Consideration of the Report on Joint AU-FGS-UN Progress against Benchmarks and AUSSOM Configuration Plan

Consideration of the Report on Joint AU-FGS-UN Progress against Benchmarks and AUSSOM Configuration PlanDate | 27 April 2026

Tomorrow (28 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1342nd session to consider the report on joint African Union–Federal Government of Somalia–United Nations progress against benchmarks and the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) configuration plan.

The session will commence with opening remarks by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026, followed by introductory remarks from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The representatives of Somalia and the United Nations (UN) are also expected to deliver statements. El Hadji Ibrahima Diene, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia and Head of AUSSOM, is expected to present the report on joint AU-FGS-UN progress against benchmarks and the AUSSOM mission configuration plan.

The last time the PSC considered AUSSOM was during its 1330th session, convened in February at ministerial level, but a more directly related session of relevance to the progress report and mission configuration plan is the PSC’s 1287th session, which was also held at ministerial level in July 2025. At that session, the PSC recognized the evolving security context since the adoption of the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) for AUSSOM and requested the Commission to provide updates regarding the increased number and location of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), and their logistical support and aviation requirements, and to submit these new requirements within six weeks for consideration and transmission to the UN Security Council (UNSC), to enable continued United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) logistical support to AUSSOM on this basis. In line with this, UNSC Resolution 2809 (2025), which renewed AUSSOM’s mandate until the end of this year, encouraged the AU, jointly with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), to transmit to the Security Council updated plans for AUSSOM’s configuration by 30 April 2026. Further to that, the resolution, under its paragraph 27, requested the UN, jointly with the AU and FGS, and in consultation with donors, to continue regular, joint technical assessments of progress made, including against the benchmarks detailed in the joint AU-UN report of November 2024, and to provide an updated assessment of progress to the Security Council by 31 October 2026. The AU Commission is therefore submitting this joint report to the PSC for its consideration in light of the above requests.

The report has two components, merging the two requests above into a single document. The first is the report on progress against the seven benchmarks guiding the transition of security responsibilities in Somalia for the period from September 2025 to February 2026, while the second part provides a report on the AUSSOM configuration plan, which is shaped by the findings of the progress report against the seven benchmarks.

It is recalled that AUSSOM operations are to be undertaken in a four-phased approach (see below), starting from phase 1 of realignment of all AU troops from ATMIS, its predecessor, at the end of June 2025, to AUSSOM, through to phase 4, which envisages mission exit at the end of 2029. The first phase has been postponed twice by the PSC, during its 1287th and 1317th sessions, pending deployment by Egypt.

AUSSOM Head El Hadji is expected to brief the Council, highlighting key findings of the report. Among others, he is likely to highlight progress made against the seven benchmarks (preparation and planning for transition to AUSSOM; AUSSOM support to Somali Security Forces (SSF) offensive operations; progressive extension of state authority across recovered areas; development of the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF)/Somali Police Force (SPF) in line with defence and rule of law white papers; enhanced logistics support and sustainment for SNAF and AUSSOM; AUSSOM and SSF enhanced accountability and compliance; and post-mission management), key challenges, and considerations as the mission transition phases advance. Similarly, the briefing is expected to cover the second aspect of the report that assesses progress against the AUSSOM mandate, the joint operational environment and coordination with the FGS, accountability measures and protection of civilians, UNSOS adaptability to provide support and sustainment capacity to AUSSOM and SSF, as well as funding modalities.

The report paints a mixed picture of AUSSOM’s operations, with measurable success registered in discharging its mandate but also facing key challenges, which, without being addressed, could result in a significant reversal of security gains. The report confirms measurable progress in joint operational coordination, institutional development within Somali security institutions, and increasing Somali-led operational initiatives. Joint planning and operational coordination mechanisms between AUSSOM and SSF, such as the National Joint Operations Coordination Centre (JOCC) and the SSF-AUSSOM Joint Operations Centres (JOCs), are now functioning more coherently and consistently and have moved beyond ad hoc practices, improving coordination, information-sharing, and alignment with Somali-led security priorities. AUSSOM-SSF joint operations have delivered some tactical gains, including territorial recovery and improved security along key Main Supply Routes (MSRs), disrupted Al-Shabaab’s command structures, and contributed to increased defections and reduced recruitment capacity in some areas. Somali forces are showing growing operational initiative, with partner-supported enablers such as air operations playing a critical role in sustaining momentum against the terrorist group, reinforced by bilateral troop deployments in line with the decision of the extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government of the troop-contributing countries to AUSSOM, held in Kampala, Uganda, on 25 April 2025, adopting a ‘whole-of-government’ approach integrating military operations with political engagement. The report also finds that state authority is gradually expanding in recovered areas, with SSF increasing their presence and building community confidence, particularly in HirShabelle, Galmudug, and Southwest States. Progress has also been recorded in strengthening compliance and accountability frameworks, including the implementation of the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework, enhanced training on international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and the operationalisation of the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) and Boards of Inquiry, which enhance civilian protection, transparency, and operational legitimacy.

Despite these gains, the report highlights key challenges that make these gains fragile. Al-Shabaab remains resilient and adaptive, continuing asymmetric attacks, particularly through improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushes, and economic coercion. The territorial gains registered remain vulnerable to reversal, as the transition from ‘clear’ to ‘hold’ and ‘build’ is not consistently matched by government deployment, stabilisation efforts, and service delivery. AUSSOM is also constrained by structural and capability gaps. The mission is operating with reduced troop levels relative to its mandate, with current deployment in 49 locations against the envisaged 23 locations in the CONOPs. Critical capability gaps notably in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), mobility, aviation assets, and Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) persist. These gaps, together with the significant budget cuts of 25 per cent, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which remains the backbone of logistical support, have reduced operational support capacity, constraining mission sustainability and support to Somali-led operations. Most of all, the mission remains in an existential funding crisis.

As the report highlights, AUSSOM’s effectiveness and the success of the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somali forces depend on many factors. First and foremost, the mission’s effectiveness heavily depends on closing critical capability gaps, ensuring full deployment of enablers, and aligning force configuration with operational demands to avoid overstretch and sustain gains. It also depends on the Somali forces’ capacity generation, without which the transition may outpace local absorption capacity, leading to reversals. Sustainable, predictable, and adequate funding, as well as logistical support, remain central to the effectiveness of the mission, requiring stronger AU-UN coordination and broader partner engagement to close the prevailing funding and logistics gap and ensure a smooth exit. The severity of the challenges facing AUSSOM also highlights the imperative for taking decisions on force configuration that align with realistically supportable sustainment capacity.

There are a few key strategic issues that the report did not address. The first of these relates to the growing confrontation between the Federal Government and Federal Member states, the political instability and uncertainty arising from the lack of consensus about major constitutional issues and related governance challenges and the resultant vacuum these conditions create for Al Shabaab to take advantage of and with respect to force generation and in the fight against Al Shabaab. The other concerns the lack of strategic clarity about the conclusive end of the AU mission in the form that it has run since 2007, and the creation of conditions for Somali actors to end the perpetual outsourcing of the full responsibility that they should bear for their political and security governance. Instead of operating as a gap-filling multilateral support measure, the AU mission is increasingly being seen as a regime security instrument, thereby becoming an excuse for Somali actors not to get their acts together. This is neither compatible with the objective of a multilateral peace support operation nor the pathway for the resolution of the underlying factors of the security crisis, which require the Somali government to deliver on its part of the bargain through both setting up and making fully functional the institutions for assuming security responsibility and securing political consensus and national reconciliation.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may welcome the finalisation of the report on joint AU-FGS-UN progress against benchmarks and the AUSSOM mission configuration plan, adopt the same, and request the Commission to transmit it to the UN Security Council pursuant to the PSC’s 1287th session and UNSC Resolution 2809 (2025). Echoing the report, the PSC may welcome the operational momentum achieved against Al-Shabaab and the gradual strengthening of Somali institutions, but may also emphasise that the transition of responsibilities remains conditions-based and requires careful sequencing to ensure that drawdowns in AUSSOM do not outpace Somali absorption capacity or undermine recently consolidated gains. Beyond expressing concerns over the prevailing challenges that AUSSOM is currently facing, it may also emphasise the critical importance of sustainable, predictable, and adequate funding and logistical support for AUSSOM; the provision of adequate operational enablers such as aviation assets, ISR capabilities, and other force multipliers; accelerating capacity-building, force generation, and integrated operational planning mechanisms between AUSSOM and Somali forces; prioritising the security of key infrastructure and population centres to avoid overstretch; consolidating offensive operations with state presence through a ‘clear-hold-build’ approach; and adherence to the compliance and accountability framework. Again echoing the report, the PSC is also likely to establish an AU-FGS-UN monitoring and evaluation mechanism to track benchmark progress, operational conditions, and sustainment capacity.