Tomorrow (03 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1146^th session in commemoration of international day on mine awareness and assistance in mine action, with a specific focus on impacts on peace and security in Africa.

Following opening remarks by Abdelhamid Elgharbi, Permanent Representative of Tunisia and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of April, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. Representatives of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), the United Nations (UN) Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) may also deliver statements at the session.

The last time the PSC convened a session under the theme ‘mine action in Africa’ was on 01 April 2022, which constituted its 1072^nd meeting. The session served to emphasise the importance of developing inclusive approaches in Africa to raise awareness around the risks and dangers of landmines. Having regard to the significance of coordination and collaboration to achieve the aim of eliminating landmines from the continent, the PSC at that session underscored the need to establish a continental mechanism for mine action to coordinate member states’ efforts and requested the AU Commission to finalise the AU Mine Action and Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Strategies and submit to the PSC for its consideration. Tomorrow’s meeting presents the opportunity to follow up on the implementation of these and other previous decisions of the PSC.

Although mine action efforts have demonstrated some success over the years in some parts of the continent, there has been alarming increase in the use of landmines and explosive devices in multiple African countries in recent years. In the Central African Republic (CAR) for instance, the threat of explosive devices has shown a worrying rise since 2021. According to data recorded by the UN, the years 2021 and 2022 have demonstrated a significant increase in the use of explosive devices in CAR as compared to 2020. UN’s report indicates that in 2021, 44 incidents involving explosive devices were recoded, resulting in 30 deaths and 48 injuries while in 2022, 54 incidents were recoded which killed 12 people and injured 46. The most recent data recorded as of 10 March 2023 indicates 20 incidents involving explosive devices, which have claimed the lives of 9 people. In April 2022, anti-personnel mines were also discovered in CAR for the first time. Having regard to 2020 when the UN recorded only two incidents of usage of explosive devices in CAR which resulted in no casualties, the figures recorded over the recent years are cause for serious alarm. They indicate increased exposure of civilian population to areas affected by landmines and even ongoing use of landmines in recent years. It would therefore be of interest for PSC members to call for the establishment of the factors behind these worrying trends in the use of landmines in CAR in order to take targeted measures to contain and eventually end this scourge.

Mali is another country that has been experiencing increasing threat of landmines, mainly IEDs. According to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), significant increase has been noted in the use of IEDs in Mali since 2017 which was initially concentrated in the central parts of the country but gradually continued to expand to other parts, particularly to the country’s western regions. In January 2023, representing one of the more recent incidents of IED explosions in the country, 16 people were killed and 25 were injured in explosions concentrated mainly in the Mopti and Ségou regions. The 2022 Landmine Monitor Report further indicates the use of antivehicle mines in Mali during the 2021-2022 reporting period. Reports from earlier years have also alluded the use of antipersonnel mines in Mali, mainly by non-state armed groups.

One of the most concerning spikes in the use of IEDs is perhaps the one currently being witnessed in Somalia. As part of its change in tactics of insurgency, Al-Shabaab has increased its focus on expanding the use of various forms of IEDs, including vehicle-borne IEDs and remotely detonated ground IEDs. In the period from January to March 2023, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) data shows a 120% increase in the use of IEDs and remote explosives by Al-Shabaab in parts of Somalia, as compared to the previous reporting period of October to December 2022. In the first two weeks of March 2023 alone, remote explosions perpetrated by Al-Shabaab reportedly constituted nearly 60% of the total events of violence recorded in Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle regions.

The use of IEDs in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, has been indicative of a more worrying trend – the possible existence of an active regional network enabling the use of external assistance in building capacity for manufacturing IEDs at insurgent bases in the region. Reports have demonstrated that IS sponsored training and financial support in late 2020 could have a direct link with the introduction of IEDs in Cabo Delgado in 2021, the same year the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) considerably increased its use of IEDs in eastern DRC and border territories of Uganda, suggesting the existence of a wider regional network connecting ADF and insurgents operating in northern Mozambique that, among others, facilitates the spread of the explosive devices into Mozambique.

Further to the security risk it imposes, the increasing use of IEDs in these countries is also a serious impediment to the provision of timely and effective humanitarian assistance to populations affected by conflict and crisis. For example, in CAR, not only are the main victims of explosive devises civilians – with nearly three quarters of the victims reported in 2022 and 2023 being civilians – but also the presence of explosives in various parts of the country has been a major deterrent limiting humanitarian access to civilian populations. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), over 900,000 people targeted for humanitarian assistance in 2023 are at risk of delayed or suspended aid as a result of access constraints emanating from suspected presence of explosive devices in the concerned areas.

The trends observed in these and other conflict settings in Africa signal the increasing utilisation of mines as well as growing sophistication in the means and methods of warfare particularly in terms of use of IEDs deployed by non-state armed groups and terrorist organisations. They also signify the ease with which these actors access the required resources and expertise in the manufacturing of mines, particularly IEDs. There is hence need to devote increased attention to identifying and addressing the underlying factors facilitating access to resources used in the development of explosive devices in concerned member states. Among others, this will require proper regulation of national weapons’ stockpiles to avert smuggling of state-owned explosives and materials that can be used in making new explosive devices. It further calls for the strengthening of inter-state collaboration and coordination to halt cross border trafficking of explosives and to prevent exchange of technical expertise as well as financial assistance in their development.

While drawing attention to the increasing spread of IED usage in the continent is pertinent, it also remains critical to emphasise the continuing significance of ensuring full clearance of antipersonnel landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) through destruction of national stockpiles in line with the 1997 Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty, particularly in the context of states in post-conflict phase. According to the 2022 Landmine Monitor Report, five of the seven states parties to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty that are known or believed to have mine contamination in their territories but have not provided information or recognised their clearance obligations under the treaty, are African countries. A significant number of African member states are also falling behind on their obligations to ensure full landmine clearance by 2025 in line with the 2014 Maputo Action Plan. This signals to the need to strengthen mine action efforts in the continent including through enhanced mobilisation of funds for mine clearance activities at the national, regional and continental level.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The PSC may express grave concern over the increasing spread of IEDs in Africa and their wide usage among non-state armed actors and terrorist groups. It may call for the AU Commission to work with relevant RECs and UN entities to examine the factors behind this worrying trend and to develop strategies specific to each affected country for addressing this scourge. The PSC may also call for the inclusion and expansion of counter IEDs capabilities in the AU Transition Mission in Somalia and to the support that the AU Mission to Mali and Sahel provides to Mali as well as the mobilization of capabilities for detecting and clearing landmines to the CAR and other countries specifically affected by landmines. It may also call on member states to ensure secure storage of state-owned explosives and enhanced regulation of stockpiles, including complete destruction of antipersonnel landmines. It may further underscore the importance of fortified coordination between member states in combating the cross-border transfer of explosives and in the removal of landmines from border areas. It may note the grave humanitarian cost of explosive devices, including curtailing humanitarian access to populations in need and in that respect, call on all relevant stakeholders to explore alternative approaches including air-based provision of humanitarian assistance while deploying mine action capacities to clear areas affected by mines impeding humanitarian access. The PSC may also call on states parties to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty to fulfil their obligations under Article 5 relating to the destruction of antipersonnel mines and urge those member states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty.  It may further emphasise the importance of enhancing mine action funding to enable member states meet their clearance obligations outlined under Article 5 of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty as well as the Maputo Action Plan.

Tomorrow (16 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1127^th session to receive briefing on the activities of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Victor Adekunle Adeleke, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Representatives of AFCONE and CTBTO are expected to brief the PSC. Representatives of the United Nations (UN) Office to the AU (UNOAU) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may also make statement in the opening segment of the session.

The last time PSC convened to discuss updates regarding the activities of AFCONE and implementation of the African Nuclear-Weapon Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) was in March 2022, at its 1071^st session. As expressed in the Communiqué of the session, recent developments geopolitical developments indicative of possible use of nuclear weapons have triggered the PSC’s concern over the impact of such developments on peace, security and humanitarian efforts, globally and in Africa in particular. One of the important outcomes of the session was the PSC’s call for joint action between relevant international and regional actors including AFCONE, IAEA, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and CTBTO in undertaking implementation efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Tomorrow’s session is expected to follow up on-going efforts including collaborations among relevant actors towards ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

One area of update the PSC may be briefed on at tomorrow’s session is the discussions of the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which took place from 1 to 26 August 2022, in New York. Although the conference came to an end without the adoption of any concreate outcome document due to Russia’s opposition to the draft tabled by the presidency, the occasion did serve to renew commitments made in the treaty to ‘prevent the spread of nuclear weapons’ and to ‘promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy’. Representing the AU Commission and AU States Parties to NTP, AFCONE submitted a statement to the Tenth Review Conference of NTP which among other points, emphasised the importance of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) and encouraged the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to ‘prioritize efforts towards ratification of all the applicable protocols of all the NWFZ Treaties.’

Regarding implementation of Pelindaba Treaty – one of the five global NWFZ Treaties –   AFCONE may update the PSC about ongoing efforts to ensure ratification of the treaty by all AU member States in order to boost its implementation. As indicated in Amani Africa’s previous insight on PSC’s 1071^st session, 11 AU member States are yet to ratify the Pelindaba Treaty. Further to contributing towards global non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and creating conditions for sustaining peace and security, the full implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty would also significantly advance socio-economic development in Africa, through promoting cooperation on the use and application of nuclear energy in critical fields such as power generation, agriculture and various industrial endeavours. The treaty could serve as an essential step for member States to forge a common goal and establish the necessary mechanisms for advancing nuclear science and technology. As noted by the AFCONE in its reflections on the Tenth Review Conference of the NPT, the peaceful application of nuclear power and technology could ‘meaningfully contribute to the achievement of a country’s socio-economic development goals, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the African Union’s Agenda 2063’.

Regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the CTBTO may update the PSC on the significant increase achieved in the signature and ratification of the treaty in Africa. Currently, 51 African States have signed the CTBT while 50 of these have ratified it. Within the framework of international nuclear arms control and disarmament and having regard to the fact that nuclear testing is a key step in the development of nuclear weapons, the CTBT bans the testing and explosion of nuclear weapons globally, be it above ground, under water and/or underground. The treaty is however yet to enter into force as ratification by eight States is still pending (these are China, North Korea, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States). The CTBT’s entry into force wold be critical both for enhancing implementation of the NPT and to contain threats and use of nuclear weapons that have currently become causes for serious concern.

In its efforts to detect nuclear explosions around the world, the CTBTO has also mobilised 38 monitoring facilities in 24 African countries within the framework of its International Monitoring System. While these have been commendable steps, it is important to ensure that better collaboration and coordination exists between the CTBTO and AFCONE in order to have a coherent approach for nuclear weapons non-proliferation and disarmament in Africa.

In addition, while the CTBT would considerably contribute towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons both in Africa and the world, it is important to ensure clarity on the difference between efforts aimed at peaceful use of nuclear energy on the one hand and nuclear testing for the purposes of developing nuclear weapons on the other. As emphasised in AFCONE’s reflections on the Tenth Review Conference of NTP, it is essential to ‘guard against attempts to deny technology, especially to developing countries, under the guise of non-proliferation or nuclear security measures’ and that States Parties should ‘guard against any reinterpretation of, or restrictions on, the inalienable right of States to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear technology’.

Another critical aspect the PSC may wish to reflect on is the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons. The destructive impact of nuclear weapons on human life and livelihood – including aspects related to environment, health and development – is an already well-established factor. However, recalling past experiences such as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings as well as the Chernobyl nuclear incident and the devastating humanitarian impacts they entailed is critical in order to keep relevant global actors from engaging in a destructive nuclear discourse.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to commend AFCONE and the CTBTO for their continued efforts to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons both in Africa and globally. It may welcome the conclusion of the Tenth Review Conference of NPT and commend AFCONE for contributing to the review on behalf of the AU Commission and African States Parties. It may express regret however, over the lack of consensus faced in adopting an outcome document at the Tenth Review Conference, which makes it second time in a row, following the Ninth Review Conference of 2015 which also unfortunately came to an end without agreement on a substantive final declaration. The PSC may also call on AFCONE, CTBTO and IAEA to better coordinate their efforts. It may also reiterate its call to AFCONE, working in collaboration with the AU Commission and other relevant stakeholders including the IAEA, to mobilise resources and technical expertise to member States to advance and promote use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful and developmental purposes.

Tomorrow (18 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold its 1085^th session on “Disarmament and control of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa.”

Following the opening remark by Ambassador Churchill Ewumbue-Monon, Permanent Representative of Cameroon and the Chairperson of the PSC for May, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement.

Representatives from the different Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) as well as representatives from the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the Secretariat of the Arms Trade Treaty and Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC) are also expected to participate at the session.

This theme for tomorrow’s session is specifically referenced in the preamble to the PSC Protocol. Most specifically, the Protocol expressed the concern ‘about the impact of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in threatening peace and security in Africa’. Similarly, the 2004 Solemn Declaration on African Common Defense and Security Policy identifies as one of the factors that engender insecurity in Africa. Addressing the scourge of SALW also forms part of the AU Agenda of Silencing the Guns and is one of the pillars of the Master Roadmap on Silencing the Guns in Africa. In terms of specific instruments, on a continental level, the AU Assembly adopted the 2013 AU Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, as well as a corresponding Action Plan. At the sub-national level, there is the example of the Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW applicable in 15 countries in the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa and bordering states.

The proliferation of and easy access to Illicit arms and weapons continues to be a major factor in fueling conflicts and making inter-communal clashes increasingly deadly. It remains to be a single critical instrument that enables terrorist groups, armed militias, criminal bandits and vigilante groups in various conflict and crisis settings on the continent. Indeed, this is one of the factors that has made the increase in the number of conflicts and the expansion of the geographic spread of such conflicts, particularly those involving armed terrorist groups. Tomorrow’s session thus provides an opportunity for the PSC to receive updates on patterns and trends in arms and ammunition inflows, illicit circulation and trafficking and gaps in control measures.

The last time the PSC convened a session on illicit proliferation and trafficking of SALW was at its 860th meeting held on 18 July 2019.  During the session, the PSC welcomed the findings of the joint mapping study conducted by the Commission and the Small Arms Survey which was launched in July 2019. The study, published under the title “Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa,” was the first-ever continental study that under the AU sought to map the problem of illicit proliferation of SALW. At the time the study was conducted, it was reported that there were forty-million of such weapons were in possession of civilians. This figure, according to the study, accounted for 80% of arms on the continent. There is little indication to show that this level of circulation of illicit weapons among the civilian population has come down.

In the context of the eruption of new conflicts and the expansion and persistence of existing conflicts as well as inter-communal violence in various parts of the continent, it is logical that the number of illicit weapons circulating on the continent has also increased. According to the 2021 Small Arms Survey research, there is an increase in smuggling and trafficking activities due to growing local demand for illicit goods and firearms. The local demand is fueled by banditry, communities’ need for self-defence, and the reliance in firearms of artisanal and small-scale gold mining operators. As a case in point, the survey specifically assessed the tri-border region, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali.

The other factor for the proliferation and trafficking of illicit SALW is the challenges surrounding the availability of reliable data on stockpiles of member states and the safe keeping of those stockpiles. As the PSC noted in its 860^th session the diversion of small arms and light weapons from national stockpiles is a significant factor contributing to the proliferation of SALW. There is thus the issue of auditing of stockpiles in member states and enhancing capacities for the safekeeping of stockpiles. Related to these are contingent owned equipment (COE) that are deployed for use in peace support operations. These weapons diversions are largely due to battlefield loss, mismanagement, theft, and corruption. According to reports, COE loss has occurred in at least 20 peace operations in 18 African countries. Lethal materiel lost in the past 10 years alone has included many millions of rounds of ammunition, thousands of small arms and light weapons, and likely hundreds of heavy weapons systems. Nonlethal materiel, such as unarmed vehicles and motorcycles, uniforms, communications equipment, and fuel, have also consistently been a target.

It is clear that stockpiles become a source of illicit circulation and trafficking in at least two ways. First, the lack of complete data and statistics by member states and the corruption in the armed forces mean that traffickers and armed groups pay for accessing weapons kept in such stockpiles. Second, nonstate armed groups have regularly targeted and overrun peacekeepers and national armed forces to seize lethal and nonlethal materiel. This has also become a significant source of armaments for Africa’s militant groups, fueling instability on the continent.

Illicit circulation of weapons also arises in the context of implementation of disarmament processes. Here a challenge worth mentioning is the lack of effective and complete demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR), noted in the AU Solemn Declaration on Common African Defense and Security Policy. In cases where no effective framework and resources for undertaking DDR as part of peace agreements for settling conflicts are provided for, weapons in the hands of armed groups ends up being traded. Similarly, the poor implementation of DDR including the proper accounting of weapons and arms in the hands of various armed groups in the DDR process would mean that such weapons and arms remain outside of the control of formal institutions.

Furthermore, for widely differing reasons non-African states appear set to increase their supply of lethal materiel to African governments. The PSC in its several communiques including on its 1029^th commemorating the 2021 Africa Amnesty Month session condemned non-African states sponsoring and promote the influx of arms into Africa, including in cases of existing armed embargoes, leading to the further escalation of existing conflicts. Indeed, unless COE control measures are strengthened, these arms flows could contribute to greater instability.

Tomorrow’s session also serves as an opportunity for follow up on previous decisions of the PSC. It is to be recalled that the PSC in its 1040^th session convened on 22 October 2021, requested the Commission, working closely with Member States and RECs/RMs, to conduct a second phase of the Mapping Study on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The council also requested the RECs/ RMs to continue to submit reports through the AU commission, on the actions taken in line with Africa Amnesty month.

In the current global context, one aspect of the war in Ukraine that may warrant Council’s attention is also the rising risk of the use of foreign fighter and mobilisation of large number of weapons and arms finding their way in the hands of traffickers and ending up in conflict settings in Africa. In the absence of proper tracing and regulation mechanism, the large-scale mobilisation of weapons and arms in the context of this war can have an adverse impact as had been witnessed with the case of spread of weapons and foreign fighters post-Libyan conflict. It is therefore imperative for the AU to take advance note of and imagine preventive measures on how the mobilisation of such weapons and arms in Ukraine without an effective tracing mechanism in place could impact Africa by boosting illicit transfer of arms from the war in Ukraine.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The council may express deep concern over the growing Illicit flow of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa. The PSC may call for the AU to work with member states to launch a process for auditing of stockpiles with a view to enable states to have up to date data on the quantity and type of weapons and arms in their possession as a basis for ensuring the monitoring and safekeeping of stockpiles. The PSC may also call on member states to undertake measures that enhance the safe keeping and protection of stockpiles important measure for preventing leakages through corruption and vulnerabilities of stockpiles for attacks from armed groups. The PSC may also call for an African Strategy on the implementation of the Armed Trade Treaty at the continental levels as a means of controlling flows of weapons and arms into the continent and the trading of such weapons and arms within the continent. It also might call upon member State and the RECs to enhance cross border security and strengthening their monitoring and controlling mechanisms. Council may also urge member states to implement regional and international instrument to curb illicit flow of SALW. Further the council may reiterate its request to conduct second phase of the Mapping Study on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa. The PSC may also urge for effective integration of DDR programs in peace agreements and the proper implementation of such programs.

Today (1 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1072^nd session to receive a briefing on mine action in Africa. The session will be held in person. This will be the first in person PSC session since the Council made a decision in March 2020 to hold all its meetings virtually due to COVID19 restrictions on physical meetings.

It is envisaged that following the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of Burundi to the AU, Willy Nyamitwe, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, will make a statement. It is also expected that the representatives of the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU), the European Union (EU) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will deliver their statements.

The session is taking place at the margins of the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action which is observed on 4 April. The session is expected to shed light on the impact of anti-personnel landmines and underscore the importance of upholding various regional and international normative frameworks towards enhancing mine action and for member states to achieve complete clearance from anti-personnel mines. While the majority of Africa countries are state party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Action Convention, according to the concept note circulated for the session ‘16 AU member states are suspected to be contaminated and/or affected directly by anti-personnel mines.’ And 12 AU member states are yet to identify and destroy anti-personnel mines. This also illustrates the gap in norm implementation and the importance of bridging this gap through concerted and collective action as well as global partnership.

To further promote and advance the Convention various instruments have been adopted including the Declaration of States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Maputo Declaration). Maputo Declaration has been instrumental in mobilizing commitments among member states on the implementation of time-bound obligation of the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines by the year 2025. In addition, in line with the five-year Oslo Action Plan adopted in 2019 state parties to the convention committed to design national responses that accommodate the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities. Hence, tomorrow’s session presents an opportunity to reflect around the challenges, prospects and risks in relation to compliance and implementation, particularly as the deadline provided in the Maputo declaration is fast approaching.

Indeed, to support member states in meeting the set deadline, the 1032^nd PSC session held on 16 September 2021 has requested the AUC to convene an experience sharing and lesson learning session in mine action. It would be of interest to PSC members to request an update around the session. Such forum will also be important to design long term plans for countries affected armed conflict and those in post-conflict situations as well. Anti-personnel land mines have long term effects and continue to kill and injure people even after cessation of hostilities by warring parties. It is thus imperative for countries to develop comprehensive plans for the various stages of conflict situations.

In the same session the PSC had expressed concern over threats related to anti-personnel land mines particularly in relation to the effects of COVID19 on mine action. It has further requested the AUC to integrate mine action into the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030 and to finalize the Draft AU Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Mitigation Strategy and submit for Council’s consideration. In this context the AUC may provide update on these processes.

Similarly, it is to be recalled that the 837th PSC session recognizing the risks associated with IED and their devastating impact on civilians, called on ‘Member States to prevent and counter the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) through integrated and coherent approaches including helping one another, and demand the Commission to continue consultations with Member States to develop the necessary framework in this regard’.

In this regard, the session may highlight the use of IEDs and their serious impact on civilian population. More particularly with the increased level of urbanization coupled with the rise of conflicts in cities, various types of explosive weapons are being used by belligerent parties. The UN Secretary General Report of August 2021 highlighted the complexities around the increased urbanization of conflicts and the catastrophic impact of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. The causalities in these settings are particularly high given population density. According to the report when explosive weapons were used in populated areas, 88% of those killed and injured were civilians, compared with 16% when used in other areas. This is a concerning trend that presenters may highlight given the nature and dynamics of current conflicts.

Another area that is expected to be underscored at the session is the importance of strengthened effort in mine action in humanitarian settings. Explosive ordnance continues to spark complex humanitarian emergencies and high rate of displacement. Population fleeing violence and armed conflict have also been confronted with further danger and risks associated with explosive weapons. Anti-personnel mines have also been a major hindrance for the delivery of life saving assistance and humanitarian action. In this respect ICRC’s intervention is expected to highlight the humanitarian aspect and the effects of weapon contamination on civilian population in armed conflict.

The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC may express concern over the continuing threat of anti-personnel mine and the devastating effects of its use despite the strides made my member states. It may call on member states, in close collaboration and coordination with the AU and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) to enhance and revitalize national response to realize the goal set in Maputo Declaration as well as the Oslo Action Plan. The PSC may urge countries that are yet to remove anti-personnel mines in their territories to do so rapidly and to ensure timely reporting on the clearance and demining activities. It may call on for strengthened international partnership to support the complete clearance of AU member states from anti-personnel mine. The PSC may reiterate its previous call for the AUC to convene an exchange forum around mine action and to expedite the finalization of the Draft AU Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Mitigation Strategy.

Tomorrow (31 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1071^st session to receive a briefing by the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) on the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty.

Permanent Representative of Lesotho to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March, Mafa M. Sejanamane, is expected to make an opening remark. AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also scheduled to make presentation. A briefing by the representative of AFCONE will follow the presentation. The representatives of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) are also expected to deliver their remarks.

This session is convened within the context of PSC’s request of the AU Commission and the AFCONE, at its 763^rd meeting held on 10 April 2018, to annually brief the Council on the ‘status of the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty and the activities of AFCONE’. The last time Council considered the Treaty was during its 837^th session that took place on 4 April 2019 while addressing the broader theme of ‘international disarmament’ with a focus on Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

Tomorrow’s session takes place at a critical time given the current global crisis and the mounting tension between powers that possess nuclear weapons. Even before the outbreak of the war, the global nuclear dynamics has worsened in recent years as global powers arms race has intensified. At its 763^rd session, the PSC also noted the ‘slow pace of nuclear disarmament and the rising tensions among nuclear-weapon possessor states’ and its impact in undermining confidence over the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT). Coming within this global context, members of the Council may reflect on how the Pelindaba Treaty could contribute in advancing global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda, thereby promote international peace and security.

It is to be recalled that the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty Treaty—commonly referred to as the Pelindaba Treaty which is named after South Africa’s central nuclear research complex—is one of the five Treaties on regional Nuclear-Weapons Free-Zones that came within the broader context of global initiative to strengthen the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation norms. The main objective of this Treaty is to enhance peace and security through the prohibition of the possession and stationing of nuclear weapons across the continent while it encourages the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology. The Treaty was opened for signature in Cairo on 11 April 1996 and entered into force on 15 July 2009 after the deposit of 28^th instrument of ratification by Burundi. Three other protocols are also attached to the Treaty to ensure respect of the Treaty by non-African states, notably the Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS).

One of the challenges towards the full implementation of the Treaty likely to be raised in tomorrow’s session is that considerable number of Member States are not still state parties to the Pelindaba Treaty. According to an information note prepared for the session, 11 African countries, namely Central African Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Liberia, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan and Uganda, are not party to the Treaty. South Sudan is yet to accede to the Treaty. The rest 43 African countries have become state parties to the Treaty.

Another issue likely to be highlighted in tomorrow’s session is the synergy and complementarity between the Pelindaba Treaty and other international disarmament and non-proliferation regime most notably the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), as well as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). ICRC’s statement is likely to focus on this issue. As State Parties to some of the treaties that form disarmament and non-proliferation regime will convene during second and third quarters of the year (5^th Conference of State Parties to the Pelindaba Treaty in April; 1^st Meeting of the State Parties to the TPNW in July; and 10^th Review Conference of the NPT in August), this session is an opportune moment to remind Member States to join these instruments.

The other aspect that AFCONE’s briefing may highlight is the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes including power generation, human health, agriculture, industrial uses and scientific research. The Pelindaba Treaty encourages such peaceful use of nuclear power, but under strict non-proliferation measures. The Council, during its 763^rd session also affirmed the ‘inalienable right of all parties to apply chemical, biological and nuclear science and technology for peaceful civilian purposes’. In this regard, nuclear energy is particularly important in Africa where more than 640 million of its 1.2 billion population have no access to electricity and electricity access rate stands just over 40 percent, the lowest in the world, according to African Development Bank report. Addressing this deficit in the continent may require the inclusion of nuclear power as an alternative source of energy.

Given that nuclear power is regarded as clean, reliable and cost-effective source of energy, it is considered to be an attractive option for Africa in its effort to tackle the twin challenges of energy poverty and climate change. It also plays critical role in realizing the developmental aspirations enshrined under Agenda 2063 and UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which in turn enhance the peace and stability of the continent. Despite the enormous benefit that nuclear energy offers, it is only South Africa that has been able to harness the potential through its Koeberg nuclear power plant. Promoting the use of nuclear energy in Africa therefore leaves a lot to be desired.

It is also imperative for Africa to take a more coordinated approach that would strengthen nuclear infrastructure and enhance nuclear expertise and knowledge. In this respect relevant international and regional bodies such as the AFCONE, the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA), and IAEA play critical role in providing the required technical support particularly in the areas of developing regulatory frameworks and the human resources, as well as nuclear research and training activities. In its briefing, AFCONE is expected to highlight the activities undertaken in this regard and the challenges faced.

Although key milestones have been achieved paving the way for AFCONE Secretariat to function fully, limited finance has become a major challenge affecting the effectiveness of the institution in discharging its envisaged mandate. This was flagged up by the AFCONE Vice Chairperson, Hadjaro Adam Senoussi, where he stated that ‘significant operationalization of the Secretariat AFCONE, which is critical for the Treaty of Pelindaba to achieve its objective, has not progressed with required speed and efficiency for the reasons explained in the AFCONE reports, particularly the critical budget issue’. The Vice Chairperson further asserted that without the ‘urgent integration of the AFCONE to the AU Institutional Reform Process’ and the ‘designation of a Permanent Executive Secretary and facilitate the appropriate staffing of the Secretariat’, AFCONE cannot sustain its function.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. Among others, Council is expected to express its concern over the nuclear escalation and may call upon all parties not to undermine the objectives and spirit of disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Council may stress the complementarity between the Pelindaba Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) their relevancy to the African Peace and Security Architecture. The Council may further encourage Member States to participate in the upcoming meetings of State Parties to Pelindaba Treaty, NPT and TPNW, and urge them to join the Treaties. Regarding the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, Council may encourage Member States to include nuclear power as an option of energy source and fully harness its benefits. Council may re-emphasize the need for the speedy operationalization of AFCONE Secretariat based in South Africa, given its role in the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty and the promotion of the peaceful application of nuclear science and technology. In this respect, the Council may particularly call on State Parties to the Treaty to fulfil their financial obligations to address the budget challenge.

Tomorrow (16 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1032nd session on activities in the area of mine action in the continent.

It is envisaged that following the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of Chad to the AU, Mahamat Ali Hassan, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, will make a statement. It is also expected that the representative of the United Nations Mine Actions Services (UNMAS) will make a presentation. Others expected to make statements include the Chairpersons of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and the representative of the European Union (EU).

Council emphasized at its 837th session on International Disarmament that antipersonnel mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continue to impose serious risk to the lives, safety and health of civilian populations. As highlighted in the Statement of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) to the AU at the commemoration of 2021’s International Day for Mine Awareness, there were 30,000 deaths caused due to the use of explosive weapons recorded in 2019 only, out of which 66% were civilian deaths. In addition to the immediate risk to the life and safety of individuals, mines and ERW also impede social and economic development and stand as serious hindrance to humanitarian action. On the impact for humanitarian work, United Nations (UN) General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 74/80 of December 2019 (A/RES/74/80) stated that the presence of mines and ERW in humanitarian settings impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance, thereby impacting the lives and livelihoods of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other members of civilian populations who are dependent on humanitarian aid.

Africa hosts majority of the world’s countries that are highly affected by mines and ERW. While encouraging steps have been taken by multiple African States in ratifying and taking some steps towards implementation of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and other relevant instruments, there is still much that remains to be done. Notably, the number of AU States parties to the APMBC suspected to be contaminated with or affected by anti-personnel mines and ERW has decreased from 30 to 16 States. However, the remaining 16 States are yet to fully meet their obligations related to demining. For instance, according to data presented by the Mine Action Review of 2020, out of eight States parties to the APMBC with regards to which no clearance of anti-personnel mines was recorded for the year 2019, seven were African countries. The same review also indicates that of the nine States parties to the APMBC, which failed to submit their reports on its implementation for the year 2020, seven are African States. In addition, in countries like Mali that confront struggles against armed non-State actors, increased threat from improvised anti-personnel mines has been recorded. This has invoked reasonable concerns over re-proliferation of mines in conflict affected African countries. One of the issues for PSC during tomorrow’s session is how to address these gaps and ensure that States renew their commitments towards full implementation of the APMBC.

Another relevant instrument is the Declaration of States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Maputo Declaration). The Maputo Declaration has been instrumental in highlighting the need to expedite demining efforts around the world, thereby setting the year 2025 as a deadline by which member States shall ensure that there are no new mine victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control and that survivors are fully assisted and included in societies on equal basis with others. As the deadline for the implementation of the Maputo Declaration quickly approaches, it is essential for member States of the AU through the leadership of the PSC to reflect on how far they have been able to meet their commitments and how they can strengthen efforts towards meeting the 2025 deadline. Indeed, silencing anti-personnel mines and freeing African countries from landmines should form part of the AU flagship project on Silencing the Guns.

In addition to demining efforts, it is also important to emphasise the importance of taking actions against the production, export and proliferation of landmines and other excessively dangerous weapons. Particularly in light of the rise in illicit proliferation of arms in Africa, it is important for member States to remain cautious and take additional institutional and legal measures against the infiltration of excessively hazardous weapons into their territories. Although some IEDs that are remotely operated are not considered as mines, it is equally as important for States to take all necessary measures to ban the use of these devices and restrict the availability of the chemicals and elements, which are used to locally manufacture them. States also need to abide by their obligations under the APMBC to destroy their mine stockpiles, which impose serious risks including the possibility of diversion and use by unauthorized non-state actors. As experience in some African States, exemplified most recently by the experience of Libya, has indicated in the past, the lack of strict and proper regulation of the flow of arms and importantly their proper stockpiling and management has enabled non-state groups and separatists to obtain mines in black markets at very low prices, in some cases, serving as catalyst for outbreak of conflicts.

Another issue of interest for tomorrow’s session related to the proliferation of mines is the issue of porous borders. In addition to taking measures against production, transfer and storing of mines within their territories, States need to strengthen border security cooperation among them in order to thwart attempts by criminal and terrorist groups to traffic mines and other arms and weapons. In order to protect civilian populations and spare them from the impacts of mines and ERW, States also need to engage in awareness creation campaigns and consider incorporating lessons in their education curriculum, targeting particularly rural communities and refugees and IDPs who are at heightened exposure and risk of mines and ERW.

One of the major constraints that has lagged AU States parties to the APMBC from implementing their commitment under Article 5 to conduct mine clearance activities is the lack of sufficient resources and the decline in donor funding for mine action programmes. This has become particularly more challenging in the context of Covid-19 outbreak, which has forced concerned States to divert most of their resources towards efforts aimed at responding to the pandemic. The AU Mine Action Strategic Framework launched by the AU Commission is aimed at, among others, supporting concerned member States transition to national ownership and financing of their demining efforts. One of the avenues the AU Commission aims to explore in this regard is through providing capacity building trainings for AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) on management and clearance of explosive hazards. It is important to explore similar approaches and options in order to address the resource barrier faced by concerned member States.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a press statement. Council may emphasise the serious victimisation of civilians as a result of mines and other dangerous weapons and call on States and other relevant actors to take necessary measures against production, use and transfer of such weapons. The PSC may decide that the monitoring and promotion of the efforts of member states in the clearance of mines and the banning of the production, circulation and use of mines in Africa should be include in the AU Roadmap on Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa as silencing mines on the ground that threaten the lives and personal security of people is as important as silencing other forms of arms. It may encourage Members States, who haven’t yet done so, to sign, ratify and implement the APMBC as well as the Maputo Declaration. It may urge States who are already parties to the APMBC to take all necessary measures to clear mined areas, assist victims of landmines and ensure timely reporting on their clearance and demining activities in line with Article 7 of the Convention. Member States may also be urged to sign, ratify and implement the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Africa, as well as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), in order to ensure that survivors of exploded mines are fully assisted. Council may also appeal to international partners to continue their support for States in their mine clearance activities as well as efforts aimed at strengthening border control and weapons regulations. In light of the importance of enhancing cross-border coordination and cooperation to control transfer of mines as well as their use in border areas, Council may call on Member States, who have not yet done so, to accede to and ratify the AU Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation (Niamey Convention). The various RECs/RMs may also be requested to enhance their regional strategies on management of cross-border threats. The AU Commission may be requested to mobilise support, including technical and financial resources, in collaboration with its partners.

Tomorrow (18 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will consider the mapping study on illicit arms flow in Africa.

The Peace and Security Department (PSD) and the Small Arms Survey are expected to brief the council and present the main findings of the mapping study. The joint study has been conducted pursuant to the 430th PSC decision that tasked ‘the Commission to undertake a comprehensive study on the flow of illicit weapons into and within Africa and submit to it the outcome of such a study’.

Following this decision the AU Commission, jointly with the Small Arms Survey, has co-organized the inception meeting on mapping illicit arms flows in Africa, in June 2017. The press release at the inception meeting indicated that the study aims at producing data on patterns and trends in arms and ammunition inflows, diversion and illicit circulation, and gaps in control measures. The study also serves to equip the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and member states with relevant tools to ‘prevent the flow of illegal arms and ammunition into conflict zones, implement evidence-based policies and better measure progress and impact in line with the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020’.

The study has been underway over the past two years including the validation by RECs and international experts in 2018. Following tomorrow’s consideration by the PSC, the study will be launched and presented to the various stakeholders in the AU headquarters.

The study is expected to establish a continental data and analysis that identifies regions and countries affected by illicit arms flow and trends in the illicit production, trade, possession, stockpile and circulation of arms. The data and analysis may also identify sources and patterns of movement and circulation of arms. This study is essential given the complexity of the issue and the absence of a continental binding instrument and a dedicated continental mechanism that can monitor trade and illicit arms flows and track their effects on peace and security. Currently the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons is the only existing continental instrument but it only expresses political rather than legal commitment. Hence its implementation and impact has been limited. Additionally, there is not a continent-wide dedicated mechanism for promoting the standards of the Declaration.

The various RECs have established frameworks within their respective regions. Although this is a positive step, it has resulted in parallel legal regimes and made response fragmented. Even in regions that have instruments, implementation is still lacking. The very nature of the flows of illicit weapons necessitates a kind of response that is trans-regional and a standardized continental framework. The fragmented response has also left regions such as the Sahel without an established instrument.

Although the 832nd PSC session underlined the primary responsibility of member states in combating illicit circulation of arms, however their capacities are limited. A related challenge is the porous nature of the boarders of many African countries and their inability to regulate their peripheral territories. Member states’ limited capacity and resources in putting in place effective administrative and institutional measures for safe stockpiling of arms has affected the safekeeping and control of arms. In this regard there is a need for the AUC to provide guidance and technical support on ways member states adequately monitor and track illicit arms as well as produce reports on their efforts and the challenges that are encountered as a follow up to the various calls of the PSC for receiving reports from member states. Hence institutional support to member states for the development of national strategy and reporting will enable relevant national institutions in discharging their roles for effective control of flow of arms.

Previous PSC sessions have made reference to the linkages between the proliferation and illicit flows of arms on the one hand and terrorism, organized crime and financing of terrorist groups. Additionally, there is a need to recognize the increased transnational nature of conflicts and how weak border control leads to porous borders that allows free movement of traffickers of arms across national borders.

Flows and circulation of illicit arms are particularly critical in conflict affected countries and post-conflict situations. The absence of effective implementation of DDR and SSR enables the proliferation of armed groups and the flow of illicit weapons, hampering cessation of hostilities and peace building processes. It may also contribute to potential relapse to violence by compromising gains made in restoring peace and security.

The PSC may also follow up on its previous decision at the 832nd, which requested ‘the Commission to consider organizing a forum for the AU to constructively engage with weapons manufacturers’. Apart from being a shared area of interest for the UN Security Council (UNSC), this international dimension of the illicit manufacturing, trade and transfer to Africa of small arms and light weapons also necessitates developing close coordination and joint approach with the UNSC. The risks and challenges associated with illicit flow of arms have been regularly debated at the UNSC.

The UN Secretary-General submits biennial report on small arms and light weapons to UNSC. In the Resolution 2220 (2015), the Security Council requested the SG to continue to submit to the Council on a biennial basis a report on the issue of small arms and light weapons. Following this decision the SG has submitted its fifth report in December 2017. In this context, the growing concern over the increased links between transnational organized crime, illicit small-arms trafficking and terrorism as well as emerging technologies for illicit trafficking and production has received attention.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. It may express concern over illicit small arms and light weapons within the continent and from the outside. It may commend the AUC and Small Arms Survey for leading on the development of the continental mapping study on illicit arms flows in Africa. It may call on member states in strengthening their monitoring and control mechanisms and may urge for enhanced cooperation among countries and with relevant international bodies. The PSC is also expected to adopt the recommendations of the study and call for their implementation. In its deliberation the council may call for standardization of the norms and approaches of RECs for a more harmonized and coordinated approach. In terms of targeted action within the framework of the AU Roadmap on Silencing the Guns as well, the implementation of measures directed at countries most affected by illicit circulation and trade of small and light weapons such as Libya. The PSC could also emphasize issues related to partnership and international cooperation in tracing illicit flows and movement of arms, capacity building to member states for arms and ammunition management and information sharing including through the UNSC.