Open Session on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocide Ideology in Africa
Open Session on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocide Ideology in AfricaDate | 7 April 2026
Tomorrow (8 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1337th session as an open session to deliberate on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocide Ideology in Africa.
Following opening remarks by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Presentations are expected from Adama Dieng, AU Special Envoy for the Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities, a Representative of the Republic of Rwanda and the Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.
The session is being convened pursuant to the PSC decision adopted at its 678th meeting of 11 April 2017, which decided to hold an annual session on the prevention of hate ideology, genocide and hate crimes in Africa in the context of the commemoration of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. It also forms part of the AU’s annual commemoration of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, following Assembly Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.695 of 2 July 2018, designating 7 April as the AU Day of Commemoration. This year marks the 32nd commemoration of the 1994 genocide. Coming amid mounting atrocity risks in several conflict settings, this year’s session may be shaped not only by remembrance but also by a sharper focus on prevention.
It is to be recalled that the last session of the Council on this theme at its 1272nd session called on member states to put in place legislative and institutional measures to prevent hate ideology, hate crimes and genocide, to confront genocide denialism and urged improved collection of data on hate crimes including through strengthening of the cyber capabilities of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). In addition to encouraging collaboration with digital platforms, the media and civil society to counter content that incites hatred and violence, it also called for the establishment of a continental research centre on hate speech and genocide ideology. Yet many of the priorities identified in that session remain unfinished, and events observed in some conflict situations underscore the urgency of some of the measures.
Among the key unfinished items is also the long-pending review by the Panel of the Wise on the status of implementation of the recommendations issued by the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities to investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the surrounding events. This review carries particular weight given the enduring relevance of the Panel’s own warning that, ‘if there is anything worse than the genocide itself, it is the knowledge that it did not have to happen.’ That conclusion speaks to a central lesson of the 1994 Genocide: the atrocity was not inevitable, but was enabled in part by the failure of both African and international actors to act preventively before the violence escalated and to stop it once it was underway. It was precisely in response to that failure that, during the transition from the OAU to the AU, Africa’s continental body departed from a rigid reliance on non-interference and instead anchored itself in the principle of non-indifference, as reflected in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. In this respect, the memory of Rwanda is not merely historical; it is bound up with the very normative and institutional foundation of the AU. The issue is equally salient for the PSC, particularly in light of Article 7 of its Protocol, which mandates the Council ‘to anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity.’
The fight against genocide ideology, together with the observance of the commemoration of the 1994 genocide, is also about reaffirming a collective responsibility to the promise of ‘never again’ and the principle of non-indifference. Indeed, remembrance was not just about paying respect to the victims and survivors, but an occasion to renew commitment to prevention. In that context, Dieng underscored that when honouring the victims of the genocide against the Tutsi, ‘we should be looking back, but we should also be looking forward,’ since ‘the commitment not to forget and the commitment to prevent are two sides of the same coin.’ Developments over the past year, and the realities still unfolding today, have only reinforced the urgency of that message.
Most notable in this respect is the situation in Sudan. In April 2025, amid rising hate speech and ethnically driven violence in Darfur, the UN Fact-Finding Mission warned that the ‘darkest chapters’ of the conflict may still lie ahead. By February 2026, the same Mission found that the Rapid Support Force (RSF) had carried out a coordinated campaign of destruction against non-Arab communities in and around El Fasher, the hallmarks of which point to genocide. At the Human Rights Council’s 38th Special Session on the situation in and around El Fasher in November 2025, Adama Dieng, presenting a joint statement also on behalf of Mr Chaloka Beyani, UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, stressed that ‘the risk of genocide exists in Sudan. It is real, and it is growing, every single day.’ The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)-led joint fact-finding mission report further underscores Sudan’s relevance to the upcoming PSC session. It documents racially and ethnically motivated violence, including attacks on non-Arab communities such as the Massalit, Fur and Zaghawa, as well as hate speech, incitement and patterns of abuse that may amount to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. For the PSC, Sudan thus stands as the clearest contemporary illustration of the cost of failing to translate early warning into timely political and protective action.
There are also concerns over the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where the nexus between armed conflict, identity-based mobilisation and hate speech has become increasingly pronounced. By September 2025, the UN Human Rights Office warned that hate speech and ethnically motivated attacks had increased in Kinshasa and the Kasai provinces against people presumed to be associated with the M23. Human Rights Watch (here and here) has also documented the targeting of Banyamulenge communities and pointed to the growing salience of anti-Banyamulenge and anti-Tutsi sentiment within the broader conflict environment. Taken together, these developments illustrate how identity-based hostility, inflammatory rhetoric and communal targeting not only inflame the conflict but also make the resolution of the conflict in eastern DRC more difficult. It would therefore be of interest for PSC members to hear from Dieng on his assessment of the principal risk theatres on the continent and on the practical steps needed to ensure that the AU reverses the betrayal of its foundational promise of ‘never again’.
Beyond Sudan and eastern DRC, developments elsewhere on the continent show that the risks associated with hate speech, exclusionary narratives and identity-based targeting are neither confined to conventional conflict settings nor limited to active war zones. The digital sphere is emerging as an increasingly important risk domain, with Africa-focused analysis warning that artificial intelligence (AI)-generated disinformation, deepfakes and the amplification of hate speech are reshaping the continent’s information environment. A similar preventive concern arises in North Africa, including notably in Libya and Tunisia. In Libya, the UN envoy warned the Security Council of a surge in xenophobic and racist hate speech inciting violence against migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees and humanitarian organisations. In Tunisia, the forcible dismantling of camps housing sub-Saharan African migrants and the deportation of some of them revived concerns over racialised incitement. Taken together, these cases underscore the wider relevance of the upcoming session by showing that the danger posed by hate speech and identity-based hostility cuts across conflict, migration and digital spaces.
It is also expected that emphasis will be put on prevention through education and memory. In April 2025, UNESCO and Rwanda announced measures to strengthen the educational role of genocide memorial sites, including training staff to receive school groups, enhancing exhibitions, developing educational content for use in schools, digitising survivor testimonies and supporting social media campaigns to counter the falsification of historical facts and online misinformation about the Genocide against the Tutsi. During the AU’s 2025 commemoration, speakers similarly stressed the importance of the responsible use of media, both digital and non-digital, as well as AI and education, in preventing genocide and other mass atrocity crimes.
While not central to the immediate conflict-driven risk theatres likely to dominate the session, the UN General Assembly’s recent recognition of the transatlantic slave trade as the gravest crime against humanity carries wider normative relevance for the PSC’s discussion. It reinforces the importance of confronting the historical and contemporary legacies of racialised dehumanisation, denial and exclusion, and lends further weight to the view that remembrance, historical truth and accountability are integral to preventing hate-driven violence and atrocity crimes.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate its concern over the persistent spread of hate ideologies, genocide denialism and incitement to violence in Africa. It may renew its call for AU member states to adopt legislation and institutions for the prevention and punishment of hate crimes and genocide, and to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators. The Council may also call for accelerated follow-up on the strengthening of CEWS cyber capacity, the improvement of hate-crime data collection and the development of partnerships with digital platforms, the media and civil society. The Council may further urge greater attention to contemporary situations where genocide and atrocity risks are manifest, particularly in Darfur, Sudan. It may welcome the continued engagement of the AU Special Envoy, encourage closer collaboration with RECs/RMs, civil society, women and youth actors, and call for follow-up on the Continental Research Centre on Hate Speech and Genocide Ideology, the Panel of the Wise review, and the operational linkage between remembrance, education and prevention.