Regional order and the new geopolitics of ports, maritime infrastructure, and transport corridors in the Horn of Africa

 

Date | 3 August 2026

Seife Ayalew Asfaw, PhD.
Affiliate Faculty, Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution
African Peacebuilding Project
George Mason University

One of the key questions in a recent policy dialogue that Amani Africa hosted on The Horn of Africa in an age of Regional Fragmentation and Global Disorder was the nature of the changing relationship between ports, maritime infrastructure, logistics and transport corridors on the one hand and peace and security, and regional order in the Horn of Africa on the other. In my presentation, my central argument was that ports and corridors are no longer simply matters of transport infrastructure or commercial access. In a contested global order, their role as strategic institutions in which sovereignty, economic integration, security, political authority and geopolitical alignment are increasingly negotiated has become most prominent.

This transformation reflects one of the defining features of today’s global disorder: the changing political meaning of infrastructure. For much of the post-World War II order, and under the dominant development paradigm, ports, maritime infrastructure and transport corridors were understood primarily as engines of development and globalisation. They were expected to facilitate trade, deepen economic interdependence, connect markets, attract investment and sustain international cooperation.

Those assumptions are now being challenged as the unipolar moment of the post-Cold War era gives way to a more fragmented, fluid, multipolar and increasingly unpredictable geopolitical landscape. In this context, ports and corridors function not only as gateways for trade and investment, but also as instruments of economic statecraft, strategic competition and regional influence. If ports and corridors have become strategic instruments rather than simply commercial assets, the central question is no longer only how to expand regional connectivity, but how to govern the political, economic and security relationships that connectivity creates.

Connectivity and Regional Integration

A central implication of this transformation is that connectivity should not automatically be equated with regional integration. A region may become more physically connected while becoming more politically fragmented. A new port, railway, transport corridor or logistics arrangement can reduce transport costs, diversify access to international markets and expand economic opportunities. At the same time, it can redistribute political influence, intensify bilateral competition, bypass neighbouring countries, strengthen contested political authorities and embed the region more deeply in competing external networks.

Infrastructure is never politically neutral. Every corridor prioritises particular routes, ports and territories, redistributes opportunities, reshapes strategic geography and creates both winners and losers. When these choices are made principally through bilateral arrangements without broader regional consultation, infrastructure can deepen the very fragmentation it is expected to overcome.

The question, therefore, is not simply whether infrastructure connects places, but what kinds of political, economic and security relationships that connectivity produces. Does it create reciprocal interdependence or new forms of asymmetric dependence? Does it broaden regional cooperation or reinforce bilateral competition? Does it strengthen collective regional agency or deepen reliance on external actors? These questions suggest that physical connectivity alone says little about the quality of the regional order it produces.

Accordingly, the governance of infrastructure becomes as important as the infrastructure itself. These are fundamentally questions of regional governance rather than engineering, logistics or investment. The central challenge with the proliferation of port and transport corridor development is therefore not whether the Horn becomes more connected, but whether that connectivity is governed in ways that deepen regional integration rather than regional fragmentation.

Strategic Infrastructure, Peace and Regional Order

The significance of this distinction becomes clearer when viewed through current developments across the Horn of Africa. Infrastructure is no longer simply an economic issue. It has become an integral part of peace, security and regional order. Somaliland illustrates this particularly well. Its strategic significance is shaped not only by questions of political status, but also by Berbera’s maritime position, Ethiopia’s search for diversified access to the sea and the growing strategic importance of the Red Sea. Recent developments surrounding Berbera, including diplomatic initiatives, major infrastructure investments and growing strategic interest from regional and extra-regional actors, further illustrate how commercial infrastructure has become increasingly entangled with questions of recognition, security and geopolitical competition.

At the same time, these issues should not be collapsed into one another. Commercial cooperation around ports does not necessarily have to await the resolution of every sovereignty dispute, nor should cooperation over transit and logistics automatically be interpreted as political recognition. Developing practical arrangements that distinguish commercial cooperation from questions of sovereignty may therefore help reduce tensions while preserving opportunities for mutually beneficial connectivity.

The evolving politics of the Red Sea provides another illustration of the same broader transformation. Littoral states understandably have primary responsibilities because their sovereignty and security are directly affected. However, the consequences of disruptions in the Red Sea extend far beyond the coastline. Trade continuity, corridor security and supply chain resilience also affect the wider hinterland. The impact can have serious security, economic and political ramifications for affected countries. Recent debates over exclusive versus more inclusive approaches to Red Sea security governance, including Ethiopia’s calls for greater participation in regional maritime affairs, illustrate how questions of infrastructure, access and security have become increasingly intertwined. They also reflect competing visions of regional order. One emphasises sovereignty-focused arrangements centred primarily on littoral states, while another advocates a broader regional framework that recognises the legitimate interests of interconnected hinterland states. In an era of regional fragmentation and global disorder, these competing governance models risk reinforcing political polarisation, weakening the legitimacy and accountability of regional governance, and creating greater opportunities for external powers and competing geopolitical agendas to shape the region’s security architecture. An inclusive regional approach should therefore recognise both the sovereignty-based legitimate interests of coastal states and the wider regional consequences of maritime governance and security.

These developments also illuminate a broader challenge concerning regional agency. The countries of the Horn possess agency. They negotiate investments, develop infrastructure and choose their international partners. Yet this agency is often exercised separately through bilateral arrangements rather than through shared regional frameworks. The result is not an absence of agency, but its fragmentation. The issue, therefore, is not whether the region possesses agency, but whether it can exercise that agency collectively in ways that strengthen collective regional governance rather than deepen strategic competition.

Imagining a new regional order

The real challenge facing the Horn is not connectivity itself, but how the region chooses to govern it. Rebuilding regional order is therefore not simply about developing more infrastructure or expanding access to ports. It is about strengthening the regional governance needed to manage the growing political, economic and security interdependence that infrastructure creates. This, in turn, requires restoring collective regional agency, not by withdrawing from external partnerships, but by developing the capacity to shape them through shared regional priorities and institutions.

From that perspective, peace and security can no longer be understood only through conflict management or military balances. They also depend on how the region governs its ports, corridors, maritime space and economic connectivity. Infrastructure has become part of the region’s security architecture, and its governance must increasingly become part of the region’s peace architecture. This also requires reimagining ports, corridors and the connectivity they create not simply as objects of geopolitical competition or national advantage, but increasingly as shared regional public goods for whose provision, sustenance and long-term value all affected countries should bear responsibility and jointly shoulder the responsibility towards cooperation, collective stewardship and mutual benefit.

The broader lesson is that the Horn has long been socially, culturally and historically interconnected, but it is becoming materially more interconnected through infrastructure, trade and transport networks while politically more fragmented. Connectivity, by itself, does not necessarily produce regional integration. Without common rules and institutions, it can instead deepen rivalry and fragmentation and in a context of political fragmentation, fuels tension and proxy conflicts.

This, in turn, raises a broader question for the region. The question is no longer simply who controls the next port or finances the next corridor. Rather, it is whether the countries of the Horn can transform increasingly securitised and zero-sum competition over ports, corridors and infrastructure into complementary, cooperative and mutually beneficial regional connectivity.

If so, what forms of regional governance, political trust and prudent regional risk management are needed to make that transformation possible by strengthening and politically empowering existing regional and sub-regional cooperation and coordination mechanisms, so that the region’s geography, infrastructure and connectivity contribute to peace, security and a more resilient regional order rather than becoming another source of fragmentation?