Tomorrow (10 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1335th session to receive an update on the situation in Madagascar. Although the agenda was initially framed as ‘Coordinated AU–SADC Support for Madagascar,’ its focus has since shifted, with SADC indicating that there has been no substantive coordination initiated between the two sides.

The session will commence with an opening statement by the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March, Mahlaba Ali Mamba, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Eswatini to the AU, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Mohamed Idris Farah, Special Envoy to the Republic of Madagascar, and a representative of the Republic of South Africa, in its capacity as Chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, are also expected to deliver statements.

Tomorrow’s session marks the fourth meeting of the PSC to consider the situation in Madagascar in the context of the political crisis the country has faced since anti-government protests began in late September 2025, culminating in the military seizure of power on 14 October 2025. The PSC convened two emergency sessions within 48 hours in October, at its 1305th and 1306th meetings, as three weeks of protests took a dramatic turn when members of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) unit of the military expressed support for the protesters and eventually assumed power. During its 1306th session held on 15 October 2025, it is recalled that the PSC suspended Madagascar from participation in all AU activities until constitutional order is restored in the country.

The PSC last considered the Situation in Madagascar on 20 November 2025 at its 1313^th meeting. In its communiqué, the Council underscored the urgent need for ‘continued vigilance and monitoring of the evolution of the situation in Madagascar’ and explicitly mandated the ‘undertaking of a Field Mission in early 2026 to gather first-hand information on the realities on the ground.’ During its 1306^th session, the PSC demanded ‘a swift and full return to constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government, and the organisation, as soon as possible, of free, fair, credible and transparent elections’ and directed ‘the AU Commission, in close cooperation with SADC, to provide the requisite support to Madagascar to ensure a swift return to constitutional order.’ It should also be recalled that at its 1305^th meeting, the PSC called on the Government of Madagascar to urgently organise an all-inclusive political dialogue as the only viable path towards consensual and sustainable solutions to the socio-economic and political challenges currently facing the country; stressing on the reactivation of the implementation of the 2011 Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar, enacted into Malagasy law under Act Number 2011-014 of 13 December 2011. The Council went further and urged for coordinated support towards the restoration of peace and stability in Madagascar under the auspices of the AU and SADC, among other decisions.

Tomorrow’s session is particularly important in light of the divergence between the PSC and SADC regarding the characterisation of the October 2025 military seizure of power and the response adopted. While the PSC, at its 1306th session, decided to suspend Madagascar on the grounds of unconstitutional change of government, SADC opted instead to dispatch a fact-finding mission. Subsequently, the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government, held in December 2025, directed the Transitional Government of Madagascar to submit a dialogue-readiness report and a draft National Roadmap by 28 February 2026. The Summit further approved, by March 2026, the deployment of the SADC Panel of Elders, led by former President Joyce Banda of Malawi, and called for coordination with the AU and broader international partners to avoid fragmentation of efforts. In late January 2026, the Panel of Elders commenced its mission in Antananarivo to facilitate an inclusive dialogue.

In this context, tomorrow’s session is timely, as it provides an opportunity to reinforce the imperative of coordination and complementarity between the AU and the regional bloc, SADC, to ensure coherent political messaging and the coordinated mobilisation of the necessary technical and financial support, including through Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT), for a consensual, inclusive, and time-bound transition process towards the swift restoration of constitutional order. Such a process should be consistent with AU norms, including Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). The session is also in line with Paragraph 5 of the PSC’s 1313^th Communiqué and Paragraph 13 of the SADC Communiqué adopted during its December 2025 extraordinary summit, which both stress the imperative of ‘enhanced coordination, harmonisation and complementarity’. In addition, it offers an opportunity to receive updates on the respective diplomatic measures undertaken by the AU and SADC in accompanying Madagascar towards the restoration of constitutional order, as well as to discuss emerging challenges and ways forward in coordinating efforts.

One of the updates from the SADC side in this regard could be the engagement undertaken on 20 January by the SADC Executive Secretary, Elias M. Magosi, with the leadership of Madagascar and Seychelles on regional priorities, peace and development. The Executive Secretary paid a courtesy call on General Maminirina Eli Razafitombo, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and substantive Minister of National Defence of Madagascar. The visit took place ahead of his formal meeting with Colonel Randrianirina. Discussions focused on the ongoing transitional governance process, the importance of an inclusive national dialogue, and efforts to stabilise essential services, including water and energy infrastructure. Madagascar also reaffirmed its decision to step aside from the SADC Chairmanship due to the ‘exceptional national context,’ while reiterating its commitment to the Community’s values and principles.

During his meeting with Randrianirina, the Executive Secretary was briefed on progress in constitutional reforms and preparations for future democratic elections. The President confirmed that the report requested by the SADC Extraordinary Heads of State and Government Summit in December 2025 would be submitted by the end of February 2026. He further emphasised that electoral reform remains a priority. While Parliament ‘currently functions as a unicameral legislature, institutional reforms will be informed by the outcomes of the inclusive national dialogue process.’

Meanwhile, the military authorities have been consolidating power and launching diplomatic engagements. Following the swearing in of the military leader, Colonel Michael Randrianirina, as Madagascar’s new president in October 2025, and the appointment of Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo as the country’s prime minister, the commander of the CAPSAT unit pledged elections in 18 to 24 months after his swearing in. Since ‘assuming office,’ Randrianirina has embarked on a series of high-level diplomatic visits. His recent visit to France came directly on the heels of a visit to Moscow, where he secured military equipment and the dispatch of Russian instructors to train Malagasy forces, including in drone warfare. Despite the optics, Randrianirina has been quick to downplay any geopolitical friction. Before departing for Paris, he emphasised that his engagements with Russia and France are entirely independent of one another, framing them as part of a results-oriented foreign policy designed to secure tangible benefits for his citizens.

The two nations committed to a ‘renewed, balanced and forward-looking partnership anchored by a two-year roadmap that aligns with Madagascar’s transition timeline and focuses on several key areas: strengthening diplomatic channels and mutual respect through enhanced political relations, accelerating investment and infrastructure to support economic development, and continuing collaborative efforts to promote regional stability through security and defence cooperation. In this context, President Emmanuel Macron reinforced France’s support for a return to constitutional order, emphasising the importance of holding free and transparent elections within the established timeframe.

It is worth noting that Madagascar’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean and its vast reserves of nickel and cobalt have turned the island nation into a focal point for global powers. As China, India and Russia ramp up their local presence, maintaining influence has become a critical priority for French diplomacy. By adding Russia and France to a list of visits that already includes the UAE and South Africa, Antananarivo is signalling that it is no longer wedded to a single patron, but is instead seeking every available avenue for investment and support.

On the other hand, the ousted Malagasy President Andry Rajoelina met King Mswati III of Eswatini in February, a development that appeared to anger the Malagasy authorities. This prompted Madagascar’s military leader, Colonel Michael Randrianirina, to issue a statement expressing his ‘strongest condemnation’ of the visit, describing it as ‘politically unacceptable.’

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is likely to emphasise the importance of ensuring enhanced coordination, harmonisation and complementarity of efforts between the AU, SADC, and the Indian Ocean Commission, as well as other relevant regional and international organisations, in order to facilitate a smooth political transition in Madagascar. The PSC is also likely to emphasise its previous decision on the need for continued vigilance and monitoring of the evolution of situation in Madagascar, and the need for undertaking a Field Mission, as soon as practicably possible, to gather first-hand information on the realities of the situation on ground, which is critically necessary in informing the next steps the Council may need to take in supporting the transition process. Council may also emphasise the need for the Government of Madagascar to holistically address the structural root causes of the multidimensional challenges facing the country, using a ‘whole of government- whole of society’ approach that brings on board all critical Malagasy stakeholders, including women and the youth. Finally, it may also encourage the Malagasy authorities to undertake trust and confidence-building measures to facilitate the conduct of the national dialogue in a conducive environment, to respect the timetable set transition with a view to returning to constitutional order and democratic governance; and to establish an inclusive, consensual and objective roadmap, with short and precise deadlines, relating to the transition and the return to constitutional order.

Tomorrow (20 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1313^th session to receive a briefing on the Situation in Madagascar.

Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver remarks. The Special Envoy of the AU Commission Chairperson, Mohamed Idris Farah, and Dominitien Ndayizeye, former Burundian President and member of the Panel of the Wise, are expected to brief the Council. It is also expected that a representative of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) will make a statement.

The session comes as the Council seeks to assess follow-up on the implementation of its 15 October decision following the coup in Madagascar and the country’s suspension from AU activities. It is to be recalled that the PSC held two sessions just one day apart, before and after the coup (1305^th and 1306^th Sessions).

Following the seizure of power by the leader of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) and the dissolution of parts of the constitution and all institutions except the lower house of parliament, the PSC, at its 1306th session on 15 October, suspended Madagascar from Participation in AU activities. Declaring the military coup a clear violation of AU principles and governance frameworks, including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the 2000 Lomé Declaration, the PSC demanded the restoration of constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government and the organization of elections as soon as possible, while urging all units of the Madagascar Armed Forces to uphold their constitutional mandate and refrain from meddling in political affairs.

The political landscape in Madagascar has evolved since the PSC’s previous session. Colonel Michael Randrianirina was formally sworn in as President of the ‘Refoundation of the Republic of Madagascar’ on 17 October and has since moved to consolidate his authority while projecting an image of reform-minded governance. In his public statements, Randrianirina has dismissed allegations that Rajoelina’s removal amounted to a coup, stressing that it occurred without violence, and rejected claims of judicial retaliation, asserting that ongoing investigations reflect justice rather than vengeance.

On 28 October, Randrianirina unveiled a new 29-member government featuring several prominent opponents of former President Rajoelina in key positions, including Christine Razanamahasoa as foreign minister, Fanirisoa Erinaivo as justice minister, and Hanitra Razafimanantsoa as state minister for ‘refoundation,’ alongside businessman Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo as Prime Minister. Randrianirina announced priorities of fighting impunity, enforcing budget austerity, and stabilising the business climate, warning ministers that failure to show results within two months could lead to their replacement.

The military authorities have articulated what they describe as a comprehensive reform agenda. Randrianirina outlined a six-step plan purporting to respond to the collective will to break with past crises and build a just, stable, sustainable, and fully legitimate country. The steps include restoring trust between the state and its citizens, strengthening governance and transparency, intensifying the fight against corruption, guaranteeing the republican nature of the responsibilities of the armed forces, drafting the fundamental texts that will govern the new Republic, and organising a constitutional referendum followed by free and fair elections recognised by all. The proposed roadmap envisages nationwide consultations led by the Council of Christian Churches in Madagascar (FFKM) to establish a new governance system, followed by a referendum and presidential election within two years, alongside plans for a Youth Assembly and strengthened Malagasy language and history education.

The proposed two-year transitional timeline and the plan for a new constitution are further indicators of the unconstitutional seizure of power. It is worth recalling that the High Constitutional Court that ‘invited’ Randrianirina to seize power, thereby giving a semblance of legality to the military seizure of power, tasked him to hold elections within 60 days of its decision, citing the Constitution’s Article 53, which requires a presidential election within 30 to 60 days after the High Constitutional Court declares the office vacant. While he accepted the ‘invitation’ of this Court and defended the ‘constitutionality’ of his seizure of power on that basis, after seizing power, he ignored the court order on the timeline for holding elections. The decision for the two-year transition is not a result of a process of national consultation or dialogue.

The military’s self-determined two-year governance timeline directly contradicts the AU’s call for immediate handover to a civilian-led transitional authority. More significantly, the military’s appointments of key figures, including Prime Minister Rajaonarivelo without consultation, and its unilateral extension of the transition timeline have reportedly fostered growing disillusionment among the youth protesters whose demonstrations precipitated the political upheaval. What began as a convergence of interests between CAPSAT and the youth-led movement has given way to a troubling divergence between the protesters’ demands for genuine democratic renewal and the military’s consolidation of its own authority. This pattern is increasingly familiar in the many instances of such military seizure of power on the continent from Gabon to Guinea, where military forces initially embraced as allies by civilian protesters subsequently sideline protest movements after seizing power, failing to fulfil revolutionary aims and instead entrenching their control under the guise of stabilisation and reform.

Acting on the PSC’s decision of its 1305^th session, the AU Commission Chairperson announced on 3 November that he appointed Mohamed Idriss Farah as Special Envoy for Madagascar. The Special Envoy commenced his first visit on 6 November. Along with the Farah’s mission to Madagascar and as a follow-up of the decisions of the 1305^th and 1306^th sessions of the PSC, the AU Commission dispatched a High-Level Delegation to Madagascar from 7 to 11 November, led by Ndayizeye. These visits had the primary objective of engaging in constructive dialogue with Malagasy authorities and national stakeholders to address the current political crisis. The delegation was received by the leader of the transition, Randrianirina, Prime Minister Rajaonarivelo, and the Foreign Minister, Razanamahasoa, in meetings described as taking place in ‘an excellent atmosphere’ that allowed both parties to share views on the current situation.

According to official AU communications, particular emphasis was placed during these exchanges on the need to maintain frank and constructive dialogue between the AU and Malagasy authorities to support their efforts to overcome the political situation, facilitate national reconciliation, and respond to the legitimate political and socio-economic aspirations of the Malagasy people. The Head of the AU delegation welcomed the openness of the authorities to dialogue and their expressed commitment to the African Union and the values of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, while reiterating the continental organisation’s commitment to supporting and accompanying the Malagasy people and authorities in their quest for peace, stability and justice. These positive characterisations of the engagement suggest that diplomatic channels remain open and suspension does not preclude but rather necessitates AU’s robust engagement.

Yet the critical question confronting tomorrow’s session is whether this diplomatic reception translates into a genuine willingness to meet the AU’s core demands for civilian-led transition and constitutional restoration. The AU delegation’s positive assessment of the authorities’ openness must be carefully weighed against the fact that the military leadership arrogated to itself the role of deciding the transitional process without any national consultative process. There is a tangible risk that the military authorities may seek to leverage diplomatic engagement to gain time and legitimacy while pursuing their predetermined course, rather than genuinely engaging with AU requirements. The articulation of reform commitments and the appointment of opposition figures to ministerial positions without the participation of political and civilian forces of the country is a clear entrenchment of the military’s control of the transitional process. It is worth recalling that the PSC in its decision demanded ‘a swift and full return to constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government, and the organisation, as soon as possible, of free, fair, credible and transparent elections.’ Yet, the developments since mid-October, instead of representing meaningful steps toward the civilian-led transition it demanded, indicate a consolidation of military authority dressed in reform rhetoric.

It is expected that the SADC representative will update the PSC on SADC’s initiatives. It is to be recalled that SADC differed on the determination of whether what transpired in Madagascar was a military seizure of power, contrary to the constitutional processes established in Madagascar for seizure of power. The PSC in which five SADC member states including the Chairperson of the PSC for October were represented did not deem difference of determination necessary as there was no any uncertainty about the occurrence of a military seizure of power contrary to established constitutional processes In a communiqué issued after the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, held virtually on 16 October 2025, the Organ urged all political actors in Madagascar to engage in inclusive dialogue as the only path toward lasting peace and endorsed the deployment of a technical fact-finding mission to Madagascar by 22 October 2025. SADC sent a fact-finding mission led by the Panel of Elders, including former Malawian President Dr. Joyce Banda, ‘to engage all stakeholders, ease tensions, promote dialogue, and identify the root causes of the crisis.’ The extraordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held on 7 November resulted in acknowledgement of Madagascar’s relinquishment of its role as Chair of SADC due to its incapacity to discharge the responsibilities of the position following recent political developments, and South Africa became Interim Chair of SADC until August 2026. It did not, however, address the outcome of the visit of the SADC Panel of Elders. From the information available, there is no indication as yet that the report from the SADC visit has yet been received and validated by the SADC Organ Troika Summit.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC may use the session as an opportunity to reiterate AU’s commitment to democratic norms and principles underpinning the rejection of and zero tolerance for UCG. It may also recall its previous decisions of the 1306^th sessions, urging the military leaders to immediately hand over power to an agreed-upon transitional civilian authority and reaffirm its stand in that respect. The PSC may commend the AU Chairperson and the AU Commission Chairperson for assigning a dedicated mechanism that follows on the decisions of the 1305^th and 1306^th sessions and may in this respect welcome the visit by the Special Envoy to Madagascar immediately after his appointment along with the deployment of the high-level delegation. The Council may acknowledge the military authorities’ articulation of a reform agenda and their reported openness to dialogue and call on them to continue collaboration with the AU and SADC mechanisms within the framework of the communiqués its 1305^th and 1306^th sessions, including on the need for civilian-led rather than military-directed. It may in this respect call for inclusive national dialogue that centres the voices of civil society, youth movements, and political stakeholders and the development of a transitional roadmap on the basis of such inclusive national dialogue with the support of SADC and the AU. The PSC may emphasise the need for close coordination between the AU and SADC in providing comprehensive accompaniment to the transitional process in Madagascar on the basis of joint responsibility. The Council may stress that the reform process for restoration of constitutional order must address not only the political crisis but also the underlying socio-economic challenges and poor governance that sparked the protests. The PSC may urge all AU member states and the international community to support the decisions of the Council and the initiatives of the AU and SADC toward addressing the grievances of citizens, particularly the youth, and supporting the restoration of constitutional order in Madagascar.

Today (15 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an emergency session to consider the constitutional rapture in Madagascar. This 1306th session of the PSC has been called following the risk of a military seizure of power becoming a reality, following weeks of public protests and the President’s escape from the country, declaring fear of a coup after an elite force of the military took the side of protestors.

The session will commence with the opening remarks of Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October. Mahmoud Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to make a statement framing the policy issues for the PSC decision and the AU Commission’s assessment of the situation. The PSC may also hear from the Representative of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission in Madagascar. The concerned Regional Economic Community/Regional Mechanism, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), will make a statement, so as to the Chargé d’affaires of Madagascar, as representative of the country concerned.

This meeting comes just less than 24 hours after the emergency session of the PSC held on Monday, 13 October. The 1305 session of the PSC, held as an emergency session, was called following a major escalation in the political instability of Madagascar.  It in particular came after tensions escalated dramatically over the weekend of 11–12 October, when members of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) unit of the military expressed support for the protestors and marched alongside demonstrators in Antananarivo and entered symbolic public spaces such as May 13 Square. Their support for the protestors, reportedly welcomed by some protesters, has blurred the line between civilian unrest and exploitation of the situation by some in the army. In the communiqué that it adopted after the meeting, the PSC stated, among others, that it ‘totally rejects any attempt at unconstitutional changes of government.’ It further urged ‘all united of the Madagascar Armed Forces to uphold their constitutional mandate, and to refrain from meddling in the political affairs of the country.’

News outlets reported that the public protest was initially triggered by widespread frustration over chronic power and water outages, compounded by rising living costs, unemployment, and public disillusionment with governance. What began as localised, youth-led (Gen Z) protests in late September quickly evolved into a nationwide movement calling for greater accountability and political reform. It attracted the support of opposition politicians.

The state’s response has been increasingly heavy-handed, with security forces employing live ammunition and tear gas to disperse demonstrators. The UN reported that over 22 people were killed, a number the government contested. Civil society groups and international media report dozens of fatalities, while hospitals in the capital struggle to treat casualties amid growing shortages. The government has justified its actions as necessary to preserve order, but its credibility has been further eroded by the visible divisions within the security establishment and by mounting accusations of repression.

With the heavy-handed response failing to yield fruit and a key segment of the army taking sides with the protestors, the government also attempted to make symbolic concessions. President Andry Rajoelina dissolved the government and named a new prime minister, demanding an effective response to the demands of the public. As the situation further escalated during the weekend, he also called for dialogue. These efforts did not placate protestors who insisted on his departure from power.

It did not take long after the elite CAPSAT unit of the military expressed support to protestors that Rajoelina fled the country to an unknown destination. With no segment of the political, institutional and social sectors of society coming to his defence, the President’s attempt to assert his authority solely on the basis of constitutional technicalities, such as his declaration of dissolution of the national Assembly, did not last nor did it succeed. What started as a support of an elite segment of the army for the public protest against governance failures evolved into the full-fledged ouster of the President and the seizure of political power by the army.

Ahead of the announcement of the seizure of power by the army, the National Assembly, which Rajoelina tried to dissolve through a letter that did not carry the seal of authority, adopted a motion impeaching Rajoelina with those members of the Assembly present and voting supporting the impeachment, except one who voted against the motion.

The Constitution of Madagascar envisages the processes that need to be followed in the event of the vacancy of the position of the president due to impeachment or abandonment of the position by the president. Following the adoption of the motion of impeachment, the National Assembly submitted the matter of filling the vacancy to the High Constitutional Court. It was reported that despite the provisions of the Constitution which stipulate that the President of the Senate or, in his or her absence, the President of the Assembly assumes the role of President temporarily, the High Constitutional Court ‘invited’ CAPSAT leader Col. Michael Randrianirina to ‘exercise functions of head of state.’ Yet, there is no provision in the Constitution that vests authority in the Court to assign such functions to the army. The court also asked Randrianirina to hold elections within 60 days of its decision, citing the Constitution’s Article 53, which requires a presidential election within 30 to 60 days after the High Constitutional Court declares the office vacant.

Notwithstanding the attempt on the part of the National Assembly and the Court to follow the Constitution, albeit selectively on the part of the Court, Colonel Randrianirina, after announcing the seizure of power, declared the dissolution of all institutions except the lower house of parliament. ‘The following institutions are suspended: the Senate, the High Constitutional Court, the Independent National Electoral Commission, the High Court of Justice, and the High Council for the Defence of Human Rights and the Rule of Law,’ a statement from the country’s military leaders read. Contrary to the Constitution and what the High Constitutional Court stipulated, a committee led by the military would rule the country for a period of up to two years alongside a transitional government before organising new elections.’

In the light of these series of developments, the PSC has to make a determination of whether an unconstitutional change of government took place in Madagascar during tomorrow’s session. While provision has been made by the PSC for sending a joint mission to Madagascar in the communiqué of its 130th session, and SADC took a decision to deploy a fact-finding mission, there are adequate facts that are incontestable for enabling the PSC to make the determination. First, it is not contested that the President of the country no longer holds the office: He had fled the country, the National Assembly impeached him, and the High Constitutional Council declared the position of the President vacant. Second, the High Constitutional Court’s invitation of Colonel Randrianirina to step in for exercising the role of President does not have any constitutional basis. It is nothing more than an exercise in giving a military seizure of power a semblance of ‘legality,’ similar to what happened in Chad in 2021. Third, it cannot also be contested that the army that took power froze the country’s Constitution by suspending key institutions of the Constitution. Fourth, in the statement it issued, the army that seized power declared that a committee that is led by itself will lead the country for two years. Taken together, these incontestable facts that don’t need any verification establish the occurrence of an unconstitutional change of government, involving seizure of power by the army. As such, the PSC has no option but to treat the situation in Madagascar as an unconstitutional change of government.

Internal dynamics of the PSC is such that some member states may argue against the application of Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol, which requires the PSC to suspend a country that experienced an unconstitutional change of government, even when they may agree that what happened was a coup or an unconstitutional change of government. Such an approach would constitute a serious deviation from the clear terms of not only the PSC Protocol but also the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and most importantly the AU’s grand law, the Constitutive Act. Additionally, there is no advantage to be gained by the AU if it considers the situation as a coup but fails to attach the consequences relating thereto as clearly stipulated in the Constitutive Act of the AU. However, the PSC may face a backlash if it falls short of applying the AU rules on unconstitutional changes of government fully. It loses whatever leverage that the application of the rules fully would give the AU for ensuring that the grievances of the people are addressed through reforms and in pushing for the restoration of constitutional order. Further to this, the PSC may face charges of selective application and double standards. It would also face an increasing crisis of legitimacy and credibility in continuing to keep the suspension of the five AU member states currently under suspension.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to express its condemnation of the occurrence of an unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar, with the seizure of power by the army. It may decide to apply Article 7(1)(g) of the Protocol and suspend Madagascar from the AU pending the transfer of political power by the army to a civilian administration in accordance with the procedures set in the constitution and the restoration of the suspended constitutional processes. The PSC may reiterate its position of the 1305th session, urging the Madagascar Armed Forces to uphold their constitutional mandate and to refrain from meddling in the political affairs of the country. It may also urge that the PSC may take note of the plan of SADC to dispatch a fact-finding mission and request the AU Commission to send a delegation that accompanies the SADC mission. The PSC may additionally express its readiness to receive the report on the fact-finding mission and review, as necessary, its policy position on the situation on the basis of SADC’s fact-finding report. It may also reiterate its request that the Chairperson of the AU Commission urgently appoint a special envoy on Madagascar. Echoing the Statement of the Chairperson of the SADC Organ, the PSC may also impress upon the de facto authorities their obligations under various AU instruments to respect and safeguard the rights, freedoms and dignity of citizens. It may also call for close coordination between the AU and SADC. It may urge all AU member states and the international community to support the decision of the PSC and the initiatives of the AU and SADC towards supporting measures for addressing the grievances of citizens, particularly the youth and the restoration of constitutional order in Madagascar.

Today (13 October 2025), at 3:00 PM, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an emergency session to consider the political unrest in Madagascar. This 1305th session of the PSC has been called following the escalating tensions and signs of a military coup in the wake of the widespread protests that gripped the island nation for the past few weeks.

The session will be chaired by Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the AU PSC Chairperson for October, and will feature opening remarks from the Chairperson of the PSC. Mahmoud Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to make an introductory remark. As Madagascar is also the current chairperson of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), apart from the representative of Madagascar, who will make a statement as a concerned country, the PSC is also expected to receive a statement from SADC. During the closed segment of the session, the Representative of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission in Madagascar is expected to make a presentation to the PSC.

The meeting follows alarming developments in the country, where soldiers have reportedly joined mass anti-government protests, and an elite military unit has declared that it is assuming control of parts of the armed forces. The situation, described by the Malagasy presidency as an ‘attempted illegal seizure of power,’ marks one of the most serious political ruptures in Madagascar since the 2009 military-backed change of government.

News outlets reported that the current unrest was initially triggered by widespread frustration over chronic power and water outages, compounded by rising living costs, unemployment, and public disillusionment with governance. What began as localised, youth-led protests in late September quickly evolved into a nationwide movement calling for greater accountability and political reform. It attracted the support of opposition politicians. Despite the fact that President Andry Rajoelina dissolved the government and appointed a general as the Prime Minister (read as an attempt to maintain the military’s allegiance) and called for dialogue, the effort did not placate protestors who insisted on his departure from power. Tensions escalated dramatically over the weekend of 11–12 October, when members of the elite CAPSAT unit, the same corps implicated in previous coups, marched alongside demonstrators in Antananarivo and entered symbolic public spaces such as May 13 Square. Their support for the protestors, reportedly welcomed by some protesters, has blurred the line between civilian unrest and exploitation of the situation by some in the army, hence heightening fears of a potential coup.

The state’s response has been increasingly heavy-handed, with security forces employing live ammunition and tear gas to disperse demonstrators. The UN reported that over 22 people were killed, a number the government contested. Civil society groups and international media report dozens of fatalities, while hospitals in the capital struggle to treat casualties amid growing shortages. The government has justified its actions as necessary to preserve order, but its credibility has been further eroded by the visible divisions within the security establishment and by mounting accusations of repression. As part of the stabilisation measures, it may be of interest for the PSC members to call for an end to the use of excessive force by security forces and for people to exercise their rights to peaceful protest without resort to violence.

Regional and international actors, including SADC and the AU Commission, have voiced grave concern over the situation, urging restraint and respect for human rights. In a statement released on 27 September, SADC expressed deep concern over violent protests in Madagascar and offered full support and solidarity to the government and people of Madagascar, commending the government’s commitment to restoring peace and stability. The statement also called on all stakeholders to exercise calm, restraint, and engage constructively and peacefully to resolve differences in the interest of national unity and reconciliation. On 12 October, the AU Commission Chairperson issued a statement emphasising adherence to the Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, calling on all parties to demonstrate responsibility and patriotism to preserve the country’s unity, stability, and peace within constitutional and institutional frameworks.

The crisis reveals deep-seated structural fragilities in Madagascar’s political order. It underscores the volatile nexus between socioeconomic hardship, governance deficits, and eroding civil–military boundaries. If left unchecked, the situation could slide into protracted instability, with severe implications for the broader Indian Ocean region. Already, curfews, internet restrictions, and disrupted flights point to a rapidly deteriorating security environment that could undermine Madagascar’s fragile economic recovery and displace populations toward neighbouring islands and mainland southern Africa.

For the PSC, the immediate challenge lies in containing the crisis before it hardens into a full-fledged coup or civil conflict. As such, the Council is expected to deliberate on deploying preventive diplomacy measures, including the dispatch of a high-level AU mission to engage with the government, opposition leaders, and civil society representatives. Such a mission could serve to create conditions for facilitating dialogue and facilitating reform measures for addressing the grievances of the public, particularly the youth.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express grave concern over the deteriorating political and security situation in Madagascar. The PSC is also expected to condemn the use of excessive force and guarantee independent investigations into the deaths of civilians. It may also call for restraint by all actors, including the need for protestors to observe rules on the right to peaceful protest. The PSC may reaffirm the AU’s zero-tolerance policy for unconstitutional changes of government. The Council may also reaffirm its support for SADC’s mediation efforts and request the AU Commission Chairperson to coordinate closely with SADC to promote a peaceful and credible electoral process. In this regard, the PSC may endorse AU-SADC-led joint mediation to bring the government, protest representatives (including youth leaders), political parties, and civil society into an urgent dialogue to address immediate grievances and to agree on a roadmap for political and socio-economic reforms and deepening democratic processes. Additionally, the PSC may call for inclusive dialogue among political actors to address grievances related to the electoral process. It may encourage the government to guarantee civic and political freedoms, including freedom of expression and assembly, in the run-up to the elections. The PSC may also call on the security forces to maintain their impartiality and restrain from actions that undermine conditions for dialogue and addressing the grievances of the public.