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	<title>Financing and other Broader Concerns Archives - Amani Africa</title>
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	<title>Financing and other Broader Concerns Archives - Amani Africa</title>
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		<title>Briefing by the Peace Fund Secretariat</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-by-the-peace-fund-secretariat-2/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Oct 2024 18:58:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Amani Africa Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financing and other Broader Concerns]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>21 October 2024</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-by-the-peace-fund-secretariat-2/">Briefing by the Peace Fund Secretariat</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-0"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Briefing by the Peace Fund Secretariat </strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 21 October 2024</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (22 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene for a briefing from the Peace Fund Secretariat.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Mohamed Gad, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the AU and PSC Chairperson for October 2024, and Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, are expected to make statements. Dagmawit Moges, Director, Peace Fund Secretariat is expected to brief the Council on the state of operationalisation of the Peace Fund and activities undertaken since the February 2024 AU summit.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As part of the effort to address the perineal adequate, predictable and sustainable funding, the AU Assembly, during its 27<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session held in July 2016 in Kigali, Rwanda, through Assembly Decision [<a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31955-file-assembly_au_dec_605_financing_the_au.pdf">Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII)</a>] resolved to revitalise the Peace Fund through contributions from member states. This decision led to the establishment of a $400 million endowment for the AU Peace Fund initially planned to be mobilised by 2020. The revitalised Fund is organised to provide support for three windows (intervention areas): preventive diplomacy and mediation activities; institutional capacity building; and peace support operations. Additionally, a Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) is established to fund rapid responses to emergency crises.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The initial Assembly Decision 605 was that the Peace Fund would be financed through equal contributions from each AU region. The Assembly in its decision [<a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/36461-assembly_au_dec_713_-_748_xxxii_e.pdf">Assembly/AU/Dec.734 (XXXII)</a>] switched the basis for contribution to be used as the scale of assessment for the regular budget. While four regions of Africa supported the use of the scale of assessment, the North African region favoured the regional formula under Assembly Decision 605. The Executive Council in its October 2020 extraordinary session adopted by consensus, with reservation by the Northern region, the use of the scale of assessment for the regular budget for contribution to the Peace Fund (EX.CL Dec./1100(XXXVII)).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Over three years after the initial timeline of endowing the Fund with $400 million, the Peace Fund has a balance of $398 million as of June 2024. This amount is made up of member states contributions ($341 million), the balance from the Legacy Fund ($ 25 million) and the interest that is generated from the investment by the 2 Fund managers. Following various consultations with the countries of the Northern region who initially objected to the use of assessed contribution as a basis for contributing to the Peace Fund, it is reported that all countries of the region except two have paid 100 per cent. The remaining two countries, Egypt and Tunisia are on a three to five-year payment plan. Despite the substantial progress made and the extension of the timeline for endowing the Fund with the $400 million from 2020 to 2023, there remain outstanding contributions from some other member states assessed contributions towards the Peace Fund.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other aspect that tomorrow’s session is expected to shed light on is the state of operationalisation of the various structures of the Peace Fund. The main structures of the Peace Fund are the Board of Trustees, the Executive Management Committee, the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), the Fund Manager and a Peace Fund Secretariat. The Board of Trustees, made up of five high-level experts from the five regions of the continent and representatives of the UN and the EU, is fully operational. Similarly, the Executive Management Committee, chaired by the AU Commission Chairperson, is operational. Two Peace Fund managers have been appointed, although there are indications that these managers are not securing the level of returns from the investment in the Peace Fund. It is expected that further and better Fund Managers will be identified and appointed to enhance the returns from the investment in the Fund. The Peace Fund Secretariat became operational with the appointment of the Head of the Secretariat and has since recruited a few of its staff members. While the IEG is not operational, the process for instituting the IEG is currently underway. It would be made up of 2 representatives from the five regions of Africa and one representative each from the African Development Bank, the African Import-Export Bank and the World Bank. It is expected that the Head of the Secretariat will provide an update on the process of selection of the members of the IEG.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session is also expected to reflect on the state of utilisation of the Peace Fund. Utilisation of the Fund has thus far been limited to the CRF and as of 2024, for pilot projects of the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Accordingly, $6.5 million and $12 million were approved for the CRF for 2023 and 2024 respectively, with $5 million dedicated to the Pilot Projects for 2024. In 2023, the 6.5 million CRF budget for 2023 was allocated for four disbursements under CRF amounting to $6.5 million for the EAC regional force in eastern DRC ($2 million), ATMIS funding shortfall ($3.5 million) and the DDR process under the Pretoria Peace Agreement of Ethiopia ($1 million).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the context of the disbursement made thus far, one of the major issues that may arise in tomorrow’s session is the institutional arrangements for the proper utilisation of the disbursed funds for the intended purposes. For example, while $2 million was disbursed to the EAC Regional Force to the DRC in 2023, this Force was discontinued following the request from the DRC. The question that arises in this context is how to account for the $2 million, given that the fund could no longer be used for the purpose for which it was disbursed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On 1 October, the AU Peace Fund’s Executive Management Committee (EMC) conducted a comprehensive <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20241001/au-peace-fund-executive-management-committee-strategic?form=MG0AV3">review of the utilisation of the funds</a>. The discussions delved into deliberating on prospective channels to leverage partnerships with the private sector and multilateral financial institutions to secure additional funding for the Peace Fund. In addition, the Committee conducted a review of the utilisation of funds disbursed through the PAPS Department. According to the <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20241001/au-peace-fund-executive-management-committee-strategic?form=MG0AV3">press release</a>,  ‘Of the $7 million approved by the AU Executive Council, 92.8% of the funds were successfully deployed through the CRF.’ As of September 2024, the Peace Fund has disbursed a total of $19 million, reflecting its growing role in addressing conflicts across the continent. The Committee also provided strategic guidance for onboarding the IEG. The EMC proposed keeping the 2025 disbursement ceiling at $15 million.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pressreleases/44081-pr-PRESS_RELEASE_African_Union_Peace_Fund_disburses_USD_7_Million_to_PAPS_18Sept.2024.pdf">$7 million</a> CRF funding for 2024 was disbursed towards supporting South Sudan&#8217;s transition process, aiding Sudan&#8217;s peace efforts through political dialogue and other activities, the SAMIDRC, enhancing stabilisation efforts in the Lake Chad Basin via the MNJTF and supporting Libya&#8217;s national reconciliation, dialogue and potential stabilisation initiatives. The funds will also aid Mozambique&#8217;s stabilisation efforts in Cabo Delgado, as well as the ongoing stabilisation efforts in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, and the Sahel region. It is clear that this small fund is thinly spread but it is unclear what meaningful impact it would have. This raises the key question of prioritisation in the use of the CRF funds for achieving the maximum impact from the use of the limited resources allocated thereunder.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other issue expected to receive attention in tomorrow’s session is the question of the source of replenishment of the Peace Fund. It is on account of the lack of identification of the means of replenishment that the use of the Fund thus far is limited to the interest collected from the Fund only. Assembly Decision [<a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/44091-EX_CL_Dec_1217-1232_XLIII_E.pdf">EX.CL/Dec.1223(XLIII)</a>] of the 43<sup>rd</sup> Ordinary Session of the Executive Council held on 13 and 14 July 2023 in Nairobi, Kenya, in which, among other things, requested the AU Commission, acting through the Peace Fund Secretariat, to explore modalities for seeking voluntary contributions from Member States as well as contributions from the private sector, and encouraged the AU Peace Fund Secretariat ‘to expand all efforts to mobilise additional resources through Member States voluntary contributions by engaging with the private sector, high net worth individuals and the citizens of our continent’. In pursuit of this, various initiatives have been undertaken by the Secretariat including outreach to the private sector and the convening of a high-level pledging event during the Mid-Year Coordination Meeting held in Accra, Ghana this last July.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session also serves to have an update on the Executive Council’s directive, during its 45<sup>th</sup> Ordinary session, for the AU Commission to develop a feasibility study for consideration by the Ministerial Joint Sitting on the payment of part of the Member States’ assessed contributions in national currencies for the consideration of the Policy Organs by February 2025. In addition, there could be an update on the assignment tasked to the Commission to develop a comprehensive cash flow management plan aimed at channeling funds to assigned programs in a timely and effective manner, thereby enhancing the planning and execution of activities and programmes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The form for the outcome document for the session remains unknown. However, it is expected that the meeting will highlight the evaluation of the impacts of the 2024 CRF and Peace Fund Pilot Projects, which will also aim to capitalise on the current momentum and address gaps identified including compliance with the financial rules and regulations. The Council may commend the Peace Fund secretariat for the progress made so far in engaging with the multi-sectoral stakeholders to mobilise resources for the Peace Fund. The Council may urge member states who have not yet fulfilled their financial commitments to the Peace Fund to fulfil their commitments.</p>
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		<title>Joint Meeting between PSC, and PRC Budget (GSCBFAM), on Financing PSOs and PSC Activities</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/joint-meeting-between-psc-and-prc-budget-gscbfam-on-financing-psos-and-psc-activities-2/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Oct 2024 18:56:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Amani Africa Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financing and other Broader Concerns]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=19538</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>21 October 2024</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/joint-meeting-between-psc-and-prc-budget-gscbfam-on-financing-psos-and-psc-activities-2/">Joint Meeting between PSC, and PRC Budget (GSCBFAM), on Financing PSOs and PSC Activities</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-1"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Joint Meeting between PSC, and PRC Budget (GSCBFAM), on Financing PSOs and PSC Activities</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 21 October 2024</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (22 October), the African Union Peace and Security Council will convene a virtual engagement with the Sub-Committee of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial, and Administrative Matters (<em>GSCBFAM). </em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session is expected to commence with an opening statement by the PSC chair of the Month, Mohamed Omar Gad, Permanent Representative to the African Union and Chairperson of the AU PSC for October. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner of Political Affairs and Peace and Security Department is also expected to make a statement. The last time the PSC held such a meeting was on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-au-peace-fund">16 September 2022</a>, it involved the GSCBFAM and the Board of Trustees of the AU Peace Fund. That meeting featured remarks from the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission, the Chairperson of the Board of Trustees of the Peace Fund, and the Chairperson of the AU Committee of 15 Finance Ministers (F15).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The GSCBFAM&#8217;s role has evolved over time. Originally known as the Advisory Sub-Committee on Administrative, Budgetary and Financial Matters, it was established as the successor to a similar committee within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Recognising the need for a more robust oversight body, the <a href="https://portal.africa-union.org/DVD/Documents/DOC-AU-DEC/EX%20CL%20Dec%20931%20(XXIX)%20_E.pdf">AU Executive Council</a> in 2016 called for the committee&#8217;s reform and renaming.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> This resulted in the establishment of the Sub-Committee on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters with its expanded mandate and strengthened authority. The mandate of the GSCBFAM is to have a financial oversight of the African Union (AU), ensuring the organisation’s fiscal health. It examines the proposed budget crafted by the AU Commission, assess administrative matters, and dives deep into the financial transactions of both the Commission and regional offices. This close review allows the GSCBFAM to identify areas for improvement and ensure efficient, transparent and accountable use of resources.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The GSCBFAM plays a crucial role in managing unforeseen circumstances. They consider requests from the Commission for budget adjustments to accommodate urgent decisions or projects and address unexpected expenditures. In addition to evaluating the current financial landscape, the GSCBFAM contributes to shaping the AU&#8217;s future financial regulations. They review draft financial rules before submission to the PRC for consideration. Once approved by the Executive Council and, ultimately, the Assembly, these regulations establish a framework for responsible financial management within the AU.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As noted, this is not the first time that the PSC engages the GSCBFAM but the focus and context of that engagement was different. Additionally, the PSC during the past couple of years has activated its role in presenting and defending its budget with the PRC in accordance with paragraph 117 of the Manual on the Working Methods of the PSC. GSCBFAM is only the second PRC sub-committee, next to the Sub-committee on Democracy, Governance and Human Rights, to have engagement with the PSC. This session marks the first occasion for direct engagement between the PSC and the GSCBFAM with a focus on the budget for AU peace and security work beyond and in addition to the Peace Fund.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Considering that the Chairperson of the PSC for October is the Chairperson of the GSCBFAM, this meeting is informed by the appreciation of the crucial role that the Sub Committee on GSCBFAM plays in the financial management of the Union&#8217;s operations including funds that are used for the peace and security work of the Union and the need for close coordination between them for aligning the requirements of the PSC for executing its mandate with allocation and responsible use of funds. This session aims to exchange on the processing of budgets for all AU peace and security activities, financial accountability in the use of funds including compliance with the AU financial rules and regulations, and whether and how the budget process provides unforeseen peace and security interventions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">According to the African Union&#8217;s budget for 2025, as identified by the Executive Council during the previous mid-year summit, the breakdown of the programmatic budget reveals <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/44091-EX_CL_DEC_1265_-_1278_XLV_E.pdf">several allocations for peace and security activities</a>. This includes funding for the Peace and Security Council itself, which constitutes $1,782,979 of the program budget, along with other institutions such as the PCRD and the Africa Center for Counter Terrorism Research, which also has allocated budget lines in the AU program budget. Additionally, Peace Support Operations represent 9% of the total budget, including various operational expenses. Given these expenditures, it is vital for the PSC to engage with the PRC Sub Committee to gain a clear understanding of the funding directed toward peace and security initiatives undertaken by the Union. A better comprehension of the allocated budget for institutions that support and facilitate the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) will enable the Council to make informed decisions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When making these decisions, the PSC can consider existing budget allocations for specific aspects of the APSA and evaluate their financial capacity to effectively carry out assigned tasks. For example, when the Council engages in conflict prevention activities, the budget required for such activities and how they would be sourced are expected to constitute part of the considerations in the PSC’s engagements. This helps to ensure that proposals for PSC decisions are put forward with due consideration of the financial requirements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other aspect that tomorrow’s session is expected to address includes the kind of working arrangement that the two sides may establish. Given that the PSC is a policy body, but the sub-committee of the PRC is a subsidiary body, the session affords an opportunity to determine the appropriate format for engagement between the PSC and PRC sub-committees broadly speaking. In this respect, the PSC may establish a sub-committee at the ambassadorial level for engagement with PRC sub-committees, including GSCBFAM.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Additionally, tomorrow’s session may explore the occasions and timelines for the convening of engagement between the PSC, potentially through the sub-committee for engagement with relevant PRC sub-committees that the PSC may establish, and the GSCBFAM.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session will be a Communique. The Council may welcome this engagement with the PRC Sub-Committee on GSCBFAM. To this end, the Council may commend the Sub Committee on its endeavours for supporting/facilitating the budget operation of the Union and more specifically, the areas that support the mandate of the PSC. The Council may affirm the need to strengthen collaboration and cooperation between the PSC and the Sub-Committee, particularly when the PSC makes decisions that have budgetary implications. In this regard, the Council may decide to institutionalise the convening between the PRC Sub Committee on GSCBFAM and the PSC to take place on an annual basis. Considering that the GSCBFAM is a sub-committee of a policy body rather than a policy body itself, the PSC may establish a sub-committee at the ambassadorial level for engagement with PRC sub-committees including GSCBFA.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> <em>(EX.CL/Dec.916(XXVIII)</em> <a href="https://portal.africa-union.org/DVD/Documents/DOC-AU-DEC/EX%20CL%20Dec%20931%20(XXIX)%20_E.pdf"><em>https://portal.africa-union.org/DVD/Documents/DOC-AU-DEC/EX%20CL%20Dec%20931%20(XXIX)%20_E.pdf</em></a></p>
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		<title>Briefing by the Peace Fund Secretariat</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-by-the-peace-fund-secretariat/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Oct 2024 14:19:17 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Financing and other Broader Concerns]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2024]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>21 October 2024</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-by-the-peace-fund-secretariat/">Briefing by the Peace Fund Secretariat</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-2"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Briefing by the Peace Fund Secretariat </strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 21 October 2024</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (22 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene for a briefing from the Peace Fund Secretariat.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Mohamed Gad, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the AU and PSC Chairperson for October 2024, and Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, are expected to make statements. Dagmawit Moges, Director, Peace Fund Secretariat is expected to brief the Council on the state of operationalisation of the Peace Fund and activities undertaken since the February 2024 AU summit.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As part of the effort to address the perineal adequate, predictable and sustainable funding, the AU Assembly, during its 27<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session held in July 2016 in Kigali, Rwanda, through Assembly Decision [<a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31955-file-assembly_au_dec_605_financing_the_au.pdf">Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII)</a>] resolved to revitalise the Peace Fund through contributions from member states. This decision led to the establishment of a $400 million endowment for the AU Peace Fund initially planned to be mobilised by 2020. The revitalised Fund is organised to provide support for three windows (intervention areas): preventive diplomacy and mediation activities; institutional capacity building; and peace support operations. Additionally, a Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) is established to fund rapid responses to emergency crises.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The initial Assembly Decision 605 was that the Peace Fund would be financed through equal contributions from each AU region. The Assembly in its decision [<a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/36461-assembly_au_dec_713_-_748_xxxii_e.pdf">Assembly/AU/Dec.734 (XXXII)</a>] switched the basis for contribution to be used as the scale of assessment for the regular budget. While four regions of Africa supported the use of the scale of assessment, the North African region favoured the regional formula under Assembly Decision 605. The Executive Council in its October 2020 extraordinary session adopted by consensus, with reservation by the Northern region, the use of the scale of assessment for the regular budget for contribution to the Peace Fund (EX.CL Dec./1100(XXXVII)).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Over three years after the initial timeline of endowing the Fund with $400 million, the Peace Fund has a balance of $398 million as of June 2024. This amount is made up of member states contributions ($341 million), the balance from the Legacy Fund ($ 25 million) and the interest that is generated from the investment by the 2 Fund managers. Following various consultations with the countries of the Northern region who initially objected to the use of assessed contribution as a basis for contributing to the Peace Fund, it is reported that all countries of the region except two have paid 100 per cent. The remaining two countries, Egypt and Tunisia are on a three to five-year payment plan. Despite the substantial progress made and the extension of the timeline for endowing the Fund with the $400 million from 2020 to 2023, there remain outstanding contributions from some other member states assessed contributions towards the Peace Fund.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other aspect that tomorrow’s session is expected to shed light on is the state of operationalisation of the various structures of the Peace Fund. The main structures of the Peace Fund are the Board of Trustees, the Executive Management Committee, the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), the Fund Manager and a Peace Fund Secretariat. The Board of Trustees, made up of five high-level experts from the five regions of the continent and representatives of the UN and the EU, is fully operational. Similarly, the Executive Management Committee, chaired by the AU Commission Chairperson, is operational. Two Peace Fund managers have been appointed, although there are indications that these managers are not securing the level of returns from the investment in the Peace Fund. It is expected that further and better Fund Managers will be identified and appointed to enhance the returns from the investment in the Fund. The Peace Fund Secretariat became operational with the appointment of the Head of the Secretariat and has since recruited a few of its staff members. While the IEG is not operational, the process for instituting the IEG is currently underway. It would be made up of 2 representatives from the five regions of Africa and one representative each from the African Development Bank, the African Import-Export Bank and the World Bank. It is expected that the Head of the Secretariat will provide an update on the process of selection of the members of the IEG.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session is also expected to reflect on the state of utilisation of the Peace Fund. Utilisation of the Fund has thus far been limited to the CRF and as of 2024, for pilot projects of the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Accordingly, $6.5 million and $12 million were approved for the CRF for 2023 and 2024 respectively, with $5 million dedicated to the Pilot Projects for 2024. In 2023, the 6.5 million CRF budget for 2023 was allocated for four disbursements under CRF amounting to $6.5 million for the EAC regional force in eastern DRC ($2 million), ATMIS funding shortfall ($3.5 million) and the DDR process under the Pretoria Peace Agreement of Ethiopia ($1 million).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the context of the disbursement made thus far, one of the major issues that may arise in tomorrow’s session is the institutional arrangements for the proper utilisation of the disbursed funds for the intended purposes. For example, while $2 million was disbursed to the EAC Regional Force to the DRC in 2023, this Force was discontinued following the request from the DRC. The question that arises in this context is how to account for the $2 million, given that the fund could no longer be used for the purpose for which it was disbursed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On 1 October, the AU Peace Fund’s Executive Management Committee (EMC) conducted a comprehensive <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20241001/au-peace-fund-executive-management-committee-strategic?form=MG0AV3">review of the utilisation of the funds</a>. The discussions delved into deliberating on prospective channels to leverage partnerships with the private sector and multilateral financial institutions to secure additional funding for the Peace Fund. In addition, the Committee conducted a review of the utilisation of funds disbursed through the PAPS Department. According to the <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20241001/au-peace-fund-executive-management-committee-strategic?form=MG0AV3">press release</a>,  ‘Of the $7 million approved by the AU Executive Council, 92.8% of the funds were successfully deployed through the CRF.’ As of September 2024, the Peace Fund has disbursed a total of $19 million, reflecting its growing role in addressing conflicts across the continent. The Committee also provided strategic guidance for onboarding the IEG. The EMC proposed keeping the 2025 disbursement ceiling at $15 million.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pressreleases/44081-pr-PRESS_RELEASE_African_Union_Peace_Fund_disburses_USD_7_Million_to_PAPS_18Sept.2024.pdf">$7 million</a> CRF funding for 2024 was disbursed towards supporting South Sudan&#8217;s transition process, aiding Sudan&#8217;s peace efforts through political dialogue and other activities, the SAMIDRC, enhancing stabilisation efforts in the Lake Chad Basin via the MNJTF and supporting Libya&#8217;s national reconciliation, dialogue and potential stabilisation initiatives. The funds will also aid Mozambique&#8217;s stabilisation efforts in Cabo Delgado, as well as the ongoing stabilisation efforts in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, and the Sahel region. It is clear that this small fund is thinly spread but it is unclear what meaningful impact it would have. This raises the key question of prioritisation in the use of the CRF funds for achieving the maximum impact from the use of the limited resources allocated thereunder.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other issue expected to receive attention in tomorrow’s session is the question of the source of replenishment of the Peace Fund. It is on account of the lack of identification of the means of replenishment that the use of the Fund thus far is limited to the interest collected from the Fund only. Assembly Decision [<a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/44091-EX_CL_Dec_1217-1232_XLIII_E.pdf">EX.CL/Dec.1223(XLIII)</a>] of the 43<sup>rd</sup> Ordinary Session of the Executive Council held on 13 and 14 July 2023 in Nairobi, Kenya, in which, among other things, requested the AU Commission, acting through the Peace Fund Secretariat, to explore modalities for seeking voluntary contributions from Member States as well as contributions from the private sector, and encouraged the AU Peace Fund Secretariat ‘to expand all efforts to mobilise additional resources through Member States voluntary contributions by engaging with the private sector, high net worth individuals and the citizens of our continent’. In pursuit of this, various initiatives have been undertaken by the Secretariat including outreach to the private sector and the convening of a high-level pledging event during the Mid-Year Coordination Meeting held in Accra, Ghana this last July.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session also serves to have an update on the Executive Council’s directive, during its 45<sup>th</sup> Ordinary session, for the AU Commission to develop a feasibility study for consideration by the Ministerial Joint Sitting on the payment of part of the Member States’ assessed contributions in national currencies for the consideration of the Policy Organs by February 2025. In addition, there could be an update on the assignment tasked to the Commission to develop a comprehensive cash flow management plan aimed at channeling funds to assigned programs in a timely and effective manner, thereby enhancing the planning and execution of activities and programmes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The form for the outcome document for the session remains unknown. However, it is expected that the meeting will highlight the evaluation of the impacts of the 2024 CRF and Peace Fund Pilot Projects, which will also aim to capitalise on the current momentum and address gaps identified including compliance with the financial rules and regulations. The Council may commend the Peace Fund secretariat for the progress made so far in engaging with the multi-sectoral stakeholders to mobilise resources for the Peace Fund. The Council may urge member states who have not yet fulfilled their financial commitments to the Peace Fund to fulfil their commitments.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-by-the-peace-fund-secretariat/">Briefing by the Peace Fund Secretariat</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Joint Meeting between PSC, and PRC Budget (GSCBFAM), on Financing PSOs and PSC Activities</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/joint-meeting-between-psc-and-prc-budget-gscbfam-on-financing-psos-and-psc-activities/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Oct 2024 08:17:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Financing and other Broader Concerns]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2024]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=19532</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>21 October 2024</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/joint-meeting-between-psc-and-prc-budget-gscbfam-on-financing-psos-and-psc-activities/">Joint Meeting between PSC, and PRC Budget (GSCBFAM), on Financing PSOs and PSC Activities</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Joint Meeting between PSC, and PRC Budget (GSCBFAM), on Financing PSOs and PSC Activities</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 21 October 2024</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (22 October), the African Union Peace and Security Council will convene a virtual engagement with the Sub-Committee of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial, and Administrative Matters (<em>GSCBFAM). </em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session is expected to commence with an opening statement by the PSC chair of the Month, Mohamed Omar Gad, Permanent Representative to the African Union and Chairperson of the AU PSC for October. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner of Political Affairs and Peace and Security Department is also expected to make a statement. The last time the PSC held such a meeting was on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-au-peace-fund">16 September 2022</a>, it involved the GSCBFAM and the Board of Trustees of the AU Peace Fund. That meeting featured remarks from the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission, the Chairperson of the Board of Trustees of the Peace Fund, and the Chairperson of the AU Committee of 15 Finance Ministers (F15).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The GSCBFAM&#8217;s role has evolved over time. Originally known as the Advisory Sub-Committee on Administrative, Budgetary and Financial Matters, it was established as the successor to a similar committee within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Recognising the need for a more robust oversight body, the <a href="https://portal.africa-union.org/DVD/Documents/DOC-AU-DEC/EX%20CL%20Dec%20931%20(XXIX)%20_E.pdf">AU Executive Council</a> in 2016 called for the committee&#8217;s reform and renaming.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> This resulted in the establishment of the Sub-Committee on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters with its expanded mandate and strengthened authority. The mandate of the GSCBFAM is to have a financial oversight of the African Union (AU), ensuring the organisation’s fiscal health. It examines the proposed budget crafted by the AU Commission, assess administrative matters, and dives deep into the financial transactions of both the Commission and regional offices. This close review allows the GSCBFAM to identify areas for improvement and ensure efficient, transparent and accountable use of resources.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The GSCBFAM plays a crucial role in managing unforeseen circumstances. They consider requests from the Commission for budget adjustments to accommodate urgent decisions or projects and address unexpected expenditures. In addition to evaluating the current financial landscape, the GSCBFAM contributes to shaping the AU&#8217;s future financial regulations. They review draft financial rules before submission to the PRC for consideration. Once approved by the Executive Council and, ultimately, the Assembly, these regulations establish a framework for responsible financial management within the AU.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As noted, this is not the first time that the PSC engages the GSCBFAM but the focus and context of that engagement was different. Additionally, the PSC during the past couple of years has activated its role in presenting and defending its budget with the PRC in accordance with paragraph 117 of the Manual on the Working Methods of the PSC. GSCBFAM is only the second PRC sub-committee, next to the Sub-committee on Democracy, Governance and Human Rights, to have engagement with the PSC. This session marks the first occasion for direct engagement between the PSC and the GSCBFAM with a focus on the budget for AU peace and security work beyond and in addition to the Peace Fund.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Considering that the Chairperson of the PSC for October is the Chairperson of the GSCBFAM, this meeting is informed by the appreciation of the crucial role that the Sub Committee on GSCBFAM plays in the financial management of the Union&#8217;s operations including funds that are used for the peace and security work of the Union and the need for close coordination between them for aligning the requirements of the PSC for executing its mandate with allocation and responsible use of funds. This session aims to exchange on the processing of budgets for all AU peace and security activities, financial accountability in the use of funds including compliance with the AU financial rules and regulations, and whether and how the budget process provides unforeseen peace and security interventions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">According to the African Union&#8217;s budget for 2025, as identified by the Executive Council during the previous mid-year summit, the breakdown of the programmatic budget reveals <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/44091-EX_CL_DEC_1265_-_1278_XLV_E.pdf">several allocations for peace and security activities</a>. This includes funding for the Peace and Security Council itself, which constitutes $1,782,979 of the program budget, along with other institutions such as the PCRD and the Africa Center for Counter Terrorism Research, which also has allocated budget lines in the AU program budget. Additionally, Peace Support Operations represent 9% of the total budget, including various operational expenses. Given these expenditures, it is vital for the PSC to engage with the PRC Sub Committee to gain a clear understanding of the funding directed toward peace and security initiatives undertaken by the Union. A better comprehension of the allocated budget for institutions that support and facilitate the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) will enable the Council to make informed decisions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When making these decisions, the PSC can consider existing budget allocations for specific aspects of the APSA and evaluate their financial capacity to effectively carry out assigned tasks. For example, when the Council engages in conflict prevention activities, the budget required for such activities and how they would be sourced are expected to constitute part of the considerations in the PSC’s engagements. This helps to ensure that proposals for PSC decisions are put forward with due consideration of the financial requirements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other aspect that tomorrow’s session is expected to address includes the kind of working arrangement that the two sides may establish. Given that the PSC is a policy body, but the sub-committee of the PRC is a subsidiary body, the session affords an opportunity to determine the appropriate format for engagement between the PSC and PRC sub-committees broadly speaking. In this respect, the PSC may establish a sub-committee at the ambassadorial level for engagement with PRC sub-committees, including GSCBFAM.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Additionally, tomorrow’s session may explore the occasions and timelines for the convening of engagement between the PSC, potentially through the sub-committee for engagement with relevant PRC sub-committees that the PSC may establish, and the GSCBFAM.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session will be a Communique. The Council may welcome this engagement with the PRC Sub-Committee on GSCBFAM. To this end, the Council may commend the Sub Committee on its endeavours for supporting/facilitating the budget operation of the Union and more specifically, the areas that support the mandate of the PSC. The Council may affirm the need to strengthen collaboration and cooperation between the PSC and the Sub-Committee, particularly when the PSC makes decisions that have budgetary implications. In this regard, the Council may decide to institutionalise the convening between the PRC Sub Committee on GSCBFAM and the PSC to take place on an annual basis. Considering that the GSCBFAM is a sub-committee of a policy body rather than a policy body itself, the PSC may establish a sub-committee at the ambassadorial level for engagement with PRC sub-committees including GSCBFA.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> <em>(EX.CL/Dec.916(XXVIII)</em> <a href="https://portal.africa-union.org/DVD/Documents/DOC-AU-DEC/EX%20CL%20Dec%20931%20(XXIX)%20_E.pdf"><em>https://portal.africa-union.org/DVD/Documents/DOC-AU-DEC/EX%20CL%20Dec%20931%20(XXIX)%20_E.pdf</em></a></p>
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		<title>Discussion on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/discussion-on-united-nations-security-council-resolution-2719-2023/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jul 2024 07:08:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Financing and other Broader Concerns]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2024]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=18987</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>23 July 2024</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/discussion-on-united-nations-security-council-resolution-2719-2023/">Discussion on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Discussion on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 23 July 2024</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (24 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a retreat to discuss the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2719 (2023) on the financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following an opening remark by Miguel César Domingos Bembe, Permanent Representative of Angola to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of July 2024, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a presentation based on a report prepared by the AU Commission.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC last considered the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Resolution-27192023n2342006.pdf">UNSC Resolution 2719</a> on 14 June 2024, during its 1215<sup>th</sup> session. This session addressed challenges that may hinder the effective implementation of the resolution and highlighted ambiguities within it. Although the meeting concluded without adopting any outcome document, it was decided that the PSC convenes a retreat on the subject at the end of July 2024. This retreat is being convened against this backdrop.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Besides planning for a retreat, at the 1215<sup>th</sup> session, the PSC also requested the AU Commission to prepare a document that includes the matrix for Resolution 2719, which outlines the sharing of responsibilities, a position paper on its implementation, guidelines for its operationalisation and recommendations. Therefore, tomorrow’s retreat is anticipated to be grounded on the document that will be presented by the AU Commission.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Using the document as a basis the discussions of the retreat are expected to explore and propose recommendations on the ambiguous areas of the resolution concerning the decision-making process, the notion of ‘case-by-case,’ ‘AU-led and under direct and effective AU command and control,’ the ‘75:25’ formula, and the extent of application of the UN Financial Rules and Regulations to AU PSOs as well as mission support.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify;">Additionally, paragraph 2 of Resolution 2719 stipulates that AU-led PSOs, granted access to UN-assessed contributions by the UNSC, will remain under ‘the direct and effective command and control of the AU’. Considering the fragmentation in the use of deployment of ‘peace operations’ on the continent taking the form of regional operations, ad hoc operations, a coalition of the willing and bilateral deployments, this formulation aims at bringing deployment under the umbrella of AU’s multilateral and established normative frameworks that ensure coherence and compliance. The implication of the requirement of ‘direct and effective command and control’ requires more than a deployment on the basis of consultation with the PSC and under the AU peace operations policy frameworks. The implication of this is that such operations by arrangements other than the AU including peace support operations by Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) will not have direct access to UN-assessed contributions within the framework of 2719.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This however does not necessarily imply there cannot be a situation in which operations initiated by RECs/RMs will not at all fall under Resolution 2719. In terms of precedent, there is no single case of a regional operation or ad hoc operation in which the AU exercised ‘direct command and control.’ The only example that can provide instructive lessons on this question of direct command and control is the hybrid UN and AU experience of mission in Sudan – the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). While UNAMID was a joint mission of the UN and the AU, the UN exercised direct command and control in coordination with the AU. UNAMID could be the model that can help develop an arrangement between the AU and RECs/RMs for meeting the requirements of operational paragraph 2 of Resolution 2719 that the AU-led peace support operation that can benefit from this resolution needs to be under ‘the direct and effective command and control of the AU.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Concurrently, Paragraph 2 requires that the use of assessed contributions has to be ‘<em>consistent with Article 17 of the Charter as well as the financial regulations and rules of the United Nations.’ </em>Similarly, Paragraph 4 of the resolution mandates that these AU-led PSOs must adhere to the UN Financial Regulations and Rules. The UN Financial Regulations and Rules grant the UN Secretary-General authority over peacekeeping budgets, including setting objectives, outputs, activities, and resource allocations for budgets submitted to the General Assembly. This framework raises issues for AU PSO budgets in that it may necessitate adjustments in both budget preparations and reporting on the use of appropriated budget in order to ensure alignment between the demands of ensuring supplies that meet the tempo of AU-led PSOs on the one hand and the UN financial regulations and the decision-making processes of the 5<sup>th</sup> Committee of the UN General Assembly on the other hand. The UN Secretary-General also holds the authority to commit funds and make payments based on General Assembly appropriations, delegating this authority to mission heads in UN operations. However, this delegation system cannot extend the administration of UN Financial Regulations and Rules outside the UN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There are however experiences to draw from. As pointed out in Amani Africa’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/seizing-the-new-momentum-for-unsc-resolution-on-un-funding-of-au-peace-operations/">special research report</a> on the financing of AU PSOs through UN-assessed contributions, the UN, under Resolutions 1863 (2009) and 2010 (2011), established a support package for supporting the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) using UN assessed contributions. This is also one of the two models (the other being the hybrid model of UNAMID) for channelling the funds that were proposed in the UN Secretary-General’s May 2023 report to the UNSC. As observed in our Special Research Report, ‘[e]xplaining the reason for the choice of the two models, the Secretary-General’s report states that ‘both approaches would facilitate the application of United Nations Rules and Regulations, standards for financial oversight, accountability mechanisms and requirements for human rights due diligence and can be implemented under existing policies and procedures.’ It is worth noting that the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/ENG%20Final%20Consensus%20Paper%20financing%20PS%20Activities%20-%208%20Feb%202023%20(2).pdf">AU Consensus Paper</a> on Financing of AU PSOs adopted by the AU Assembly in February 2023 also provides the support package model as ‘the best starting points for discussing financing options.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With regards to the financial burden-sharing aspect of the resolution, which directs for the use of up to 75% of UN-assessed contributions for eligible AU-led Peace Support Operations, two issues may arise. Various AU member states made it clear that the AU is not in a position to contribute the 25%. In keeping with not leaving the AU with the full burden of contributing the balance of the budget not covered by UN Assessed contributions, one is the aspect of the resolution, which states that the remaining 25% is expected to be jointly mobilised from the international community as extra-budgetary resources. The UNSC with its resolution commits to exploring &#8216;all viable options&#8217; in the event of significant shortfalls in resource mobilisation. This commitment raises the question of whether &#8216;all viable options&#8217; might include the use of assessed contributions beyond the 75% cap. Another matter that seeks clarity in this regard is what accounts as a ‘contribution’ according to what is stated under paragraph 9 of the resolution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other aspect of Resolution 2719 that is expected to receive attention is the decision-making process in the authorisation of AU-led PSOs that falls under Resolution 2719 envisaged in operational paragraph 3. This envisages a process that requires a workflow that covers a series of sequential activities: a) consultation by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN for the conduct of a strategic assessment (of emerging and ongoing conflict situations) with a range of options for response, b) a joint strategic assessment guided, among others, by ‘regular joint review and reporting processes to ensure oversight by the Security Council of all authorised operations that access United Nations assessed contributions’, c) preparation of the report of the strategic assessment and the draft concept of operations (CONOPs), d) decision by the PSC on the report and the draft CONOPs, d) transmission of the PSC decision to the UNSC, and e) a consideration and decision by the UNSC. The key issues that the decision-making process envisaged under operational paragraph 3 include the kind of working arrangement that needs to be established between the AU and the UN and whether or not there is a need for engagement with and greenlight from the UNSC in starting the initial process of consultation between the AU Commission Chairperson and the UN Secretary-General as well as the mechanism for triggering the process.</p>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>The decision-making process in the authorisation of AU-led PSOs, Source: The United Nations Secretary General report on financing of AU peace support operations (May 2023) and UNSC Resolution 2719(2023)</figcaption></div></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-7" data-row="script-row-unique-7" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-7"));</script></div></div></div><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-8"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Furthermore, the AUC report and briefing are expected to explore the conception of a ‘case-by-case’, as it can have different outcomes as to the response to the request of UN-assessed contributions by the AU. Some member states of the PSC are of the view that the fact that the assessed contribution is grunted on a case-by-case basis does not secure adequate, predictable, and sustainable financing of AU-led PSOs. This is because one of the outcomes for a case-by-case consideration of AU-led PSOs could be the rejection of the request by the UNSC. In these cases, the PSC will be required to answer questions like, what will be the contingency plan in scenarios where UN-assessed contributions fall short. It is therefore expected that the PSC will develop a position on the issue as to what should be adopted in examining different conflict cases.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As a follow-up to previous discussions, the PSC is also expected to continue deliberations on the identification of the test case for implementation of Resolution 2719. It is worth recalling in this respect that the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/com-psc-1217-somalia-atmis-en.pdf">1217<sup>th</sup> session</a> of the PSC that decided on the deployment of a post-ATMIS mission to Somalia in paragraph 17 stipulated the PSC’s request ‘that a dedicated funding mechanism, through UN-assessed contributions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)…be established to guarantee the financial stability of the mission.’ Part of the issue in this context is how this decision of the PSC can be pursued in the implementation of the various aspects for authorisation for access to UN-assessed contributions under Resolution 2719.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With respect to mission support, Resolution 2719 provides that ‘the Security Council will decide on the most appropriate mission model, prioritising the establishment of a United Nations Support Office, which enables the use of the fiduciary processes and reporting of the United Nations system or as may be necessary through any other mission model.’ The experience from AMISOM/ATMIS shows that there is a need for aligning the strategic logistic frameworks of the AU and the UN. Particularly where AU-led operations require enforcement action, there is not only a robust logistical support framework that meets the demands of such kinetic operations and the tempo of such operations which may necessitate decentralisation and prepositioning of supplies. Part of the consideration in tomorrow’s PSC retreat is how to ensure the development of such a strategic logistics support framework and the kind of steps required to avoid some of the shortfalls that undermined the effectiveness of AMISOM including airlift capacity and availability of force enablers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome is a conclusions document of the retreat that will later be submitted to future PSC sessions on the matter. The PSC is expected to commend the AU Commission for developing the matrix of the UNSC Resolution 2719, the position paper and further. The PSC may also state that it looks forward to the conclusion of the development of the position paper. The Council may further call on member states and the AU Commission to utilise the upcoming 18<sup>th</sup> PSC-UNSC Annual Joint Consultative Meeting in October, to engage with stakeholders, including the A3, to forge a common understanding of the resolution.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/discussion-on-united-nations-security-council-resolution-2719-2023/">Discussion on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Discussion on the UNSC Resolution 2719(2023)</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/discussion-on-the-unsc-resolution-2719-2023/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Jun 2024 04:53:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Financing and other Broader Concerns]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2024]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=18545</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>13 June 2024</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/discussion-on-the-unsc-resolution-2719-2023/">Discussion on the UNSC Resolution 2719(2023)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-9"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Discussion on the UNSC Resolution 2719(2023)</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 13 June 2024</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (14 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1215<sup>th</sup> session to discuss the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2719 (2023) on the financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Rebecca Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda and Chairperson of the PSC for June, followed by statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The representatives of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) may also deliver statements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While the PSC discussed the resolution in the preparation of its report submitted to the AU Assembly in February 2024, this is the first time that the PSC is convening a dedicated session on this resolution. Apart from providing the PSC with the opportunity to get updates on measures being put in place towards the operationalization of the resolution, this session can help build shared understanding of what it takes and how and when Resolution 2719 can be activated.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session serves as a follow up to the decision of the 44<sup>th</sup> ordinary session of the Executive Council of the AU held in February 2024 that called upon the Commission to submit a ‘proposal to the UNSC after adoption by the Peace and Security Council, by August 2024’ to trigger the operationalization of this funding mechanism for AU-led PSOs. As such, also of significance for tomorrow’s session is the issues of how to trigger consideration of the application of the resolution and how to proceed with using the resolution in a concrete test case.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In terms of updates, it would be of interest for the PSC members to know the steps taken at the level of the AU Commission, the UN and between the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat. In his briefing, it is expected that Adeoye would inform the PSC the establishment of a taskforce dedicated to the resolution. On the basis of this, the taskforce held internal consultations for unpacking what resolution 2719 mean and the issues that require attention for the implementation of the resolution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On the part of the UN as well, a taskforce was established at the level of the UN Secretariat. This taskforce has been engaging both in unpacking the resolution and in identifying the processes required towards the operationalization of the resolution. As for the UNSC, while no dedicated session was held on the resolution as such, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa convened a meeting on 30 April to discuss the implementation of Resolution 2719.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Apart from the initiatives at the level of the AU and the UN respectively, the 23<sup>rd</sup> consultative meeting of the AU-UN Joint Task Force on 16 April 2024 adopted a decision for developing a joint plan on the implementation of resolution 2719. They agreed on steps towards that end, notably the holding of consultative meeting between the AU and UN taskforces.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As a follow up to the decision of the AU-UN Joint Task Force, the AU and UN held a consultative meeting between their respective taskforces. The meeting <a href="https://unoau.unmissions.org/au-and-un-task-teams-convene-consultative-meeting-implementation-unscr-2719-2023">agreed</a> on modalities for the development and finalization of a joint Roadmap for the implementation of resolution 2719. They also identified the four clusters or thematic work streams around which the joint roadmap is to be elaborated.  These are: joint planning, decision-making and reporting; mission support; financing and budgeting; human rights compliance and protection of civilians. According to information publicly shared by the AU, ‘the meeting articulated a skeleton Roadmap around: Planning, Decision-making, and Monitoring and reporting; Mission support, Financing and budgeting; Human Rights Compliance and Protection of Civilians.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During the 23<sup>rd</sup> consultative meeting of the AU-UN Joint Task Force on 16 April 2024, the two sides also agreed to hold a follow up meeting between 17-20 June, if required. The plan is to finalize the Joint Roadmap on the implementation of the resolution for its adoption by the AU Chairperson and UN Secretary-General during the next AU-UN Annual Conference slated for October.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Apart from following up the progress made towards delivering on the request made by the Executive Council, tomorrow’s meeting also helps for the PSC members to reflect on the content of the resolution and seek to achieve shared understanding. As the concept note of the UN Ad Hoc Working Group on the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa for its meeting on the implementation of resolution 2719 rightly put it, ‘ensuring common understanding of the resolution as well as development of detailed modalities for its implementation is critical to help guide utilisation of the resolution.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The resolution covers wide range of issues, including decision-making and authorization, financial arrangements and procedures, compliance frameworks, and reporting and monitoring. It also envisages closer AU-UN engagement and alignment of their processes and capacities in the authorization, deployment and management of the PSOs. However, there are some key elements around which there is a need for achieving shared understanding on the part of the AU and the UN for a smooth implementation of the resolution. One of such areas is regarding joint planning, decision-making and reporting. Paragraph 2 of the resolution provides that UNSC agrees to consider requests from the PSC for AU-led PSOs authorized by UNSC to have access to UN assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. Key questions in this respect include how the requests are developed and presented to the UNSC and most notably whether and what kind of consultations are required for submitting such a request to the UNSC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other area is financing and mission support, particularly the 25:75 burden-sharing formula. Paragraph 6 of the resolution determines that AU-led PSOs authorized by UNSC will have access to UN assessed contributions ‘not exceeding 75 percent of their annual budgets’, with the remaining 25 percent to be ‘jointly mobilized from the international community as extra-budgetary resources.’ UNSC commits to ‘consider all viable options in the event of significant shortfalls in resource mobilization.’ This raises a question of whether ‘all viable options’ actually includes the use of assessed contributions beyond the 75 percent cap.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is anticipated that tomorrow’s session will also discuss the possibility of testing the use of Resolution 2719 in the specific case of implementing a post-ATMIS security arrangement in Somalia. Apart from the provision in the proposal of Somalia of the use of this resolution for financing the post-ATMIS security arrangement in Somalia, during its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1205.comm_en.pdf">1205<sup>th</sup></a> session on ATMIS, the PSC hinted accessing UN assessed contribution within the framework of resolution 2719 as one of the possible financial modalities for post-ATMIS mission.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Yet, there are divisions particularly in the UN on whether a post-ATMIS security arrangement can and should be made a test case. Some members of the UNSC are keen to push forward the agenda of invoking resolution 2719 for the first time on the envisaged post-ATMIS mission, even by tabling a resolution that would pave the way for the application of resolution 2719. This is despite that some other UNSC members, notably US, not being supportive of the idea.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome is a communiqué. PSC is expected to commend the steps taken thus far towards the operationalization of the resolution, including the establishment of the Task Force at the level of the AU Commission and the convening of a technical-level meeting with the UN counterpart in May 2024. The PSC may also state that it looks forward to the conclusion of the development of the joint roadmap by the AU and the UN. The PSC may call for follow up on the Executive Council’s decision for the AU Commission to develop a ‘proposal to the UNSC after adoption by the Peace and Security Council, by August 2024’ to trigger the operationalization of this funding mechanism for AU-led PSOs. It may also in this respect call for such proposal to be developed and submitted on the specific case of the post-ATMIS security arrangement for Somalia.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/discussion-on-the-unsc-resolution-2719-2023/">Discussion on the UNSC Resolution 2719(2023)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Ministerial session on financing of AU led peace support operations</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/ministerial-session-on-financing-of-au-led-peace-support-operations/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Sep 2023 05:18:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Financing and other Broader Concerns]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2023]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=15838</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>22 September 2023</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/ministerial-session-on-financing-of-au-led-peace-support-operations/">Ministerial session on financing of AU led peace support operations</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-10"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding single-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Ministerial session on financing of AU led peace support operations </strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 22 September 2023</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (23 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1175<sup>th</sup> meeting at a ministerial level to deliberate on financing of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The meeting will be held in the margins of the 78<sup>th</sup> session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York, USA.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Cameroon’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lejeune Mbella Mbella, chairperson of the PSC for the month of September, is expected to open the session. Moussa Faki Mahamat, the AU Commission Chairperson, will make a statement. Donald Kaberuka, the AU High-Representative for the Peace Find and Financing of the AU, is also expected to address the session. On the part of the UN, it is envisaged that Jean-pierre Lacroix, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, and Rosemary A. DiCarlo, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, will make statement as well. The representatives of the African Members in the UN Security Council (A3), namely Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique and the incoming two African members of the UN Security Council, Algeria and Sierra Leone, will also be present for this ministerial session.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The last time that the PSC met to discuss the issue of financing AU PSOs was on 12 May of this year during its 1153<sup>rd</sup> session, which was held at the ministerial level. In that session, the PSC authorized the A3 to ‘resume consultations with the relevant stakeholders towards the adoption of a UNSC resolution on financing AU-led PSOs.’ This set the negotiation process towards the adoption of UNSC resolution in motion, a process that was put on hold after the request of the PSC in September 2019 to suspend the negotiation over the draft resolution put forward by South Africa. (For more details see Amani Africa’s 10 May 2023 <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/seizing-the-new-momentum-for-unsc-resolution-on-un-funding-of-au-peace-operations/">Special Research Report</a>).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">From our consultations, Ghana – who is spearheading the agenda of adopting a framework resolution on financing AU PSOs – has developed a draft resolution to start the negotiation process in the UNSC. It is anticipated that the draft resolution may be circulated sometime in October with the hope to table the resolution for voting in December during Ecuador’s Presidency. Tomorrow’s session thus offers an opportunity for the PSC to provide substantive and concrete guidance on how to proceed with the negotiation particularly on the remaining delicate issues in the coming months.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The renewed interest in and the window of opportunity towards the adoption of the long pending resolution is a result of various developments both at the level of the AU and the UN as well as changes in the peace and security dynamics and the dynamics in the UNSC. The AU Commission prepared what it called ‘African consensus paper on predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for African Union peace and security activities’, which the AU Assembly considered and adopted in February 2023 at its 36<sup>th</sup> ordinary session. This Consensus Paper not only presented the advances that the AU made in strengthening its various institutional, normative and regulatory processes but it also clarified AU’s position on burden sharing.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On the part of the UN, following the presidential statement of August 2022 under Chinese presidency of the UNSC which requested UN Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfil the commitments set out in resolutions 2320 and 2378, and recommendations to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources, the Secretary-General released the report on 1 May and presented to the UNSC during its 25 May 2023 session. The dynamics within the UNSC today is more favorable for the adoption of a resolution on financing than it was before as the <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15294.doc.htm#:~:text=African%20Union%2Dled%20peace%20support%20operations%20need%20predictable%2C%20adequate%20and,best%20to%20leverage%20the%20latter">statements</a> delivered by UNSC members during the 25 May briefing clearly attest. Considering that a major factor for the collapse of the process for the adoption of a resolution in December 2018 was a US threat to veto the resolution, a notable positive development is US’s statement expressing more positive and supportive stance towards the adoption of the resolution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Further to that, while the nature of the peace and security context increasingly demands the use of instruments that go beyond those applicable to UN peacekeeping and hence putting UN peace operations on the continent under increasing pressure, there is no appetite in the UN for deploying UN peacekeeping. Additionally, the recent geopolitical shifts that increasingly acknowledge Africa as a key global actor can find meaningful institutional expression through, among others, the decision to use UN assessed contribution for AU PSOs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the context of the last attempt for the adoption of a UNSC resolution during 2018/2019 and following the suspension of the process in September 2019, the issues requiring further engagement have been identified. Broadly speaking, four issues emerged as requiring further engagement between the AU and the UN to pave the way for the adoption of a UNSC resolution: the question of burden-sharing, compliance frameworks for human rights and international humanitarian law, fiduciary standards of financial arrangements and reporting, and oversight and command and control of the missions. (For more details on the history of the negotiation and the controversial issues, see Amani Africa’s 10 May 2023 <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/seizing-the-new-momentum-for-unsc-resolution-on-un-funding-of-au-peace-operations/">Special Research Report</a>).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite the favorable political dynamics within the UNSC, the negotiation over the draft resolution will not be easy. The 25 May 2023 UNSC briefing reveals that support on the part of UNSC members including some of the P5 remains uneven.  In that regard, it is worth noting that the representative of the UK, during the 25 May briefing, stressed the need for the AU to ‘openly and clearly establish how it intends to share the financial burden’, and further warning that ‘any scope for misinterpretation will result in new initiatives being stalled’. Together with the issues that others like Brazil, Albania and Japan raised, further compromise and agreement may be required on some of these sticking issues.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During tomorrow’s session, it is expected that the PSC, apart from reiterating the progress made in enhancing ownership and burden sharing through the AU Peace Fund, may highlight the need for giving due recognition to the unaccounted aspects of the financial burden that AU member states bear in mobilizing and deploying troops who pay with their lives and limbs. It may further reaffirm the position of the Consensus Paper that the AU would cover the costs relating to the preparatory stages of the deployment of PSOs supported by UN assessed contributions. Considering the expectation on the part of some members of the UNSC for further commitment for financial burden sharing, the PSC may indicate in the context of the clear commitment that the AU demonstrated in recent years that instead of making unrealistic commitment for a specific percentage for all PSOs that may be funded through UN assessed contributions that further financial contribution is considered at the time of the planning and negotiation of the deployment of each PSO.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session will also serve as an opportunity for the PSC to also express its support for the financing model for accessing UN assessed contributions for AU-led PSOs as articulated both in the AU Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s May 2023 report. With respect to oversight and command and control, the PSC may also welcome the proposed formula in the Secretary-General’s report as the basis for formulating the provisions in the resolution while affirming the importance of the development of joint AU-UN planning guidelines.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC should take lessons from the 2018/19 negotiation process to avoid the risk of another failure. First, it is imperative to ensure the cohesion of the A3 members and that they are able to speak in one voice on controversial issues throughout the negotiation process. In that regard, an interesting development is PSC’s suspension of Gabon – a member of the A3 – after the 20 August military coup. It remains to be seen whether the sanction will affect Gabon’s relations with other A3 members, as well as the PSC while engaging on the file. Second, building a broader consensus with the UNSC members is also crucial. One immediate available avenue to that end is the upcoming 17<sup>th</sup> annual joint consultative meeting between the PSC and the UNSC, which is scheduled to take place from 5 to 6 October in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. PSC may commend the efforts of the A3, and request them to fast track the finalization of the draft resolution and the negotiation on the same in order to seize the current window of opportunity for the adoption of the resolution before the end of the year. The PSC may emphasize the need for a sustained engagement between the AU Commission, the PSC and the A3 throughout the negotiation process; and to that end, it may request a regular briefing from the A3 until the successful completion of the negotiation process. The PSC may affirm AU-led PSOs authorized by the UNSC and funded through UN assessed contribution as being part of the range of tools that the UN deploys for maintenance of international peace and security. The PSC may also welcome the proposals contained in the Secretary-General’s May 2023 report notably with respect to monitoring and reporting, joint and consultative decision-making. It may commend the progress made by the AU for achieving ownership and burden sharing and signal that specific financial contribution by the AU for a PSO funded by UN assessed contribution is dealt with on a case-by-case basis. It may also express the need for the UNSC to recognize the important contribution of AU PSOs for international peace and security, hence for the realization of the primary responsibility of the UNSC.</p>
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		<title>Discussion on Financing AU Peace Support Operations in Africa</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/discussion-on-financing-au-peace-support-operations-in-africa/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 May 2023 10:30:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Financing and other Broader Concerns]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2023]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=14212</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>12 May 2023</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/discussion-on-financing-au-peace-support-operations-in-africa/">Discussion on Financing AU Peace Support Operations in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Discussion on Financing AU Peace Support Operations in Africa</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 12 May 2023</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (12 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1153<sup>rd</sup> session at a ministerial level to discuss the issue of financing AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Uganda’s minister of Foreign Affairs, Odongo Jeje Abubakhar, Chairperson of the PSC for the month of May, is expected to open the session followed by remarks from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), as well as remarks from Mohammed El-Amine Souef, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Somalia and Head of AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Head of UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) is expected to address the PSC and provide overview of the Secretary-General’s report released early this month. The representative of the European Union (EU) could be also among the speakers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session on financing AU PSOs comes in the context of a new momentum for the resumption of negotiation on a framework UNSC resolution on financing of AU-led PSOs that has stalled since 2019. In February of this year, the 36<sup>th</sup> ordinary session of the AU Assembly adopted what the AU referred to as ‘African consensus paper on predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for African Union peace and security activities.’ On 1 May, the UN Secretary-General officially released the report on the Implementation of UNSC resolutions 2320(2016) and 2378(2017), which is scheduled to be considered by the UNSC on 25 May. These two documents set the stage for starting the negotiation on a UNSC framework resolution that secures concrete commitment from the Council on the use of UN assessed contributions for AU-led PSOs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Happening at the ministerial level, tomorrow’s session presents the PSC the opportunity to provide strategic guidance on how to take forward the agenda of financing within the UNSC and the respective roles and responsibilities of the various AU actors in that regard. It could also serve as a platform for the PSC to create awareness and shared understanding on some of the key issues highlighted in the two documents and those areas that may require further engagement and negotiated compromise.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There are around four issues, which all received attention in the two documents and are expected to required further engagement. The first of this has to do with burden sharing. This relates to the percentage of the budget of AU-led PSO supported by UN funding that the AU contributes to. One of the issues in this regard was the clarification needed on contribution of 25 % of PSOs budget. The Consensus Paper stated that the 25% of AU’s budget would be dedicated to supporting ‘priority initiatives of the AU in support of <strong>peace and security</strong> efforts on the continent.’ From the 25% of the Union’s annual budget that is committed to the overall peace and security work of the AU, the budget for PSOs is expected to cover the <strong>preparation stage</strong> of AU led PSOs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During the session, member states may also raise the question of various unaccounted costs that they absorb when deploying for PSOs. As highlighted in Amani Africa’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/seizing-the-new-momentum-for-unsc-resolution-on-un-funding-of-au-peace-operations/">latest report</a>, there may also be a need for the AU to commit to a percentage of the financial burden of the PSOs that will be supported by UN assessed contributions. The PSC may thus need to consider how to provide further clarification that specifies the percentage of the cost of the peace operations that AU’s contribution constitutes even if this would be a percentage that is symbolic of AU’s willingness for burden sharing.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On the financing model, the Consensus Paper proposed three financing options. The first model is the establishment of AU-UN Hybrid mission based on the UNAMID experience. The second model is what the Consensus Paper described as an ‘Enhanced UN Logistics Support Package (LSP)’ – a financing option that has been tested in Somalia since 2009 to support AMISOM/ATMIS but with the support additionally covering monthly stipends to the police and military components as well as death and disability compensation (AMISOM/ATMIS plus model). While these two converge with the two financing options supported by the Secretary-General’s report, the Consensus Paper additionally envisaged that sub-regional peace support operations also benefit from UN assessed contributions. The Secretary-General’s report does not close the door for such operations but requires that such operations are brought under AU decision-making and financial management frameworks.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other area is the question of decision-making, oversight and command and control, which does not seem to be sufficiently reflected in the consensus paper. Previous negotiations on the matter highlighted the disagreement between AU and UN over who provides the strategic and political guidance to the AU-led PSOs that are primarily funded through UN assessed contributions. The view on the part of the AU is that its deployment of PSOs using UN assessed contributions should not be seen as just a sub-contracting by the UN of its peace operations responsibility to the AU. As such it expects to exercise a level of control over the PSOs it deploys under UNSC authorization and UN assessed contributions support. The Secretary-General’s paper provides a diagram of the decision-making process and acknowledges the authority of the AU. What the scope of this control by AU would be clear when negotiating the language in the draft resolution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other issue related to the strengthening of human rights compliance and financial transparency and accountability mechanisms. Both the Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s repot provide updates on the progress made in this respect by the AU meeting the expectations set in the two UNSC 2016 and 2017 resolutions. It is expected that the PSC will welcome the Secretary-General’s report and call on the UNSC to heed the call of the Secretary-General and adopt the resolution on financing of AU-led PSOs through UN assessed contributions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In terms of next steps, it would also be of interest for PSC on the process and arrangements that should be put in place for sustained consultation and close coordination. The various consultations would understandably need to be organized in a way that addresses the specific areas of concern of various role players. The PSC may in this respect welcome the roadmap that the A3 have prepared. It may also call for creating a dedicated standing coordination arrangement to ensure close coordination of the AU Commission, the PSC, the A3, the AU Permanent Observer Mission to UN and the wider Africa Group in New York throughout the negotiation process for having a UNSC resolution that adequately reflects AU’s position.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The PSC is expected to reiterate the key aspects of the consensus paper, including AU’s understanding of the 25% commitment, the different financing options outlined; progress made in addressing some of the concerns raised in previous negotiation on the matter. PSC may welcome the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of UNSC resolutions 2320 and 2378 and may endorse the strong call of the Secretary-General for the UNSC to adopt a resolution on use of assessed contributions for AU-led peace support operations authorized by the UNSC. The PSC may also authorize the A3 to resuscitate the negotiations on the resolution on the basis of the Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s report, which was developed in close coordination with the AU Commission. For ensuring close &amp; sustained consultation and ensure that the various AU actors speak with one voice, the PSC may call for the establishment of a standing consultation and coordination arrangement dedicated to this file and for the duration of the negotiations. At the level of the PSC, it may decide to have this agenda to be a regular item of the monthly program of work of the PSC every month until the conclusion of the negotiations on the draft resolution and establish a committee made up of three to five members involving Ghana as a state with membership in both the PSC and the UNSC. Considering that the negotiation over the resolution is also political as the Secretary-General’s report underscored and the strategic significance of this file, the PSC may call for the AU Commission and member states to be seized of, provide leadership and take active part throughout the negotiation process at the highest levels.</p>
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		<title>Session on the Common African Position on the Financing of AU led Peace Support Operations through UN Assessed Contributions</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/session-on-the-common-african-position-on-the-financing-of-au-led-peace-support-operations-through-un-assessed-contributions-2/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Jul 2021 08:16:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Amani Africa Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2021]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financing and other Broader Concerns]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=14701</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>21 JULY 2021</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/session-on-the-common-african-position-on-the-financing-of-au-led-peace-support-operations-through-un-assessed-contributions-2/">Session on the Common African Position on the Financing of AU led Peace Support Operations through UN Assessed Contributions</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-12"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding single-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Financing and other Broader Concerns</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 21 July, 2021</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (21 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a session on the common African Position on the Financing of AU led peace support operations through UN assessed contributions. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to brief the council on the progress and state of development of the common position.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU Assembly in its decision of its 14th extraordinary summit requested the PSC to articulate a common African position on financing peace support operations in Africa, to guide the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3) in championing and mobilizing support within the UNSC for adoption of a resolution that will enable Africa to access UN assessed contribution for peace support operations in the Continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is also to be recalled that the PSC at its 881st session held in September 2019 took a view that ‘a better articulated and African owned common position’ before a draft resolution on financing of AU peace operations through UN assessed contributions is tabled for consideration by the UN Security Council (UNSC). This decision was taken against the background of issues that emerged as the A3 members of the UNSC were seeking during 2018 and 2019 to secure a UNSC resolution authorizing in principle under agreed upon conditions the use of UN assessed contributions for AU led UNSC authorized peace support operations on a case-by-case basis.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The A3 spearheaded by Ethiopia initiated a draft resolution on financing to be adopted in December 2018 under the Cote d’Ivoire Presidency of the Security Council. However, the US threatened to Veto the resolution. Following the introduction of a so- called compromise text proposed by France to accommodate the US, the vote on the A3 draft resolution was postponed (Please refer to the Amani insight on this issue). South Africa, who initially brought the issue of financing to the Security Council in its previous membership, made the issue one of the priorities of its tenure during 2019-2020. After holding consultations on the matter including a visit by the Permanent Representatives of the A3 to Washington, D.C. to engage with the United States, including the Congress, White House and the Department of State, South Africa introduced a new and slightly updated text from the initial A3 draft and the so-called compromise draft.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When the PSC finally reviewed the matter, it felt that the latest updated draft did not adequately reflect AU interests. The PSC opted for deferring the consideration of the draft text by the UNSC pending the holding of adequate consultation at the level of the AU leading towards a common position. This aims at providing greater clarity on various issues, including on the implementation of the 75/25 formula and on the operationalization of the AU Peace Fund and its role for burden sharing. The common African position elaborated by the Commission is expected to explain some of these issues in order to ensure greater understanding and consensus within the AU and help the discussion in the UNSC move forward.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During tomorrow’s session Commissioner for PAPS, Adeoye, who revived the process for the adoption of the common position, is expected to provide update to the PSC on steps taken towards the elaboration of the common position and the orientation of the common position that will be the basis for resuscitating the discussion on A3 sponsored resolution on financing AU peace operation through UN assessed contributions. The common position is expected to take stock of and build on the various efforts undertaken both at the level of the UN and the AU.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is worth noting that the issue of predictable and reliable financing has been one of the longstanding subjects in the AU-UN relationships on peace and security in Africa. In 2008, the UN Panel led by former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi on the subject recommended in its report the use of United Nations-assessed funding to support United Nations- authorized African Union peacekeeping operations for a period of no longer than six months. This was further reinforced by the UN’s 2015 High Level International Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report, which recommended the use of United Nations-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis to support Security Council-authorized African Union peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the AU and/or African Member States.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On the part of the AU, the Policy Organs had adopted milestone decisions in 2015 and 2016 on financing of the AU and the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund. Accordingly, the A3 were called upon to champion the financing of AU led peace support operations. This paved the way for the adoption of resolution 2320 (2016), facilitated by Senegal, which stressed ‘the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council.’ The subsequent resolution 2378 (2017), whose adoption was facilitated by Ethiopia, expressed the UNSC’s intention to consider partially funding AU-led peace support operations authorized by the Council through UN-assessed contributions ‘on a case-by-case basis.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One of the factors for the delay in adopting the common position related to the factors that impeded progress in the UNSC. In 2018, Cote D’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia proposed a joint draft resolution which tried to secure a clear commitment from the Council to decide in principle to finance AU led peace support operations. The draft text had received wider support within the UNSC and the broader UN membership. However, the US under Trump administration was not willing and ready to accommodate the AU request and, in fact, threatened to exercise its veto power if the African members decide to go ahead and table the draft text for a vote.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With the Biden administration in the US and its renewed multilateral engagement, there appears to be a new window of opportunity to revive the financing issue. Both Chairperson Moussa Faki and UNSG Antonio Guterres are also expected to exert reinvigorated efforts to enhance the AU-UN partnership in their new mandate by, among others, ensuring progress on the financing issue. This will certainly unleash the potential of the partnership across the whole spectrum of peace operations. Furthermore, the EU leadership seems to be much more committed and determined to enhance its partnership with the AU and may likely pull its weight behind the AU if there is readiness to resuscitate the discussion on this issue.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This said, however, it should also be understood that the discussion on this issue would not be easy. COVID-19 has had its own impact on the discussion on peacekeeping. Increasing financial pressures, among other reasons, is forcing the UN to downsize and/or draw down peacekeeping missions in recent years. Some experts are anticipating that the tendency in the future could possibly be to prioritise affordable alternatives, such as observer missions and civilian special political missions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Even though the Biden administration could be favorably disposed to the discussion on the issue, there is a need for serious discussion to reach a shared understanding on the way forward. This necessitates engaging the Biden administration in earnest, including the state department, National Security Council and the department of defense. It is also important for the AU to engage Congress and canvass the necessary support in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations building on willingness of some congressmen to support the idea of financing AU led peace support operation as part of enhancing the role of the US.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The development of a common African position is indeed a step in the right direction and it is expected to facilitate a clear decision by AU, which will then pave the way for the A3 to resuscitate the file and try to secure a concrete commitment on the issue from the UNSC. The process will definitely take time and the necessary preparatory work for laying the ground work needs to be developed. The AU Commission and the UN Secretariat need to follow up on the implementation of their Joint Declaration of 6 December 2018, and work towards making tangible progress on some of the agreed issues as they relate to the financing issue, including the full operationalisation of the peace fund, reporting, oversight and accountability.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Most importantly, there is need to learn the right lessons from the experiences of 2018 and 2019. Ensuring greater clarity on the implementation of the AU Peace fund and demonstrating concrete commitment in sharing the burden would be vital. The full operationalization of the African Standby Force would go a long way in demonstrating AU’s commitment to shoulder responsibility on matters of peace and security in Africa. It would be absolutely important that the AU common position is accompanied by a solid roadmap with clear time lines for holding consultations and mobilizing support from all the relevant interlocutors on this file while ensuring close coordination of the AU Commission, the PSC and the A3 throughout the process for having a UNSC resolution that adequately reflects the common position.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While no formal outcome is expected from tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC is expected to provide input both on what is expected to be contained in the common position and the timeline for finalising the drafting for fulfilling the request of the AU Assembly, particularly the decision of its 14th extraordinary session held on 6 December 2020.</p>
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		<title>Session on the Common African Position on the Financing of AU led Peace Support Operations through UN Assessed Contributions</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Jul 2021 07:58:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Financing and other Broader Concerns]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2021]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=3013</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>21 July, 2021</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/session-on-the-common-african-position-on-the-financing-of-au-led-peace-support-operations-through-un-assessed-contributions/">Session on the Common African Position on the Financing of AU led Peace Support Operations through UN Assessed Contributions</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Financing and other Broader Concerns</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 21 July, 2021</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (21 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a session on the common African Position on the Financing of AU led peace support operations through UN assessed contributions. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to brief the council on the progress and state of development of the common position.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU Assembly in its decision of its 14th extraordinary summit requested the PSC to articulate a common African position on financing peace support operations in Africa, to guide the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3) in championing and mobilizing support within the UNSC for adoption of a resolution that will enable Africa to access UN assessed contribution for peace support operations in the Continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is also to be recalled that the PSC at its 881st session held in September 2019 took a view that ‘a better articulated and African owned common position’ before a draft resolution on financing of AU peace operations through UN assessed contributions is tabled for consideration by the UN Security Council (UNSC). This decision was taken against the background of issues that emerged as the A3 members of the UNSC were seeking during 2018 and 2019 to secure a UNSC resolution authorizing in principle under agreed upon conditions the use of UN assessed contributions for AU led UNSC authorized peace support operations on a case-by-case basis.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The A3 spearheaded by Ethiopia initiated a draft resolution on financing to be adopted in December 2018 under the Cote d’Ivoire Presidency of the Security Council. However, the US threatened to Veto the resolution. Following the introduction of a so- called compromise text proposed by France to accommodate the US, the vote on the A3 draft resolution was postponed (Please refer to the Amani insight on this issue). South Africa, who initially brought the issue of financing to the Security Council in its previous membership, made the issue one of the priorities of its tenure during 2019-2020. After holding consultations on the matter including a visit by the Permanent Representatives of the A3 to Washington, D.C. to engage with the United States, including the Congress, White House and the Department of State, South Africa introduced a new and slightly updated text from the initial A3 draft and the so-called compromise draft.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When the PSC finally reviewed the matter, it felt that the latest updated draft did not adequately reflect AU interests. The PSC opted for deferring the consideration of the draft text by the UNSC pending the holding of adequate consultation at the level of the AU leading towards a common position. This aims at providing greater clarity on various issues, including on the implementation of the 75/25 formula and on the operationalization of the AU Peace Fund and its role for burden sharing. The common African position elaborated by the Commission is expected to explain some of these issues in order to ensure greater understanding and consensus within the AU and help the discussion in the UNSC move forward.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During tomorrow’s session Commissioner for PAPS, Adeoye, who revived the process for the adoption of the common position, is expected to provide update to the PSC on steps taken towards the elaboration of the common position and the orientation of the common position that will be the basis for resuscitating the discussion on A3 sponsored resolution on financing AU peace operation through UN assessed contributions. The common position is expected to take stock of and build on the various efforts undertaken both at the level of the UN and the AU.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is worth noting that the issue of predictable and reliable financing has been one of the longstanding subjects in the AU-UN relationships on peace and security in Africa. In 2008, the UN Panel led by former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi on the subject recommended in its report the use of United Nations-assessed funding to support United Nations- authorized African Union peacekeeping operations for a period of no longer than six months. This was further reinforced by the UN’s 2015 High Level International Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report, which recommended the use of United Nations-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis to support Security Council-authorized African Union peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the AU and/or African Member States.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On the part of the AU, the Policy Organs had adopted milestone decisions in 2015 and 2016 on financing of the AU and the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund. Accordingly, the A3 were called upon to champion the financing of AU led peace support operations. This paved the way for the adoption of resolution 2320 (2016), facilitated by Senegal, which stressed ‘the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council.’ The subsequent resolution 2378 (2017), whose adoption was facilitated by Ethiopia, expressed the UNSC’s intention to consider partially funding AU-led peace support operations authorized by the Council through UN-assessed contributions ‘on a case-by-case basis.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One of the factors for the delay in adopting the common position related to the factors that impeded progress in the UNSC. In 2018, Cote D’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia proposed a joint draft resolution which tried to secure a clear commitment from the Council to decide in principle to finance AU led peace support operations. The draft text had received wider support within the UNSC and the broader UN membership. However, the US under Trump administration was not willing and ready to accommodate the AU request and, in fact, threatened to exercise its veto power if the African members decide to go ahead and table the draft text for a vote.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With the Biden administration in the US and its renewed multilateral engagement, there appears to be a new window of opportunity to revive the financing issue. Both Chairperson Moussa Faki and UNSG Antonio Guterres are also expected to exert reinvigorated efforts to enhance the AU-UN partnership in their new mandate by, among others, ensuring progress on the financing issue. This will certainly unleash the potential of the partnership across the whole spectrum of peace operations. Furthermore, the EU leadership seems to be much more committed and determined to enhance its partnership with the AU and may likely pull its weight behind the AU if there is readiness to resuscitate the discussion on this issue.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This said, however, it should also be understood that the discussion on this issue would not be easy. COVID-19 has had its own impact on the discussion on peacekeeping. Increasing financial pressures, among other reasons, is forcing the UN to downsize and/or draw down peacekeeping missions in recent years. Some experts are anticipating that the tendency in the future could possibly be to prioritise affordable alternatives, such as observer missions and civilian special political missions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Even though the Biden administration could be favorably disposed to the discussion on the issue, there is a need for serious discussion to reach a shared understanding on the way forward. This necessitates engaging the Biden administration in earnest, including the state department, National Security Council and the department of defense. It is also important for the AU to engage Congress and canvass the necessary support in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations building on willingness of some congressmen to support the idea of financing AU led peace support operation as part of enhancing the role of the US.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The development of a common African position is indeed a step in the right direction and it is expected to facilitate a clear decision by AU, which will then pave the way for the A3 to resuscitate the file and try to secure a concrete commitment on the issue from the UNSC. The process will definitely take time and the necessary preparatory work for laying the ground work needs to be developed. The AU Commission and the UN Secretariat need to follow up on the implementation of their Joint Declaration of 6 December 2018, and work towards making tangible progress on some of the agreed issues as they relate to the financing issue, including the full operationalisation of the peace fund, reporting, oversight and accountability.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Most importantly, there is need to learn the right lessons from the experiences of 2018 and 2019. Ensuring greater clarity on the implementation of the AU Peace fund and demonstrating concrete commitment in sharing the burden would be vital. The full operationalization of the African Standby Force would go a long way in demonstrating AU’s commitment to shoulder responsibility on matters of peace and security in Africa. It would be absolutely important that the AU common position is accompanied by a solid roadmap with clear time lines for holding consultations and mobilizing support from all the relevant interlocutors on this file while ensuring close coordination of the AU Commission, the PSC and the A3 throughout the process for having a UNSC resolution that adequately reflects the common position.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While no formal outcome is expected from tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC is expected to provide input both on what is expected to be contained in the common position and the timeline for finalising the drafting for fulfilling the request of the AU Assembly, particularly the decision of its 14th extraordinary session held on 6 December 2020.</p>
<p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/session-on-the-common-african-position-on-the-financing-of-au-led-peace-support-operations-through-un-assessed-contributions/">Session on the Common African Position on the Financing of AU led Peace Support Operations through UN Assessed Contributions</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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