Tomorrow (6 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1345^th session on African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) in Africa.

Following opening remarks by Ambassador Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Briefings are expected from representatives of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL).

In 2019, during its 845^th session, the Council decided to institutionalise an annual session on TOC as a standing agenda item. Beyond dedicated sessions, the Council has repeatedly expressed concern over TOC in conflict-specific and thematic sessions, particularly those on terrorism, illicit economy and small arms proliferation, and has acknowledged the convergence between TOC and terrorism.

The last time the Council convened on this issue was at its 1279^th meeting, held on 14 May 2025, under the theme ‘Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region.’ Unlike that meeting, tomorrow’s session is not region-specific, offering an opportunity to consider the trends and developments at a continental level and to follow up on key outcomes of the 1279^th session.

The Global Organised Crime Index 2025 provides an important evidence base on recent developments and trends relating to TOC. Its Africa-specific findings show steady growth in criminal markets and actors since 2019, with financial crimes, human trafficking, non-renewable resource crimes, counterfeit goods and arms trafficking among the most pervasive TOC markets on the continent. It also highlights regional diversity: human trafficking, arms trafficking and human smuggling in East Africa; financial crimes and cannabis trade, along with human trafficking in North Africa; non-renewable resource crimes in Central Africa; cocaine trafficking in West Africa; and wildlife crime in Southern Africa. This calls for tailored and regionally grounded responses.

A central issue for the PSC is that TOC is no longer merely a law-enforcement concern, but a structural peace and security threat that erodes sovereignty, weakens institutions, fuels corruption, sustains conflict economies and creates structures that undermine legitimate sources of authority. In various conflict settings from the Sahel, Sudan, Somalia and Great Lakes, terrorist armed groups, insurgents, and militias increasingly intersect with and draw on TOC networks and markets. In the Sahel, terrorist groups and criminal groups draw revenue from illegal gold mining, arms trafficking, cattle rustling, kidnapping, fuel smuggling and drug trafficking, while exploiting livelihood vulnerabilities in a region where informal work and artisanal mining sustain millions. Similar dynamics affect the Lake Chad Basin, eastern DRC, Libya, Somalia, North Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The PSC may therefore stress a multidimensional response to TOC that goes beyond criminal justice, combining borderland development, legitimate governance, service delivery, law enforcement and community resilience, including livelihood support.

The link between TOC and illicit arms flows is another major concern. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, described small arms proliferation as ‘a cancer’ driving instability across the continent, from the Sahel to the Great Lakes. In West Africa alone, around 12 million illicit arms are circulating, used by terrorist groups, vigilantes, self-defence groups, bandits and civilians who feel abandoned by the state. Their proliferation transforms local disputes into deadly conflict. Counter-TOC relating to illicit arms flows should therefore be linked to efforts at curbing SLW stockpile management, arms tracing, diversion control, and disarmament initiatives.

These include the call for an AFRIPOL-anchored continental criminal intelligence mechanism, criminal corridor mapping and tailored responses to criminal flows. It further requested the AU Commission, in coordination with AFRIPOL, the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) and CISSA, to carry out a comprehensive study on TOC, peace and security in the Sahel region, detailing its nature, origin, sources of financing and impacts on local populations, and to present the study to the PSC.

It is of interest to the PSC that the networks and corridors of TOC are mapped to inform targeted response. In this respect, several criminal corridors have been identified. These include: the Lagos–Kano–Agadez–Tripoli route for migrant smuggling and Tramadol trafficking; the Bamako–Gao–Tamanrasset route for arms and fuel trafficking; the Dakar–Ziguinchor–Bissau route for cocaine from Latin America, the Diffa–Lake Chad–Maiduguri route linked to Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) logistics, and the Port Sudan–Khartoum–Bangui corridor for arms trafficking. The Global Initiative-TOC Risk Bulletin on arms trafficking routes in Mali shows that disrupted routes pushed traffickers and armed groups to seek alternative routes and weapons sources. The Illicit Hub Mapping in West Africa 2025 report maps 350 illicit hubs across 18 countries and identifies five accelerant markets: kidnapping, cattle rustling, illicit arms, illicit gold and extortion/protection racketeering. The tracing and operation of these various routes highlights the importance of following up on one of the outcomes of the last PSC session on TOC. It is to be recalled that the PSC tasked the AU Commission to coordinate AFRIPOL and others in ‘developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities.’

Corruption and state-embedded criminality are also central to the discussion. TOC often thrives where institutions are weak, compromised or penetrated by criminal interests, enabling illicit networks to evade accountability, influence decision-making and undermine the rule of law. As Global Initiative-TOC’s analysis of the role of state actors and armed groups in the conflict in Eastern DRC shows, conflicts can become structurally criminalised where armed actors and state-linked networks benefit from illicit resource extraction. African strategies should therefore treat anti-corruption, institutional resilience, financial investigation, asset recovery, judicial cooperation and public integrity as core peace and security tools, integrating them into conflict prevention, mediation, peacebuilding, stabilisation, security sector reform, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD).

Given the transnational character of TOC, border governance remains a major issue. Borderlands are often areas of weak state presence, but also livelihood spaces where communities depend on cross-border trade, pastoral mobility, family networks and informal markets. Criminal networks exploit these same routes. The Niamey Convention remains relevant not only for border security but also for local development, cross-border governance and conflict prevention.

The session may also benefit from considering emerging and non-traditional forms of TOC, which are increasingly shaped by new technology and artificial intelligence (AI). African strategies should therefore address conventional trafficking alongside cybercrime, AI-enabled fraud, online exploitation, digital finance, crypto-enabled laundering and the criminal use of logistics and technology platforms, consistent with the 1279^th session’s concern over the co-option of new technologies by criminal actors.

Institutionally, addressing the transnational dimension of organised crime requires leveraging the role of AFRIPOL, CISSA and AUCTC. The 1320^th meeting on Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Security Outlook adds an operational layer by calling for AUCTC–CISSA–AFRIPOL horizon-scanning briefings, a dynamic risk-mapping tool, stronger cyber and digital-threat monitoring, and a continental working group on illicit financing, including hawala/mobile-money networks used by extremist groups.

Another policy area concerns peace operations. Recent work on TOC and peacekeeping and TOC and UN peace operations underlines that organised crime can undermine peace operations by financing armed groups, distorting local economies and weakening political settlements. AU-led and AU-authorised missions, therefore, need a stronger analytical capacity to understand criminal economies without being transformed into anti-crime agencies.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The Council may express deep concern about the growing threat of TOC in Africa and its linkages with terrorism, illicit arms flows, corruption, illicit financial flows, trafficking in persons, migrant smuggling, illegal mining, cybercrime and environmental crime. It may underscore the need for adopting a multidimensional African strategy that goes beyond security and law enforcement instruments. It may call for targeted enforcement, financial investigations, criminal justice cooperation, border governance, anti-corruption measures, livelihood alternatives, legitimate local governance, service delivery and community resilience as critical measures to address the underlying factors that make TOC possible. The PSC may reiterate its call for enhanced cross-border cooperation, leveraging the Niamey Convention, improved weapons management, joint border management and strengthened coordination of police, intelligence, customs, border-control, financial intelligence and judicial institutions. It may further urge Member States to domesticate and implement relevant continental and international instruments, combat money laundering and illicit financial flows. The Council may also call for the AU Commission to present a comprehensive report on trends in TOC in Africa, including criminal corridors, sources of financing, links with armed actors and impacts on local populations. The Council may also underscore the need for a whole-of-AU system approach, emphasising coordination among AFRIPOL, CISSA, AUCTC, the AU Border Programme, the African Governance Architecture, the AU Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AUDA-NEPAD), the PCRD Centre, the African Development Bank and RECs/RMs.

Tomorrow (15 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1297^th session to consider the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the PSC Sub-committee on Counter-Terrorism. Although not initially on the August 2025 programme of work, the PSC is also expected to consider the ToR for the Sub-committee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD).

Following opening remarks from Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make introductory remarks. Michael Wamai, Expert from Uganda and the Chairperson of the Committee of Experts (CoE) of the PSC for July 2025, is expected to make a presentation on the ToR of the PSC Sub-committee on PCRD. In addition, Mohamed Lamine Nait Youcef, Expert from Algeria and Chairperson of the CoE of the PSC for August 2025, will make a presentation on the ToR of the PSC Sub-committee on Counter-Terrorism.

Building on the CoE’s 78^th meeting on the ‘review of the Draft Terms of Reference of the Peace and Security Council Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism’ held on 1 August, the Sub-Committee’s establishment aligns with the Malabo Decision of May 2022, the 249^th PSC meeting of November 2010 and the 1182^nd PSC meeting of 2023, which emphasised the urgent need to activate this body to address the growing complexity of terrorism in Africa. The proposed ToR outlines the Sub-Committee’s objectives, mandate, composition and operational modalities, aiming to enhance the PSC’s ability to respond to terrorism through African-led strategies, coordination with Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and collaboration with AU bodies like the African Union Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), AFRIPOL and CISSA. The Sub-Committee is tasked with monitoring PSC decisions, assessing trends in continental terrorism, and promoting a multidimensional approach to addressing the structural causes of terrorism.

Africa continues to face an unprecedented surge in terrorist activities, with the Sahel region emerging as the global epicentre of terrorism. According to the AUCTC, terrorist attacks increased by 99% and related deaths by 53% in 2023 compared to the previous year, with West Africa accounting for 45% of attacks and 62% of deaths in Q2 of 2024. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remain the most affected, with groups like Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), Al-Shabaab and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) expanding their reach. The spread of terrorism to coastal West African states like Benin, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire, alongside emerging links between piracy and terrorism in the Gulf of Guinea, underscores the evolving threat landscape. Initiatives such as the AU Ministerial Committee on Counter-Terrorism (AUMCCT) and the African Counter-Terrorism Coordination Task Force (A2CTF), as mandated in the 1237^th PSC meeting of October 2024, have been established to mitigate this. However, challenges such as the dissolution of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, political instability and foreign interference have hampered regional coordination. The 2024 Global Terrorism Index highlights Burkina Faso as the world’s most terrorism-affected country, emphasising the need for a shift from military-centric to holistic, governance-focused strategies.

The PSC and AU Assembly have issued several decisions to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts. The 2022 Malabo Declaration called for the immediate operationalisation of the PSC Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism and the establishment of the AUMCCT. The 1182^nd PSC meeting, on the other hand, urged the full activation of the Sub-Committee and the A2CTF, emphasising context-specific interventions. Additionally, the 1237^th PSC meeting welcomed the AU Commission’s report on combating terrorism, condemning foreign interference and calling for sustainable funding for AU-led peace support operations (PSOs) under UNSC Resolution 2719. It also emphasised psychosocial support for victims and the operationalisation of the AU Special Fund for Counter-Terrorism. Notwithstanding, The Abuja Process Declaration of 2024 reinforced the need for regional cooperation and institutional building to address terrorism’s evolving nature. Despite these decisions, implementation gaps persist, including delays in operationalising the Sub-Committee, limited funding for counter-terrorism initiatives, and weak coordination between AU bodies and RECs/RMs. The PSC further noted the growing nexus between terrorism and transnational organised crime, such as illicit resource exploitation, which remains inadequately addressed.

The draft ToRs provides a foundational framework for the Sub-Committee’s role in coordinating counter-terrorism efforts, monitoring PSC decisions, and promoting African-led solutions. However, several gaps warrant attention. First, there is ambiguity in the mandate scope: while the ToR outline broad functions such as recommending strategies and monitoring PSC decisions, they lack specificity on operational mechanisms, timelines and accountability frameworks. Funding mechanisms are also insufficiently addressed; although a proposed annual budget is mentioned, sustainable funding sources are not identified, despite the PSC’s call for predictable financing in its October 2024 meeting and the operationalisation of the AU Special Fund for Counter-Terrorism remains stalled. In addition, while the ToR references a multidimensional approach to addressing structural causes of terrorism, it does not explicitly integrate governance, socioeconomic development, or climate-induced insecurity, which the AU Commission’s 2024 report identified as key drivers. The framework does not also address the growing use of advanced technologies, including drones and digital platforms, by terrorist groups and finally, the need for psychosocial support for victims, particularly women and youth, is imperative. The ToR does not incorporate mechanisms to ensure gender-sensitive or victim-centered approaches.

To strengthen the ToRs and enhance the Sub-Committee’s effectiveness, the PSC and AU Commission should clarify operational mechanisms by defining specific procedures for punitive measures, intelligence sharing and strategy development, including timelines for reporting and decision-making and adopt a quarterly review mechanism to track progress on PSC decisions. In light of the increasing number of PSC Sub-Committees, the PSC should give due consideration to ensuring that the Sub-Committees receive the necessary support to execute their given mandates effectively and efficiently, while exploring partnerships with international donors without compromising African ownership. Regional coordination can be improved by establishing a formal framework with RECs and RMs, including joint task forces and regular consultations, to harmonise regional counter-terrorism strategies and address gaps left by the G5 Sahel’s dissolution. The mandate should explicitly integrate governance, socioeconomic development, and climate resilience, potentially in collaboration with the AU Centre for PCRD, to address the root causes of terrorism. Emerging technologies should also be addressed by including measures to counter drones, cyberattacks and digital propaganda, leveraging technical partnerships with AFRIPOL and CISSA. Victim-centred approaches, on the other hand, should be prioritised through programmes for psychosocial support and reintegration, particularly for women and youth, with gender mainstreaming embedded in all activities. Finally, accountability should be strengthened by introducing a robust monitoring and evaluation framework, with regular reporting to the PSC and AU Assembly on progress and challenges.

On the other hand, the PSC will consider the ToR for the Sub-committee on PCRD. The establishment of the Sub-Committee on PCRD is rooted in the AU’s recognition of the evolving nature of conflicts in Africa, which demand coherent, coordinated and sustainable post-conflict reconstruction strategies. The AU’s Policy on PCRD, revised in 2024, emphasises holistic approaches combining peacebuilding, institutional capacity-building, socio-economic recovery and reconciliation. The Sub-Committee, established under Article 8(5) of the PSC Protocol, is designed to receive assignments and mandates on specific post-conflict situations from the PSC. It will monitor political, socio-economic, and security developments across the continent in collaboration with the relevant units of the AU Commission, the AU PCRD Center, AUDA-NEPAD, APRM, other AU organs, institutions, entities and RECs/RMs and make recommendations to the PSC on required interventions. The Sub-Committee will oversee the implementation of PCRD activities and decisions adopted or endorsed by the PSC, providing regular updates on progress. It will also seek, at a technical level, relevant information from AU Member States, RECs/RMs, and partners regarding actions taken to implement PCRD measures, and offer recommendations to enhance their effectiveness. Furthermore, it will identify key areas for capacity building, financial support and technical assistance needed by Member States in post-conflict situations, and propose appropriate measures for PSC consideration. Lastly, the Sub-Committee will advise on resource mobilisation strategies, including innovative financing solutions, to sustain long-term PCRD efforts and ensure lasting recovery and development.

Recent PSC and Assembly decisions underscore the urgency of this initiative. The 1293^rd PSC meeting on 4 August highlighted the worsening humanitarian and security crisis in Sudan, calling for enhanced PCRD efforts to address famine and conflict escalation. Similarly, the 1291^st meeting in July 2025 addressed the situation in Libya, emphasising the need for coordinated post-conflict strategies. The AU Assembly’s Decision [Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.(XVI)] and 1122^nd PSC meeting of November 2022 further reinforced the mandate for PCRD, stressing the prevention of conflict relapse through governance and socio-economic interventions. The Sub-Committee’s formation comes at a time when Africa faces persistent and emerging threats, including terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government and complex political transitions. The PSC’s recent engagements, such as the July 2025 Joint Consultative Meeting with the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) in Midrand, South Africa, emphasised enhancing institutional synergy to implement PSC decisions and promote post-conflict recovery.

To afford this sub-committee its relevance, institutional synergy is important. In this regard, the Sub-Committee should prioritise coordination with RECs/RMs, the PCRD Centre in Cairo, AUDA-NEPAD and the APRM to prevent fragmented efforts, while leveraging existing platforms like the I-RECKE Policy Sessions to share best practices. Tailored PCRD strategies are also essential, with the Sub-Committee developing country-specific frameworks to address unique post-conflict challenges. Finally, sustainable financing must be pursued, with the AU Commission exploring innovative funding models, including public-private partnerships, to ensure the long-term sustainability of PCRD initiatives.

It is also worth noting that the Sub-Committees will be composed of the fifteen (15) Member States of the PSC, represented at the level of experts. Given the nature of their work, each Member State on the Council—and therefore in each Sub-Committee—will designate two experts, with one serving as the main representative and the other as a substitute, though both will be able to participate in the Sub-Committees’ activities.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué or a summary record. The PSC may welcome and endorse the refined ToRs for the PSC Sub-Committees on Counter-Terrorism and PCRD, commending the Committee of Experts for their engagement in the process. Council is also likely to direct the AU Commission to utilise the ToRs on counterterrorism and PCRD in the mandating, implementation, management and oversight of all counterterrorism and PCRD efforts, with a view to enhancing institutional coordination between relevant AU Organs, as well as between the AU and AU-RECs/RMs in the prevention, response and resolution of conflicts on the Continent. Furthermore, Council may urge the prompt operationalisation of the Sub-Committees, encourage regular and robust monitoring and evaluation and call for sustainable and predictable financing.

Tomorrow (14 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1279^th session as an open session on Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region.

Following opening remarks by Ambassador Harold Saffa, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Briefings are also expected from representatives of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL).

Despite the Council’s decision in 2019, during its 845^th session, to institutionalise an annual session on Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) as a standing agenda item, the last time the Council convened a session dedicated to the theme was in May 2022 during its 1082^nd session. However, the Council had consistently shown concern over the rise of transnational organised crime in Africa in several sessions on conflict-specific situations and on thematic sessions, particularly those on terrorism, illicit economy and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The Council has also acknowledged the convergence between TOC and terrorism. During its 1237^th session, convened to consider the report of the AU Commission on combating terrorism in October 2024, the Council noted with deep concern the growing linkages between TOC and terrorism and called for the strengthening of international cooperation.

Tomorrow’s session is of particular importance given the accelerating pace at which organised criminal networks are expanding their operations across Africa and some countries and regions have become major sites of TOC. These include notably the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin. According to data from the Africa Organised Crime 2023 Index, countries in these regions exhibit some of the highest levels of organised criminality on the continent above the continental average of 5.25. Such is the case in Nigeria (7.28), Sudan (6.37), Cameroon (6.27), Mali (5.93), Burkina Faso (5.92), Niger (5.70) and Chad (5.50). Beyond trafficking in arms, TOC in these regions and beyond manifests in multiple forms: trafficking in narcotics, people, and fuel; cybercrime; and the illicit exploitation of natural resources, such as gold.

Another dimension of TOC is its deepening entanglements with terrorism, insurgency and broader instability. And the growing convergence between TOC and terrorism is increasingly evident in various parts of Africa, but more so in the Sahel and Lake Chad basin, which are most affected by terrorism. While it does not account for it, TOC contributes to and is aggravated by the standing of the Sahel as the region that has become the epicentre of global terrorism. Illicit arms and weapons proliferation and trade is one example of TOC affecting the Sahel. In this context, the TOC and conflicts involving terrorist groups feed into each other, as criminal economies provide financial lifelines to extremist groups, while terrorist actors offer protection and enforcement mechanisms to illicit traders. These mutually reinforcing relationships allow both sets of actors to thrive in environments of weak state control, porous borders, and pervasive governance deficits.

The political economy of TOC goes beyond simply criminal economies in regions like the Sahel. It also creates an environment in which it is used as an informal survival strategy for marginalised communities, where state presence is weak and employment and livelihood opportunities are scarce. A 2024 UNODC report underscores this feature of TOC in the Sahel, both as intensifying violence and serving as a critical source of livelihood for economically marginalised communities. By distributing the benefits of illegal markets, non-state armed groups often gain accommodation from local communities, further entrenching their influence and ability to perpetuate the cycle of insecurity. Firearms trafficking, in particular, has played a catalytic role in triggering conflict across the Sahel. Additionally, the UNODC report notes that organised criminal networks provide financial and human resources to armed groups, thereby prolonging conflicts. Illicit economies are central to sustaining violence, as revenues are either directly or indirectly reinvested in weapons and logistical support, strengthening the operational and economic resilience of armed groups.

Given the role of unregulated borders in facilitating TOC, the other issue to be addressed in tomorrow’s session is the institutional weaknesses at the national level that create the vacuum for the emergence and expansion of TOC. This draws attention to some of the major underlying causes, including spaces with weak presence of state institutions and porous borders. Apart from addressing state fragility and expanding legitimate local structures of governance, this highlights the need for strengthening border control capacities through training, technology transfer, and joint operations.

In addition to receiving updates and reflecting on trends in TOC in the Sahel during the past few years and its intersection with insecurity and conflict, tomorrow’s session serves to follow up on PSC’s earlier engagements on the subject. In its communiqué from its 1082^nd session, the PSC had requested AFRIPOL to work in collaboration with the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) to develop two databases; one on persons, groups and entities involved in Transnational Organised Crimes, including Foreign Terrorist Fighters; and another regional database for guiding member states and RECs/RMs on their policy interventions for Transnational Organised Crimes. The PSC also requested AFRIPOL and INTERPOL to produce in-depth research on ‘regional information papers in the fight against transnational organised crime’. Given the two-year lapse, tomorrow’s session will provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess progress on these mandates and renew calls for institutional synergy. Also of importance is the need to bridge the gap, which is the disconnect between policy pronouncements and operational coherence. Coordination among the various AU bodies tasked with countering TOC continues to suffer from resource constraints and insufficient horizontal integration.

In terms of policy, some of the notable instruments include the November 2006 Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking on Human Beings, especially Women and Children, the 2014 Niamey Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation, the August 2019 AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention 2019-2023 and the December 2018 Enhancing Africa’s Response to Transnational Organised Crimes Project. Institutionally, AFRIPOL is one of the recent institutional structures instituted at the AU as the continent’s law enforcement coordination mechanism to, among others, deal with TOC. An example of the contribution of AFRIPOL in this respect is the launch of ‘Operation TAPI’ in Benin, the first cross-border initiative that targeted a range of illicit activities, including the trafficking of drugs, pharmaceuticals, arms, counterfeit or smuggled goods and environmental crimes. The operation will engage six AU member states: Benin, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Nigeria, Chad, and Togo. It is also worth giving due consideration to deepen the role of the Nouakchott Process and the Djibouti Process in contributing to addressing the scourge of TOC. However, the AU has as yet to find ways of bringing counter TOC to the centre of its conflict prevention, management and resolution processes in view of TOC’s deepening entanglement with conflict dynamics. For example, it is rare that reference is made to the policy instruments cited above in responding to and dealing with specific conflict situations.

Beyond the continental frameworks, there is also the issue of how to mainstream response to and address TOC in international conflict management. In Mali, despite a 2018 mandate to address TOC, the UN’s mission, MINUSMA, focused primarily on terrorist financing rather than tackling the broader political economy that sustains organised crime. A similar pattern was noted in the Central African Republic under MINUSCA. These examples reflect a systemic challenge to treat TOC as a central concern of conflict dynamics. They also illustrate the broader problem of siloed mandates and loosely integrated strategies, an area where there is an increasing need for adaptation by peacekeeping missions.

Against this backdrop, in tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC also faces the challenge of how to push away from fragmented, security-heavy responses to more holistic, coordinated strategies that address the structural drivers of TOC and terrorism and emphasise the need for a multidimensional response that combines intelligence-sharing, targeted enforcement, and community resilience-building. The Council is likely to revisit the importance of early warning systems, localised peacebuilding efforts, institution-building, and socioeconomic development interventions as tools for preventing recruitment into criminal and terrorist networks. The 17^th Joint Consultative Meeting between the AU PSC and the UNSC, convened on 6 October 2023, also underscored the necessity of a ‘multidimensional approach to tackle the structural root causes of insecurity’, while advocating for coordinated responses to the interlinked threats of terrorism and TOC in the Sahel. It also highlighted the importance of sustained international engagement. The need for stronger international partnerships is likely to be reiterated, as collaboration with global partners remains crucial for securing predictable and sustainable financing for regional initiatives. The PSC had emphasised the importance of cooperation with institutions such as the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), UNODC, and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) in previous sessions. The 17^th Joint Consultative Meeting with the UNSC reinforced the value of aligning AU-led responses with global strategies like the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel while calling for increased, predictable funding for regional initiatives. Tomorrow’s session is expected to echo these calls, pushing for greater international support while ensuring that responses remain context-sensitive and locally owned.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The Council may express deep concern about the increasing threat of the scourge of transnational organised crime in Africa. It may underscore the need for adopting a multidimensional and multipronged approach that goes beyond security and law enforcement instruments. In this regard, it may call for increased use of livelihood support interventions, the rolling out of legitimate local governance structures and other peacebuilding and development support activities as critical measures to address not just the symptoms but also the underlying factors that make TOC possible. Given the transnational nature of TOC, the PSC may reiterate its call for enhanced cross-border cooperation, leveraging the Niamey Convention and the lessons from AFRIPOL’s Operation TAPI. It may also reiterate the importance of the Nouakchott and Djibouti processes while underscoring the need for ensuring that those processes expand their lens beyond the security and law enforcement domain to integrate peacebuilding with a focus on advancing economic development and building of legitimate local governance structures that facilitate the delivery of social services.  The Council may also underscore the need for a whole of AU system approach, emphasising both the need for coordination between AU security institutions such as AFRIPOL and CISSA, and importantly, the role of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), African Development Bank, AUDA/NEPAD, African Governance Architecture. The PSC may emphasise the need to develop counter TOC as a key area of joint action with the Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). It may task the AU Commission to develop and present a comprehensive report on both the trends in TOC in Africa and importantly on how the AU contributes to addressing the growing scourge of TOC leveraging on its broader governance, regional integration and peace and security norms and instruments while enhancing the role of AFRIPOL and CISSA in this area. The PSC may also task the AU, working closely with RECs/RMs, to develop guidance on giving growing attention to TOC in developing and implementing peace and security initiatives in conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts. It may also call for greater international support and cooperation in developing responses to the threat posed by TOC.

Tomorrow (19 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1266^th session to discuss the theme of ‘Deradicalisation as a Leverage for the Fight against Violent Extremism in Africa.’

The Permanent Representative of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for March, Mohammed Arrouchi, will deliver the opening remarks, followed by a presentation from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) is also expected to deliver a statement.

This is not the first time that the PSC has dedicated a session on deradicalisation as a strategy to fight terrorism and violent extremism. On 7 October 2022, during its chairship of the PSC, Morocco convened a ministerial-level session on the same theme, ‘Development and Deradicalisation as Levers to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism.’ The communiqué adopted at that session identified radicalisation and underdevelopment as key factors fostering terrorism and violent extremism in Africa. Emphasising comprehensive, multidimensional, and human rights-sensitive approaches, the PSC highlighted the need to address all structural root causes, drivers, and facilitators of radicalisation and violent extremism.

A major outcome of that session was the endorsement of reconciliation, dialogue, and negotiation as critical tools in countering terrorism. Relatedly, it underscored ‘the critical role of the media, religious institutions, educational and cultural institutions in countering terrorist narratives, deradicalisation, and in promoting inter-faith dialogue, tolerance and peaceful coexistence.’ These echo findings from our Special Research Report on the growing threat of terrorism in Africa, which highlights that ‘the recognition of the essentially political, governance, and development nature of the conflict dynamics in which insurgent groups identified as terrorists operate necessitates that negotiation and dialogue with members of such groups forms part of the political strategy for settling the conflict involving these groups.’ Furthermore, the PSC requested the AU Commission to develop a compendium of African national reconciliation best practices for the Council’s consideration. It also called for the inclusion of strategies to counter radicalisation and extremist ideologies in the envisaged review of the African Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Tomorrow’s session presents an opportunity to follow up on progress in implementing these and other related decisions adopted by the PSC at various times to combat terrorism and violent extremism in the continent.

This session takes place against the backdrop of a persistent and escalating threat of terrorism and violent extremism. The Sahel region remains the global epicentre of terrorism, accounting for 51 per cent of all terrorism-related deaths in 2024, according to the newly released Global Terrorism Index 2025, an annual report by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The region has also witnessed a nearly tenfold increase in terrorism-related deaths since 2019. Six of the ten most affected countries are in Africa—Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, and Cameroon. Despite a decline in both attacks and fatalities, Burkina Faso remains the most impacted country, accounting for one-fifth of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide. Meanwhile, Niger recorded the highest increase in terrorism-related deaths globally, rising by 94 per cent—highlighting the fragility of progress in countering terrorism.

Tomorrow’s discussion is important in spotlighting political, social, cultural and socio-economic approaches to counterterrorism, particularly given the dominance of hard security as the prevailing policy thinking and response. As outlined in our aforementioned special research report, an analysis of AU policy decisions—from the AU Assembly to the PSC—reveals particular emphasis on hard security measures in combating terrorism.

Building on the 1111^th session of the PSC and the increasing recognition in the AU Counter Terrorism Centre for a more comprehensive approach, tomorrow’s session can take forward the shift to a multidimensional strategy that prioritises the political governance, social, cultural and socio-economic, development dimensions. Given its focus on deradicalisation, the session is also expected to draw attention to public policy measures that facilitate social cohesion, reconciliation and inclusion, opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration, and religious teachings and practices that advance tolerance and moderation.

In terms of best practices, it is expected that the session may put the spotlight on Morocco’s success in deradicalisation programs. Morocco has been classified among the countries with ‘zero risk’ of terrorism worldwide, ranking first in North Africa according to the GTI 2025. The report, which assesses the impact of terrorist attacks across 163 countries, places Morocco 100th—marking significant progress from its 76th position in 2022 among countries affected by terrorism. This shift moves Morocco into the category of countries with ‘no impact’ from terrorism, making it one of the safest in the world, registering scores of zero, meaning the country had been free of terrorist activity for at least the past five years. This track record is not due to a lack of threats. In fact, Morocco remains a target for terrorist groups due to its location at the crossroads of Africa, Europe, and the Arab world. However, its success in containing the threat is largely attributed to its multidimensional counterterrorism strategy.

The 2003 Casablanca attacks marked a turning point in Morocco’s counterterrorism approach, prompting a comprehensive strategy—often described as a ‘tri-dimensional counterterrorism strategy’—that integrates security measures, socio-economic development, and religious oversight. Law 03.03, enacted shortly after the attacks, established a stronger legal framework, while from a security perspective, enhanced border security and intelligence capabilities have reportedly helped dismantle over 200 terrorist cells and arrest more than 3,500 individuals on terrorism-related charges over the past two decades, potentially preventing over 300 planned attacks.

A key pillar of Morocco’s counterterrorism strategy is its deradicalisation programs, notably the Moussalaha (Reconciliation) initiative, which has rehabilitated hundreds of detainees. As part of efforts to counter extremist narratives, Morocco’s Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs has developed an educational curriculum for nearly 50,000 imams and female Islamic guides (mourchidates). As summarised in a contribution to the GTI 2022, key lessons from Morocco’s counterterrorism efforts include its deep understanding of the threat, the interconnectedness of its counterterrorism methods, the combined application of soft and hard measures, the facilitation of information-sharing practices, and the promotion of international cooperation as the sine qua non of counterterrorism.

As this experience attests and our research report established, while security measures remain essential in addressing immediate terrorist threats, they alone cannot fundamentally alter the continent’s terrorism landscape without addressing the underlying socio-economic and political conditions that fuel extremism. As highlighted in our special research report, governance deficiencies, community grievances, and structural vulnerabilities create fertile ground for terrorist groups to emerge and thrive. Given the limitations of a security-heavy approach, it remains imperative for the PSC to prioritise investments in socioeconomic development, governance reforms, and humanitarian interventions alongside security responses. Despite being in a neighbourhood that witnessed a major expansion of the terrorist threat, another country that largely shielded itself from the impacts of terrorism is Mauritania. As with Morocco, this is not attributable to the reliance on the security approach but also to the use of instruments that advance the prevention of violent extremism and deradicalisation.

Encouragingly, in recent years, PSC discussions have increasingly recognised the need to address the structural root causes of terrorism. For instance, the Declaration of the April 2024 High-Level African Counter-Terrorism Meeting in Abuja, endorsed by the PSC during its 1219th session, emphasised the importance of complementing military action with political solutions. It called for policies to counter economic, religious, and cultural discrimination, promote inter-community dialogue, and strengthen social cohesion. The Declaration also underscored the need to invest in education, integrate counterterrorism efforts with SDG 16 and Agenda 2063, and adopt community-led approaches. Additionally, it highlighted the importance of countering terrorist propaganda that exploits inter-religious tensions and the clash of civilisation narratives.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the importance of adopting a comprehensive and multidimensional counterterrorism strategy that integrates both hard and soft approaches, including security measures, legal frameworks, socio-economic development, and programs for countering radicalisation and deradicalisation. It may also emphasise the need for national reconciliation, social cohesion, and inter-community dialogue to address the structural challenges that fuel terrorism and violent extremism while highlighting the importance of facilitating platforms for lesson learning and experience sharing. In this regard, the PSC may reiterate its call from the 1111th session for the AU Commission to develop a compendium of best practices on national reconciliation in Africa. Recognising the role of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism Programme Office in Rabat in supporting Member States’ capacity-building efforts, the PSC may encourage Member States to effectively leverage its resources and enhance coordination with Nigeria’s recently upgraded Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre. Furthermore, the PSC may use this opportunity to follow up on the implementation of its previous decisions, such as the full operationalisation of the AU Ministerial Committee on Counter-Terrorism and the PSC’s Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism.

Tomorrow (23 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1202^nd session to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.

Following opening remarks by Mohamed Arrouchi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for February 2024, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to make a statement. Lallali Idriss Lakhdar, Acting Director of the Africa Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) is also expected to make a presentation.

The AU Commission Chairperson’s report on the fight against terrorism and violent extremism was last considered by the PSC at its 1182^nd session held on 27 October 2023. One of the concerning trends identified in this report was the alarming geographical spread of terrorism in the continent, particularly in the Sahel region and the growing risk of expansion to the coastal sates of west Africa.  The latest report of the Chairperson to be considered by the PSC tomorrow is expected to demonstrate the continuing increase both in incidences and geographic spread of terrorism in Africa.

Heading into 2024, the threat of terrorism and violent extremism is predicted to remain one of the most pressing peace and security concerns the continent will continue to grapple with. By the end of 2023, ACSRT’s database indicated 99% increase in the number of terrorist attacks and 53% in the number of terrorist related deaths noted in the period from January to December 2023, as compared to the previous year of 2022. The database further registered 8 terrorist attacks and 43 terrorism-related deaths per day, for the same period.

Aside from the geographic spread and growing prevalence of terrorist activities, what makes the threat even more concerning is the increasing complexity it involves associated with geo-politics, involvement of external actors and local dynamics of countries affected by terrorism. As may be observed in the Chairperson’s report, there is a noted intersect between terrorist groups, some of whom are affiliated with global radical religious movements, and local militia groups engaged in armed conflict with member states. This intersection between terrorist groups and local conflict dynamics manifests in either one of two ways – a collaboration between terrorist groups and local militias, or contestations between the two actors for resources and control over territories. Needless to say, both of these dynamics entail serious challenges. In those cases where states, in their fight against terrorists, resort to the use of militias to effectively take advantage of their knowledge of local terrain and their understanding of cultural contexts, issues associated with human rights abuse and violations have also proven to become widespread.

Another important trend worth noting is the increasing shift in the perpetration of terrorist attacks, from civilians to military personnel and equipment. While civilians still continue to be the predominant primary victims of terrorist attacks in the continent, terrorist groups seem to be gradually demonstrating their capabilities to successfully orchestrate attacks against state security apparatus. According to data recorded by the ACSRT for the period from January to December 2023, ‘out of 2,952 terrorist attacks, 1,597 were against civilian targets, 1,218 were against military/security targets and installations, 89 were against International Organizations and deployments, and 48 were against Government Officials, Institutions, and Infrastructure’.

In terms of regional concentration of terrorist attacks and activities, the Sahel region continues to dominate, taking up 35% of the total attacks recorded in the course of 2023. Jihadist groups including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are the main terrorist sects that are currently active in this region. With Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the three states in the region most affected by the scourge of terrorism, currently undergoing complex political transitions and faced with serious governance crisis, the conditions are tilted in favour of these terrorist groups to further intensify their insurgency and meet their objectives of expanding their operations into coastal west African countries. Amid withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) from Mali and the decision made by transition authorities of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) – opting to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) as an architecture of collective defence and mutual assistance mechanism – the region is experiencing major shifts and uncertainties that create a fertile environment for terrorist actors to strengthen their positions. This is further complicated by geopolitical contestations and involvement of foreign actors in the region.

The issue for the AU and the PSC in the face of such challenging dynamics is how to prioritize and enhance support and engagement in the effort to contain and ultimately overcome the terrorism menace in the central Sahelian states without being restrained by the post-coup complex transition that the countries are going through.

Following the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Lake Chad basin and the Great Lakes Region respectively registered significant increase in violent incidents related to terrorist actors. In the Horn of Africa, one of the critical developments has been the strengthening of attacks by Al-Shabaab against military and security personnel. With the deadline for final withdrawal of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) fast approaching and little indication of full readiness of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to take on complete security responsibilities, the intensification of Al-Shabaab’s activities as demonstrated through some of its more recent attacks against local administrations and protected locations in the capital city, Mogadishu, is definitely a worrying sign.

In the Lake Chad Basin, ISWAP and Boko Haram continue their insurgencies targeting particularly the north-eastern parts of Nigeria and the north of Cameroon. Trends of power struggle between these two main terrorist groups has been one of the concerning developments in the region which may interest the PSC to reflect on with an emphasis on the kind of impact such insurgent infighting will have on the already dire security situation.

The Great Lakes Region also continues to experience a spike in incidents associated with terrorist actors, mainly the Alliance Democratic Forces (ADF)/Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), which has allegiance to Daesh/ISIS. Majority of the terrorist attacks recorded in the region took place in the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) although Uganda also experienced some attacks. According to data registered by the ACSRT, DRC accounts for the majority of the total terrorism related civilian deaths in the continent and has the highest number of civilian casualties recorded in a single country.

In addition to these region-specific trends, the PSC may also take note of the emerging concern related to the use of technological advancements for terrorist activities. Terrorist groups in the continent increasingly use technologic advancements in at least three ways. The first one of these is the use of new technologies such as cryptocurrencies to finance their activities in a manner that avoids the risk of being tracked by law enforcement. The use of cyberspace such as ‘Dark Web’ for conducting transactions including trade of drugs and weapons as well as human trafficking is another way through which terrorist groups make use of technology to fund their operations. The second use of technology for terrorist actors is the ease it creates for the dissemination of their ideology and propaganda. This enables recruitment of members and coordination of activities with speed and in an untraceable manner. Lastly, terrorist actors in the continent are increasingly using technologies such as AI and Drones for purposes of surveillance and spying. Further to infiltrating state positions, the use of Drones by terrorist groups for carrying out attacks is also an impending concern.

Despite the deployment of counter-terrorism efforts at the national and regional levels across the continent, the threat not only continues to persist but evidently intensifies over time. In addition to fortifying collaborations centred around the cross-boundary and transnational nature of the threat, it is also critical to re-examine the predominantly hard-security natured response deployed to eliminate the threat of terrorism in Africa.

In this respect, aside from receiving updates regarding counter-terrorism operations in the continent, the PSC may also reflect on bolstering the deployment and expanded use of non-military response approaches beyond the existing hard-security measures. It is expected that tomorrow’s session in this respect would build on earlier sessions to put emphasis on support for expansion of local governance structures and delivery of basic public and social services, the provision of livelihood support and humanitarian assistance and the design and implementation of development programs tailored to the conditions of areas affected by and are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Not any less important is the use of negotiation and national reconciliation as vehicle for both facilitating the surrender and rehabilitation of fighters and achieving political settlement of the conflict dynamics that made the emergence of such groups possible.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express grave concern over the continuing increase in the spread of terrorism in the continent. Noting and commending the AU Commission and the ACSRT for the ongoing efforts to support member states in their counter-terrorism efforts including through capacity-building activities, the PSC may urge member states to allocate adequate resources for the development and implementation of strategies for counter-terrorism and prevention of violent extremism. Emphasising the major contribution of governance crisis to fuelling the threat of terrorism in Africa, the PSC may also call on member states to work towards addressing governance issues that serve as underlying root causes. The PSC may call on the ACSRT to work closely with the AUDA/NEPAD and the relevant development and infrastructure departments of the AU as well as the AU PCRD Centre for promoting the design and implementation of non-security interventions as critical measures for expanding state authority. It may also reiterate its endorsement of the use of negotiation and reconciliation processes as the means for the final settlement of conflicts involving terrorist groups. In this respect, the PSC  may request the AU Commission to develop guidelines on the use of negotiations, reconciliation and mediation for settling conflicts involving terrorist groups drawing on avenues for such possibilities from countries affected by terrorism. Having regard to the transnational nature of terrorism, the PSC may further underscore the importance of enhanced collaboration and coordination between member states as well as with Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), including through the deployment of joint operations. Taking into account the growing use of technologies for supporting and perpetrating terrorist activities, the PSC may highlight the need for undertaking a study on the effect of technological advancements on the spread of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa.

Tomorrow (27 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC)  convene its 1182^nd session at ambassadorial level to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on counter terrorism.

Following the opening statement by Daniel Owassa, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, the Commissioner of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver remarks.  Additionally, Lallali Idriss Lakhdar, Acting Director of the Africa Centre for the Research and Study on Terrorism, is expected to give a presentation.

The report of the Chairperson aligns with the decision made by the Assembly (/AU/Dec.311 (XV)) during its 15^th Ordinary Session in July 2010. The Assembly requested the Commission to provide regular reports on the progress of counterterrorism efforts and cooperation in Africa. Furthermore, the PSC, in its 249^th session in November 2010, urged the AU Commission to submit reports and briefings on the state of terrorism in Africa, as well as the efforts of the AU, Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms and member States to combat this issue. It is worth noting that the Malabo Summit on Terrorism, held in May 2022, marked the fourth occasion where the issue of terrorism was discussed at the level of Heads of State and Government. This is not surprising considering that conflicts involving terrorist groups continues to grow from strength to strength.

As pointed out in our various research outputs including our landmark special research report, Africa has experienced major spike in not only the proliferation of conflicts involving terrorist groups but also in their impact and geographic spread. According to the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), Africa witnessed a staggering 400% increase in attacks and a 237% rise in deaths between 2012 and 2020. The 2023 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) further reveals that despite a slight decrease in terror attacks from 1,445 in 2021 to 1,332 in 2022, there was an 8% surge in deaths in 2022, making Africa the region with the highest increase in terrorism-related fatalities. Additionally, the ACSRT’s quarterly terrorism bulletin) reported a 12% increase in terrorism attacks during the first quarter (January – March) of 2023 compared to the same period in 2022 with 426 recorded attacks and 2,809 deaths. The ACSRT report indicates that  the attacks 226 targeted civilians and 160 targeted military forces.

The report also highlights the alarming geographical spread of terrorism, particularly in the Sahel and the West African coastal states, making the Sahel region the epicentre of terrorism in the world. As indicated in the 2023 GTI report, ‘four out of the ten most impacted countries by terrorism in 2022 were located in the Sahel region’. While Burkina Faso had the highest number of deaths in 2022, the areas near its borders with Niger, Benin, and Mali witnessed the majority of terror attacks, ‘accounting for 71% of all attacks that occurred in 2022’. The border area known as Liptako-Gourma, located between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, continues to be the most severely affected region.

Additionally, there is also encroachment of terrorism into coastal West African states from the Sahel affecting Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, and Ghana.

For instance, in Togo, a violent terrorist attack was carried out on 11 May, 2023 by around 60 attackers at a military outpost in Kpinkankandi, near the border with Burkina Faso. It was reported that this attack resulted in the death of eight Togolese soldiers and left 13 others injured. The GTI report further indicates that 17 attacks and 44 deaths occurred in Benin and Togo in 2022. In Ghana, the government expressed concern that an escalation of violence could benefit jihadist groups after ‘criminals’ attempted to bomb a bridge in Bawku, a northern region of Ghana bordering Burkina Faso on 9 February 2023.

Similarly, Boko Haram and its faction the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP) have also expanded their activities to Southern Nigeria and neighbouring countries such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The groups’ actions have resulted in the displacement of millions of people and a humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad region. In East Africa, al-Shabaab’s operations along the Kenya-Somalia border have been reported to have significantly increased starting from June this year. Recently, on 10 September Kenyan Defence Forces’ Soldiers patrolling along Milimani-Baure Road were killed and injured during a suspected al-Shabaab attack in Lamu County’s Boni Forest.

When it comes to Central Africa, there has been a significant rise in the overall number of attacks due to the activities of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) in the Great Lakes Region. In the South, the ACSTR recorded 31 attacks by  Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ), the terrorist group operating in Mozambique.

The other issues that the Chairperson’s report may also highlight is the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and those returning after joining the ISIS in places such as Syria.

Given the rise in the frequency and geographical spread of terrorism, it has become clear that the overreliance on hard security response measures is not delivering the expected outcomes. If anything, it has exacerbated the situation through its adverse impacts including abuses and collateral damages it inflicts on affected communities. This necessitates that the policy repones achieves a shift towards enhancing and focusing on the use of non-security measures targeting the governance, institutional, socio-economic, environmental and development issues that create the conditions for the emergence and expansion of conflicts involving terrorist groups.

It would also be of interest in PSC’s consideration of the Chairperson’s report to discuss the  impact of the constitutional crisis ensuing from military coups particularly in the Sahel on efforts for containing the growing threat of terrorism in the region. The Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (FC-G5S), a subregional arrangement initially composed of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, is gradually losing its strength as a result of member states’ withdrawal. In May 2022, Mali decided to withdraw from the G5 Sahel, including the FC-G5S, due to disagreements among the regional group members regarding the transitional authorities in Mali assuming the rotating presidency of the organization. This withdrawal has caused a profound institutional crisis within the subregional organization, as stated by Eric Tiaré, the Executive Secretary of the G5 Sahel, in his address to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Since then, coup d’états have taken place in Burkina Faso and Niger, leading to an alliance between the de facto leaders of Mali and Niger as well as the interim president of Burkina Faso.

On the other side, another development worthy of interest to this session is the signing of a charter that established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) on 16 September. In his press statement, Abdoulaye Diop, Mali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, emphasized that the main focus of the alliance ‘…is the fight against terrorism in the three countries.’

As in the past, one other issue that has increasingly received attention in the Chairperson’s recent reports is the relationship between terrorism and transnational organized criminal networks. Among the terrorist groups operating in West Africa, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) are known for taking advantage of such networks including for financing their activities and the recruitment of new members. In areas with predominantly informal economies, limited state resources and presence, and pervasive corruption, terrorist groups find it easy to levying taxes with little opposition from locals. This is particularly observed in territories experiencing the insurgence of JNIM and ISWAP.

The consideration of the Chairperson’s report is also expected to also deliberate on how terrorist groups operating in Africa are increasingly leveraging advanced technologies to mobilize support, recruit and carry out their attacks. Organizations such as al-Shabaab and ISWAP have adapted to the digital era by utilizing a variety of tools and platforms to plan, communicate, and organize their operations. Some terrorist groups, for example in relation to the Lake Chad Basin region, Boko haram, have sought to use drone technology for surveillance and weapon delivery. The ISWAP for instance has increased its use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED). Attention should also be paid to the risk of such actors employing cyber warfare tactics to disrupt crucial infrastructure and communication networks. Additionally, it is important to address the significant reliance of these groups on small arms and light weapons.

Tomorrow’s session would also serve as an opportunity for reviewing the efforts made by the AU, its Member States, and RECs/RMs to contain the spread of and enhance concerted efforts in the face of the transnational and transregional character of the threat. As it did last time, the Chairperson’s report further emphasizes that the predominant responses have been of a military nature, and ongoing attacks have resulted in increased militarization of states’ reactions. However, it is crucial to devote more attention to comprehending the less evident covert activities, such as the collaboration between terrorists, violent extremists, and illicit actors in recruiting and mobilizing resources. In this respect, the report calls for renewed efforts and provides a list of preventive measures.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its concern over the continuing scourge of terrorism and violent extremism, as well as the surge in the influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) into Africa and its implications for the peace and security of the continent. Towards strengthening continental mechanisms to counter terrorism, the PSC may recall Decisions, particularly [Assembly/AU/Dec.753.XXXIII] of February 2020, and Assembly/AU/Dec.815(XXXV) of February 2022, on the establishment of a Counter-Terrorism Unit within the African Standby Force (ASF). The PSC may also request member states to enhance the implementation of applicable AU instruments and Decisions, specifically the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the 50th OAU/AU Anniversary Solemn Declaration. Furthermore, the PSC is expected to stress the need for efforts to combat transnational organized crime, especially the proliferation of illicit arms, including through enhanced intelligence sharing mechanisms, border management cooperation, and control. The PSC may also reiterate its previous decision on the need to address the root causes of terrorism, including poverty and marginalization, the weak or absence of presence of the state and legitimate local governance infrastructures, which create the conditions for a breeding ground for terrorism. The PSC is also expected to emphasize the need for increased support for those affected by armed conflict, including children, youth, and women impacted by terrorism, radicalization, and insurgency. Additionally, the PSC may recognize the need to collaborate with Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and AU Organs to build community resilience and promote long-term recovery through post-conflict reconstruction and development programs. Drawing on the recommendation of the report of the Chairperson, the Council may also highlight the need to mainstream counterterrorism and prevention/countering of violent extremism in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).