Tomorrow (12 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will meet at ministerial level on the margins of the AU Summit to discuss the situation in Sudan, as agreed during its last meeting on the country in December.

The session commences with the opening address of Badr Abdelatty, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Chairperson of the PSC for February. This will be followed by the statement that the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, introducing his report on the situation. Representatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations are also expected to deliver a statement.  While Sudan, as a country concerned, will not participate in the session due to its suspension, there was a plan for an informal consultation by the PSC with the representative of Sudan before this session. Among the issues expected to feature are PSC’s support for the National Initiative for Peace proposal presented by the representative of Sudan to the UN Security Council in December 2025.

Since the last PSC session in December, the war has intensified across multiple fronts, with both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seeking to gain the upper hand by consolidating territorial control. The latest round of fighting has centred on the Kordofan region, though clashes continue elsewhere in the country. Last month, the SAF reportedly captured Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, and Dilling, the region’s second largest and strategically important town, both of which had been under siege by the RSF for nearly two years.

The RSF has recently intensified its attacks on El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, which remains under SAF control. It is also seeking to consolidate its hold over Darfur following its capture of El-Fasher in Northern Darfur in October, while the SAF is attempting to regain lost territory. Meanwhile, the security situation in Blue Nile State, bordering Ethiopia and South Sudan, has deteriorated as the RSF and its allied forces have increased their presence in an apparent effort to open a new front against the SAF, with the bordering region in Ethiopia reportedly being used for facilitating the movement of RSF and allied forces into the region.

The regional ramifications of the war have been a major concern since its outbreak three years ago. There have been reports of some neighbouring states implicated for allowing the use of their territories or supporting one of the sides. There have been reports of the use of Ethiopian territory in facilitating support to the RSF. In the aftermath of the seizure by the RSF of El Fasher and the resulting de facto division of Sudan, some countries, notably Egypt, expressed serious concern and objection to any threat to the territorial integrity of Sudan, deeming it a direct threat to their security. While it has allegedly provided logistical and technical support to the SAF, it has also reportedly conducted targeted air strikes against the RSF over the past six months.

External intervention has come to be a major driver of the conflict in Sudan, with the UAE in particular reported for its extensive supply of weapons to the RSF. With Mogadishu cancelling all its bilateral agreements with Abu Dhabi and countries denying the latter flight permits, the UAE appears to be facing growing challenges in sustaining its support for the RSF. There are growing fears that the widening rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has transformed the war in Sudan into an intense proxy competition, with Riyadh backing the SAF and Abu Dhabi continuing to support the RSF. Riyadh has reportedly mobilised several countries from the region and beyond in an effort to shift the military balance. This dynamic has become more evident on the battlefield in recent months, with the SAF gaining the upper hand in the ongoing fighting in the Kordofan region.

At its last meeting, the AUPSC strongly condemned the involvement of external actors in the conflict and tasked its Sub-Committee on Sanctions, in close coordination with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), with identifying those actors and recommending appropriate measures for consideration by the AUPSC. However, almost two years after the PSC adopted a similar decision, there has been no progress.

As fighting in Sudan has escalated, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated sharply. On 5 February, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)—a global, multi-partner initiative that informs urgent humanitarian response—confirmed that famine-level malnutrition is spreading in North Darfur after nearly three years of conflict, warning of catastrophic, life-threatening, and man-made starvation conditions. According to humanitarian actors, some 21 million people across Sudan require emergency assistance, making it the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. Over the past three years, the conflict has forcibly displaced an estimated 11.7 million people, including seven million internally displaced persons and 4.5 million refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries.

The appalling human rights situation in Sudan has been another major concern, with serious atrocities and crimes allegedly committed by the parties to the conflict. During his visit to Sudan in January, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk stated that ‘the war has plunged the country into an abyss of unfathomable proportions.’ He further noted that ‘the proliferation of advanced military equipment, in particular unmanned aerial vehicles—or drones—across Sudan has enhanced the military capabilities of both the RSF and the SAF to inflict vast damage, prolonging hostilities and deepening the crisis for civilians.’ At its last meeting, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) underscored the need to document atrocities being committed in Sudan and requested the AU Commission to regularly monitor and report on crimes across the country. It also commended the continued engagement of the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, Adama Dieng, with Sudanese authorities and national human rights entities in this regard. Despite the finalization of an investigation report undertaken by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights carried out upon the request of the PSC, there has been no reference to and consideration of this report which presented widespread and grave violations of human and peoples’ rights, indicating that the scale and nature warrants the invocation of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.

As Security Council President in February, the UK intends to focus on Sudan. The UK Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, who visited Addis Ababa earlier this month to consult with regional countries and the AU on steps to halt the fighting and alleviate the suffering of the Sudanese people, will chair a Council meeting on Sudan on 19 February. In April, Germany and the UK are also expected to convene an international conference on Sudan in Berlin.

The humanitarian crisis was also the focus of a meeting convened by the United States on 5 February, aimed at mobilising $1.5 billion to respond to Sudan’s urgent humanitarian needs. At the meeting, the US reportedly indicated that it has been working with other members of the Quad on a Sudan peace plan. The Quad—comprising the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—has been advancing a roadmap first outlined in September last year, which called for an initial three-month humanitarian truce to enable the rapid delivery of aid across Sudan, followed immediately by a permanent ceasefire. At the time, the SAF rejected the initiative, citing concerns over the UAE’s involvement, while the RSF—widely condemned by the international community for committing mass atrocities and war crimes—welcomed it in what was widely seen as a tactical move to rehabilitate its image.

The peace plan, which is expected to be announced soon, reportedly includes measures to address the humanitarian crisis; protect civilians and coordinate their safe return; transition to a permanent ceasefire; launch a political process toward a civilian-led government; and support reconstruction. At its last meeting, the AUPSC welcomed the establishment of the Quintet—comprising the AU, UN, EU, and the League of Arab States—under AU leadership to enhance coordination of mediation efforts aimed at convening an inclusive inter-Sudanese political dialogue. It also reiterated its call for the Quintet and the Quad to work closely together to avoid duplication and ensure a coherent approach to achieving a negotiated and lasting solution to the conflict in Sudan. At tomorrow’s meeting, Egypt, which presides over the AUPSC in February, may highlight the consultative meeting it convened in Cairo last month. The meeting brought together several bilateral and multilateral partners.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reiterate its grave concern over the escalating fighting in Sudan. It may condemn the atrocities being committed in the course of the escalating violence, including those perpetrated particularly by the RSF since the PSC’s last meeting. Welcoming the Fact-Finding report of the ACHPR and noting the mission undertaken by the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities, the PSC may reaffirm the need for continuous documentation of the atrocities and violations being perpetrated in the course of the War in Sudan. including the AU, IGAD, the UN, and the EU, to discuss the situation in Sudan. The PSC may welcome the role of the Quintet and the AU’s leadership role in that context, particularly in advancing the convening of the political dialogue. The PSC may also take a decision to undertake a field mission to Sudan.

Tomorrow (16 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will receive a briefing on the situation in Sudan.

The session is expected to begin with opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for December, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Adama Dieng, the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities, may also brief the PSC. Representatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations (UN) are also expected to deliver statements.

In October 2025, following the fall of El Fasher, the PSC held an emergency session on the situation in Sudan, particularly on the atrocities that ensued following the city’s fall. As noted in our Monthly Digest, although the atrocities reportedly committed by the RSF during and after the fall of El Fasher are of a scale and nature that could trigger Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act—which confers upon the AU the power to intervene in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances—the emergency session missed an opportunity for the PSC to take bold decisions, including the invocation of Article 4(h). Instead, the PSC largely confined itself to reiterating decisions adopted more than a year ago.

From the communiqué it adopted after the session, the PSC tasked the AU Commission ‘to regularly monitor and report such heinous crimes committed throughout Sudan, in order to put in place preventive measures and reduce the risk of recurrence; develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation; [and] develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations to the PSC within three weeks.’

PSC went further and directed the Chairperson of the AU Commission to engage with the Members of the PSC Presidential Ad-hoc Committee, under the leadership of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda, to urgently facilitate the negotiation process between the leaders of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), including the holding of an AU Special Summit on Sudan. It also reiterated its call for the Subcommittee on Sanctions, in collaboration with CISSA and AFRIPOL, to identify all external actors supporting the warring parties and recommend measures to be taken by the PSC within three weeks. Another assignment included tasking the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities to undertake a fact-finding mission to Sudan and report back to the Council with recommendations within three weeks. This, however, did not happen. Since then, the Special Envoy undertook a visit to Port Sudan on 16 November and engaged Sudanese authorities and civil society actors, as well as people affected by the fighting. At tomorrow’s session, the PSC is expected to follow up on progress in the implementation of these decisions, including an update on the Special Envoy’s visit to Port Sudan.

The RSF are now advancing aggressively into Kordofan, with major cities such as El-Obeid squarely in its sights. Having defeated the SAF in El Fasher in October– an assault that triggered widespread atrocities, including the reported killing of at least 1,500 civilians and the displacement of tens of thousands – the RSF currently holds the battlefield momentum in Sudan’s escalating war.

Early this month, RSF seized the 22^nd SAF division headquarters in Babanusa, West Kordofan State. Going further, the RSF seized the strategic Heglig oilfield in South Kordofan, forcing the SAF to withdraw into neighbouring South Sudan. Reports indicate that the South Sudanese government, SAF and RSF have reached an agreement to allow South Sudanese troops to move into Heglig to secure the critical oil infrastructure in the region, which is vital for both Sudan and South Sudan. This oil-rich region was a flashpoint in 2012 when a brief war took place between Sudan and South Sudan over control of the area. The Heglig crisis was resolved following intense diplomatic efforts involving the AU and UN that eventually resulted in South Sudan forces withdrawing from the area.

Most recently, on 13 December, drone attacks targeted the logistics base of the United Nations Interim Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in Kadugli, Sudan, killing six peacekeepers and injuring eight others. UN Secretary-General António Guterres strongly condemned the ‘horrific’ attacks, warning that they may constitute war crimes.

On 21 October 2025, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) released its Fact-Finding Report that documented the atrocities committed by the warring parties since the outbreak of the war on 15 April 2023. The report observed that the conflict is ‘characterised by total lack of regard to the rules of war and the human rights standards under the African Charter.’ It further held that Sudanese civilians ‘endured all forms of atrocities and the worst humanitarian conditions.’ Recognising that the situation in Sudan warrants the application of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, the report called on the AU ‘deploy an AU peacekeeping mission to Sudan consistent with article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act to assist in the process of stabilizing the situation in Sudan and offer necessary protection to civilians including the establishment of safe and demilitarized humanitarian corridors.’ However, the PSC did not consider the report when it held its 1308th emergency session following the fall of El Fasher. Since then, the ACHPR physically handed in the Fact-Finding Report to the Chairperson of the AU Commission during a meeting held on 19 November at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The fact that the report was not scheduled to be presented to the PSC is a major omission, given that the fact-finding mission was initiated following and within the framework of the decision of the PSC Communiqué, PSC/HoSG/COMM, adopted at its 1218th meeting of 21 June 2024.

On 4 December, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk rang the alarm bells on another wave of atrocities in Sudan amid an escalation of fighting in the Kordofan region. At least 269 civilian deaths from aerial strikes, artillery shelling, and summary executions since 25 October, when RSF captured Bara city in North Kordofan. The High Commissioner noted that the number could be much higher, given reports of retaliatory killings, arbitrary detention, abductions, sexual violence and forced recruitment, including of children, but telecommunications and internet outages hinder accurate reporting.

Additionally, his office reported that an RSF drone attack on 3 November killed 45 people in El Obeid, North Kordofan, while an aerial strike carried out by the SAF on 29 November in Kauda, South Kordofan, resulted in the deaths of at least 48 people, most of them civilians. His office also highlighted the dire humanitarian situation, particularly in Kadugli and Dilling in South Kordofan, which have been besieged by the RSF and SPLM-N, with famine confirmed in Kadugli and a high risk of famine in Dilling. El Obeid in North Kordofan is also partially surrounded by the RSF. His office made it clear that all parties continue to block humanitarian access and operations.

On 8 December, the United Nations Security Council held closed consultations on Sudan, focusing on the ongoing situation in Kordofan. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher and High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk briefed Council members on the appalling humanitarian and human rights conditions in the region. Türk apparently echoed the statements he released on 4 December, stating that ‘we cannot remain silent in the face of yet another man-made catastrophe.’ He also urged an immediate end to the fighting and called for life-saving aid to reach those facing starvation, appealing to all actors with influence over the parties to halt hostilities and stop the flow of arms fueling the conflict. On his part, Fletcher seems to have highlighted the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Sudan. With 20 million people in urgent need of assistance, Sudan is one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world. In November, he visited Darfur—the epicentre of the crisis. In the Council, he appears to have emphasised the need for renewed international attention to Sudan and the importance of advancing the political process to achieve a ceasefire.

Despite the involvement of multiple actors to advance the peace process in Sudan, progress has been elusive. The latest initiative is the US-led effort to revive the peace process through the convening of a Quad meeting, comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The foreign ministers of the Quad countries issued a joint statement on 12 September calling for a humanitarian truce, for an initial three months, to enable the swift entry of humanitarian aid to all parts of Sudan, to lead immediately to a permanent ceasefire. Then, an inclusive and transparent transition process should be launched and concluded within nine months. The AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) issued a joint statement on 14 September, welcoming the Quad initiative and affirming its full alignment with the AU/IGAD roadmaps.

The initiative received mixed reactions from the belligerents and other Sudanese actors. The SAF rejected the initiative as biased and strongly opposed the UAE’s role in the Quad, denouncing it as an attempt to dismantle the SAF in favour of the RSF. The SAF reiterated its commitment to continue fighting until the RSF is expelled from all occupied areas. Other stakeholders also expressed mistrust, viewing the initiative as an externally driven solution and emphasising the need for Sudanese ownership of the peace process. In contrast, the RSF—widely condemned by the international community for committing mass atrocities and war crimes—appears to have made a tactical move to welcome the initiative in an effort to rehabilitate its image and expressed its readiness to engage in talks. Nonetheless, it does not appear to be committed to the talks and has reportedly violated the terms of the humanitarian truce.

In apparent elevation of US interest to engage in peace efforts at the highest levels, in November, President Donald Trump said that the U.S. would put greater focus on ending the war after being urged by the Saudi Crown Prince. In his November press briefing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio recognised the involvement of external actors in the Sudan conflict and noted ongoing engagements at the highest level to exert pressure on these actors. Despite this high-level attention, the fighting has continued to escalate with the RSF capturing further territories. While the expression of interest at the highest levels is welcomed by some, it remains far from certain that it would substantially change the conditions for peacemaking, with some pointing to Washington’s inability to sustain engagement as its recent peace efforts in DRC show and its limited leverage, considering its strategic relationships with key external actors involved in the war.

As the PSC convenes its meeting tomorrow to discuss the situation in Sudan, the Security Council is scheduled to hold an informal interactive dialogue to discuss ways and means of reinvigorating the peace process. All those involved in the peace process, including the AU and IGAD, are expected to attend the meeting and address the Council.

Amid the escalating conflict in Sudan and the resulting humanitarian and human rights crises, discussions on punitive measures are gaining momentum. Apparently, there are behind-the-scenes discussions among like-minded Security Council members regarding the possible imposition of additional sanctions. It remains to be seen whether these efforts gain any traction over the coming days and months. Meanwhile, on 20 November, the European Union imposed sanctions on Abdelrahim Dagalo, the RSF’s second-in-command. On 9 December, the US sanctioned four individuals and four entities linked to a transnational network—composed primarily of Colombian nationals and companies—that recruits former Colombian military personnel to fight for the RSF and provides training to its fighters, including children.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reiterate its grave concern over the escalating fighting in Sudan. It may condemn the atrocities being committed in the course of the escalating violence, including those perpetrated particularly by the RSF since the PSC’s last meeting. Welcoming the Fact-Finding report of the ACHPR and noting the mission undertaken by the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities, the PSC may reaffirm the need for continuous documentation of the atrocities and violations being perpetrated in the course of the War in Sudan. In this respect, the PSC may request the AU Commission Chairperson to establish a standing mechanism for the monitoring, documentation and reporting of violations being perpetrated in Sudan, consisting of a team made up of the ACHPR and the Special Envoy. The PSC may also underscore that there is no military solution to the war in Sudan and urge the parties to collaborate with the initiatives for securing cessation of hostilities and the AU and IGAD-led political process for securing a political settlement in Sudan. The PSC may echo the statement of the AU Commission and IGAD on efforts by the Quad, emphasising the need for respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sudan and the cessation by external actors of supplying weapons and other resources that fuel the fire of war in Sudan. Considering its earlier decision assigning various AU entities to track and report on the source and means of supply of support exacerbating the war in Sudan and the lack of progress in this respect, the PSC may request that a former head of state of respectable standing is tasked with the role of overseeing the documentation and reporting to the PSC on the sources, actors and means of supply of support. The PSC may also urge the need for African and international actors supporting the efforts for the provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need, including by assisting Sudanese local humanitarian actors and ensuring the protection of humanitarian access and actors.

Tomorrow (4 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) will hold its first session of the month to consider the situation in Sudan.

The session will commence with an opening remark by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for August 2025. This is followed by introductory statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. A representative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is also expected to make a statement. It is also envisaged that the PSC receives a statement on the humanitarian situation, including access to humanitarian assistance and food insecurity, from Haneed Nuru, Director of the World Food Programme African Union Global Office. Since Sudan is suspended following the October 2021 coup that laid the foundation for the eruption of the conflict in April 2023, it would not accordingly be invited to make a statement during the session.

There have been major developments since the PSC’s last substantive session in February 2025. The frontlines of the fighting and the territorial control of the major parties to the war – the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have substantially shifted. At the end of March, the SAF succeeded in wresting control of Khartoum from RSF. On its part, the RSF expanded its offensive in May to the East by launching long-range drone attacks that targeted various cities, including Port Sudan. These attacks targeted key civilian and military infrastructure, including the international airport, a military airbase, fuel depots, and power stations.

Despite shifts in the battlefield dynamics, the warring parties remain entrenched in their positions and appear determined to pursue a military solution. As each tries to consolidate its respective areas of control and inflict loss on the other, the focus of the terrain of fighting has shifted. As a result, the fighting now appears to be shifting southward into Kordofan and eastward in Darfur. The ongoing fighting in Kordofan has reportedly resulted in the massive displacement of people and the collapse of essential services. As the RSF shifted its focus to consolidate its control in Darfur, it intensified its siege and attacks on North Darfur’s capital, El Fasher, through shelling, drone strikes, and ground operations, exacerbating the already dire humanitarian and hunger conditions in the besieged city and its environs. In July, the United Nations called on the warring parties to agree to a humanitarian pause in the besieged city. While the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) reportedly accepted the proposal, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) rejected it. Indicating further expansion of the war front, in June, the RSF claimed control of the tri-border area of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, both to expand the supply line through Libya and extend the fighting into the Nile Valley and Northern State.

With the war showing no sign of abating, the dire humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, as the statement from the WFP representative would make clear. Indiscriminate attacks against civilians continue. The RSF long-range drone attacks targeted not only military targets but also civilian infrastructures, including the 10 May 2025 bombing that attacked the central prison in El Obeid, reportedly resulting in the death of 29 prisoners and injuring dozens more. In an incident attributed to the SAF, the bombing on 21 June on the Al-Mujlad hospital in West Kordofan reportedly resulted in the killing of more than 40 people, including six children and five healthcare workers. Sudan remains the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, with over 30 million people in need of assistance.

As they both deepen their effort to consolidate their respective territorial control, they are also seeking to translate territorial control into political influence. SAF has regained control over parts of the east and centre of the country, including the capital, Khartoum. Meanwhile, RSF is working to consolidate its hold in the west and south, particularly in Darfur and South Kordofan. In May, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, appointed Kamal Idris as the new prime minister. Idris subsequently dissolved the existing government in June and is currently consulting on the formation of a new cabinet. On 26 July, the RSF-led coalition, known as the Tasis Alliance, also announced the formation of a parallel government, with RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo appointing Mohamed Hassan al-Ta’ishi as prime minister.