Informal Consultation: ‘The Impact of the Middle East Crisis on the Peace and Security Situation of Africa’

Informal Consultation: ‘The Impact of the Middle East Crisis on the Peace and Security Situation of Africa’Date | 8 April 2026

Tomorrow (9 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene an informal consultation on the ‘Impact of the Middle East Crisis on the Peace and Security Situation of Africa.’

Following opening remarks by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for April 2026, the AU Commission is expected to share its tracking of how the situation in the Middle East is impacting peace and security in Africa. Apart from the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the AU Department of Economic Development, Trade, Tourism, Industry and Minerals may also brief the Council.

While the AU, through the Chairperson of the Commission and individual member states, made statements which also drew attention to the consequences of the war, this is the first time the issue featured as an agenda item of a policy organ of the AU. It is to be recalled that this was not initially on the April 2026 Programme of Work. It appears that it was added in view of the deepening consequences of the war and recent signs of its possible expansion to the Red Sea, with all its risks of directly drawing the Horn of Africa into the conflict.

There are at least three aspects to the impact of this war that may be of interest to members of the PSC. Given the high-level vulnerability and dependence of many in Africa on global supply chains, the disruption this war caused would have direct implications for the social and economic well-being of many countries. As the AU Commission Chairperson noted in a statement he issued on 8 April, the repercussions of the conflict have been felt across the world, including Africa, where disruptions to fuel supplies have driven inflation and increased the cost of basic commodities.’ This can strain, and if prolonged, potentially trigger instability in fragile social and political contexts. A defining feature of this crisis is also the energy crunch triggered by the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which has removed nearly 20% of the global oil supply from the market and driven crude prices towards well over $100 per barrel. This surge has created a widespread energy shock that affects even African oil exporters, and with other countries, including Kenya, Ethiopia and Zambia, reporting shortages.

Second, this conflict, both by dominating and diverting diplomatic and international attention, can also lead to not only the overshadowing but also the neglect of conflict situations in Africa, such as in Sudan. Third, without some measure of containment of the war, it can draw Africa more directly as the risk of its expansion to the Red Sea increases.

The policy brief that the AU, UNECA, AfDB and UNDP published on 2 April provides further details of the assessment of these institutions on how this war is impacting Africa. It projected a loss of 0.2 percentage points on Africa’s GDP in 2026, particularly if it persists over six months. It may also precipitate not only a cost-of-living crisis but also food insecurity, which can be particularly consequential due to the disruption of the supply of fertilisers.  It also raises the spectre of heightened geopolitical competition in fragile settings already affected by external interference, such as Sudan, Somalia and Libya.

AU statements over the course of this crisis reflect the growing concern over these implications. On 28 February 2026, the AU Commission issued two statements (here and here) warning that escalation ‘threatens to worsen global instability, with serious implications for energy markets, food security and socio-economic resilience, particularly in Africa. Where conflict and economic pressures remain acute.’ On 9 March 2026, the chairperson of the Commission issued a statement stressing the implications of the crisis for energy security, trade routes and African economies. On 3 April 2026, the Chairperson welcomed the China-Pakistan Five-Point Initiative, in which he expressed further deep concern over the consequences of the continuation of the conflict to Africa. On 8 April 2026, the Chairperson also welcomed the US-Iran ceasefire agreement while highlighting the effects of the conflict on Africa through inflation, fuel supply disruption and the rising cost of basic commodities.

One of the concerns expected to feature during tomorrow’s informal session is the Horn of Africa-Red Sea nexus. Among African sub-regions, the Horn is one of those most directly exposed to the interaction between Middle Eastern rivalries, maritime insecurity and external military interests. This concern is sharpened by the Houthis’ declared entry into the current war, which raises the prospect of renewed threats to Red Sea shipping and a further deterioration of the security environment along one of Africa’s most strategic maritime corridors. In this respect, tensions in the Middle East affect Africa not only economically, but also through security and geopolitical competition, particularly in the Red Sea corridor. Indeed, the active and sustained participation of the Houthis in Yemen could also increase the risk of potential use of the Horn of Africa in responding to the Houthis’ involvement, thereby exposing the region to direct retaliatory attacks.

The other issue is the humanitarian dimension, alongside the related question of fuel supply disruption. One of the more immediate implications for Africa is that instability in the Gulf and surrounding shipping lanes can complicate the movement of essential supplies and increase both transport costs and the cost of humanitarian delivery into already fragile contexts. This is particularly relevant for Sudan and Somalia, where questions of access, cost, energy supply and donor attention are already major concerns. From this perspective, the PSC may consider these humanitarian effects not merely as economic consequences, but as part of the wider peace and security implications of the crisis for states already affected by conflict and displacement.

A fourth issue relates to Africa’s diplomatic posture. AU statements issued over the course of the crisis sought to tread carefully, inclined largely to toe the middle ground. It has exposed the AU to be charged with a crisis of inconsistency. This is in part attributed to failure to name the initial act as a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, opting to remain vague in characterising the nature of the act, while the statement on retaliatory measures was ‘anything but vague’ as it expressed strong condemnation, defining it as ‘a clear violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity.’ Given that the only weight the AU can mobilise is moral authority and international law-based principled consistency in its policy pronouncements and positions, the lack of these deprives it of any credibility.

As possible courses of action, the PSC may wish to move beyond a purely declaratory response. One option may be to call for more sustained attention to the implications of the crisis for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, particularly regarding maritime security, humanitarian access and the wider consequences for fragile settings. Another may be to encourage more systematic reflection of these risks in the AU’s early warning and preventive work. The session may also offer an opportunity to reaffirm an African posture anchored in principled respect for international law rules, rather than one shaped by the alignments to external actors. Importantly, it may task the AU to further flesh out the short, medium and long-term implications of this conflict and the policy measures that need to be adopted along those different timelines as set out in the joint AU-UNECA-AfDB-UNDB briefing.

Since the session will be held in an informal format, no outcome document is expected to be adopted.