Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa
Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in AfricaDate | 22 September 2026
Tomorrow (23 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1369th session at ministerial level in New York, on the margins of the 81st United Nations General Assembly, to consider ‘Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa.’ The session was initially envisaged at the level of Heads of State and Government but was subsequently changed to ministerial level in the revised programme of work.
Corinne AMORI BRUNET, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Benin and PSC Chairperson for September, is expected to deliver opening remarks, followed by introductory remarks from Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission. A statement is also expected from the representative of the United Nations.
The PSC discussed countering terrorism and violent extremism at its 1354th session, held at ministerial level on 21 July. The Chairperson of the AU Commission is also expected to submit a report on counterterrorism next month. At its most recent session on countering terrorism and violent extremism, the PSC expressed concern over the expanding reach and growing sophistication of terrorist groups across the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes and parts of Southern Africa (northern Mozambique). According to the report submitted to the PSC’s 1354th session, while global terrorism has decreased overall in recent years, Africa remains the principal epicentre of terrorist violence, accounting for an estimated 70-75 percent of terrorism related fatalities globally. Six of the ten most terrorism-affected countries globally are in Africa: Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia. In the central Sahel, JNIM and Islamic State affiliates operate across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, while militant activity has spread towards the borderlands of Benin and Togo. Around Lake Chad, Boko Haram and ISWAP move through territory shared by Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, while the emergence of Lakurawa has added to insecurity around the Nigeria-Niger border. In the Horn of Africa, Al-Shabaab remains a serious threat in Somalia and neighbouring countries, while the Islamic State in Somalia has still been active in Puntland despite the counterterrorism efforts. In eastern DRC, the Allied Democratic Forces originated in Uganda and remains active across a frontier affected by other armed groups. In Southern Africa, the insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province also persists nine years after it began. The groups and the dynamics may differ, but their use of borderlands, cross-border movement and transnational supply networks exposes the limits of responses organised within individual states.
The regional consequences of other conflicts also reinforce the same point. The crisis in eastern DRC has drawn in neighbouring countries and reignited inter-state tensions. Sudan’s war has also generated displacement and security pressures across its borders; with more countries sucked into the conflict, the Sudan war is evolving into a regional conflagration/conflict.
Africa has established several continental and regional mechanisms to address the scourge of terrorism. They include the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre, AFRIPOL and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa; the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes; the Accra Initiative; the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin; and the AU mission in Somalia. Their effectiveness, however, depends on the willingness of states to cooperate through them. Fragmentation of regional arrangements and deteriorating relations among neighbours have made that increasingly difficult.
Tomorrow’s session provides an opportunity to move beyond a review of trends in the threat and the technical means in addressing it, such as the role of institutions such as the AU Counter Terrorism Centre. It is rather expected to focus on a political and strategic question: how the state of relations among neighbouring countries affects their ability to respond collectively to terrorism and other security threats? This question gives particular importance to the principle of good neighbourliness at a time when threats cross borders, but cooperation among affected states has deteriorated in various parts of the continent.
The 2004 Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADS Policy) provides a basis for the discussion. It affirms sovereign equality, respect for borders, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference and the prohibition of the use or threat of force. It also prohibits a member state from allowing its territory to serve as a base for aggression or subversion against another. The Policy goes further in recognising the indivisibility of African security: ‘the security of one African country is inseparably linked’ to that of other African countries and the continent as a whole. On this basis, it treats a threat to one country as a matter of concern for others.
Most notably, a key element of the objectives of the Policy is to ‘promote mutual trust and confidence among African states.’ This objective is critical to advancing good neighbourliness. The importance of this objective is emphasised in the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in June 1994 and serves as a pillar of the CADS Policy. The Declaration accordingly affirmed the resolve of African states ‘to develop and strengthen the amicable relations and cooperation existing among our States and to promote friendship among our peoples. The challenges facing us can be met only through concerted action, cooperation and solidarity.’ However, ‘concerted action, cooperation and solidarity’ in responding to regional or international threats to peace and security is possible only where mutual trust and good neighbourliness thrive. Thus, the Declaration asserts that ‘every cooperation effort is doomed to failure in an environment devoid of stability, trust and security.’
In West Africa, rising mistrust in the context of the response to the military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger has disrupted the regional order. Amid the resultant mounting regional tension, the three countries withdrew from ECOWAS and formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). As the threat to regional security continues to proliferate, regional responses such as the Accra Initiative have struggled to take off the ground. The relationship of individual members of the AES with some of their neighbours has led to diplomatic strains. Ties between Niger and Nigeria deteriorated after the 2023 coup, as did relations between Niger and Benin. Mali’s relations with Algeria have also suffered a blow. Relations between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire remain strained. Some of these relations have shown signs of improvement (Algeria-Mali, Benin-Niger), but restoring diplomatic contact is only a first step.
Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF in 2025 has likewise raised concern about coordination in the Lake Chad Basin. The situation in the region is further aggravated by the geopolitical contestation involving Russia, France and increasingly Ukraine.
Apart from weakening the West African regional order, the resultant erosion of good neighbourliness and trust continues to fragment regional efforts for responding to various security threats, including terrorism. Where neighbouring governments distrust one another, intelligence sharing, joint border operations and cooperation against recruitment and illicit financial flows become harder to sustain. Armed groups and criminal networks can exploit the resulting gaps. As a result, the terrorism menace destablising the Sahel is creeping into the coastal states of West Africa.
Fragmentation fuelled by growing mistrust is evident elsewhere. Rwanda’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of Central African States in 2025 followed a dispute over the organisation’s rotational chairmanship against the backdrop of tensions over eastern DRC. In the Horn of Africa, tensions among member states have constrained IGAD’s political role, with Eritrea announcing its withdrawal from the struggling regional body. These developments reduce the capacity of regional organisations to bring states together around a common assessment of threats and a coordinated response.
Even where states agree to a common regional response through deployment of peace operations, strained relations can limit its effectiveness. In Somalia, tensions among neighbouring states have complicated the environment in which the AU mission operates. In Mozambique, lack of coordination and trust issues between Mozambican forces, Rwanda’s bilateral deployment and the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) limited the scope for a unified response. Meanwhile, eastern DRC shows how divergent expectations can affect regional forces. Competing regional deployments by the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) in November 2022 and the SADC deployment in DRC (SAMIDRC) in December 2023 also caused friction that led to the withdrawal of EACRF by December 2023 after Kinshasa declined to renew the Status of Force Agreement. The experience points to the need for shared understanding among the affected state, neighbouring countries and regional organisations on a force’s mandate, objectives and relationship to wider political efforts. A deployment cannot resolve political differences that its main stakeholders have left unsettled.
Beyond the Sahel, geopolitical rivalries and the growing involvement of middle powers are also reshaping Africa’s regional security arrangements and bilateral relations. As neighbouring states turn to different external partners, agreement on collective action against terrorism and other shared threats becomes harder to achieve. Indeed, one of the major factors behind the fragmentation of the Horn of Africa regional order is the intensification of the entanglement of various middle powers, including Gulf states, Turkey, and Iran and the emergence of competing alliances into which countries in the Horn of Africa are being sucked.
Against this backdrop, tomorrow’s session should consider how these political and strategic difficulties affect good neighborliness and trust among neighbors, which is critical both for achieving a shared perception of common threats and for developing a common strategy for deploying an effective response. As clearly articulated in the CADS Policy, good neighbourliness requires states to refrain from actions that threaten their neighbours. These necessitate keeping and constantly cultivating channels of exchange and communication as well as consultation, as envisaged in the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations.
Without trust among neighbouring countries, collective responses to terrorism and other security threats will remain limited. The session therefore offers an opportunity to reaffirm good neighbourliness as a practical condition for effective regional security response.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the fragmentation of regional arrangements, deteriorating bilateral relations among some member states, and the impact of geopolitical dynamics on collective security efforts. It may underscore the urgency of curtailing these developments for effectively deploying the relevant instruments and mobilizing the collective action necessary for effective response to threats to regional security and terrorism. The PSC may underscore the need for reaffirming the principles of the Common African Defence and Security Policy, including the indivisibility of security and the obligation of states not to allow their territory to be used against their neighbours. It may also reaffirm the commitment of Member States to the standards set in the OAU Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations. In this regard, the Council may urge Member States to uphold the principles of good neighbourliness reflected in various AU foundational documents, including the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and the Common African Defence and Security Policy; settle disagreements peacefully; and resolve their differences in a spirit of Pan-African solidarity. The Council may emphasise that effective regional responses to cross-border threats depend on member states honouring these commitments in practice. As a practical step, the PSC may task the AU Commission Chairperson, working in close coordination with Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms and the United Nations, to initiate and deploy various confidence-building measures, engage in sustained shuttle diplomacy and present a report to the next AU Assembly in January 2027 on ways and means of deepening mutual trust, good neighborliness, amicable relations and cooperation among African states.