Tomorrow (21 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) will hold their 9^th Annual Consultative Meeting in New York, United States.

The meeting will be co-chaired by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for October 2026, and Omar Hilale, Permanent Representative of Morocco to the UN and PBC Chair, who will deliver the welcoming remarks.

Convened under the theme ‘Advancing synergies and regional approaches in support of nationally owned peacebuilding priorities in Africa’, the meeting precedes the PSC’s engagements with the UN Security Council. It builds on the 8^th consultation, which reaffirmed national ownership, inclusion and regional cooperation, while emphasising the need for systematic follow-up. The consultation will consider three interrelated agenda items: strengthening follow-up to previous commitments, advancing regional peacebuilding and prevention, and financing and partnerships. The central question running through these discussions is how the two bodies can translate existing commitments into sustained and coordinated action that strengthens regional prevention, supports nationally led peacebuilding priorities and ensures effective follow-up.

The first agenda item is expected to take stock of commitments from the last two consultations, including achievements, outstanding recommendations and impediments to implementation. Following the emphasis on the need for a follow-up on previous commitments and conclusions outlined in Amani Africa’s review of the 2023 informal consultation, at the 7^th joint consultation in October 2024, the two bodies agreed that annual meetings should be preceded by ‘at least one preparatory meeting of the experts of the AUPSC and PBC’ to assess implementation of previous commitments. The 8^th consultation subsequently called for regular sharing of outcomes and systematic follow-up, welcoming the designation of focal points linking the AUC’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) structures and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). Of particular significance is whether these arrangements have led to regular information-sharing, joint analysis and identifiable country-level engagement. The two bodies could accordingly identify priority country contexts or thematic areas for mutually reinforcing action, including a possible joint field visit, subject to national consent, and a defined activity between the AUC’s PCRD structures and PBSO with clear responsibilities and timelines. Periodic exchanges between the Chairs and mid-year updates could sustain momentum despite rotating leadership.

A major development since the previous consultation is the conclusion of the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review, which lends further impetus to strengthening institutional follow-up. The PBC’s report on its nineteenth session identifies ‘focusing on United Nations coherence and follow-up’ and ‘emphasising accountability’ among the priorities of its 2025 programme of work. More importantly, Security Council resolution 2805 (2025) encourages the PBC to strengthen its partnership with the PSC and ‘to create a mechanism, within existing resources, to follow up on the implementation of relevant recommendations’ from annual consultations. The broader value of practical AU–UN cooperation was also reflected in the 27^th AU–UN Joint Task Force consultation, which highlighted ‘joint learning and the exchange of knowledge and expertise’ in operational support. At its 26 March 2026 expert-level meeting, PBC members called for a ‘clear roadmap for continued engagement’ on implementing the review, while the 15 May informal retreat reflected interest in a ‘shift from discussion to implementation’. These developments bring into sharper focus the need to move beyond reiterating commitments. A modest implementation matrix setting out priorities, focal points, deliverables and reporting timelines could help the PSC and PBC to make this shift from discussion to implementation through existing arrangements, rather than establish additional structures.

The second agenda item, central to the meeting’s theme, will consider how regional peacebuilding and prevention approaches can reinforce nationally owned priorities, particularly in West Africa and the Great Lakes. The discussion is expected to explore support by the AU, Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), and the PBC to Member States, upon request, in developing voluntary national prevention strategies and responding to transboundary challenges. At its 1369^th ministerial session on 23 September 2026, the PSC underscored the need to address the ‘structural root causes and enablers of terrorism and violent extremism’, while calling for ‘integrated approaches to border governance’ that link security with development, local governance, and social cohesion. This approach aligns with the revised AU PCRD Policy of 2024, which extends PCRD to prevention, institution-building, and recovery, and calls for ‘enhancing complementarity, fostering concrete synergies where feasible’ with UN partners. The AU annual report on PCRD and peacebuilding further highlights efforts to operationalise the PSC Sub-Committee on PCRD, engage RECs/RMs and strengthen the PCRD Centre. The practical challenge is to bring together the PSC’s political engagement and regional knowledge with the PBC’s advisory, convening and resource-mobilisation comparative advantage around gaps identified by countries themselves, without creating parallel arrangements.

Recent country-specific engagements of the PBC illustrate both the scope for nationally led peacebuilding and the importance of aligning external support with national priorities. In January, Mauritania presented its Strategy for Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion with World Bank participation, emphasising ‘alignment between international assistance and Mauritania’s evolving peacebuilding priorities’. The Gambia’s April engagement focused on translating ‘existing commitments into tangible outcomes for victims and communities’ through transitional justice. At an Amani Africa–Cameroon (PSC Chairperson for November 2025)–UNOAU policy dialogue on peacebuilding held on 18 November 2025, The Gambia’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Salimatta Touray, observed that ‘the legitimacy of regional and international organisations is not a zero-sum game’, while pointing to weak national coordination and conflicting external advice as impediments to effective interventions. In June, São Tomé and Príncipe returned to the PBC to report on progress in implementing its National Conflict Prevention Strategy, with the participation of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), highlighting the importance of sustained engagement and regional support for nationally owned conflict prevention efforts. The May visit of the PBC’s Liberia Configuration similarly highlighted reconciliation and decentralisation, with its Chair stressing that ‘[p]eacebuilding must be inclusive, nationally owned and locally led’. These experiences suggest that the added value of regional and international engagement rests less on creating new initiatives than on reinforcing nationally defined priorities and avoiding fragmented or competing interventions.

The Sahel, Lake Chad Basin and Great Lakes region demonstrate the difficulties of pursuing peacebuilding amid persistent insecurity and fragile state–society relations. Part of the challenge is how to address security threats while also working on the underlying economic, social, governance and environmental conditions driving conflicts and insecurity. At its 1347^th session, the PSC welcomed regional priorities and action plans under the adjusted Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR 2.0), while its 1344^th session called for stronger cross-border cooperation on natural resource governance and a review of the AU’s Sahel strategy drawing on lessons from the Lake Chad Basin. At the UN Security Council’s 14 July 2026 briefing on West Africa and the Sahel, UNOWAS Head Leonardo Santos Simão emphasised that ‘investments are needed in the social, economic, and environmental foundations of peace’. In the Great Lakes, the February 2026 regional retreat in Kampala sought to strengthen coordination on disarmament and repatriation in support of the Doha and Washington peace processes on the eastern DRC conflict. The PBC’s 19 May expert-level meeting on DDR also highlighted the importance of linking reintegration with reconciliation, livelihoods and inclusive participation. The challenge for AU–PBC cooperation is therefore to reinforce existing regional initiatives with coordinated support for civilian protection, essential services and livelihood recovery, without duplicating programmes or substituting such interventions for political mediation.

Equally important is ensuring that regional peacebuilding efforts are informed by the concerns of the communities most affected by conflict. Their participation should not end with initial consultations but extend to implementation of programmes. The previous consultation emphasised that peacebuilding approaches should reflect ‘the priorities and needs of communities’. This resonates with the AU’s Inaugural Continental Dialogue with Traditional, Inter-Faith and Judicial Leaders, held in Accra in June 2026, which underscores the imperative of a whole-of-society approach. In this regard, the consultation could emphasise the meaningful involvement of traditional and religious leaders, women, youth, displaced communities and local authorities in identifying risks, shaping interventions and assessing results, particularly in borderlands.

The third agenda item concerns financing and partnerships, an area in which the gap between commitments and available resources continues to constrain peacebuilding. The previous consultation acknowledged persistent financing challenges, underscoring that ‘voluntary contributions should remain the primary source of funding’, while recognising assessed contributions as reflecting Member States’ shared commitment to peacebuilding. It also welcomed initiatives under Window II of the AU Peace Fund, including Quick Impact Projects and capacity-building. The UN Peacebuilding Fund’s (PBF) 2025 report recorded a US$69.5 million portfolio covering 16 cross-border initiatives, including cooperation among Mali, Mauritania and Senegal using ‘inclusive water governance as an entry point to prevent conflict’. Yet, an analysis of the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review notes the absence of stronger commitments to predictable financing, with implementation qualified by the requirement to operate ‘within existing resources’. The implications of sustained financing needs are illustrated by the PBC–PBF joint visit to the Central African Republic from 28 March to 3 April 2026, which highlighted initiatives addressing land disputes, documentation for returnees and community reconciliation. In his subsequent 23 June briefing to the Security Council, the PBC Chair underscored that ‘adequate and predictable financing will be essential’ for reintegration efforts, stressing complementarity between the PBF and MINUSCA in addressing funding gaps. The consultation therefore offers an opportunity to explore how the AU Peace Fund, PBF, bilateral partners and international financial institutions, including the African Development Bank, could better align support through country-led financing dialogues identifying priorities, existing resources and gaps.

The expected outcome is a joint statement. The two bodies are expected to reaffirm their commitment to African-led peacebuilding, implementation of the AU’s PCRD agenda and support for regional, sub-regional and voluntary nationally owned prevention strategies. The meeting is also likely to underscore national ownership and leadership, as well as the meaningful participation of affected communities, including women and youth, and emphasise stronger cooperation with RECs/RMs in addressing transboundary drivers of conflict. It may further call on international partners, including the UN system and international and regional financial institutions, to align financing with nationally identified peacebuilding priorities and sustain support during political and security transitions. The two bodies may agree on priority country or regional contexts for joint engagement, including the possibility of a joint AU PSC–PBC field visit subject to national consent, and arrangements for regular information-sharing and systematic follow-up with defined responsibilities and timelines.

Tomorrow (17 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) are scheduled to hold their 8^th Annual Consultative Meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The consultative meeting will be co-chaired by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November 2025, and Ricklef Beutin, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the UN and Chairperson of the UNPBC. Following the welcoming remark of the co-chairpersons, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU), are expected to make statements. It is the second time that the consultative meeting is being held since the decision of the PSC and the PBC during the 6^th Informal Annual Consultative Meeting held in November 2023, to elevate the annual informal consultation into a formal consultative meeting.

Convened during the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Awareness Raising Week, taking place from 17 to 21 November, tomorrow’s session is expected to build on the 7^th consultative session. It is to be recalled that, the Joint Statement adopted during the last joint consultations, the 7^th Annual Consultative Meeting, emphasised the role of the PBC in convening stakeholders and garnering international support, as well as the role of the AU in implementing and advancing PCRD policy, noting that ‘strengthened cooperation between the AUC-PCRD in Cairo and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (PBSO/DPPA), is essential for implementing the AU-UN MoU on Peacebuilding.’ The Pact for the Future, adopted at the Summit of the Future on 22 September 2024, inculcates renewed political momentum by reaffirming commitment to advancing peacebuilding efforts. The session also comes in the context of the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR), which offers a timely opportunity to both sharpen focus on operational effectiveness and measurable impact and to enhance close coordination between the AU and the UN in developing and implementing peacebuilding interventions in Africa.

Against the foregoing background, the first agenda item of the 8^th annual consultative meeting is the ‘Review of Collaborative Peacebuilding Efforts and Priorities.’ It is envisaged that the PSC and PSC Chair will take the lead in making a statement on this agenda item. This segment is expected to highlight the collaborative peacebuilding efforts of the AU and the PBC, as well as key achievements in peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Africa. It will pay particular attention to conflict prevention, sustainable financing and integration of peacebuilding with development priorities, particularly amid the ongoing 2025 PBAR. The PBAR is especially significant when viewed alongside the latest guiding multilateral frameworks, including the newly revised AUPCRD policy, the New Agenda for Peace and the Pact for the Future, which collectively call for more coherent and effective global governance approaches to conflict management. During the High-Level Dialogue on ‘Cultivating Consensus Towards a Common African Position on the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review,’ the AU engaged in developing a set of recommendations for consideration in the development of the Common African Position (CAP) on the 2025 PBAR, ensuring Africa’s ownership and leadership in advancing the peacebuilding agenda. This was informed by regional consultations, including the ACCORD-DIRCO-UNPBSO forum of October 2024, in which discussions centred on establishing stronger links between the UN PBSO and regional and national mechanisms to enhance peacebuilding efforts.

The CAP developed and adopted by the PSC in 2020, as Africa’s contribution to the first Review of the UNPBA, identified twelve core peacebuilding priorities that continue to hold relevance today. These include managing transitions which assumed particular significance during the past few years; strengthening inclusive, resilient and responsive governance institutions; advancing transitional justice; preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism; and ensuring sustainable financing for peacebuilding, among others. However, national peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts are increasingly challenged by various, at times intersecting political transitions being pursued in a context mired by terrorism and violent extremism, rising debt distress and cost of living, institutional fragility, breakdown of state-society relations, contested legitimacy of governments,  pandemics, rising geopolitical fragmentation and tension and the escalating impacts of climate change. As a result, support to African countries emerging from conflict or navigating complex transitions must be planned and developed to address these interconnected pressures within and as part of a political settlement rather than just as a technical process. It is therefore essential that the current review of the UNPBA reflects and integrates these priority concerns into its deliberations.

The second agenda item focuses on Youth – linkages between development and Peacebuilding. Under this agenda item, it is envisaged that the PSC and the African Union Youth Ambassador for Peace (AYAP) will make the presentation. It is expected that the PBC will also give an update on youth engagement in the Peacebuilding Architecture. In the previous Annual Joint Consultations between the two bodies, both bodies underscored ‘the importance of the Youth Peace and Security Agenda and to leverage the AU’s Youth Decade Plan of Action and the PBC’s Strategic Action Plan on Youth and Peacebuilding to promote the inclusion of youth in peacebuilding efforts, including by building their capacities, skills and livelihoods to actively contribute to sustaining peace and development.’ This focus on youth comes at a time when Generation Z (GenZ) protests have become recurrent, highlighting the growing disenchantment of the majority youthful population on the continent with the state of governance and economic opportunities.  As highlighted in our analysis of the PSC’s 1310^th session on YPS and migration held early in the month, increasing youth migration and the entanglement of migration with various threats to peace and security is another manifestation of the discontent with the pervasive development and governance deficits in various parts of the continent. These clearly indicate the need for systematic peacebuilding interventions that address the twin challenges of development and governance deficits stunting opportunities for youth.

The PBC’s presentation is expected to highlight its involvement in initiatives such as the Africa Regional Consultation for the Second Independent Progress Study on YPS, mandated by Action 20 of the Pact for the Future. This forum provided a platform to highlight new narratives and contributions that young people are making in peace processes. Moreso, the Peacebuilding Support Office, together with partners, commissioned the 2025 Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Thematic Review on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS), which highlights best practices and lessons from 41 PBF-funded projects across 33 countries (2018 – 2022). The review outlines how these initiatives expanded opportunities for youth participation in decision-making by supporting youth councils, strengthening stakeholder dialogue and fostering youth networks and YPS linkages, which also contributed to the development of National Action Plans and other national strategies on YPS.

The third and last agenda item of the 8^th consultative meeting is a discussion on ‘Peacebuilding Initiatives in South Sudan, Sahel countries and the Lake Chad Basin.’ The fragile political and security situation in those areas has compelled the AU to intensify its efforts to respond effectively. Since early 2025, the PSC has intensified its engagement on the situation in South Sudan in response to escalating political and security instability. Since clashes erupted in March between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and armed groups linked to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), a recent Amani Africa briefing to the UNSC on the situation in South Sudan highlighted that the fragile peace established under the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) is in grave peril and the country is on the cusp of relapsing back to full-scale war. For pursuing meaningful peacebuilding, the briefing emphasized that the downward spiral to full-scale conflict should be arrested through robust and prompt preventive diplomacy; measures that restore commitment of the parties to the 2018 peace agreement such as dialogue should be urgently implemented; and support to the work of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), particularly in enhancing protection of civilians and advancing sub-national peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts should be sustained.

The situation in the Sahel countries epitomises the challenges to peacebuilding efforts in political transition taking place in a context of violent extremism and conflict involving terrorist groups and a geopolitical context of absence of trust and broken regional and international relationships. As highlighted in the edition of Insight on the PSC for the informal consultation with countries in transition held on 13 November, pursuing the transition process for restoration of constitutional order (and by extension peacebuilding activities) cannot be separated from and need to be part of a wider stabilization and state authority expansion strategy backed by a security mechanism they develop and deploy together with the Sahel countries to address the existential threat facing these countries.

Finally, in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), despite the sustained efforts being deployed by the LCB Commission and the MNJTF, Boko Haram remains an existential threat to peace and security in the area and the wider region. The gravity of this threat has not diminished, and the MNJTF has not been able to break this status quo. At the same time, the emergence of developments weakening the MNJTF and persisting vulnerabilities due to climate, security and governance fragilities are fast bringing the MNJTF to a turning point. Yet, given the important contribution of the stabilisation strategy for the region, the challenge is how to scale up peacebuilding interventions and expand the nature and focus of such interventions in the region.

The expected outcome is a joint statement. The two bodies are expected to encourage Member States to integrate peacebuilding and social cohesion into their National Development Strategies, emphasising strong national ownership and leadership, as well as the inclusive participation of all segments of society, particularly women and youth. The meeting is also likely to reiterate the urge for international partners, including in the UN System, as well as international and regional financial institutions, to align and coordinate their peacebuilding-related efforts in Africa, with nationally led peacebuilding, regionally and continentally supported efforts, with particular emphasis on addressing the twin challenges of development and governance deficits triggering youth protests and migration. The two bodies are also likely to stress the importance of effective partnership and cooperation, including with the regional and sub-regional organisations, to improve coordination and cooperation in peacebuilding, and increase synergies to ensure the coherence and complementarity of such efforts. The AUPSC and UNPBC are also expected to highlight the importance of political commitment on the part of national political actors and authorities and the need for pursuing peacebuilding as part of a political settlement that has solid support from various sectors of society and all political and social forces, including the youth and women.

Tomorrow (29 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1299th session to receive a briefing from the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3).

The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025, followed by a statement from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The representatives of the A3 members—Algeria, Sierra Leone, and Somalia—are then expected to brief the PSC on their activities.

This engagement is in line with the first conclusion of the High-Level Seminar (HLS) on peace and security in Africa, held in December 2013 in Algiers, where participants agreed that the A3 would brief the PSC quarterly on African issues on the agenda of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3, adopted during the PSC’s 1289th session on 24 July 2025, also stipulates that A3 coordinators shall provide regular briefings and quarterly reports to the PSC. This mechanism is designed to ensure accountability of the A3 to the AU and amplify Africa’s common voice within the UNSC. Although this commitment was made more than a decade ago, the quarterly briefings have not been carried out as regularly as envisaged. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to help revive this practice and give it greater institutional weight.

The A3 are expected to brief the PSC on activities undertaken within the UNSC over the past quarter. In particular, they will highlight efforts of the A3+ (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) in coordinating joint statements, engaging in collective negotiations, and increasingly assuming roles as penholder or co-penholder on African files. These activities are aimed at ensuring that Africa’s perspectives are integrated into UNSC decision-making and outcomes. One example likely to be cited is the joint statement delivered by the A3+ on 22 August during the UNSC’s meeting on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In that statement, the A3+ called for impartial investigations into atrocities committed by armed groups, demanded accountability for perpetrators, underscored the leading role of the AU and sub-regional mechanisms under Togo’s President Faure Gnassingbé, and urged the establishment of a credible verification mechanism to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement.

The A3 are also expected to reflect on their role in negotiating UNSC outcome documents. Recent examples include negotiations on a draft resolution and statement concerning the situation in the DRC, as well as renewal of the sanctions regime in July and August. Earlier this month, the A3+ worked alongside the United Kingdom—penholder on the Sudan file—to draft a press statement following the RSF-led Tasis alliance’s declaration of a parallel governing authority. These instances underscore the growing contribution of the A3+ in shaping UNSC outcomes on African files.

Another positive development likely to be highlighted is the adoption of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3. Adopted on 24 July 2025, this milestone consolidated practices and commitments developed over years of PSC sessions and HLS conclusions. The request for a manual was first raised at the 8th HLS in December 2021, when participants urged the AU Commission to prepare guidelines for A3 engagement and PSC–A3 cooperation, drawing on previous experiences. The draft was subsequently refined through successive HLS discussions before its final adoption last month.

While the adoption of the manual is a step forward, the main challenge lies in ensuring its implementation. As highlighted in our special research report ‘Making Africa’s Voice Matter in the UN Security Council: Bridging the Gap between Ambition and Reality in the Role of the African Three Members of the UNSC’, A3–PSC coordination over the past decade has often been irregular and ad hoc. The manual provides an opportunity to shift from fragmented practice to more consistent engagement, but this will only be achieved if agreed commitments are translated into action.

For example, modalities such as inviting the A3 to participate in PSC meetings on agenda items also under discussion at the UNSC, holding quarterly video teleconferences (VTCs) between the PSC Troika (outgoing, current, and incoming chairpersons) and the A3, and aligning the PSC’s monthly programme of work with the UNSC on African files have not been implemented regularly. Moreover, the PSC’s annual report to the AU Assembly has not systematically reflected A3 activities, instead annexing HLS conclusions without substantive assessment. The manual seeks to address this by requiring the A3 Secretariat, the AU Permanent Observer Mission to the UN in New York, to submit an annual report to the PSC Secretariat by the end of October each year. This year presents an opportunity to begin incorporating A3 activities into the PSC’s annual report, a task that will be considerably easier if quarterly engagements between the PSC and the A3 are regularised.

The A3 briefing may also highlight efforts to institutionalise and strengthen strategic engagements between the African and Caribbean members of the UNSC, with the aim of amplifying the voice of both regions in advancing their interests at the Council. In this context, the briefing may spotlight the annual A3 Plus retreat, held in Georgetown, Guyana, in February 2025, which provided an important platform for strengthening modalities of internal coordination.

Another activity likely to be highlighted in the briefing is the Arria-formula meeting convened by Sierra Leone on ‘The Global Race for Critical Minerals: Addressing Resource-Driven Insecurity in Africa,’ with Guyana and the incoming UNSC non-permanent members (the DRC and Liberia) as co-sponsors in July. This was an important engagement, providing a forum to deliberate on the ongoing global race for critical minerals in Africa and its implications for the continent’s peace and security.

The A3 are further expected to update the PSC on preparations for two major upcoming engagements: the Oran Process, scheduled for later this year, and the annual PSC–UNSC joint consultative meeting, expected in October in Addis Ababa. The Oran Process will include, for the first time, participation of the DRC and Liberia, both of which were elected in June to serve as non-permanent members of the UNSC for two-year terms starting in January 2026. Early involvement of these incoming members will help build continuity and strengthen institutional memory within the A3.

No outcome document, in the form of a communiqué or press statement, is expected from tomorrow’s briefing. However, the PSC may commend the A3 for their efforts in enhancing internal cohesion and promoting Africa’s common voice within the UNSC. It may also welcome the adoption of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3 at its 1289th session and emphasise the importance of translating agreed modalities and commitments into practice, including the regularisation of quarterly briefings to the PSC by the A3. As highlighted in the manual, the PSC may further request the A3 to submit its report by October so that it can be included in the PSC’s annual report to be presented at the upcoming AU Summit.

Tomorrow (15 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) are scheduled to hold their 7^th annual consultative meeting. This will be the first meeting to take place following the decision during the 6^th informal consultative meeting held on 13 November 2023 to institutionalise the annual consultations and elevate it into a formal meeting.

The consultative meeting will be co-chaired by Mohamed Omar Gad, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for October 2024, Sérgio França Danese, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN and Chairperson of the UN PBC. It is expected that the consultative meeting will commence with opening remarks from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and Elizabeth Spehar, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support.

The first agenda item of the 7^th annual consultative meeting involves a review of the status of implementation of the joint statement of the 6^th informal consultative meeting. It is to be recalled that the joint statement called for ensuring adequate, predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding, noting that the amount of voluntary contributions has not been sufficient to meet increasing demands for the support of the Peacebuilding Fund. In this respect, one critical development that the 7^th consultative meeting is expected to welcome is the decision of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to establish the Peacebuilding Account, a dedicated multi-year special account, as a modality for financing the Peacebuilding Fund. UNGA Resolution 78/257 on Investing in Prevention and Peacebuilding further decided for the first time ‘to approve $50 million of assessed contributions per annum, under grants and contributions, to fund the Peacebuilding Account, starting 1 January 2025.’ Beyond welcoming this decision, it is expected that the PSC and the PBS will call for enhancing the funding base for peacebuilding including through partnerships with international financial institutions.

In light of this major development in expanding the role of peacebuilding, the other element of the joint statement from the 6^th informal consultative meeting that is expected to receive attention is the support for priorities identified and communicated by the PSC. It would be of interest for this year’s informal consultation to consider and agree on processes for identifying priorities and the modalities for coordination in the identification of such priorities to benefit from the Peacebuilding Fund.

The second agenda item focuses on achievements and challenges of peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Africa. It is envisaged that Egypt, supported by Equatorial Guinea, will take the lead in making a statement on this agenda item. The development of National Action Plans on Youth and Women, Peace and Security, implementation of national truth and reconciliation processes of the ones in the Gambia and the Central African Republic and security sector and other reform processes in Lesotho can be mentioned as good examples in this respect. Challenges to peacebuilding are many and they include, among others, an increase in conflicts, most notably those involving terrorist groups such as in the Sahel and West Africa; collapse of transitions and peace processes leading to relapse to conflicts such as in Sudan; geopolitical tensions undermining multilateral cooperation critical to successful peacebuilding; and lack of inclusive political consensus and settlement that anchors effective peacebuilding processes.

The third agenda item of the 7^th consultative meeting is transitions from Peace Support Operations to Peacebuilding in Africa. It is envisaged that Uganda, supported by Morocco, will make a statement on the subject. This agenda seeks to speak to recent experiences on the continent involving the untimely ending or departure of peacekeeping operations or their ongoing drawdown. It is to be recalled that the UN mission to Mali (MINUSMA) departed Mali at the end of 2023 following a disagreement with the transitional government in Mali. Similarly, the UNITAMS, the UN Mission that replaced UNAMID, was terminated in December 2023. Another UN mission, MONUSCO in the DRC is in the process of a drawdown. One can similarly mention the end of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). In all of these cases, concerns about the emergence of a security and peacebuilding vacuum have been raised. Proper contextualisation of these trends is critical to draw the right lessons from them. First, they manifest the mismatch between what national authorities and host communities expect of these missions and what these missions are designed and able to deliver. Second and related to the first, they reflect an emerging trend in which national authorities seek to bend the operation of these missions towards their preferred political and security choices, focusing on regime interest and survival. Third, they also manifest the poor state of support on the part of the mandating authority, the UN Security Council, to these missions. Finally, the unplanned departure of these missions also shows a lack of adequate coordination not only between national and international actors but also between the AU and the UN in facilitating the effective functioning of these missions.

These issues underscore the need for addressing the demand and supply side crises relating to peace support operations at the host state and UN levels as well as the challenge of close coordination between the AU and UN. While addressing the challenges facing peace support operations, particularly UN peacekeeping in Africa which requires dealing with the foregoing issues, consideration should be given to how peacebuilding can help fill in some of the gaps that are left by the departure of these missions. Additionally, to mitigate the impact of the untimely withdrawal of peacekeeping operations, the PSC and the PBC may underscore the importance of integrating peacebuilding into the mandate of peace support operations from the outset.