Tomorrow (23 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a session to receive an update on the situation in South Sudan.

Following opening remarks from Jean Leon Ngandu Ilunga, the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the AU and chairperson of the PSC for the month of November, Bankole Adeoye, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, is expected to make a statement. South Sudan, as a country concerned, is also expected to make a statement. Others expected to make statement include the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as the concerned regional economic community/Mechanism (REC/M), South Africa (as Chairperson of the AU Ad Hoc High-Level Committee on South Sudan (C5), Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC); and the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

The political, security, and humanitarian situation in the country appears to have deteriorated further since the Council last discussed South Sudan on 28 October 2025. Political tension is mounting. Fighting and insecurity are spreading.

It is to be recalled that in its communiqué adopted at the last session of its 1308th meeting held on 28 October, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) underscored the need to avoid any actions that could jeopardise the full implementation of R-ARCSS, which it described as the only viable pathway towards a consensual and sustainable solution to the country’s challenges.

However, R-ARCSS is now on the verge of collapse. The Revitalised Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), the body monitoring the R-ARCSS, observed in its report released in October that there is ‘systematic violation of the responsibility-sharing arrangements across all crucial bodies, including functionality of the executive and legislature.’ Progress on other provisions critical to South Sudan’s transition from conflict to peace, including those required for the holding of elections, remains stalled. In its report to the Reconstituted Transitional National Legislative Assembly in December 2025, RJMEC expressed ‘serious concerns that if urgent steps are not taken to expedite progress, then holding elections as scheduled in December 2026 may be extremely difficult.’

The SPLM-IO under Machar’s leadership has declared the R-ARCSS defunct following Machar’s arrest, while another faction continues to cooperate with the government. Following the detention of Riek Machar in March, the first vice president and signatory of the R-ARCSS as the leader of the SPLM-IO, the party has experienced internal divisions, with some of the members of the party coopted into and collaborating with the government.

Meanwhile, Machar and seven of his allies are standing trial before a Special Court in Juba. During its most recent session on 12 January, the court barred the public and the media from attending the proceedings, citing the need to protect prosecution witnesses. Machar and his allies have been charged with murder, treason, and crimes against humanity. Machar has rejected the charges and claimed immunity as a sitting vice president. His defence team has also challenged the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that such crimes fall within the mandate of an AU hybrid court, as stipulated under the R-ARCSS. Nevertheless, the Special Court dismissed these objections, including challenges to the constitutionality of the proceedings. It is to be recalled that the AUPSC called for the immediate and unconditional release of Machar and his wife, but the South Sudanese government rejected the appeal.

The SPLM has also experienced internal fragmentation, with veteran politician Nhial Deng Nhial suspending his membership in the party and launching a new political movement, the South Sudan Salvation Movement, which operates under the opposition United People’s Alliance led by Pagan Amum. In a surprise move in November, President Salva Kiir dismissed one of his vice presidents and the SPLM’s First Deputy Chairperson, Benjamin Bol Mel, who had been widely regarded as being prepared to be a possible successor. Although Bol Mel was promoted to the rank of general within the National Security Service’s Internal Bureau, he was subsequently stripped of his military rank and dismissed from the national security service. Kiir then reinstated James Wani Igga as vice president; Igga had been replaced by Bol Mel earlier in 2025.

President Kiir has also frequently reshuffled the cabinet through presidential decrees amid the unfolding political crisis. These reshuffles have been criticised for violating the 2018 R-ARCSS, as the President appoints and dismisses officials without consulting the other signatories, thereby undermining the power-sharing arrangements stipulated in the agreement.

In a step that is feared to cause further erosion of the collapsing R-ARCSS and in another surprise move in December, the government announced a series of amendments to the R-ARCSS following a meeting convened by President Kiir to discuss the final phase of the transition and preparations for general elections scheduled for December 2026. According to the government, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), a faction of the SPLM-IO not aligned with Machar, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), the Former Detainees (FD), and Other Political Parties (OPP) attended the meeting.

The amendments agreed at the December meeting reportedly removed provisions linking the holding of general elections to the completion of a permanent constitution, a process that has dragged on for the past eight years. In the absence of a permanent constitution, general elections would be conducted under the Transitional Constitution adopted in 2011. The amendments also stipulate that a national population and housing census—deemed necessary for elections under the R-ARCSS—would be conducted after the elections.

The government indicated that the amendments would undergo a review process before being ratified by the national legislature. However, the SPLM-IO reportedly characterised the move as illegal, arguing that it excluded other signatories to the peace agreement and rejected the amendments in their entirety. Civil society representatives also expressed concern over the unexpected decision, calling for respect for the R-ARCSS and greater inclusion of civil society in the process.

The political crisis has contributed to a significant deterioration in South Sudan’s security situation. Reports indicate intensified fighting in various parts of the country between government and opposition forces. As political tension and fighting escalate, recent weeks have witnessed intensified hostilities in Jonglei State involving ‘repeated aerial bombardments by the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), clashes with SPLM/A-IO and the reported mobilisation of armed civilian militias’, noted the UN Commission on Human Rights in its press release of 18 January 2026. This escalating fighting is compounded by local and intercommunal violence.

The spreading and intensifying violence is precipitating significant civilian casualties and destruction of critical infrastructure, including health facilities, schools, and public buildings, as well as severe limitations of humanitarian access.

These developments are aggravating an already dire humanitarian situation. According to OCHA, two-thirds of the population will require humanitarian assistance in 2026. It is reported that more than 100,000 people, predominantly women, girls, older persons and persons with disabilities, have been forcibly displaced across the state since late December 2025. The alarming humanitarian and civilian protection situation is compounded by worsening economic conditions, corruption and disease outbreaks. The ongoing conflict in neighbouring Sudan has further strained South Sudan’s already dire humanitarian situation.

As Amani Africa indicated in its briefing to the UN Security Council in November, South Sudanese civilians are the ones bearing the brunt of the deteriorating political and security situation in the country, underscoring a heightening need for reinforcing measures for the protection of civilians and humanitarian support.

At a time when the Horn of Africa is facing multiple challenges, the heightening risk of South Sudan’s relapse back to full-scale war has become a major concern, thus requiring a more robust conflict prevention effort from all quarters, not least of all the AU. In a joint statement issued on 18 December, the Troika (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway) expressed alarm over the widespread conflict across the country, describing it as a major setback. The Troika urged South Sudanese leaders to reverse course, halt armed attacks, immediately return to the nationwide ceasefire, and engage in sustained, leader-level dialogue. These calls were reinforced by a subsequent joint statement supported by the embassies of Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Sudan, Uganda, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European Union delegation in Juba, which stressed the need for inclusive dialogue to address the country’s political and security crisis.

It is to be recalled that the AUPSC encouraged the continued engagement of the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) in supporting the constitution-making process and preparations for the December 2026 elections. A C5 delegation comprising representatives from South Africa, Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, and Rwanda visited Juba on 14 January. It held high-level meetings with South Sudanese authorities to discuss the political situation, implementation of the R-ARCSS, and preparations for general elections, among other issues. The AUPSC is expected to receive an update on the outcome of the visit.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express grave concern over the deteriorating political and security situation, the systematic violations of the R-ARCSS and the rising danger of the country’s relapse to full-scale civil war. It may condemn and call for an unconditional end to the indiscriminate use of violence and violence against civilians. The PSC may also reaffirm that the R-ARCSS remains the most viable framework for sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan and may urge both parties to recommit to the permanent ceasefire and transitional roadmap. It could also call for the release of all political detainees and restoration of political dialogue. As a critical step towards restoration of stability and implementation of R-ARCSS, it may call for an independent investigation of incidents of violations of the revitalised peace agreement, including the March 2025 incident in Nasir, through a mechanism that is put in place by the UN-AU-IGAD. It could also call for full reactivation of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) to ensure compliance with the ceasefire. To ensure high-level and sustained engagement for preventing South Sudan’s relapse back to full scale civil war, the PSC may reiterate its request for the AU Commission to maintain sustained engagement, including possibly appointing a High-Level Envoy to work jointly with IGAD, the C5, and the Trilateral Mechanism to facilitate direct dialogue between President Kiir and the SPLM-IO leader and signatory to the R-ARCSS Machar.

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For additional reference, check the briefing Amani Africa delivered to the UN Security Council from the link here https://amaniafrica-et.org/amani-africa-tells-the-unsc-to-deploy-preventive-measures-with-urgency-and-decisiveness-to-pull-south-sudan-from-the-brink/

The press statement by the UN Commission for Human Rights in South Sudan, dated 18 January 2026, can also be found at the following link:

https://x.com/uninvhrc/status/2012798544801906798.

Tomorrow (28 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1308^th session to receive an update on the situation in South Sudan.

The meeting will be chaired by Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) will make the introductory remarks. Statements are then expected to be delivered by representatives from South Sudan; South Africa (as Chairperson of the AU Ad Hoc High-Level Committee on South Sudan (C5); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC); and the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The most recent engagement of the PSC on South Sudan took place during its 1302^nd session, held on 19 September 2025. However, the session did not introduce any substantively new or different measures compared to the Council’s previous communiques on South Sudan. During that session, the Council issued a press release urging the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) to redouble its efforts toward the full implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The PSC also called for the organisation of a genuine, “all-inclusive South Sudanese national political dialogue leading to a national reconciliation process that would culminate in the successful conduct of democratic elections in December 2026”.

Since early 2025, the PSC’s engagements on South Sudan (1297^th, 1283^rd, 1270^th, and 1265^th Sessions) have unfolded amid escalating political and security instability. Since clashes erupted in March between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and armed groups linked to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), the fragile peace established under the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) has been severely undermined. This incident triggered the most serious crisis since the signing of the 2018 peace agreement, with hostilities spreading across Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity States, Central Equatoria, and Western Equatoria, causing extensive civilian displacement and loss of life.

The political and security situation in South Sudan has sharply deteriorated following the detention of senior officials, mainly First Vice President Riek Machar; the emergence of splinter factions; the deployment of Ugandan troops; and intensified military operations by the SSPDF against SPLM/A-IO and allied groups. Machar’s arrest effectively paralysed the RTGoNU, which the PSC previously described as a ‘blatant violation of the R-ARCSS.’ The crisis further escalated when Machar and eight other senior members of the SPLM/A-IO were charged on 11 September with murder, treason, crimes against humanity, and other serious offences linked to a White Army attack in Nasir County. Subsequently, Machar was temporarily suspended from the vice presidency pending his trial. Since Machar was placed under house arrest, multiple envoys seeking to meet Machar, including former Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga in March and a delegation from the AU in April, have reportedly been denied access. As such, it is expected that during tomorrow’s session, the PSC is expected to receive an update on detention and legal processes concerning Riek Machar and other SPLM-IO detainees.

Beyond Machar’s detention, a series of political manoeuvres by President Kiir has further consolidated executive power while weakening coalition inclusivity. Since March, Kiir has undertaken extensive reshuffles by presidential decree, replacing senior officials, including the Chief of Defence Forces, the Chief Justice, the Central Bank Governor, and several state governors, moves the SPLM/A-IO has condemned as unilateral. The appointment of his daughter, Adut Salva Kiir, to a senior position has fueled perceptions of growing nepotism and entrenched patronage within the government, raising concerns about governance legitimacy and the monopolisation of state institutions by loyalist networks. Furthermore, President Kiir’s reconstitution of the high-level ad hoc committee overseeing the implementation of the R-ARCSS, which excluded former SPLM/A-IO representatives and instead incorporated members aligned with the Par Kuol splinter faction, has raised significant concern. The committee is mandated to oversee the implementation of all aspects of the R-ARCSS, except for provisions related to the permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements. Observers note that this move appears to signal an attempt to reshape the peace architecture in favour of the SPLM’s political dominance.

These political manoeuvres by President Kiir have significantly heightened tensions, triggering intense clashes between government forces and opposition groups, particularly in Upper Nile, Jonglei, Central Equatoria, and Western Equatoria, and resulting in substantial casualties and widespread displacement. The humanitarian situation has consequently worsened, with the UN (OCHA) reporting that, in addition to the existing two million internally displaced persons, more than 497,000 people were newly displaced between January and September 2025, approximately 321,000 due to conflict and 175,000 due to flooding. In response, the UN Human Rights Commission has urged the African Union and the UN Security Council to take decisive action to prevent further escalation. UNMISS, on the other hand, has reported increasing restrictions on humanitarian access and attacks on aid workers, warning of a potential collapse of life-saving services in the most affected regions. Exacerbating these challenges, according to OHCHR, systemic corruption among South Sudanese leaders continues to undermine governance and humanitarian interventions, deepening the crisis. It is therefore expected that the PSC’s deliberations will focus on the severe humanitarian repercussions resulting from the escalating political and security crisis.

Another key issue expected in tomorrow’s session, in view of the foregoing conditions, is the implementation of the R-ARCSS amid worsening humanitarian and governance conditions. In previous sessions, the PSC has also emphasised that the R-ARCSS remains the only viable framework for lasting peace, calling for investigations into violations of the R-ARCSS and warning that peace spoilers will be held accountable. The Revitalised Joint Monitoring Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), body monitoring the R-ARCSS, reported during the reporting period that the country faces a serious and growing risk of the unravelling of the 2018 peace agreement and relapse back to full-blown war. In the report it released this month, the Commission urged the RTGoNU to ‘urgently resolve the current political and security impasse and return to full and inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS.’ Given the clear warning on the fast-growing risk of the deteriorating situation plunging the country back to large-scale national civil war, the PSC is expected to receive updates on the imminency of the risk and the ways and means and opportunities for reversing this risk.

On 11–12 August, the PSC conducted a field visit to South Sudan to assess the deteriorating political and security situation, review progress on the R-ARCSS, and discuss preparations for the 2026 elections. On 7 October, the RJMEC held an extraordinary meeting in Juba, warning that rising tensions and stalled implementation had increased the risk of a relapse into conflict unless urgent corrective action is taken. On 12 September, the UN Security Council(UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 2791 (2025), extending the Sudan sanctions regime, including targeted sanctions and the arms embargo, along with the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 October 2026, to align both timelines. Subsequently, on 13 October, the AU Commission Chairperson appointed Abdiwelli Ali as the AU Special Representative and Head of Mission to South Sudan, while important it does not dispense with the PSC’s earlier June call for the AU Chairperson’s sustained engagement with President Salva Kiir and regional leaders, fostering inclusive dialogue, facilitating the release of political detainees, and promoting full implementation of the R-ARCSS.

In tomorrow’s session, the PSC is also expected to follow up on its previous decisions aimed at advancing the implementation of key transitional provisions of the R-ARCSS. Specifically, the Council will likely assess progress on its earlier encouragement to the Trilateral Mechanism (AU, IGAD, and UN) to work closely with the RTGoNU in reactivating the Government–Trilateral Joint Task Force (JTF) to expedite the implementation of pending provisions, including the constitution-making and electoral processes. Furthermore, the PSC is expected to review the extent of progress made in operationalising transitional justice mechanisms, following its reiterated call for the RTGoNU to collaborate with the AU Commission’s Office of the Legal Counsel (OLC) in finalising the guidelines for establishing the Hybrid Court of South Sudan and defining modalities for truth, reconciliation, compensation, and reparation processes.

The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC is expected to express concern on the deteriorating political and humanitarian conditions and condemn continued violations of the R-ARCSS. It may also condemn the violence against civilians and humanitarian workers and call for credible investigations and accountability mechanisms. The PSC may also express concern over the stalled implementation status of the R-ARCSS. In this regard, the Council is expected to call for the acceleration of transitional security arrangements, particularly the unification and deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces, as well as institutional preparations for the election. Furthermore, the Council may reiterate that the R-ARCSS remains the most viable framework for sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan and may urge both parties to recommit to the permanent ceasefire and transitional roadmap. The PSC could also call for the release of all political detainees, restoration of political dialogue, and full reactivation of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) to ensure compliance with the ceasefire. The PSC may echo RJMEC’s call on the RTGoNU to urgently resolve the current political and security impasse and return to full and inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS. In addition, the PSC may reiterate its request for the AU Commission to maintain sustained engagement, including possibly appointing a High-Level Envoy to work jointly with IGAD, the C5, and the Trilateral Mechanism to facilitate direct dialogue between Kiir and Machar.

Tomorrow (12 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1283^rd session to receive an update on the situation in South Sudan.

Following opening remarks by Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Joram Mukama Biswaro, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Juba; Ismail Wais, IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan and representatives from the AU Panel of the Wise and AU Ad-Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) are also expected to deliver briefings. The representative of South Sudan, as a country of concern, is also expected to make a statement.

The session follows the Council’s 1265^th and 1270^th sessions on South Sudan, held on 18 and 31 March respectively, in response to the sharp deterioration in South Sudan’s political and security landscape since renewed violence erupted on 4 March. The 4 March attack on the South Sudan People’s Defence Force (SSPDF) base in Nasir by the militia group known as the White Army that is reportedly loosely associated with First Vice President Riek Machar the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement- In Opposition (SPLM-IO), has triggered the most severe crisis facing the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) since its adoption in 2018. The situation has since devolved into military confrontations, high-level arrests, deployment of Ugandan troops and increased violence. These developments have gravely undermined the transitional process.

Tensions had been mounting even before the 4 March incident, largely due to the breakdown of relations in the presidency and a series of unilateral actions. These included replacing opposition officials with loyalists and reshuffling positions within his own faction, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Since February 2025, more than 20 senior SPLM/A-IO political and military officials have been arrested, while many others have gone into hiding or fled the country, further deepening the rift between Kiir and Machar. Governors in at least three states loyal to Machar have also been replaced.

The unstable political situation spiralled further down when the government arrested Machar on 26 March in Juba—a move his party denounced as marking the collapse of the 2018 peace agreement, which ended a devastating five-year civil war that claimed nearly 400,000 lives. The move was widely condemned, including by the PSC’s 1270^th session press statement, which called for Machar’s ‘immediate and unconditional release’ and urged the government to uphold his safety and health.

Apart from the constitutional crisis it has triggered for the Government of National Unity under the R-ARCSS, Machar’s detention also instigated a rapid unravelling of the SPLM-IO’s cohesion. Reports indicate that key party figures, including Deputy Chairperson Oyet Nathaniel, fled or went into hiding, while internal disputes escalated into factionalism. Internal rifts within the SPLM-IO erupted publicly in April 2025 when Deputy Chairman Oyet Nathaniel, who is also the first deputy speaker of parliament, suspended four senior members of the party, including Peacebuilding Minister Stephen Par Koul, for allegedly plotting to replace Machar. In response, a convening of a faction of SPLM-IO members in Juba on 9 April announced the establishment of a temporary leadership structure that will cease upon Machar’s release and named Koul as the interim chairperson of the party. Despite the PSC’s firm position calling for Machar’s immediate and unconditional release, Juba did not heed this call. Machar and other political and military leaders from the SPLM-IO remain in detention.

Further compounding the difficult political situation is the major changes in the leadership of the ruling SPLM that President Kiir chairs. In a move that is widely seen to be an orchestration of a succession plan, President Kiir took steps to elevate his former financial advisor, Benjamin Bol Mel, to very senior positions.  First, he appointed Bol Mel to the position of vice president of the country. Most recently, on 21 May, after dismissing James Wani Igga, a long-serving liberation struggle stalwart, Kiir appointed Bol Mel to be the first vice chairman of the ruling SPLM, a position that is viewed to be a launching pad to the presidency.

The security situation has also deteriorated markedly. Across Upper Nile and other hotspots, clashes between the SSPDF and SPLM-IO forces have intensified, resulting in widespread civilian displacement and the destruction of critical infrastructure, including the 3 May aerial bombing of a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital. The AUC Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, condemned the attack, which he described as ‘a flagrant breach of International Humanitarian Law’ and urged for an investigation. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan also warned the attacks ‘could amount to a war crime.’ The gravity of the situation in South Sudan is further underscored by recent UNHCR data indicating that over 165,000 have fled since the resurgence of violence in March, with over 100,000 people seeking refuge in neighbouring countries.

While Uganda’s military deployment in South Sudan is under a bilateral agreement for training and technical support and positions Uganda in shaping the political and security trajectory in South Sudan including as one of the guarantors of the R-ARCSS, there are concerns that Uganda’s presence tips the balance firmly in favor of President Kiir and away from SPLM-IO and may trigger militarised external interference on the side of SPLM-IO. The SPLM-IO also accuses Ugandan forces of participating in military operations, hence in a manner contrary to the R-ARCSS.

Given that the implementation of the R-ARCSS was already derailed, the current situation is feared to deal a mortal blow to the transitional process. In his briefing to the extraordinary summit of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan held on 12 March, the Executive Secretary of IGAD warned that ‘should tensions escalate, the risk of a return to widespread hostilities looms large, with repercussions that would echo resoundingly across the region.’ In his 16 April briefing to the UN Security Council, Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMISS described the conditions as ‘darkly reminiscent of the 2013 and 2016 conflicts, which took over 400,000 lives’ and warned of a trajectory that could shift from community-based violence to ‘a more complex picture involving signatory parties and foreign actors.’ He also flagged the intensifying use of hate speech and misinformation, which continue to fuel ethnic tension and violence.

In response to the growing crisis, regional and international actors have ramped up diplomatic efforts despite minimal breakthroughs. On 29 March, the AUC Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf and UNSG António Guterres discussed the evolving situation in South Sudan. They reaffirmed their support for the R-ARCSS as the best path to lasting peace in South Sudan and agreed to coordinate efforts between the AU, IGAD, and the UN.

The PSC’s 1265^th and 1270^th sessions had called for the AU Commission Chairperson to deploy a high-level delegation to engage the parties in South Sudan. Led by former Burundian President Domitien Ndayizeye, the AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, deployed the AU Panel of the Wise to Juba on 2 April. The delegation held meetings with various stakeholders, including President Kiir, but was reportedly denied access to Riek Machar. It is expected that tomorrow’s session will consider the Panel’s report of the visit.

The Panel’s visit was followed by a joint AU–IGAD high-level visit from 5–6 May, during which the AU Commission Chairperson and the IGAD Deputy Executive Secretary met with South Sudanese leaders to reaffirm support for the R-ARCSS and preserve its hard-won gains and reiterate support for the timely, credible, and transparent implementation of the transitional roadmap. Yet again, the Chairperson did not get access to Machar.

More recently, on 8 May, the Quartet – AUMISS, IGAD, UNMISS and RJMEC- issued a joint statement urging an immediate cessation of hostilities, the release of detainees, and the revitalisation of the R-ARCSS. The statement welcomed the recent joint visit by the AUC and IGAD to South Sudan and highlighted that the 2018 peace deal remains the only viable framework for resolving the crisis. The Quartet, also called the reinvigoration of the ‘visibly stalled peace implementation by addressing all grievances through an inclusive political dialogue’, with the release of the First Vice President and other SPLM/A-IO officials as the starting point.

From 3 – 4 June, IGAD convened a consultative meeting bringing together regional and international envoys, including representatives from the AU, UNMISS, and the C5, to address South Sudan’s peace process. The discussions aimed to identify viable solutions to de-escalate tensions and reinforce support for the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), emphasising the need for coordinated efforts to sustain stability and advance the country’s transitional roadmap. (A consolidated overview of key developments, policy positions and diplomatic engagements can be accessed via Amani Africa’s regularly updated Tracker of events and diplomatic efforts on the crisis in South Sudan)

Apart from following up on its proposed policy measures from previous sessions, tomorrow’s session is expected to help the PSC take stock of both the political and security developments on the one hand and the diplomatic efforts underway, including the steps taken by the AU. Building on the mission of the Panel of the Wise and the joint AU-IGAD visit, the statement of the Quartet may help structure PSC’s deliberations on additional steps to be taken to arrest the deteriorating situation and put the transitional process in South Sudan back on track. Undeniably, for any initiative of the PSC, the role of the region and most notably Uganda, with its presence on the ground and its role as Guarantor, is expected to be paramount.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may reiterate that the R-ARCSS remains the most viable and relevant Agreement for sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan. The PSC may call for immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities and restoration of strict adherence to the permanent ceasefire, with IGAD’s Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) reinforced to ensure compliance. Echoing the Quartet, the PSC may also call for the full and scaled-up return to and implementation of the R-ARCSS and the transitional process with the full and effective participation of the signatories of the R-ARCSS. To this end, the Council may reiterate its demand for the release of detained politicians, including First Vice President Riek Machar. The PSC may also call for the streamlining and coordination of diplomatic efforts. The PSC may request the AU Commission Chairperson to task a head of state of an AU member state to work with the guarantors of the R-ARCSS and the Committee of 5 to facilitate dialogue between the leaders of the main signatories of the 2018 agreement to restore mutual confidence and culminate in a joint public declaration affirming their commitment to peace.