Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) in addressing Piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG)
Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) in addressing Piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG)Date | 14 May 2026
Tomorrow (15 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to discuss the Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) in addressing Piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG).
Following opening remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chair of the PSC for May, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver a statement. It is also expected that presentations will be delivered by Moses Vilakati, Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE), representative of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), the Coordinating Commander of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF), and the Representative of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Additionally, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are expected to deliver statements.
The Gulf of Guinea remains one of Africa’s most strategically significant maritime spaces due to its role in international trade, energy exports, and access to strategic natural resources. Stretching approximately 6,000 kilometres from Senegal to Angola and encompassing 19 coastal states, the region facilitates nearly 90% of the international trade of West and Central African coastal countries. The Gulf also contains substantial oil, gas, and mineral reserves, including cobalt, manganese, bauxite, uranium, tin, and diamonds, which continue to reinforce its economic and geopolitical importance. The increasing strategic value of the region has also intensified both regional and international interest in securing maritime routes and protecting offshore infrastructure.
The PSC’s discussion is expected to take place against the backdrop of important progress in reducing piracy. Since the peak of piracy incidents in the 2010s, the region has recorded a significant decline in attacks. Reported incidents declined from 115 in 2020 to 22 in 2023, 18 in 2024, and 21 in 2025. According to the ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre, only one reported theft-at-sea incident was recorded in the first quarter of 2026. This decline reflects the cumulative impact of improved regional coordination, increased naval patrols, international maritime cooperation, and strengthened maritime surveillance mechanisms. Regional frameworks such as the Yaoundé Architecture, combined with national initiatives including Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project, have contributed significantly to enhancing maritime domain awareness and response capabilities.
However, despite these improvements, the PSC is expected to note that the reduction in piracy has not necessarily translated into a fully secure maritime environment. Rather, maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea have evolved and diversified. Criminal actors are increasingly shifting toward less visible but more sophisticated forms of maritime criminality, including illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, trafficking of narcotics and arms, fuel smuggling, oil theft, and maritime-linked organised crime networks.
Among these threats, IUU fishing has emerged as one of the most serious and persistent challenges confronting the region. Estimates indicate that between 40% and 65% of fish catches in parts of the Gulf of Guinea may result from illegal fishing activities, with annual regional losses estimated at approximately $2.3 billion. Beyond economic losses, IUU fishing has become an important security concern due to its impact on food security, livelihoods, and social stability within coastal communities. The depletion of fish stocks and declining livelihoods for artisanal fishers contribute to economic desperation and increase vulnerability to criminal recruitment and participation in illicit maritime economies.
The PSC is also likely to consider the growing interconnection between maritime insecurity and wider regional instability. Maritime trafficking routes are increasingly linked to inland conflict economies and armed groups operating across the Sahel. The Gulf of Guinea has become an important corridor for the movement of narcotics, arms, fuel, and other illicit goods connecting Latin America, West Africa, Europe, and the Sahel. In 2022 alone, authorities reportedly seized more than 16,000 kilograms of cocaine in West Africa. The increasing use of ‘dark vessels’ that disable tracking systems further illustrates the growing sophistication of criminal networks operating in the region.
At the same time, the southward spread of violent extremism from the Sahel into northern areas of coastal states such as Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire is increasingly blurring the distinction between inland and maritime security threats. This evolving security environment has contributed to a growing recognition that maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea must be addressed through integrated approaches that combine maritime operations with governance reform, development interventions, and regional security cooperation.
It is within this context that the PSC is considering the implementation of the CMTF in tackling maritime insecurity in the region. The PSC first introduced the need for a maritime task force during its 1012th session held on 23 July 2021, where it called for enhanced cooperation among African littoral states through the establishment of a Maritime Task Force. This political commitment gradually evolved into concrete operational planning through subsequent PSC sessions.
In this regard, during its 1275th session held on 23 April 2025, the PSC formally endorsed the CMTF as a standing and ready-to-deploy maritime force for the Gulf of Guinea, reaffirming its vision of promoting a secure and resilient maritime environment free from transnational organised crime and maritime insecurity. This endorsement marked an important step in transitioning the CMTF from a conceptual initiative into an institutionalised regional maritime security mechanism within the AU peace and security architecture. To this end, the CONOPS explicitly requires formal PSC authorisation to secure broader political, technical, and financial support from the AU, the United Nations, and international partners. Such authorisation is critical not only for providing continental political legitimacy to the Task Force, but also for anchoring it within broader continental frameworks, including the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIMS), the Lomé Charter, and the ‘Silencing the Guns’ initiative.
Beyond the Gulf of Guinea, the operationalisation of the CMTF is also likely to contribute to broader continental maritime security efforts, particularly the implementation of the Regional Maritime Command Post Exercise within the framework of the African Standby Force (ASF), proposed by the PSC during its 1128th session in December 2022. In this respect, the PSC is expected to follow up on progress toward strengthening the maritime dimension of the ASF through enhanced interoperability, joint operational planning, and coordinated maritime responses. The CMTF could therefore serve not only as a regional security mechanism for the Gulf of Guinea, but also as a pilot framework for strengthening the ASF’s maritime component and advancing AU-led maritime operational readiness more broadly.
While the CMTF is designed as an operational maritime security mechanism, the CONOPS makes clear that its effectiveness will depend fundamentally on sustained political, institutional, and strategic support from the PSC. In this regard, the PSC’s role extends beyond political endorsement to encompass strategic legitimacy, coordination, oversight, and resource mobilisation. It is therefore expected that the PSC’s role in mobilising political will among Member States will be discussed during tomorrow’s session. The CONOPS identifies weak political commitment and inadequate resources as some of the principal limitations undermining the effectiveness of the Yaoundé Architecture. Given the sensitivities surrounding sovereignty and cross-border maritime operations, the PSC remains uniquely positioned to foster trust, sustain collective ownership, and encourage Member States to fulfil operational commitments and force pledges. The Council’s engagement is also expected to be essential in strengthening coordination between the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC), CRESMAC, CRESMAO, and national maritime structures to reduce institutional fragmentation and improve interoperability and information-sharing across the region. Regarding this, the PSC may also follow up on its previous decision for the establishment of a Maritime Security Coordination Unit within the AU Commission.
Beyond political coordination, the PSC is also expected to play a decisive role in addressing the structural and operational constraints affecting the implementation of the CMTF. One of the most significant challenges identified in the CONOPS relates to sustainable financing and operational readiness. The successful deployment of the Task Force requires substantial maritime assets, surveillance systems, trained personnel, and logistical infrastructure, all of which necessitate predictable and long-term financing arrangements. In this respect, the PSC’s engagement will be critical in mobilising AU support, encouraging burden-sharing among Member States, and facilitating strategic partnerships with international actors and maritime industry stakeholders. The implementation of the CMTF currently relies heavily on Nigeria’s leadership and logistical support. While this demonstrates important regional leadership, excessive dependence on one state may create sustainability and ownership challenges over the longer term, particularly for smaller coastal states with limited naval and financial capacities.
The Council is also expected to deliberate on creating mechanisms to exercise oversight over legal and normative harmonisation efforts, particularly regarding the implementation of international maritime law, the criminalisation of piracy, judicial cooperation, extradition arrangements, and adherence to human rights standards during operations. This role is particularly important given the persistent legal inconsistencies and weak prosecution mechanisms that continue to undermine maritime security responses in the region. Different states continue to prioritise maritime threats differently depending on their economic interests and national vulnerabilities. While oil theft and attacks on offshore infrastructure remain major concerns for some countries, smaller coastal states may prioritise IUU fishing and coastal criminality. Additionally, the PSC is likely to discuss how it can play a broader strategic oversight role through regular monitoring, reporting, and evaluation of the CMTF’s implementation progress and operational effectiveness.
Another important element in the CONOPS that is expected to be featured in the discussions is the importance of integrating maritime security into continental peace and security priorities by addressing longstanding ‘sea blindness’ within African security frameworks. In this regard, the PSC’s engagement will be important in elevating maritime security within the AU agenda and linking it to broader continental priorities such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and Africa’s blue economy strategy.
Tomorrow’s session is also expected to assess recent developments toward operationalising the CMTF. During the 6th Meeting of the ECOWAS Sub-Committee of Chiefs of Naval Staff held in February 2026, Nigeria announced practical measures to support the launch of the Task Force, including the provision of three ships, one helicopter, eight vehicles, and temporary office facilities for the headquarters in Lagos. Earlier, during its 67th Ordinary Session held in June 2025, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government formally endorsed Nigeria’s offer to host the headquarters of the CMTF. Additionally, six countries, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, confirmed readiness to participate in the ceremonial flag-off of the CMTF scheduled for 31 May to 1 June 2026 in Lagos. The PSC is likely to consider these developments as important steps toward transitioning the CMTF from a conceptual framework into an operational regional maritime security mechanism.
Beyond the discussion on the CMTF, the PSC may also emphasise in its discussion that sustainable maritime security cannot rely exclusively on military deterrence and naval deployments. Maritime criminality in the Gulf of Guinea remains deeply linked to broader socio-economic and governance conditions, including poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, weak institutions, and limited economic opportunities within coastal communities. Consequently, long-term maritime stability will require integrated approaches that combine security operations with governance reform, economic development, institutional strengthening, and community resilience initiatives.
The outcome of the session is expected to be a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate the need to strengthen coordination between the CMTF and existing regional maritime mechanisms, particularly the Yaoundé Architecture and maritime coordination centres, to improve intelligence-sharing and operational responsiveness. The Council may also encourage continued political and financial support from the Gulf of Guinea states for the operationalisation of the Task Force and request the AU Commission to expedite the establishment of the Maritime Security Coordination Unit. Additionally, the PSC may call for the development of sustainable financing arrangements, harmonised legal frameworks, and enhanced burden-sharing mechanisms to ensure the long-term effectiveness and collective ownership of the CMTF. Finally, the Council may emphasise that durable maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea requires balancing operational responses with investments in governance, development, environmental sustainability, and coastal community resilience.