The African Union (AU)’s role in elections in Africa is conducted through two interrelated processes. The first is AU’s election observation activities and the other is the Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) agenda on elections in Africa. Between 2021 and 2025, the PSC progressively consolidated its focus on elections, moving beyond episodic observation toward sustained engagement that recognises elections as extended political processes with significant implications for political and institutional stability. This period registered some notable institutional gains, including improved professionalism of AU Election Observation Missions (AUEOMs), support for professionalization of election observation bodies, increased attention to inclusivity of women and youth, and the launch of knowledge-generation initiatives.

These advances (not central to the political factors that shape the conduct of elections), however, were offset by persistent weaknesses, notably the normalisation of minimalist electoral assessments that privilege calm over credibility, inconsistent enforcement of continental norms, most critically Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) in post-coup contexts and weak follow-up on election observation recommendations and the lack of consistent use of preventive diplomacy. AU’s uneven handling of elections following a) unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), b) constitutional and electoral manipulation and c) cases where electoral and military illegality converged (in Gabon in 2024 and in Guinea Bissau in November 2025) have not only eroded the deterrent value of AU norms and strained the Council’s preventive credibility but also are exposing the AU to charges of being complicit in the increasing perversion of elections in Africa.

In an address to chiefs of intelligence services gathered in Mombasa, Kenya, in April 2026, President William Ruto of Kenya, who is the African Union (AU) Champion for Institutional reform, proclaimed that the African Union (AU), as it stands today, is not fit for purpose.’ While it may seem evident given the increasing ineffectiveness of the AU in dealing with the challenges facing the continent, this statement does not exactly tell us what the AU is not fit for. It is true that Africa’s peace, security and governance landscape is undergoing one of its most severe stress tests since the establishment of the African Union (AU). Despite the existence of one of the most elaborate regional peace and security frameworks, the continent continues to experience a proliferation of armed conflicts, unconstitutional changes of government, democratic regression and complex humanitarian emergencies. It is this growing gulf between the policy, normative and institutional arrangements of the AU and the peace and security realities of the continent that, in part, led to the call for the reform of the AU, including its peace and security system.

Sierra Leone’s 2024–2025 tenure on the United Nations Security Council unfolded during a period of visible retreat from an international law-based order, marked by rising unilateralism, intensifying geopolitical rivalry, selective application of norms, and growing strain on the UN Charter’s collective security scheme. Drawing on Sierra Leone’s Council experience and the framing of Amani Africa’s 2026 Pre-AU Summit High-level Dialogue on ‘Africa at a Crossroads: Pan-Africanism, the breakdown of  global order, and the Future of Collective Security,’ this paper argues that the present moment, while destabilizing, also creates strategic space for African recalibration. Four interrelated pathways emerge: consolidation of African solidarity through the A3 and A3 Plus; principled African engagement on global crises beyond the continent; strategic navigation of multipolarity through coalition-building and stronger resource-governance safeguards; and a dual reform agenda centered on Security Council reform and operational subsidiarity under Chapter VIII. The paper concludes that Africa’s policy task is neither inward retreat nor rhetorical resistance, but the practical advancement of African agency: investing in African solutions while sustaining global relevance through principled, coalition-based diplomacy.

The 2026 election for the 10 members of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was held by the Executive Council on 11 February 2026 at its 48th Ordinary session, in line with the power vested in it pursuant to Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.106 (VI) of the Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly. The outcome of the election was endorsed by the Assembly during its 39th ordinary session on 14 and 15 February. The result of the election produced a significant change in the composition of the PSC, bringing to the PSC more than 1/3 new members, including Morocco and South Africa.

In a notable development, Somalia became the latest AU member state to be elected to the PSC for the first time, after three earlier unsuccessful attempts. Also notable was the large number of withdrawals between the closing of the submission of candidacy and the day of the election. The number of candidates shrank by nine (9) at the time of voting. As a result, there were only two AU regions (North Africa and Southern Africa) that had a list of candidates that was in excess of the number of seats available.

This policy brief provides an analysis of the conduct and outcome of the elections. It also highlights the key dynamics that transpired in the lead-up to and during the election, as well as the ways in which the new composition of membership would affect the PSC between rejuvenation and persisting decline in effectiveness and impact.

Le Soudan est aujourd’hui l’épicentre de l’un des conflits les plus meurtriers au monde et de l’une de ses pires crises humanitaires. Les chiffres parlent d’eux-mêmes : depuis 2023, plus de 150 000 personnes ont perdu la vie du fait des violences perpétrées par les belligérants et d’autres causes connexes ; environ 7,3 millions ont été nouvellement déplacées à l’intérieur du pays – s’ajoutant aux 2,3 qui l’avaient déjà été avant le déclenchement du conflit actuel, ce qui porte le chiffre total des déplacées à 9,6 millions ; 4,3 millions ont trouvé refuge dans les États voisins; et   plus de 30 millions de personnes –soit les deux tiers de la population – dépendent désormais de l’aide humanitaire. Les atrocités commises dépassent l’entendement. La bataille pour le contrôle d’El-Fasher – sa chute aux mains des Forces de soutien rapide (FSR) et les récits insoutenables qui ont suivi – a ravivé les échos les plus sombres d’une tragédie antérieure : la politique de la terre brûlée pratiquée au Darfour en réaction à la rébellion armée qui y éclata en 2003. La crainte est aujourd’hui vive de voir ce qui s’est déroulé dans cette localité se reproduire ailleurs.

30 March 2026 will mark the end of the mandate of 10 members of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) who were elected for a two-year term in February 2024 during the 37th ordinary session of the AU Assembly. Since the election for the three-year term was held during the 38th AU Assembly in February 2025, the 2026 election of the PSC will be limited to these ten two-year term seats in the Council. Unlike the three-year term seats, which are allocated equally to the five regions of the AU, the regional allocation of the ten two-year term seats is based on the number of states in the different regions at the time of the adoption of the PSC Protocol. Thus, pursuant to the Protocol Establishing the PSC and the Modalities on the Elections of the PSC, the two-year term membership of the PSC is allocated for the five regions as follows: three seats for West Africa, two seats for Central, East and Southern Africa regions, and one seat for North Africa.

Sudan is now the epicenter of one of the world’s deadliest conflicts and most desperate humanitarian crises. The numbers speak for themselves: since 2023, more than 150,000 people are estimated to have died as a result of violence and other related causes, 7.3 million have been newly internally displaced—on top of 2.3 million already displaced, bringing the total 9.6 million, 4.3 million have fled as refugees to neighboring countries, and more than 30 million people—two-thirds of the population—require humanitarian assistance (here). The atrocities committed defy words, and the battle for El-Fasher—its fall to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the unbearable reports that followed—has revived the darkest echoes of an earlier tragedy: the scorched-earth campaign waged in Darfur following the 2003 armed rebellion in that region. The fear now is stark: what happened there could happen again, elsewhere.

For Africa, this era, in which the world is living through a historic transition from a multilateral system underwritten by a dominant hegemon backed by a strong bloc to a world order characterised increasingly by multipolarity, brings both perils and opportunities. Both the perils and opportunities necessitate the repositioning of the continent. This is imperative both for shielding the continent from the perils that the uncertainties and tensions that accompany the transition and for enabling it to seize the opportunities for ending the marginal place to which it has hitherto been relegated in the order that is coming to an end and become an active player to make the emerging global order more amenable for securing the wellbeing of its peoples.

The global order is going through a historic transformation. There is a profound shift in the structure of the power relations between states.  While the state system remains the basis of the global order, the role and power of the state have hugely diminished. Of particular significance is the fact that the old order is in the process of giving way to an emerging order characterised increasingly by multipolarity.  Major power rivalry and geopolitical tension are on the rise. Unilateral action and protectionism are gaining momentum. The United Nations (UN) faces an existential crisis.  International law is under enormous assault.  All of these pose a direct and serious risk to Africa.

This policy brief presents a brief assessment of the current state of Africa’s engagement with major powers and its readiness for advancing its interests in view of the deep shifts in the global context. Based on such assessment and having regard to the efforts of other parts of the world for repositioning themselves, the brief outlines the kind of major strategic shifts that Africa needs to adopt promptly for repositioning itself for the new international order and to ameliorate the perils the state of the world poses to Africa.

Peacekeeping faces unprecedented challenges, driven by rapidly evolving security threats, complex global geopolitics, and shifting priorities among Member States. While talk of the ‘end of peacekeeping’ may be overstated, the foundational consensus that has long supported peacekeeping missions has faded, if not collapsed. In response, the international community—including policymakers, scholars, and peacekeeping practitioners—is engaged in a deep reassessment of peacekeeping’s role, relevance, and the strategies required to adapt and make it fit for these changes and challenges.

This policy brief presents an analysis of the major themes and insights that emerged from a day-long conference that Amani Africa convened on 19 March 2025 based on the UN Commissioned Independent Study on the Future of Peacekeeping.