Tomorrow (12 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1352^nd session to receive an update on the AU’s Compliance and Accountability Framework.

The session will commence with opening remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for June, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS).

The session takes place as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is set to review the implementation of Resolution 2719 (2023) later this year, three years after its adoption, as required under the resolution. The Resolution stresses the operational necessity for AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) to access UN-assessed contributions to be planned and conducted in compliance with the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework, the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), and aligns with relevant UN frameworks and policies. Although Resolution 2719 has yet to be applied, the AU and the UN have, over the past two and a half years, undertaken a range of preparatory efforts to facilitate its implementation. These efforts have included a series of meetings of the AU–UN Joint Task Force, culminating in the development of a joint roadmap for the implementation of Resolution 2719, which is structured around four workstreams, one of which focuses on compliance and the protection of civilians.

In tomorrow’s session, the AU Commission is expected to brief the PSC on where the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework (AUCF) currently stands, progress made in strengthening and operationalising the Framework, the state of AU–UN coordination and institutional readiness for the implementation of Resolution 2719 in the context of compliance requirements, challenges encountered so far, and the way forward.

The issue of compliance began to feature prominently within the AU in the context of institutional reform efforts and the revitalisation of the Peace Fund from 2016 onwards. The Report on Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa, prepared by the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund, Donald Kaberuka, and endorsed by the AU Assembly at its 27^th Ordinary Session in July 2016, recommended the development of an AU Compliance Framework outlining applicable international legal obligations and due diligence requirements. The recommendation reflected the AU’s growing role in the deployment of PSOs across the continent and the legal and moral imperative for such operations to adhere to obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Strengthening compliance was seen not only as essential to enhancing the legitimacy, effectiveness, and credibility of AU peace operations, fostering trust among local populations, and contributing to sustainable peace and stability, but also as one of the conditions for AU-led PSOs to access UN-assessed contributions.

The PSC subsequently reinforced this agenda at its 689^th session, held on 30 May 2017, where it underscored the importance of adherence to international humanitarian law, human rights standards, and conduct and discipline requirements in the conduct of PSOs. The Council further agreed that the operationalisation of financing arrangements for AU-led PSOs authorised by the UNSC should be predicated, inter alia, upon strengthening the AU’s human rights due diligence capabilities, including preventing and combating sexual exploitation and abuse.

Efforts to strengthen the AU’s compliance framework gained further momentum during negotiations on a UNSC resolution on the financing of AU-led PSOs, which intensified between 2018 and 2023 and culminated in the adoption of Resolution 2719 in December 2023. Throughout these negotiations, several UNSC members repeatedly emphasised the need for the AU to establish a robust compliance framework capable of meeting UN standards on human rights due diligence, conduct and discipline, and accountability. In response, the AU progressively consolidated its compliance architecture.

Notable milestones included the adoption by the PSC, at its 813^th session in November 2018, of the AU Policy on Conduct and Discipline for PSOs and the AU Policy on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in PSOs, both of which were subsequently endorsed by the 32^nd AU Assembly in February 2019. Compliance and accountability principles were further mainstreamed into the 2021 AU Doctrine on Peace Support Operations. Additional progress was made through the adoption of the Policy on Child Protection in AU PSOs and the Policy on Mainstreaming Child Protection into the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) during its 14^th ordinary session. The framework received a further boost in January 2023 when the 15^th STCDSS adopted three key instruments: the AU Strategic Framework for Compliance and Accountability in PSOs, the AU Policy on Protection of Civilians in PSOs, and the AU Policy on Selection and Screening of Personnel for PSOs.

To further institutionalise the compliance and accountability framework and strengthen implementation efforts, the AU entered into a Tripartite Project with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations in February 2022 on AUCF for PSOs. The project aims to ensure that AU-led PSOs are planned, conducted and managed in compliance with IHL, IHRL, and applicable standards of conduct and discipline. Through this initiative, the AU has benefited from additional staffing, technical expertise and dedicated programmatic resources to support the implementation of the framework. Currently, there is a dedicated AUCF Project Focal Point within the Peace Support Operations Division of the Conflict Management Directorate.

Recent developments indicate continued progress in strengthening the framework. In May 2026, the AU–EU–UN Strategic Steering Committee (SSC) of the AUCF launched the next phase of the project covering the period 2026–2030. AU also officially launched the Case Management System (CMS) for PSOs under the AUCF. The CMS serves as a critical mechanism for the prevention, reporting, investigation, tracking and management of allegations relating to violations of IHL and IHRL, as well as other forms of misconduct. It is also intended to facilitate corrective action, accountability processes and redress for affected individuals. In addition, a Third-Party Compensation Policy has been developed, while the AU’s compliance training curriculum—originally developed in 2018—has undergone a comprehensive review to ensure its continued relevance and responsiveness to the evolving operational requirements of AU-mandated and authorised PSOs.

Encouraging steps have also been taken to integrate the AU’s compliance architecture into ongoing peace operations. The March 2026 report on joint AU–Federal Government of Somalia–UN progress against benchmarks and the AUSSOM mission configuration plan highlighted several advances, including the role of the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC). The mechanism enables the mission to identify, assess and analyse incidents involving civilian harm and supports the implementation of mitigation measures, operational adjustments and accountability actions where necessary. To strengthen accountability and transparency, AUSSOM has also established Boards of Inquiry (BOIs) at both contingent and Mission Headquarters levels. These bodies serve as formal investigative mechanisms responsible for examining incidents involving potential violations, operational failures, and breaches of conduct and discipline.

Despite these progresses, challenges remain in the implementation of the compliance and accountability framework. AU PSOs are often deployed in highly volatile and complex conflict environments characterised by asymmetric warfare involving terrorist and other non-state armed groups, which complicates compliance efforts. Mission management dynamics can also pose challenges. In some instances, troop-contributing countries retain varying degrees of operational control over their contingents, which may constrain the AU’s authority over mission personnel and impede the consistent application of compliance and accountability measures. Most of all, at the continental level, the growing emergence of ad hoc security arrangements and regionally led deployments operating outside established continental frameworks highlights major challenges in the effective implementation of the AUCF. Sustained support is required not only to uphold compliance standards but also to facilitate investigations, disciplinary processes, remedial measures, and cooperation with oversight mechanisms.

Institutionally, the project-based nature of elements of the framework raises questions regarding sustainability and continuity. While external partnerships have played a critical role in advancing the framework, long-term institutionalisation will require predictable funding, dedicated staffing, and enhanced technical capacity. Adequate resources are particularly important to support continuous training, monitoring and evaluation, investigations, victim assistance, and compensation mechanisms.

Challenges also persist in AU–UN coordination, particularly in the context of operationalising Resolution 2719. While the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat have maintained regular engagement on the technical and operational requirements for the application of the resolution through the various workstream configurations, progress in unpacking and operationalising compliance-related requirements appears to have been relatively limited. While major progress has been registered on all workstreams, including compliance, compared to other workstreams—most notably joint planning, decision-making and reporting, and mission support— there are areas in which the Human Rights Compliance and Protection of Civilians workstream lags behind, such as the existence of a full staff complement dedicated to this at strategic headquarters towards full operational readiness.

It is not yet clear whether tomorrow’s session will adopt an outcome document in the form of a communiqué or press statement. However, the PSC may welcome the achievements of the first phase of the AU–EU–UN tripartite project on the AUCF, as well as the launch of its second phase covering the period 2026–2030. The Council may also take note of the progress made over the years in strengthening the AU’s compliance architecture and its institutionalisation and operationalisation, including the adoption of key policy instruments, the recent launch of the AUCF Case Management System, the development of a Third-Party Compensation Policy, and the revision of the compliance training curriculum. While acknowledging progress made in unpacking and operationalising Resolution 2719 through the four workstreams, the PSC may request the AU Commission to intensify engagements with the UN Secretariat in order to develop a common understanding of the compliance requirements under the Resolution and the steps necessary to meet them, as the UN Security Council prepares to review its implementation later this year.

Tomorrow (12 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1352^nd meeting with two agenda items, one of them being a ‘Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review.’ Although the session is scheduled for tomorrow, the initial June 2026 Programme of Work had scheduled it to happen on 30 June.

The Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for the month of June, Nasir Aminu, will deliver opening remarks. This will be followed by a briefing from the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is entrusted with a relevant mandate, may also brief the PSC on its critical role.

Structural conflict prevention is closely linked to the AU’s core principles as set out in its Constitutive Act, which requires Member States to uphold democratic values, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, while also advancing socio-economic development and regional integration. Over the years, the AU has adopted several normative and policy instruments designed to facilitate the structural prevention of conflicts. In addition to the APRM that proved effective in detecting risks and vulnerabilities of reviewed AU member states, within the framework of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), steps were taken to develop tools aimed at facilitating the identification of a country’s structural vulnerability to conflict at an early stage. Of significance in this respect is the CSVRA and the accompanying Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS).

The CSVRA, developed as a follow-up to PSC’s 360^th session, held in March 2013, forms part of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF). The CSCPF has been developed to facilitate a Commission-wide and coordinated approach to structural conflict prevention with the aim of identifying and addressing structural weaknesses that have the potential to cause violent conflicts if left unaddressed.

During its 463^rd session of October 2014, the PSC, taking note of its efforts to finalise the elaboration of the CSCPF and the development of the CSVRA, requested the Commission to expedite the process. PSC’s 502^nd session, convened in April 2015, adopted the CSVRA/CSVMS tools, and requested the Commission, in collaboration with the RECs, to provide all the necessary assistance to Member States and popularise the tools while encouraging Member States to fully take advantage of these tools in their efforts towards the structural prevention of conflict. At its 901^st meeting of December 2019, the PSC encouraged Member States to make full use of the Commission’s tools for structural conflict prevention, including the CSVRA.

The PSC’s last meeting on the theme was held in December 2024, as its 1251^st session, in which, it tasked the AU Commission in partnership with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), ‘to take the necessary measures, in accordance with the rules and procedures of each organ and in compliance with their respective mandates, to establish a harmonised framework for the CSVRA and the CSVMS, including integration of CSVRA/CSVM into the APRM Questionnaire for the improvement of governance in Africa, by adopting coordinated and multi-sectoral approaches aimed at promoting the peace, security and development nexus on the continent.’ It further urged the AU Commission ‘to submit the draft harmonised framework to the PSC for approval.’ This was taken further when the PSC tasked the AU Commission to ‘undertake a comprehensive review of the CEWS, CSVRA and CSVMS with a view to reengineering the tools to effectively respond to threats to peace and security and proposing appropriate interventions’; and to ‘establish a comprehensive coordination mechanism, in collaboration with RECs/RMs and the APRM, aimed at optimising resource utilisation, strengthening synergy, and effectively integrating national, regional, and continental early warning systems, and submit the proposed coordination mechanism for its consideration by June 2025.’

Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to give an update on the ten-Year CSVRA review, and follow up on the tasks from the 1251^st session. Of concern, however, as the CSVRA undergoes its ten-year review, several persistent challenges have come into sharper focus. One of the issues that would be in the spotlight is the concern that the PSC expressed during that session, over the limited accession of Member States to the CSCPF tools – CSVRA and CSVMS, nine (9) years after adoption. Since then, the Malawi draft report validation meeting was held in November 2025, and the Strategic Review of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) methodology was held in Rwanda in November 2025, which included reviewing the CSCPF implementation (which considered the CSVRA and CSVMS). Additionally, the restructuring that integrated the Political Affairs and Peace and Security Departments into the PAPS Department effectively dismantled the dedicated CEWS division, leaving the CSVRA without a clear institutional anchor or dedicated personnel to promote and implement the mechanism. There is also the question of the alignment between and integration of the CSVRA into the APRM review processes to avoid duplication and ensure coherence.

It would also be of interest to the PSC to look into the decision of the February 2022 35^th AU summit requesting the Commission to establish a ‘Monitoring and Oversight Committee’ comprising the AU Commission, RECs/RMs, APRM and Member States to facilitate effective coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In tomorrow’s session, PSC may follow up on progress made towards the implementation of this decision. The other issue that is expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the update that the AU Commission may provide on the lessons learned from the implementation of the CSVRA on how it helps identify risks or vulnerabilities for conflict and facilitating the initiation of measures to mitigate or address those risks or vulnerabilities in the countries that volunteered to undertake the CSVRA review.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the importance of enhanced action for addressing structural causes of conflicts and the need for the full utilisation of the CSVRA towards mitigating and resolving the underlying causes and drivers of conflicts in Africa. The PSC may also reiterate the need for strengthening coordination between relevant entities for enhancing the effective implementation of the CSVRA without duplication. It may, in this regard, underscore the importance of the Monitoring and Oversight Committee that the AU Assembly tasked the AU Commission to establish at its 35^th session in February 2022. The PSC may also encourage both the AU Commission and member states that undertook the CSVRA review to document and share lessons learned from the review in order to improve the role of the CSVRA to tackle the underlying causes and drivers of conflict. The PSC may encourage Member States to fully take advantage of the CSVRA and CSVMS as instruments for the consolidation of peace and stability.

Tomorrow (15 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1346^th meeting to receive an ‘Update on the Status of the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF).’

Following the opening remarks from Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the progress made in the operationalisation of the Force.

The last time the PSC discussed this theme was during its 1257^th session held on 30 January 2025, in which, it provided an opportunity for the PSC to assess the status of ASF’s readiness, key challenges to ASF’s operationalisation, and the ongoing strategic review process aimed at enhancing its effectiveness as Africa’s primary mechanism for peace support operations (PSOs), and the integration of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law (IHL and IHRL) into the ASF doctrine.

In tomorrow’s session, two recent developments are expected to feature. The first is the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities and the Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) on the Use of the ASF, during the 39th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in February 2026. The Assembly directed the AU Commission to expedite its signing and its operationalisation, which is scheduled to take place in June 2026 on the margins of the AU Mid-Year Coordination meeting to be held in Egypt. The second development is the endorsement of completion of the ASF Strategic Review by the same Assembly session, which further tasked the AU Commission to ‘expedite the implementation of its recommendations, with emphasis on readiness, interoperability, and sustainable financing mechanisms.’ It is to be recalled that during Council’s 1159^th meeting held at the ministerial level on 22 June 2023, it requested the AU Commission, among other things, to expedite ‘the strategic review of the ASF in order to align it with contemporary security challenges facing the continent’ drawing on Conclusions of the Inaugural Lessons Learned Forum on AU Peace Support Operations and the ASF that was held in November 2022, in Abuja, Nigeria. Despite the Assembly decision indicating the completion of the review, the outcomes of the process were expected to be tabled before the PSC and the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) in early 2026, as agreed during the second Lessons Learned Forum on AU PSOs and the ASF held in November 2025, unless the review process was concluded without prior presentation to the PSC and the STCDSS.

Meanwhile, a recent PSC meeting, 1341^st meeting, held on 27 April 2026 on ‘Peace Support Operations in Africa,’ saw the Council, among other things, calling for the need for ‘regular strategic reviews of AU PSOs, drawing on lessons learned to inform necessary adjustments to the PSO framework, in line with the outcomes of the Abuja Lessons Learned Forum on PSOs and the ASF,’ and called for systematic follow-up and integration of the outcomes of the Abuja Forum into ongoing AGA-APSA and PSO reform processes. The same meeting also saw the PSC calling for the need to ‘improve rapid deployment capacity, force readiness (training and equipment for ASF battalions), and key enablers (aviation, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance – ISR, engineering, medical, and mobility).’

It is also anticipated that, during tomorrow’s session, the Commission will provide updates on its consultations with key stakeholders as part of the ASF strategic review process, amid its full operationalisation. A major impediment to the operationalisation of the Force has been the lack of political consensus and institutional alignment between the AU and RECs/RMs. The adoption of the MoU during the 15^th STCDSS in May 2023 clarified roles and responsibilities in planning, deployment, and post-deployment stages, as well as political sensitivities. However, competing regional interests continue to hinder coordination. Differences over authority, particularly between the AU and RECs, have complicated decision-making and affected the ASF’s readiness across regions. While ECOWAS, SADC and EASF have made notable progress, other regions continue to face challenges related to resources, coordination, and harmonisation. The PSC during its 1341^st session called for the need to ensure ‘multidimensional strategic management at the AU and within the Planning Elements (PLANELMs) of the RECs/RMs.’ This arises from previous consultations between the AU Commission and the five ASF PLANELMs, including the first phase, held from 2 to 4 December 2024 in Algiers, Algeria, involving a Technical Consultative Meeting and dedicated consultations between the ASF RECs/RMs PLANELMs and TCEs/Tis, to strengthen coordination and harmonise decision-making in line with the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative advantage.

Logistical and operational readiness also remain significant obstacles to the ASF’s effectiveness. Although the establishment of the Continental Logistics Base in Douala, Cameroon, in 2018 marked important progress, the incomplete development of Regional Logistics Depots and inadequate strategic airlift capabilities continue to constrain rapid deployment. The PSC’s 1159^th session, therefore, called on the AU Commission to expedite assessments and agreements related to pledged strategic lift assets to support troop deployment, reinforcement, casualty evacuation, and logistics supply. Maritime readiness also requires further investment despite ongoing preparations for the ASF’s first maritime exercise. Tomorrow’s sessions will also provide the opportunity to advance discussions on the council’s previous decision at its 1159^th meeting on the ‘need for a maritime component within the ASF, among others, to facilitate maritime trade and ultimately the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area.’ At the same time, the ASF’s potential role in counter-terrorism has gained strategic importance amid growing insecurity in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and other regions. The proposed establishment of a counter-terrorism unit within the ASF, first endorsed during the PSC’s 960^th session in October 2020, remains a key priority for enhancing the ASF’s response to asymmetric threats.

Despite these challenges, the ASF framework continues to offer significant opportunities for strengthening Africa’s peace and security architecture through standardised training, improved interoperability, and enhanced institutional resilience. ASF-led training programmes have contributed to a shared understanding of operational procedures, while integrating regional and ad hoc peace support initiatives into the ASF framework could optimise collective security efforts. In this vein, from 1 to 5 December 2025, the 17^th African Standby Force Training Implementation Workshop (TIW) took place in Harare, Zimbabwe, under the theme, ‘Enhancing Efficiency in Mandate Implementation: Reassessing Capacity Needs Assessments.’ The workshop brought together stakeholders to review progress and challenges in implementing the ASF Training Directives (2024–2026) and the recommendations from the 16^th TIW, while emphasising the importance of Training Needs Assessment (TNA) as a key instrument for aligning training with PSOs’ mandate requirements and strengthening operational effectiveness. Among others, the discussions also focused on enhancing strategic analysis, promoting collaboration, and harmonising training efforts among the AU, RECs/RMs, PSOs, training centres, and partners through the exchange of best practices and lessons learned.

Conversely, the ASF strategic review process has been slowed by funding gaps, with recent consultations focusing on legal and policy frameworks, operational challenges, financing, and capacity enhancement. Finally, the ASF’s effectiveness in addressing terrorism, violent extremism, and other complex threats depends on sustained political commitment, strategic investment, and the resolution of institutional ambiguities between the AU and RECs. The PSC’s directive to integrate ASF principles into all AU PSOs and align the ASF concept with the AU doctrine on PSOs represents an important step toward institutionalising the framework and ensuring that the ASF remains a practical mechanism for advancing African-led peace and security.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session could be a communique or a summary record. Council may call for enhanced collaboration and coordination between the Planning Elements (PLANELMs) of the RECs/RMs and the Continental PLANEL, to facilitate harmonisation of decision-making on the deployment of the ASF based on the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantages. Council may further underscore the need for a maritime component within the ASF, among others, to facilitate maritime trade and ultimately the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area. Regarding funding, Council may highlight the importance of intensifying efforts to address the perennial challenge of unpredictable, inadequate and unsustainable funding for AU peace and security efforts, including the commitment by Member States to make contributions to the AU Peace Fund according to the approved scales of assessment.

Tomorrow (16 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene a briefing on the continental early warning and security outlook in the afternoon.

Following opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for December 2025, a representative of the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. It is also expected that the Executive Secretary of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Service of Africa (CISSA), Jackson V. Hamata, and a representative of the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) will make statements, followed by a briefing that the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) will deliver on its analytical report on the security and terrorism landscape on the continent.

The last time the PSC met on this theme was in August 2025, at its 1298^th meeting. From the communiqué it adopted after the session, among the decisions Council had was tasking the AU Commission, together with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), ‘to establish and institutionalise, by December 2025, a dynamic and continuously updated risk mapping tool to allow the PSC to strengthen its ability to engage in early warning for early action, by providing a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities and potential triggers, including colour-coded risk levels linked to a pre-authorised menu of diplomatic, security and stabilisation tools’ as well as ‘an annual review of acted/missed alerts with lessons-learned.’

Africa’s security landscape remains volatile, accentuated by the global surge in insecurity, with terrorism and armed conflict continuing to drive widespread and persistent political violence across the continent. The Sahel remains the structural epicentre of the terrorism threat on the continent, with the central Sahel – Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – facing the most protracted and escalating terrorist violence. In this environment of institutional, socio-economic and climatic vulnerability, extremist groups exploit shared ethnic, commercial, and migratory networks, facilitating the seamless movement of fighters, weapons, and resources across porous borders. A recent UN Security Council Report highlighted that in Mali, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaida affiliate, has attacked more than 100 fuel tankers and abducted fuel truck drivers near the capital, Bamako, and other parts of the country. The group’s months-long siege has disrupted access to essential supplies to Bamako. The prolonged fuel blockade had precipitated a severe nationwide fuel crisis, forcing the closure of schools and universities while triggering a sharp contraction in economic activity. Diplomatic missions significantly reduced their staffing, and several partner governments issued urgent travel advisories urging their citizens to depart the country. These developments represent a profound escalation in JNIM’s economic warfare strategy, seeking to undermine the military government’s legitimacy, exacerbating humanitarian vulnerabilities – including reduced lifesaving aid operations and risks to millions dependent on them – and raising fears of broader instability that could further erode state control and fuel regional spillover effects.

In Niger, the recent attack in Assamakka killed six Nigerien Soldiers. JNIM claimed it had taken control of the border post there. The Nigerian military confirmed that militants from the Mali-based JNIM killed one soldier during an ambush in western Kwara State, near the border with Benin. This marked JNIM’s first confirmed attack inside Nigeria, a move which underscored the expanding reach of Sahelian extremist groups deeper into West Africa, which signals a new multi-front threat in the region. A recent Amani Africa analysis on the situation in the Sahel also highlighted that the Tillabéri region – bordering Mali and Burkina Faso – has seen a sharp rise in terrorist attacks. In early September, an ambush in the region resulted in the deaths of 14 soldiers, according to the Nigerian Ministry of Defence.

Burkina Faso also remains one of the most severely affected countries. Extremist groups exert control or significant influence over vast rural areas – estimates ranging from 40% to as much as 60% of the national territory outside major urban centres. In these regions, groups such as the JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) function as the de facto authorities, operating checkpoints to regulate movement, imposing taxes on transport, commerce, and local economies (including ‘zakat’ funds and levies on smuggling routes), adjudicating disputes under their interpretation of sharia, and controlling access to land, water, and resources. While a full encirclement of Ouagadougou is not imminent, ongoing territorial gains, blockades of peripheral towns, and disruptions to supply routes have made isolation of the capital an increasingly plausible scenario should the collapse of outlying areas persist.

Somalia, on the other hand, remains mired in a deepening crisis, marked by a resurgent jihadist insurgency led by al-Shabaab. Without a fundamental shift in strategy and if the serious challenges facing the AU mission are not addressed, plausible near-term outcomes include the collapse of the federal government or an al-Shabaab seizure of the capital, with severe implications for regional stability. As the group launched a major offensive across central Somalia in early 2025 – intensifying from April onward – the group has since captured a series of strategic towns from Somali forces. By July, the militants had advanced to within roughly 50 kilometres of the capital, effectively encircling much of it, establishing checkpoints on approaches, and prompting many foreign embassies to evacuate non-essential staff to Kenya. The advance then inexplicably stalled, allowing the federal government to declare a tentative ‘victory.’ The group has since focused on building forces around Mogadishu while escalating attacks within the city. In October 2025, an al-Shabaab suicide squad stormed a high-security facility run by the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), destroying critical intelligence assets and freeing dozens of prisoners – just meters from the presidential palace at Villa Somalia.

Beyond the foregoing, it would be of major interest for the PSC to consider in its discussion the need to fully reinstitutionalise the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to effectively anticipate and address conflicts, as highlighted in its 1251^st meeting held in December 2024. Measures also need to be stepped up to address structural drivers which fuel the geographic expansion of terrorism and violent extremist actors across Africa, including: weak governance and state fragility, pervasive poverty and youth marginalisation, socioeconomic inequalities, intercommunal tensions, and the proliferation of illicit economies linked to transnational organised crime. The effects of climate change cannot go unmentioned, as it exacerbates these underlying pressures by accelerating desertification, disrupting rainfall patterns, depleting scarce resources, and triggering widespread displacement. These environmental stresses erode livelihoods and heighten competition over dwindling land, water, and pasture, creating vulnerabilities that extremist groups skillfully exploit – positioning themselves as alternative providers of resource access, mediators in local disputes, or protectors of marginalised communities.

More so, illicit economies serve as vital revenue sources for extremist groups across Africa, embedding them deeply within complex transnational supply chains. Activities such as artisanal gold mining, fuel trafficking, narcotics transhipment, illegal logging, wildlife poaching, human smuggling, and maritime piracy not only generate substantial funds but also enable these actors to exert influence over local communities and cross-border networks. Kidnapping for ransom also remains a particularly pernicious financing mechanism, undermining continental counter-terrorism efforts.

In addition, Amani Africa’s Special Research Report, ‘Towards a New Agenda for Peace and Security in Africa: New Security Threats and the Future of the Peace and Security Council’ highlighted that one of the new security threats in Africa arises from the expansion of the use of emerging technologies. Technological advancements have revolutionised the operational landscape for extremist groups, enabling the use of drones for surveillance, targeted strikes, and intimidation; encrypted platforms for decentralised coordination and agile tactics, including mobilisation of resources; and sophisticated online ecosystems – including AI-generated propaganda – to manipulate narratives, undermine state legitimacy, sow communal divisions, and recruit transnationally. Crypto-based transactions and mobile money systems further evade oversight, with digital laundering techniques complicating tracing and accountability efforts.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to note the briefing and updates from AUCTC, AFRIPOL, and CISSA, and may underscore the need for continued cooperation and collaboration in enhancing early warning, intelligence sharing, and coordinated responses to terrorism and transnational organised crime. The PSC is also likely to condemn all acts of terrorism and violent extremism, as well as the exploitation of communities and the use of illicit economies by armed groups. It may stress the imperative to bridge the early warning-early action gap, critical for the PSC, AU institutions, and Member States to take timely, evidence-informed preventive actions early enough against threats like conflict, terrorism, and organised crime. Council is also expected to emphasise the need for enhanced collaboration, including information sharing, between and among Member States, as well as with international partners, including technology firms, to more effectively counter the exploitation of digital platforms by terrorist and violent extremist groups. Council may also reiterate its 1298^th meeting statement on the need for AU’s risk capacity to anticipate risks through the CEWS, and to ensure that its analysis directly informs the PSC’s agenda-setting and deliberations. It may also reiterate the need for restoring the institutional base of CEWS and for making CEWS the anchor of the early warning and early action initiatives of the AU, working in coordination with the APRM, AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and the early warning systems of the Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms.

Tomorrow (27 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene for its 1298^th session to get a briefing on the early warning system and its role in mapping risks and threats across Africa.

The session commences with an opening statement of the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025, Mohamed Khaled. The AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, will make an introductory remark. The session is expected to get presentations from Marie-Antoinette Rose QUATRE, Chief Executive Officer of the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); Lallal Idris Lakhdar, Acting Director, African Union Counter Terrorism Centre; Jalel Chelba, Acting Director, African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation; and Maxwell Yaw Kumah, Principal Researcher and Analyst of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA). A representative from the African Regional Standby Forces is also expected to make a statement.

The session will build on previous discussions on the theme, with the recent engagement being the 1247^th session held on 27 November 2024, where CISSA, AUCTC and AFRIPOL briefed the PSC on the Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook. From the communiqué of the session, the Council encouraged these institutions ‘to continue to provide technical assistance and to increase the dissemination of early warning reports and operational intelligence to Member States and the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), with a view to enabling them to more effectively respond to emerging threats.’ In addition, Council tasked the AUCTC, CISSA, AFRIPOL, other specialised AU agencies and Member States ‘to work together towards the establishment of a joint Cybersecurity Task Force focusing on preventing the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and emerging technologies by terrorist groups for radicalisation, recruitment, training and funding.’

According to INTERPOL’s 2025 Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report, a growing share of reported crimes in Africa is cyber-related. The report goes further and highlights that, despite the rising caseloads, most African states surveyed still lack essential IT infrastructure to combat cybercrime. Just 30 per cent of countries reported having an incident reporting system, 29 per cent a digital evidence repository and 19 per cent a cyberthreat intelligence database. Additionally, while cybercrime routinely crosses national borders, 86 per cent of African countries surveyed said their international cooperation capacity needs improvement due to slow, formal processes, a lack of operational networks and limited access to platforms and foreign-hosted data. Against this backdrop, this upcoming PSC meeting will present an opportunity to advance the discussions from the 1247^th meeting and brainstorm a concrete plan for the establishment of a joint Cybersecurity Task Force.

Relatedly, of concern for tomorrow’s session will be the issue of violent extremism on the continent. It has been reported that, in the past year, nearly half of the fatalities (10,685) occurred in the Sahel, while Somalia accounted for about one-third of Africa’s total fatalities (7,289). Together with the Lake Chad Basin, these three regions comprised 99% of the continent’s militant Islamist-linked deaths. According to one recent report, ‘all five African theatres (including Mozambique and North Africa) remain highly dynamic with militant insurgents mounting offensive operations in each, especially in the Sahel and Somalia.’ There was a 14-per cent rise in battle-related deaths across the continent (15,678).’ Militant Islamist groups in the Sahel and Somalia expand their hold on territory.

Organised Transnational Crime is also another element of discussion to be addressed. In May 2025, the Council held its 1279^th meeting to discuss this theme, with a focus on the Sahel region. From the communiqué of the meeting, Council expressed concern ‘over the growing operational sophistication of transnational criminal networks exploiting structural vulnerabilities across the Sahel, including governance deficits, legitimate or popular grievances, porous borders and limited state presence.’ Yet, organised transnational crime does not take the same form across various regions of the continent. Thus, Council tasked the AU Commission to coordinate with AFRIPOL, INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other critical stakeholders ‘in developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities…’ From Amani Africa’s Insight of the session, the PSC was in the spotlight as it faces ‘the challenge of how to push away from fragmented, security-heavy responses to more holistic, coordinated strategies that address the structural drivers of transnational organised crimes and terrorism’.

It would also be of interest for PSC members to follow up on PSC’s earlier decisions on the need for anchoring the sessions on early warning on the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). It is worth recalling that during its 1251^st session held on 17 December 2024, the PSC underscored the need for greater visibility and prominence of CEWS within the proposed restructuring of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Department. Previously, the 1208^th session of the PSC underscored the imperative of ‘a robust and fully functional CEWS to effectively pre-empt and mitigate conflicts.’

Following the merger of the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peace and Security, the structure that housed CEWS disappeared despite it being a statutory structure. Since then, instead of CEWS, established under Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, this session on early warning has been organised around the work of CISSA, AUCTC and AFRIPOL. This tends to limit the scope of analysis of threats to the domain of intelligence and law enforcement-based threats, hence making it hard security-focused. The implication of this is that it does not fully account for risks of conflict, political, social, economic and environmental issues. A case in point is the lack of attention given to intercommunal conflicts. In recent years, these conflicts have represented the majority of non-state conflicts in Africa.

During tomorrow’s session, the role of the APRM in early warning is also expected to feature. As the entity that identifies risks through its governance assessment of participating states, APRM stands to make a notable contribution in drawing attention to the governance-related risks of conflict. It is to be recalled that the 4^th Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and APRM on 7 to 8 April 2025 highlighted the importance of leveraging APRM’s governance-focused peer review reports to enhance early warning strategies. This builds on prior pronouncements, which emphasised closer coordination between APRM and PSC to address structural vulnerabilities and governance deficits that fuel conflicts.

From the perspective of institutional coordination on early warning and continental security outlook, an issue that deserves attention during tomorrow’s session concerns the role of the early warning mechanisms of Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). In May 2025, during the 2^nd Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (ECOWAS MSC), the two bodies reaffirmed in their joint communique ‘the commitment to continue enhancing cooperation between the AU PSC and the ECOWAS MSC on Peace, Security and Governance issues, including by developing stronger and more structured cooperation on conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development. In this respect, they ‘underlined the need to enhance Early Warning and joint analysis capabilities, and to further strengthen the synergy between the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), including joint scenario planning, data exchange and rapid deployment of early response teams to contain potentially explosive situations.’

Discussions may also address challenges such as climate change vis-à-vis peace and security, as it is a critical factor in Africa’s complex crises, intensifying conflicts, driving forced migrations and worsening socio-economic challenges. Identified as a ‘threat multiplier,’ it amplifies existing vulnerabilities and poses new risks to human security and regional stability. The concept note of PSC’s 1263^rd session of March 2025 highlighted that ‘climate change also weakens state governance, making it harder to maintain security and public welfare. This creates opportunities for terrorist and criminal groups, who exploit climate-related frustrations to recruit and expand their influence, further threatening regional stability. Thus, climate change is not just an environmental threat – it undermines social cohesion and governance, necessitating an integrated approach that combines climate adaptation and resilience, sustainable development and peacebuilding.’

Acute competition for natural resources is a key issue slated for discussion at tomorrow’s PSC session, recognised as a significant threat to peace and security across Africa. The growing demand for limited resources like water, arable land, and minerals intensifies tensions within and between communities and states, particularly in regions such as the Sahel, Great Lakes, and Horn of Africa. This competition drives intercommunal clashes, banditry, and interstate disputes, with conflicts over water and fertile land escalating pastoralist-farmer tensions, and contests for valuable minerals fueling armed groups and transnational crime networks. The PSC is expected to explore integrating resource governance into early warning systems, prioritising sustainable management and equitable access to reduce conflict risks. This will likely involve using geospatial tools to track resource-related tensions and collaborating with RECs/RMs to craft tailored, region-specific strategies for preventing resource-driven conflicts.

Beyond these pressing challenges, the PSC is expected to address a set of emerging threats that further compound Africa’s security landscape. Among these are escalating inter-state tensions, intensifying geopolitical rivalries, and the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government. Youth restiveness, driven by widespread political exclusion and deep-seated structural unemployment, is identified as a particularly significant risk. The Council will also consider the effects of prolonged humanitarian crises, characterised by forced displacement and the weaponisation of sexual and gender-based violence, alongside the cascading impact of post-COVID-19 economic shocks and the growing burden of unsustainable external debt, all of which continue to erode state resilience.

The PSC is also expected to look into how tools like digital maps, satellite images, smart computer analysis, and future risk monitoring can help them better understand security situations and prepare for possible threats before they happen.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to emphasise the need for enhanced collaboration, including information sharing, between and among Member States, as well as with international partners, including technology firms, in order to more effectively counter the exploitation of digital platforms by terrorist and violent extremist groups. The PSC may also reiterate the need for the establishment of a joint cybersecurity taskforce and, importantly, call on AFRIPOL to develop an action plan on expanding the institutional and infrastructural preparedness of AU member states to deal with the increasing cybersecurity threats and enhance transnational cooperation for addressing the cross-regional nature of these threats. Considering the increase in intercommunal conflicts, the PSC may request the CEWS to undertake the mapping of intercommunal conflicts and their trends in close coordination with the concerned RECs/RMs. The PSC may reiterate its decision from its 1208^th session on the imperative of ‘a robust and fully functional CEWS to effectively pre-empt and mitigate conflicts’. In this regard, it may call for the need for anchoring the CEWS in a structure dedicated to CEWS.