Libya’s latest turmoil has the hallmarks of the African Union Peace and Security Council’s diagnosis of why its transition remains stalled
Libya’s latest turmoil has the hallmarks of the African Union Peace and Security Council’s diagnosis of why its transition remains stalled
Date | 14 August 2026
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa
Previne Habu, Researcher, Amani Africa
The news coming out of Libya during 8-12 August 2026 highlights a peace process and a transition caught up in a vicious cycle of violence and institutional instability. There were three major incidents that together carry significant ramifications for both the country’s economic and political stability.
In eastern Libya, the explosion of a car bomb led to the assassination of Khalifa Haftar-led Libya National Army’s intelligence chief, Major General Fawzi Al-Mansouri. The death of Al-Mansouri is indicative of the fragility of the security situation in eastern Libya, where Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) is dominant.
This assassination took place while in western Libya, the oil refinery in Zawiya was on fire. Drone attacks on a major oil refinery and power station have triggered massive fires, prompting Libya’s National Oil Corporation to declare a ‘maximum state of emergency.’ Blackouts have triggered protests in Tripoli, Zawiya, Misrata and other cities.
Another major incident highlighting the institutional instability involved the announcement in Tripoli by Naji Issa, the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya, of his resignation.
Taken together, these incidents indicate persisting strains in the peace process and transition of the country, owing to their interrelated factors aptly identified in the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council’s most recent meeting on Libya. According to the PSC’s 1351st meeting held on 9 June 2026, one of the three major factors for the stalled peace process and transition in Libya was the institutional and political fragmentation.
Libya continues to operate on the basis of two rival governments. The internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) is based in Tripoli, while the Government of National Stability (GNS), aligned with the House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) under General Khalifa Haftar, operates from eastern Libya. Each command has some influence in the political and economic spheres and is supported by rival local and external backers.
The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the lead entity in the Libyan peace process and transition, has been exerting diplomatic efforts and has proposed a political roadmap aimed at helping Libyan stakeholders overcome their differences. The UN roadmap aims to facilitate the adoption of a viable electoral framework for presidential and legislative polls; unify institutions under a new government; and pave the way for the holding of elections. To this end, the mission launched a structured dialogue among Libyan stakeholders in December 2025 to advance implementation of the roadmap.
But there has been little progress toward meeting the major milestones set out in the roadmap to pave the way for the unification of institutions and the holding of elections. The stalled progress for implementing the roadmap is in no small measure due to the entrenched institutional bifurcation of two rival governments.
It was in view of these that the PSC emphasised the need for ‘national cohesion’, ‘the reunification of the Libyan defence and security institutions under legitimate civilian authority’ and ‘unification of all state institutions.’ It further called on ‘all Libyan stakeholders to jettison their personal ambitions, refrain from actions and statements that could escalate tension.’
The resignation of Issa, who is seen as a referee in the dispute over oil revenues, is not only a product of this institutional and political rivalry but also may come as a setback to recent efforts to unify the national budget. For the first time in a decade, US Senior Advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos, purportedly facilitated an agreement on Libya’s first unified budget, which was signed on 11 April. This was hailed as a major success in bridging differences between the Libyan political rivals. The PSC also welcomed ‘the signature, on 11 April 2026, of the agreement on a unified budget by representatives of the High Council of State (HCS) and the House of Representatives (HoR) under the auspices of the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL).’ The resignation of Issa, for reasons that he said are too sensitive to disclose, seems to suggest that the celebration of the purported unified budget came too early.
While no one claimed responsibility for it, the drone attacks that precipitated the declaration of emergency in Zawiya appear to be part of a power play. The 120,000-barrel-per-day facility has repeatedly been caught in fighting between rival armed factions. This incident also relates to the second factor that accounts for the stalling of the peace process and the transition in Libya identified by the PSC, namely, what could be identified as a shadow or war economy. While it encompasses trafficking of weapons and human smuggling, central to this war economy is also the illicit oil exports.
This shadow economy continues to entrench both internal and external rivalries while deepening the country’s economic decline. The PSC’s 1351st meeting communiqué pointed to this, albeit indirectly, expressing concern over the economic challenges facing Libya stemming from institutional crises and instability and calling for the establishment of ‘an accountable and transparent mechanism to manage the country’s economy.’
The third major factor identified in the PSC session was external interference and uncoordinated engagement with Libyan actors. One manifestation of potentially uncoordinated engagement reflects recent US initiatives in Libya. Although Boulos reiterated US support for UNSMIL’s ongoing efforts to advance the UN political roadmap, facilitate national elections, and promote Libyan unity, his parallel engagement with Libya’s rival political leaders generated mixed reactions. Concerns have been raised, including by some major actors, that the initiatives risk undermining the framework established under the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement (the Skhirat Agreement), which remains the cornerstone of international efforts to support a unified and inclusive political transition in Libya.
Critics argued that any political arrangement negotiated outside established UN mechanisms could weaken the legitimacy of the UN-led process and reinforce elite-driven bargaining at the expense of broader national consensus. In meetings held in January and May 2026 of the tripartite framework of neighbouring countries of Libya involving Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, the foreign ministers of these countries emphasised their support for developing the political process under the auspices of the United Nations and rejecting all forms of foreign interference.
While the competing engagements highlight persisting challenges in coordinating interested global and regional actors, the most nefarious aspect of external involvement is the backing that different regional and external powers extend to rival political and armed entities in Libya. The PSC accordingly expressed its ‘strong rejection’ of ‘any form of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Libya’ and urged ‘all external parties to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Libya.’
Nearly thirty sessions after first taking up the Libya file in February 2011, the AU, like the UN, is still grappling with a country whose political and economic future hangs in the balance. While PSC’s 1351st session shows that PSC’s diagnosis of the factors stalling the peace process and the transition in Libya is on mark, its prescriptions leave much to be desired. Indeed, despite the marginal progress around the signing of the AU-sponsored reconciliation charter, AU’s engagements, including PSC’s decisions, carry no significant measure that could address any of the factors entrenching and perpetuating Libya’s vicious cycle of instability.
The three incidents that took place in quick succession signify the stronghold that institutional fragmentation, the shadow economy and external interference hold over the country. Libya is nowhere near the end of its stalled peace process and transition.