adoption by Somalia’s bicameral Federal Parliament of amendments to the 2012 Provisional Constitution, among others, extending the terms of the Federal Parliament and the President from four to five years and introducing a highly contested direct electoral system. Just like former President Farmajo, President Mohamud did exactly what he opposed five years ago and signed the constitutional amendments into law on 8 March. As in 2021 (which sought to extend elections by two years), the constitutional changes extended the incumbent president’s tenure by one year beyond its expiry on 15 May and postponed federal elections until 2027.

As in 2021, opposition groups have strongly rejected the constitutional changes. They argued that the changes were adopted unilaterally and without the broad political consensus required for such fundamental reforms. Consequently, they do not recognise the extension of President Mohamud’s mandate and maintain that his constitutional term ended in May.

The political impasse that these amendments and Mohamud’s continuation in power after the expiry of his term in May eventually escalated into armed confrontation, when opposition groups sought to stage protests on 4 June. It was against this backdrop that the opposition sought to organise demonstrations in Mogadishu on 4 June, but the deployment by the Government of security forces to the residences of the former Prime Minister and former President amid rising tension tipped the situation into armed confrontation.

The confrontation has alarmed both domestic and international actors because of the risk that the escalation could spiral into a broader and less controllable conflict. Such an outcome would have profound implications for Somalia’s fragile stability and could undermine years of hard-won security gains achieved in the fight against Al-Shabaab. There are growing concerns that the militant group could exploit political divisions and security vacuums created by the crisis to expand its influence and operational reach.

International and regional actors responded swiftly to the violence. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission called on all parties to cease hostilities immediately, exercise maximum restraint, protect civilians, and avoid actions that could further escalate tensions. The Chairperson also urged Somali stakeholders to resolve their differences through dialogue and established constitutional mechanisms. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) called for de-escalation to protect Somalia’s stability and future. Similarly, the United Nations Secretary-General issued a statement, underscoring the urgent need for all stakeholders to resume dialogue and identify a way forward to preserve the progress Somalia has achieved over recent years.

Although the immediate violence appears to have subsided following intense mediation efforts by traditional leaders and international actors, the underlying political disagreements remain unresolved, leaving open the possibility of renewed escalation.

Beyond the immediate security implications, the crisis constitutes a major test of Somalia’s state-building project, the resilience of its institutions, and the maturity of political actors in managing disputes before they evolve into wider conflict. The developments also warrant close attention from international partners, particularly the AU, which has deployed peace support operations in Somalia since 2007 and secured substantial, albeit fragile, security gains through the sacrifice of the lives and limbs of thousands.

The timing of the crisis is particularly concerning given the challenges facing the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The mission is currently grappling with significant political, operational, and financial constraints as it seeks to preserve security gains and support the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somali forces.

For years, Somali political actors have continued to defer the assumption of full responsibility, as they continue to outsource security responsibility with their heavy reliance on AU-led security support. Despite notable progress, Somalia, on account of the weakest link in the equation for its stability, has yet to develop the level of institutional and security capacities necessary to fully assume responsibility for its own security. The latest political confrontation, if not resolved promptly, undermines confidence about progress for achieving a level of organisation and capability of Somalia’s security institutions for them to assume full security responsibility.

The crisis also reinforces a broader lesson for the AU: security interventions alone cannot provide a sustainable solution to Somalia’s challenges. Without an accompanying political strategy capable of addressing the underlying causes of instability and fostering political consensus, even significant security achievements remain vulnerable to reversal. AU’s interest and role are not just that of any third party. It has a direct and major stake in what is unfolding in Somalia and as such cannot afford to simply limit its engagement for de-escalating the situation and securing agreement on the holding of elections at the level of issuing statements.

First, as it did during the April 2021 political crisis, the AU Peace and Security Council could convene an emergency session to provide strategic guidance and adopt firm and principled policy decisions for urgent consensus on the holding of elections. In 2021, the PSC condemned the extension of the mandate of the president and the parliament. Second, the Chairperson of the AU Commission could undertake a high-level diplomatic mission to Mogadishu to engage directly with key stakeholders and encourage a negotiated resolution to the crisis. Third, the AU could work with IGAD, the United Nations, and international partners with leverage on Somali political actors—including the United States and Türkiye—to establish a coordinated mediation framework aimed at establishing a consensual and mutually acceptable arrangement for holding elections, while creating conditions for a broader political settlement that permanently ends Somalia’s weakest link.

In the short term, one of the intriguing questions is whether the incumbent, President Mohamud, would succeed in what his predecessor, former President Farmajo, tried and failed five years ago. This will determine the trajectory of the political dimension of Somalia’s protracted conflict.

Zekarias Beshah, Senior Researcher, Amani Africa

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

The weakest link in Somalia’s quest to end the protracted conflict is the fragmentation and infighting between the political elites of the country. The constitutional revision process and the conduct of elections have become major sites of power struggle and confrontation between rival political elites, although these are not the only sites of confrontation between these elites.

Five years ago, the expiry of the terms of parliament and the president in December 2020 and February 2021 respectively, without any political consensus on the time and modality of elections plunged Somalia into a constitutional crisis and political uncertainty. In a development that mimicked the resultant violent confrontation of April 2021, Somalia’s weakest link struck again as political leaders failed to agree on a constitutional amendment and the modality for holding parliamentary and presidential elections.

On 3 June, fighting erupted in Mogadishu between government forces and armed groups loyal to opposition leaders near the residences of former Prime Minister Hassan Khaire and former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The clashes occurred ahead of a planned protest scheduled for 4 June against the one-year extension of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term, which opponents argue expired in mid-May. The confrontation continued into 4 June before subsiding following mediated talks.

The latest violence is the culmination of months of growing tensions between the FGS and opposition forces organised under the Somali Future Council—a coalition established in October 2025 by the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland, together with other opposition figures, to coordinate positions on major national issues, including constitutional amendment, notably those relating to electoral reform and the role of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) vis-à-vis Federal Member States (FMS).

Five years ago, Somalia plunged into political and security turmoil after the lower house of Somalia’s parliament adopted a bill extending its own term of office and that of the President and President Farmajo’s assenting of the bill into a ‘Special Election Law’ purporting to return Somalia to a one-person one-vote electoral model. The latest eruption of political showdown and armed confrontation in Mogadishu followed, as in April 2021, the adoption by Somalia’s bicameral Federal Parliament of amendments to the 2012 Provisional Constitution, among others, extending the terms of the Federal Parliament and the President from four to five years and introducing a highly contested direct electoral system. Just like former President Farmajo, President Mohamud did exactly what he opposed five years ago and signed the constitutional amendments into law on 8 March. As in 2021 (which sought to extend elections by two years), the constitutional changes extended the incumbent president’s tenure by one year beyond its expiry on 15 May and postponed federal elections until 2027.

As in 2021, opposition groups have strongly rejected the constitutional changes. They argued that the changes were adopted unilaterally and without the broad political consensus required for such fundamental reforms. Consequently, they do not recognise the extension of President Mohamud’s mandate and maintain that his constitutional term ended in May.

The political impasse that these amendments and Mohamud’s continuation in power after the expiry of his term in May eventually escalated into armed confrontation, when opposition groups sought to stage protests on 4 June. It was against this backdrop that the opposition sought to organise demonstrations in Mogadishu on 4 June, but the deployment by the Government of security forces to the residences of the former Prime Minister and former President amid rising tension tipped the situation into armed confrontation.

The confrontation has alarmed both domestic and international actors because of the risk that the escalation could spiral into a broader and less controllable conflict. Such an outcome would have profound implications for Somalia’s fragile stability and could undermine years of hard-won security gains achieved in the fight against Al-Shabaab. There are growing concerns that the militant group could exploit political divisions and security vacuums created by the crisis to expand its influence and operational reach.

International and regional actors responded swiftly to the violence. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission called on all parties to cease hostilities immediately, exercise maximum restraint, protect civilians, and avoid actions that could further escalate tensions. The Chairperson also urged Somali stakeholders to resolve their differences through dialogue and established constitutional mechanisms. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) called for de-escalation to protect Somalia’s stability and future. Similarly, the United Nations Secretary-General issued a statement, underscoring the urgent need for all stakeholders to resume dialogue and identify a way forward to preserve the progress Somalia has achieved over recent years.

Although the immediate violence appears to have subsided following intense mediation efforts by traditional leaders and international actors, the underlying political disagreements remain unresolved, leaving open the possibility of renewed escalation.

Beyond the immediate security implications, the crisis constitutes a major test of Somalia’s state-building project, the resilience of its institutions, and the maturity of political actors in managing disputes before they evolve into wider conflict. The developments also warrant close attention from international partners, particularly the AU, which has deployed peace support operations in Somalia since 2007 and secured substantial, albeit fragile, security gains through the sacrifice of the lives and limbs of thousands.

The timing of the crisis is particularly concerning given the challenges facing the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The mission is currently grappling with significant political, operational, and financial constraints as it seeks to preserve security gains and support the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somali forces.

For years, Somali political actors have continued to defer the assumption of full responsibility, as they continue to outsource security responsibility with their heavy reliance on AU-led security support. Despite notable progress, Somalia, on account of the weakest link in the equation for its stability, has yet to develop the level of institutional and security capacities necessary to fully assume responsibility for its own security. The latest political confrontation, if not resolved promptly, undermines confidence about progress for achieving a level of organisation and capability of Somalia’s security institutions for them to assume full security responsibility.

The crisis also reinforces a broader lesson for the AU: security interventions alone cannot provide a sustainable solution to Somalia’s challenges. Without an accompanying political strategy capable of addressing the underlying causes of instability and fostering political consensus, even significant security achievements remain vulnerable to reversal. AU’s interest and role are not just that of any third party. It has a direct and major stake in what is unfolding in Somalia and as such cannot afford to simply limit its engagement for de-escalating the situation and securing agreement on the holding of elections at the level of issuing statements.

First, as it did during the April 2021 political crisis, the AU Peace and Security Council could convene an emergency session to provide strategic guidance and adopt firm and principled policy decisions for urgent consensus on the holding of elections. In 2021, the PSC condemned the extension of the mandate of the president and the parliament. Second, the Chairperson of the AU Commission could undertake a high-level diplomatic mission to Mogadishu to engage directly with key stakeholders and encourage a negotiated resolution to the crisis. Third, the AU could work with IGAD, the United Nations, and international partners with leverage on Somali political actors—including the United States and Türkiye—to establish a coordinated mediation framework aimed at establishing a consensual and mutually acceptable arrangement for holding elections, while creating conditions for a broader political settlement that permanently ends Somalia’s weakest link.

In the short term, one of the intriguing questions is whether the incumbent, President Mohamud, would succeed in what his predecessor, former President Farmajo, tried and failed five years ago. This will determine the trajectory of the political dimension of Somalia’s protracted conflict.