Remarks by El-Ghassim Wane: Open Session of the African Union Peace and Security Council on the theme: “Peace Support Operations in Africa”, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 April 2026

Open Session of the African Union Peace and Security Council on the theme: “Peace Support Operations in Africa”, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 April 2026

Remarks by El-Ghassim Wane, Former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Mali and Head of MINUSMA and United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, and Former Director of the African Union Commission Peace and Security Department

Date | 27 April 2026

Let me start by thanking the Ethiopian Presidency of the Peace and Security Council for inviting me to participate in this session on peace support operations.

This discussion takes place against a particular backdrop, both on the continent and globally.

First, we are witnessing the persistence—and in some cases escalation—of conflicts and tensions across Africa. The situation in Sudan is undoubtedly the most alarming. It is a crisis that should keep all Africans alert and prompt full and practical mobilization.

Second, the involvement of external actors in African conflicts is growing, in a context of intensifying geopolitical competition and rivalries among them. While some of this involvement can be constructive, it has narrowed the space for African institutions to act and reduced their role in addressing peace and security challenges. Processes led from outside the continent are now increasingly shaping outcomes in Africa.

This marks a departure from an earlier period, when African-led initiatives were at the forefront of conflict resolution—an era reflected in processes and agreements named after African cities, from Sodore (Ethiopia) and Arta (Djibouti) to Arusha (Tanzania), Algiers, Machakos (Kenya), Sun City (South Africa), Accra, Pretoria, Ouagadougou, and Libreville, to name but a few.

Third, we are confronted with a broader weakening of multilateralism. This is reflected in the rise of unilateral measures, as well as in the growing frequency of breaches to international law.

Taken together, these trends are concerning for Africa.

Sustainable development cannot take place without peace. Persistent tensions between states undermine continental integration. Increased external engagement affects African ownership and leadership. The erosion of multilateralism and international law reduces the continent’s ability to advance its interests, while increasing the exposure of African countries and undermining the safeguards that protect their sovereignty.

Consequently, Africa must first address its internal challenges to navigate the current geopolitical environment; otherwise, it risks being shaped by external dynamics rather than shaping them.

It is within this broader effort to strengthen African agency that peace support operations must be situated. Properly conceived and used, they can play an important role in helping address the continent’s peace and security challenges.

However, for peace operations to effectively serve this purpose, four considerations are essential.

First, peace support operations are only one instrument among many for conflict management and resolution. Prevention, mediation, and peacebuilding—as set out in the PSC Protocol—are equally, and often more, important.

It is useful to recall what the PSC Protocol actually did. While it firmly introduced peace operations into the African Union’s normative framework, it nonetheless established a far more balanced approach than is often assumed.

At its core, the Protocol places strong emphasis on prevention and on peacemaking. This is reflected in its objectives and principles. It is also reflected in the significant powers given to the Chairperson of the Commission and to the Panel of the Wise. The PSC’s own rules of procedure reinforce this logic: no member state can block the inclusion of an item on the Council’s agenda, and countries that are party to a conflict do not take part in the related deliberations.

The implication is clear. We should not over-invest in peace operations at the expense of these other tools, which are often more feasible and, in many cases, more effective for the AU.

This is all the more important because the PSC and the Commission have, over the years, developed innovative non-military instruments that enabled AU’s leadership in the management of some conflicts.

These include what could be termed as “framework communiqués”, through which the PSC sets out comprehensive pathways to resolve crises, with clear timelines and concrete expectations for the parties. A notable example is the 24 April 2012 communiqué on Sudan and South Sudan.

The AU has also made effective use of high-level ad hoc mechanisms—often composed of current or former heads of state and government—to engage both the parties concerned and international stakeholders at the highest level. Examples include the AU High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and South Sudan, the High-Level Panel on Côte d’Ivoire, and the High-Level Panel for Egypt.

Finally, the AU has convened international contact groups, to coordinate external engagement and avoid fragmented responses. This approach has been notably used in Guinea, Madagascar, and the Central African Republic.

These experiences show that Africa already has a diverse and effective toolbox. Peace operations are an important part of it—but they are not, and should not become, the dominant one.

Second, peace support operations are not an end in themselves. They are tools to support political solutions. In intrastate conflicts in particular, they cannot succeed without credible peace processes. Absent such a foundation, even the most robust operations are unlikely to produce lasting results.

The response to terrorism in several parts of Africa illustrates this clearly. While security measures are an imperative, they are not sufficient. In many contexts, the challenge has been compounded by weak governance, lack of inclusion, and abuses during counterterrorism operations.

Where progress has been achieved, it has not come from military action alone, but from a broader approach combining security efforts with dialogue, reconciliation, and governance reforms.

This is why the growing tendency to valorize peace enforcement on the continent should be treated with caution. Without a parallel and credible political strategy, such approaches are unlikely to deliver sustainable outcomes.

Third, peace operations are inherently resource- and logistics-intensive. This explains why, for a long time, African leaders resisted expanding the OAU toolbox to include such operations. This reluctance was clearly reflected in the 1993 Cairo Declaration, which authorized only limited missions in both scope and duration.

The shift came later with the PSC Protocol, influenced in large part by the failure—by both the OAU and, more significantly, the UN, which had a mission on the ground—to prevent and stop the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

This framework rested on two key assumptions: first, that AU Member States—building on the momentum of the new Union—would provide increased funding for peace and security activities; and second, that the UN would respond positively when called upon to support AU operations.

More than two decades after the launching of the PSC, it is clear that neither assumption has truly held. AU Member States have been unable or unwilling to mobilize the level of resources needed to sustain peace operations, especially large-scale missions. At the same time, UN support has fallen short of expectations. While Security Council resolution 2719 represents progress, it did not go as far as the AU had hoped. Moreover, recent reductions in contributions to the UN have further complicated the outlook, forcing deep cuts in current missions.

This calls for a more realistic approach. The AU should prioritize smaller, targeted, time-bound operations aligned with its financial capacity and the current global fiscal environment. In this regard, the models outlined in the October 2024 UN study on the future of peacekeeping offer useful guidance. They can be implemented by the AU alone or jointly with the UN in various configurations, including under resolution 2719, and—given their limited scope—also help address the political sensitivities of Member States that may view large-scale deployments as infringements on sovereignty.

As a general rule, large multidimensional operations should remain the responsibility of the UN, given its comparative advantages: predictable financing, specialized expertise, strong logistics, and established accountability. The AU should undertake such missions only where the UN is clearly unable or unwilling to act, including in extreme situations such as terrorism or genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

Fourth, the effectiveness of peace support operations in Africa depends on a very close partnership between the AU and the UN. AU and UN operations are not competing options, but complementary parts of the same multilateral system, each with distinct strengths. Yet, with the progress made by the AU, a view has emerged that it could largely replace the UN, reducing it to a support role—especially in contexts such as terrorism, where traditional peacekeeping faces limits.

This view is misleading. The two are not substitutes, but essential partners. The UN retains clear advantages, as noted earlier, while the AU has shown readiness to deploy in complex, high-risk environments despite capacity and funding constraints.

The performance of both organizations is closely linked. Effective UN missions strengthen multilateral approaches that benefit the AU. Successful AU missions strengthen regional solutions, as part of the collective security system envisaged in the UN Charter. Conversely, failure on either side weakens confidence in the broader peace and security architecture.

Against this backdrop, the AU and the UN should prioritize stronger cooperation in support of ongoing UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. This serves both sides. UN missions benefit from the AU’s political influence and proximity, as well as from the role of the A3: when African members take the lead in raising mission-related issues, they help keep discussions focused and limit the impact of broader geopolitical tensions. The AU, in turn, has a direct stake in outcomes, as Africa bears the consequences of both success and failure.

To this end, the UN should systematically share information on its missions activities and challenges with the AU. This would strengthen African ownership and make it more likely that the AU provides timely and proactive support.

Additionally, consideration should be given to embedding AU liaison teams in UN missions. This would improve understanding of operations and allow the AU to provide more targeted support. In the same spirit, the UN should more systematically involve the AU in the strategic reviews of its missions.

As stressed above, effective peacekeeping must go hand in hand with enhanced peacemaking. This calls for closer coordination between the AU and the UN, including joint envoys or jointly-led contact groups, to bring coherence to increasingly fragmented mediation efforts.

Finally, sustaining peacekeeping gains requires greater investment in peacebuilding. This means closer AU–UN cooperation on governance to consolidate peace and avert relapse into violence. The aim is to combine the AU’s rich normative framework on governance, democracy, and human rights with the UN’s technical expertise and resources.

I would like to conclude by underlining the complexity of the international environment in which Africa navigates. This environment, while full of risks, also offers a chance to push for a more inclusive and fair system—but only if Africa first puts its own house in order. This starts with silencing the guns through concrete action, not rhetoric. Peace operations are an important part of that effort.

The AU already has the necessary tools. Focus should be on delivery, not on endlessly refining instruments. This requires stronger collective discipline and coordination across the AU system—Member States, the Commission, and other organs—grounded in the indivisibility of peace and security on the continent and in a renewed sense of African solidarity.

In this context, the proposed review of AU peace support operations can be a useful step to focus on implementing existing tools with greater creativity and agility, addressing the critical issue of financing with Member States fully meeting their obligations, and unlocking the untapped potential of the AU–UN partnership, including within the framework of resolution 2719.

I thank you.