Tomorrow (17 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1336^th meeting to receive a briefing from the AU Panel of the Wise on its activities in Africa.

Following opening remarks by Mahlaba Ali Mamba, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Eswatini to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for March 2026, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make an introductory statement. Domitien Ndayizeye, Chair of the Panel of the Wise, is expected to brief the Council.

The Panel of the Wise, one of the key pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) for preventive diplomacy, last briefed the PSC in March 2025. Although the PSC’s 665^th session in March 2017 envisaged quarterly briefings by the Panel, engagement between the two has in practice remained largely annual. During its 1264^th session of 11 March 2025, the Panel reaffirmed the Panel’s central role in conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding. That session drew particular attention to tensions in South Sudan and underscored the need for strengthening both resources and the AU presence on the ground. The Council also highlighted growing expectations on the Panel, including responding rapidly to emerging crises, sustaining engagement in fragile transitions and working more closely with partners. To support this, the PSC directed the AU Commission to strengthen early warning analysis for the Panel and undertake joint scenario-building with experts such as NeTT4Peace.

Broadly speaking, three sets of activities are expected to feature during tomorrow’s session. The first relates to the core mandate of the Panel, preventive diplomacy initiatives with respect to risks of eruption of conflicts or relapse into conflict. The second relates to the Panel’s engagement in election-related activities. The final one relates to the activities of the subsidiary bodies of the Panel, such as FemWise.

In terms of preventive diplomacy work of the Panel, the Panel’s missions to South Sudan and Madagascar are expected to receive particular attention.  The Panel’s continued engagement in South Sudan, while not enough to reverse the deteriorating situation, is expected to be of interest to the PSC. Following the PSC’s 1270^th meeting of 31 March 2025, which requested a high-level delegation led by the Panel of the Wise to help ‘de-escalate the tensions, cease-fire, and to mediate between the parties’, the Panel undertook a four-day mission to Juba in early April 2025 and engaged key stakeholders. A major gap was the denial of access to Riek Machar. The Panel also convened a consultative roundtable with South Sudanese civil society in Addis Ababa in June 2025. The Panel reportedly later recommended the appointment of an AU High-Level Representative, and at its 1297^th session, the PSC called on the Commission Chairperson to ‘urgently appoint’ one, although this had yet to be acted upon. The Council renewed the same appeal at its 1326^th meeting on 23 January 2026. Tomorrow’s session may therefore allow the Council to assess how this engagement can enable conditions for effective peacemaking, urgently needed for arresting South Sudan’s relapse back to full civil war currently underway.

Another area likely to feature in the briefing concerns the Panel’s engagement in Madagascar. It is to be recalled that at its 1306^th emergency meeting of 15 October 2025, the PSC suspended Madagascar following the unconstitutional change of government. In the same session, the Council reiterated ‘its recommendation to the Chairperson of the Union, with the support of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, to immediately dispatch a high-level delegation to Madagascar to engage with the stakeholders concerned’. This followed a similar recommendation made by the PSC at its 1305^th meeting two days earlier. On 16 October 2025, the AU Commission announced the deployment of a high-level delegation to Madagascar, coordinated with the Southern African Development Community (SADC), aimed at engaging state authorities, political parties, civil society and youth representatives in support of a Malagasy-owned, inclusive and civilian-led national dialogue geared toward restoring constitutional democratic governance.

The delegation to Madagascar, led by Domitien Ndayizeye and undertaken alongside AU Special Envoy Mohamed Idris Farah, visited Antananarivo from 7 to 11 November 2025. During the visit, the AU delegation consulted transitional leader Michael Randrianirina, Prime Minister Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo, Foreign Minister Christine Razanamahasoa and other stakeholders. The PSC’s 1313^th  meeting of 20 November 2025 received briefings from both Ndayizeye and Farah. Tomorrow’s session may therefore provide the PSC with an opportunity to take stock of the Panel’s engagement in Madagascar and to encourage sustained coordination between the Panel, the AU Special Envoy and SADC in support of mediation and an inclusive path toward restoring constitutional order.

In electoral contexts, the Panel continued with efforts to promote peaceful electoral conditions in countries involved in electoral processes. Accordingly, it undertook missions, among others, to Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Malawi and Tanzania through pre-election assessments, dialogue with political actors and institutions, confidence-building measures and post-electoral follow-up, helping to promote restraint, sustain political dialogue and reinforce trust in constitutional and electoral processes. As events in Guinea-Bissau and Tanzania illustrated, these efforts did not change electoral instability and violence. Tomorrow’s session would afford both the PSC and the Panel the opportunity to reflect on ways of improving the working methods and approaches to the Panel’s engagement in elections to make it more impactful than performative.

Another activity likely to receive attention is the Panel’s engagement in the Sahel and West Africa. On 15–16 December 2025, the Panel of the Wise convened a two-day consultative roundtable with eminent religious and traditional leaders in support of preventive diplomacy, dialogue, peace and social cohesion. The discussions highlighted the role of these leaders in promoting peaceful coexistence and stressed inclusive, community-based approaches involving women, youth, faith leaders, traditional authorities and state institutions, while also exploring more sustained mechanisms for collaboration with the PSC and the AU Commission.

Tomorrow’s session is also expected to review the work of the Panel’s subsidiary mechanisms and their contribution to AU preventive diplomacy. A key milestone for FemWise-Africa was the onboarding of its second continental cohort of members, conducted in collaboration with RECs/RMs and NeTT4Peace, through which 50 experienced women mediators were selected, expanding the pool available for AU deployment and concluding the Network’s re-conceptualisation to strengthen its support for AU-led mediation. FemWise-Africa also held a reflective meeting in Dakar in December 2025 on lessons from its decentralisation process, generating recommendations on membership, resource mobilisation and practical engagement to strengthen its chapters. Similarly, the AU WiseYouth Network held the first African Youth Consultation on Mediation, Preventive Diplomacy and Peace Processes in Kigali from 30 September to 2 October 2025, bringing together youth mediators, policymakers and emerging leaders to reflect on youth participation, share best practices and develop recommendations for expanding the role of youth in peace processes. Together, these efforts deepened the integration of gender-sensitive and youth-sensitive perspectives into AU preventive diplomacy and reflected closer coordination between the Panel and its subsidiary bodies, including through joint deployments to Gabon, Malawi, Tanzania and Côte d’Ivoire.

Another development that may feature in tomorrow’s briefing is the participation of members of the Panel, together with AU Special Envoys and High Representatives, representatives of regional organisations, and international partners, in the 16^th High-Level Retreat on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa held in Aswan, Egypt, from 21 to 22 October 2025 under the theme ‘Reframing AU Mediation – Consolidating African Leadership and Ownership’. The retreat reflected on ways of strengthening Africa-led mediation and preventive diplomacy and underscored the importance of more inclusive peace processes that engage women, youth, traditional and religious leaders, and local communities as indispensable actors in building sustainable peace and reconciliation.

In addition, on 19 December 2025, the Panel was hosted by Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, at AU Headquarters for discussions on preventive diplomacy strategies, ongoing reforms within the peace and security architecture and the changing security threats facing the continent. During that meeting, the Chairperson expressed appreciation for the Panel’s proactive engagement in conflict prevention and mediation and reiterated the Commission’s commitment to supporting the Panel’s role in advancing African-owned and African-led peace initiatives.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the Panel’s preventive diplomacy missions, particularly in South Sudan and Madagascar, as well as its missions to countries in transition and its electoral preventive diplomacy efforts. It may urge efforts for enhanced integration of FemWise and AU WiseYouth network into the various preventive diplomacy initiatives and peacemaking processes. The PSC may also call for an assessment of the efficacy of the working methods and approaches of the Panel, as well as the institutional and working arrangements of the Panel, as a critical measure for reinvigorating the role of the Panel in view of the escalation and complexity of insecurity and conflicts. It may stress the need to reinvigorate early warning and conflict prevention through closer collaboration with the Panel, while also calling for stronger coordination in supporting complex transitions, sustaining peace in fragile contexts and enabling early action to de-escalate emerging crises. The Council may further emphasise the need for better resourcing and more systematic follow-up to Panel missions, while encouraging closer cooperation with RECs/RMs and the UN, as well as other AU good offices. It may also welcome the first African Youth Consultation on Mediation, Preventive Diplomacy and Peace Processes held in Kigali from 30 September to 2 October 2025.

Tomorrow (09 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 16^th annual joint consultative meeting. This follows the 8^th annual joint retreat taking place today in Brussels, Belgium, where the consultative meeting is also being held.

Opening remarks at the 16th consultative meeting are expected from Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the AU PSC Chairperson for October, and the Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, Delphine Pronk.

This year’s consultative meeting comes against the background of three consecutive years of the AUPSC and the EUPSC being unable to adopt a joint communique due to disagreement over the language to be included with specific reference to the war in Ukraine. It is anticipated that this trend will finally come to an end during this year’s consultative meeting.

The members of the PSC reviewed and provided inputs on the draft joint communiqué only yesterday 6 October after the draft was sent by the EU side to the AU belatedly on Friday 3 October. The agenda for this year’s consultative meeting reflects continuity with past discussions, focusing on developments in the Horn of Africa—particularly Somalia/AUSSOM and Sudan—, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Great Lakes Region. In addition, the two sides are expected to address broader global geopolitical developments under ‘Any Other Business’. Additionally, the final agenda included ‘Working lunch on Women, Peace and Security’ during which the AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security is scheduled to make a presentation.

Horn of Africa

Under the Horn of Africa agenda item, two situations are envisaged to receive particular attention: the situation in Somalia, including the deployment of AUSSOM, and the ongoing crisis in Sudan.

With Ethiopia and Eswatini leading the intervention of the PSC on Somalia and AUSSOM, the dominant concern remains the mission’s funding. AUSSOM is faced with an existential crisis, arising from mounting debts and the lack of a predictable and sustainable financing arrangement to sustain operations until its planned exit at the end of 2029.

The AU had pinned its hope on UN Security Council Resolution 2719 on the financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations as a viable framework for predictable financing. However, efforts to operationalise the resolution stalled in May after the UN Security Council failed to reach an agreement, primarily due to U.S. opposition to applying the resolution as a test case for AUSSOM.

The AU has long explored alternative mechanisms, particularly the convening of a pledging conference. Following repeated delays—including earlier plans for Doha to host—progress was made on 25 September 2025 when the AU, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the UN, and the United Kingdom co-convened a High-Level Financing Event for AUSSOM on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. The AU has already committed an unprecedented amount of USD 20 million from its Peace Fund Crisis Reserve Facility for the mission’s 2025 operations, in addition to the provision of personnel and logistical enablers to strengthen operational effectiveness. The United Kingdom pledged GBP 16.5 million (USD 22 million), while Italy and Spain each appeared to commit USD 1 million. Additional, albeit modest, contributions are also anticipated from Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Given the nearly $200 million annual budget of AUSSOM, the pledges—though symbolically important—remain insufficient to bridge the gap. The co-chairs’ summary of the New York event underscored that ‘AUSSOM’s sustainability depends on closing the current financing gap, which remains substantial’. Yet, in the immediate term, there may be a possibility for significantly reducing the financing gap if the EU comes to the rescue of the mission through additional renewed support, considering the EU investment into this mission as the single largest contributor to AU missions in Somalia, providing close to €2.7 billion since 2007.

While the EU has not yet announced a specific funding package for AUSSOM, following the signal from the EU during the pledging conference in New York, expectations remain high that the EU may make an announcement in the near future. Tomorrow’s consultative meeting is expected to provide more clarity on the EU’s thinking in this respect.

Meanwhile, Somalia’s political landscape remains tense, with disagreements sparked by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s introduction of a ‘one person, one vote’ electoral model for the 2026 elections, replacing the long-standing clan-based indirect system. The move has generated friction with opposition figures and some of the federal member states, notably Jubaland and Puntland. These tensions risk diverting focus from the fight against al-Shabaab and, if left unresolved, could potentially escalate into violence.

It is also expected that, despite the fact that the attempt to apply Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM did not succeed, reference will be made in the outcome document to the continued relevance of Resolution 2719 and the imperative for its implementation.

With Tanzania and Algeria leading PSC’s intervention on Sudan, discussions are expected to focus on the security, political, humanitarian situations and the ongoing diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. Fierce fighting has continued around El-Fasher and the Kordofan region between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

On the political front, a particular point of concern for both counterparts will be the establishment of parallel governing structures and their implications for Sudan’s territorial integrity. In May 2025, SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appointed Kamil Idris as prime minister and announced a technocratic government based in Port Sudan. In response, the RSF-led Tasis coalition declared its own parallel government in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, in July 2025, naming Mohamed Hassan al-Taishi as Prime Minister, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo as head of a Presidential Council, and SPLM-N leader Abdel Aziz al-Hilu as his deputy.

The PSC, during its 1264^th, 1292^nd, and 1293^rd sessions, firmly rejected the RSF’s creation of a parallel government and urged AU member states and the wider international community not to recognise it. Similarly, the 24 September 2025 Co-Chairs’ statement issued by the AU, EU, France, Germany, and the UK following a ministerial meeting on Sudan ‘strongly’ rejected the establishment of parallel governing structures. In tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC and the EU PSC may reiterate the more neutral language of the co-chairs’ statement, rejecting the establishment of parallel governments in Sudan, while emphasising the need for a Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned transition process.

Signs of a more concerted diplomatic process gained momentum in September, though it remains fragile and without any breakthrough. On 12 September, the foreign ministers of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (the Quad) issued a joint statement calling for an initial three-month humanitarian truce leading to a permanent ceasefire, followed by the launch and conclusion of an inclusive and transparent transition process within nine months. The conflict parties did not heed the call.

On 24 September, the Quad’s foreign ministers met again on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. That same day, the AU, EU, France, Germany, and the UK convened a ministerial meeting with relevant actors to discuss Sudan and coordinate efforts toward de-escalation and civilian protection. The Co-Chairs’ statement, while welcoming Quad’s joint statement, expressed support for the AU and IGAD’s efforts to coordinate international and bilateral initiatives to pressure all Sudanese parties towards a ceasefire, humanitarian action and political dialogue. While these peace initiatives are encouraging, the lack of coordination among various initiatives remains a major challenge to launching a credible single peace process for Sudan—a challenge that tomorrow’s meeting is likely to reflect upon further.

The two counterparts are also expected to discuss ways of increasing pressure on the warring parties to allow unhindered humanitarian access, urge foreign actors to refrain from fueling the conflict, and step up humanitarian assistance in response to what has become the world’s most devastating humanitarian and displacement crisis—with over two-thirds of the population (30 million people) in need of assistance and more than 24 million facing acute food insecurity.

Great Lakes Region

With The Gambia and Equatorial Guinea leading PSC’s intervention, on the Great Lakes Region, as before, the focus remains on the situation in eastern DRC and the renewed diplomatic efforts to address it—particularly the involvement of the US and Qatar alongside the AU and relevant regional blocs (SADC and EAC). Diplomatic activity has intensified since M23’s significant territorial advances in eastern DRC beginning in January, including control of mineral-rich Goma in North Kivu Province.

A major breakthrough was the US-brokered peace agreement signed between the DRC and Rwanda on 27 June 2025. The two parties agreed, among others, to refrain from acts of aggression; to immediately and unconditionally end state support to non-state armed groups; and to implement the Harmonised Plan for the Neutralisation of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda—an outcome of the Luanda process. To support implementation, a Joint Oversight Committee—composed of the two parties, the US, Qatar, Togo (as AU facilitator), and the AU Commission—has been operationalised and has convened three meetings so far, the latest held earlier this month. In parallel, Qatar has been facilitating direct peace talks between the DRC and M23 since late March. This separate but coordinated track with the US produced a preliminary peace agreement in July, but missed the mid-August deadline for a final deal. Talks are expected to resume during the week of 6 October.

Meanwhile, in March, the joint EAC-SADC Summit appointed a Panel of Facilitators composed of five former Presidents to support the DRC peace process. On 1 August, the Co-Chairs of the Joint EAC-SADC Summit met the Panel in Nairobi and adopted a framework to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes. They also decided on the immediate merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. The Summit further called on the AU Commission to ensure all other initiatives and stakeholders align with this African-led process.

Against this backdrop, tomorrow’s meeting will grapple with at least three issues. First, despite progress in implementing the US-brokered peace agreement, hostilities and hostile rhetoric persist, with the parties trading blame for obstructing peace efforts. Second, accountability in the region is critical in light of continued allegations of human rights violations against civilians, as evidenced in the 5 September report of the Fact-Finding Mission on North and South Kivu. Third, there is also the issue of how the three peace initiatives could be consolidated into one credible process.

Sahel and Lake Chad Basin

On the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria will lead the intervention of the PSC during tomorrow’s meeting. The security and political situation in the Sahel has continued to deteriorate since the last consultative meetings of the two organs in November 2024. JNIM and ISGS have intensified their attacks in the Central Sahel and expanded their operations into coastal West Africa. This worsening insecurity is compounded by protracted political transitions, with the juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger consolidating power and extending military rule until 2030.

The approach of the AU and the regional body ECOWAS was primarily focused on the unconstitutional change of government, with no due regard to the priority issue of saving the countries from the existential threat facing them due to terrorism. In a departure from this flawed policy approach, at their second annual joint consultative meeting, they held in May, the PSC and ECOWAS agreed to develop a security cooperation framework with the three countries to more effectively respond to the crisis.

Tomorrow’s consultative meeting is expected to discuss recent AU efforts, including the AU Commission Chairperson’s meeting with representatives of the three countries in May, the visit of Angola’s Foreign Minister as special envoy on behalf of AU Chairperson João Lourenço, and the July appointments of President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi as Special Envoy for the Sahel and former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara as Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of MISAHEL. The meeting is further expected to deliberate on ways to step up engagement with the three countries to address the security crisis as a critical avenue for facilitating a return to constitutional order.

On Lake Chad Basin, tomorrow’s discussion is expected to focus on the security and humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin, the operations and support needs of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), and the status of implementing the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR). The EU has pledged €30 million over 18 months from January 2025 to strengthen MNJTF operations, while the AU Commission has also been providing support through the Crisis Reserve Facility of the AU Peace Fund and equipment from the Continental Logistics Base. A key regional development of interest to the consultative meeting is Niger’s March announcement of its withdrawal from the MNJTF, raising fears that this could weaken the Force and create a security vacuum that can be exploited by terrorist groups active in the region.

This year, beyond African peace and security issues, the agenda also reserves space for Any Other Business (AOB) to discuss global geopolitical developments. As an agenda proposed by the EU side, it remains unclear what the focus of the discussion on this agenda would be. However, there is increasing recognition that the major global geopolitical changes, characterised by, among others, the emergence of a multipolar world, are not without serious implications for both the AU and the EU and for their relationship. In this context, the flagrant breaches of international law norms, including international humanitarian law and related challenges to multilateralism and global governance reform, may also feature in the discussions.

As noted earlier, for the past three years, the PSC and the EU PSC have been unable to adopt a joint communiqué, primarily due to disagreements over the language to be used on the war in Ukraine. As highlighted in our earlier insights on the PSC, the recent AU–EU ministerial meeting held in May 2025 and the ongoing negotiations toward the outcome document of the forthcoming AU–EU Summit, expected in November 2025, have created optimism that both sides may reach common ground to adopt a joint communiqué this time. Indications are that the draft communiqué of the consultative meeting reproduced the formulation used in the joint ministerial communiqué which expressed support for ‘a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in Ukraine, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Sahel and in other major wars and conflicts around the globe, including Syria.’ With this, the two sides are expected to adopt a joint communiqué, ending the past three years of deadlock in adopting such a communiqué.

Tomorrow (08 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 8^th informal joint retreat, which will be followed by the 16^th annual joint consultative meeting to be convened on 09 October. This year’s joint retreat and consultative meeting is set to be hosted by EUPSC in Brussels, Belgium.

Ahead of the joint retreat, the AU PSC, particularly at the level of the Committee of Experts, met in Brussels on 6 October to finalise consultation on the agenda and the assignment of roles in leading interventions by members of the PSC. With the draft communique initiated by the EU side relayed to the AU belatedly on Friday 3 October, this will also be the first time that the AU PSC gets a chance to view and discuss on the draft joint communiqué.

Since 2015, the AUPSC and the EUPSC have institutionalised the practice of holding an informal joint retreat before their annual consultative meeting. Typically, the informal joint retreat focuses on current thematic issues. Tomorrow’s retreat is expected to focus on three key agenda items. The first one will be Peace Support Operations, with a focus on the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2719 and complementarity between Africa-led operations and EU-Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations. The second agenda item will focus on maritime security, and the third will address hybrid threats to peace and security, with a particular emphasis on cybersecurity, AI, and disinformation.

Peace support operations constitute a major area of longstanding partnership between the AU and the EU. With the understanding that AU’s peace support operations are critical for advancing global public good and fill in critical gaps in the international peace and security architecture, the EU has been a leading partner of the AU, among others, in making significant financial contributions to AU peace operations. Following the end of the Africa Peace Facility and the inauguration of the European Peace Facility, there has been a shift in approach. Yet, tomorrow’s session is expected to build on the AU-EU ministerial joint communiqué commitment to ‘strengthen African security, defence capabilities and stabilisation, including the supply of military equipment through the European Peace Facility and the African Peace and Security Architecture.’

In terms of partnership on peace operations in Africa, the most notable recent development was the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2719 on the financing of AU-led peace operations. One concrete situation in respect of which there was strong convergence between the AU and the EU on the application of this resolution was the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Thus, EU-AU Foreign Ministers in the Joint Communiqué they adopted after their meeting on 21 May 2025 ‘recognised the need for adequate, predictable and sustainable international support for AUSSOM and supported the hybrid implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) pertaining to the framework for financing the AU PSOs by the UN [and] considered this as more pressing given the multiplicity of challenges facing the Federal Government of Somalia and the need to continue supporting the government and strengthening state institutions.’ Despite the consensus between the AU and the EU on the application of UNSC Resolution 2719, the UNSC failed to adopt a decision on the use of this resolution for financing the AU mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). With no alternative source of funding available, the AUSSOM is faced with an existential financial crisis.

Despite the setback regarding the application of the Resolution for financing AUSSOM, the PSC is expected not only to affirm strong support for Resolution 2719 but also to call for strong commitment by all for the implementation of the resolution. The draft joint communiqué initiated by the EU side does not contain a dedicated language on Resolution 2719, which is viewed by members of the PSC as an omission that needs to be rectified. It is thus anticipated that the PSC will push for a formulation expressing strong support for and a joint call for advancing the implementation of the resolution in the joint communiqué to be adopted during the annual consultative meeting.

The second sub-item of the first agenda item focuses on complementarity between African missions and EU missions/operations. The EU runs various missions and operations as part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and CSDP in various parts of the continent, including three military operations (Central African Republic (CAR), Mozambique and Somalia) and five civilian missions (CAR, Gulf of Guinea, Libya, Mauritania and Somalia). In the theatres where African and EU missions operate in parallel, there is an opportunity for closer coordination and advancing complementarity. It is expected that during tomorrow’s retreat, the PSC and the EUPSC will exchange on opportunities not only for experience and information sharing but also for technical and logistical cooperation between the Africa-led missions and the EU-CSDP missions and operations operating in the same country.

The other agenda item tabled for the AUPSC-EUPSC informal retreat is Maritime Security. From the Joint communiqué of the May 2025 AU-EU Summit, the ministers welcomed the ongoing cooperation between the two continents on enhancing maritime security in the ocean and sea bordering Africa and Europe. In this regard, they ‘renewed their commitment to maintaining a rules-based maritime order in accordance with the principles of international law as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and called for greater exchange of information, improvement of operational coordination and provision of enforcement capacity to protect sea lanes and combat transnational crimes, including drug trafficking and piracy. The ministers also committed to work together to end Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, take action to conserve and sustainably use the ocean and sea, as well as promote science-based management of marine resources.’ The upcoming consultations are likely to discuss the evolving maritime security threats critical to Africa’s blue economy, global trade routes and EU-Africa partnerships.

The engagement on this may build on the 23 April 1275^th session of the PSC, which focused on the ‘Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.’ From the session’s communiqué, it is notable that beyond endorsing the Combined Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea as a standing, ready-to-deploy force capable of rapid and coordinated regional responses, the PSC underscored the importance of addressing the underlying drivers of maritime crime – poverty, weak governance and limited economic opportunities. This marked a welcome shift toward a holistic, preventive approach to maritime security, recognising that sustainable stability cannot be secured through military and law enforcement measures alone. By prioritising issues such as development deficits, corruption, youth unemployment and lack of sustainable livelihoods, the approach holds promise for building long-term resilience in coastal communities.

Finally, the last agenda item to be discussed at the AUPSC-EUPSC joint informal retreat is hybrid threats to peace and security, with particular focus on cybersecurity, AI and disinformation. Hybrid threats encompassing cybersecurity breaches, AI-driven manipulations and disinformation campaigns have escalated globally and across Africa as well, posing a threat to stability. According to INTERPOL’s 2025 Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report, a growing share of reported crimes in Africa is cyber-related. The report goes further and highlights that, despite the rising caseloads, most African states surveyed still lack essential IT infrastructure to combat cybercrime. Just 30 per cent of countries reported having an incident reporting system, 29 per cent a digital evidence repository and 19 per cent a cyberthreat intelligence database.

Regarding AI and disinformation, the AU Commission Chairperson noted in a speech earlier this year that ‘with AI’s ability to spread rapidly, …complex ethical and security concerns now exist.’ He cautioned that ‘[l]eft unchecked, AI will amplify these threats, exploiting disinformation, cyber-attacks, and even autonomous weapons,’ adding that disinformation and hate speech in the online space have become ‘most dangerous accelerators of conflicts.’ Accordingly, the AUC Chairperson counselled that ‘[o]ur response must be to pursue a balanced approach—one that maximises AI’s benefits while mitigating its risks.’ It is expected within this context that the two sides would exchange respective experiences, both in terms of the nature and trend of the threat posed by cybersecurity, AI and disinformation, and in terms of the tools being used and developed to respond to these threats.  Issues that may feature include closing AI governance gaps, harmonising early warning systems for AI-driven misinformation and expanding capacity-building for digital literacy and fact-checking. By integrating African perspectives into the development of global AI norms and governance, as well as advancing joint action for countering hybrid threats, the consultations can ensure the adaptation of the AU’s and EU’s governance and peace and security instruments to these emerging domains.

Tomorrow (24 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1303rd session in New York, on the margins of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly, at the level of Heads of State and Government, to deliberate on the theme ‘Re-energising Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa.’

The Chairperson of the PSC for September 2025, Angola’s President João Lourenço, will preside over the session and deliver the opening statement, followed by an introductory statement from Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission. António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), is also expected to deliver a statement. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), may deliver a presentation on strategies for effective conflict resolution in Africa.

The session appears to be Angola’s signature event during its chairship of the PSC in September. The theme of this session resonates well with President Lourenço’s role as AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation and his pivotal mediation in the conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo through the Luanda Process. It is expected that tomorrow’s deliberation will present an opportunity for Heads of State and Government to reassess the AU’s conflict resolution efforts and reflect on critical lessons and best practices for enhancing the PSC’s mandate in this area.

The session comes at a critical moment for the AU and its conflict prevention and resolution mandate. Conflicts across the continent are surging, spreading geographically, and causing devastating human and socio-economic impacts. At the same time, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)—AU’s framework for promoting peace, security and stability—has struggled to provide effective responses. In crises ranging from Libya and Sudan to tensions between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, external actors have increasingly assumed a lead role in peace efforts, while the AU has increasingly assumed a marginal role. This decline in African agency is unfolding against a wider backdrop of intensifying global rivalries, the erosion of multilateralism, and the expanding involvement of foreign actors in African conflicts or crises. These developments highlight the urgent need to recalibrate APSA and restore the AU’s role as a leading actor in resolving conflicts on the continent.

These developments make tomorrow’s session particularly significant. A key focus of the deliberations of the session is therefore expected to be how to reverse the downward spiral in AU’s role in conflict prevention and resolution and explore ways and means of advancing effective conflict prevention and resolution strategies and interventions. As a summit-level meeting of the PSC, the outcome of this meeting could also set the framework and inform the ongoing APSA review process.

One aspect of the deliberation is expected to highlight the challenges undermining the AU’s conflict prevention and resolution role. Several interlinked factors stand out, the first being the lack of strategic leadership. In earlier years, the AU demonstrated its ability to initiate credible mediation. The High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and South Sudan is a good example as an AU conflict resolution mechanism that highlights the key elements of a successful peace process: strong PSC direction, capable and committed mediators, sustained engagement and robust wider continental and international support. In 2012, it produced a roadmap so credible that even the UN Security Council endorsed it and helped to pull Sudan and South Sudan from the brink of a full-blown war. By contrast, recent AU efforts— Such as the one on Sudan—have been fragmented and ineffective. Despite multiple continental and regional initiatives, no single credible peace process has emerged, resulting in duplication, lack of sustained effort and a strategy that garnered the commitment of key Sudanese political and armed actors and the support of regional and international actors.

The AU once drew strength from putting in place processes that focus on political dialogue, mediation, and negotiation. This has gradually given way to a performative issuance of statements expressing concern or calling for peace and a tendency to focus on securitised peace operations and peace enforcement instruments—resource-intensive and often ill-suited to the complex socio-political dynamics driving most of the continent’s conflicts, particularly in the context of terrorism and violent extremism.

Over the years, the AU has also become more reactive, with interventions typically coming only after conflicts escalate. Inconsistencies in how the AU addresses conflict or crisis situations and applies its norms have also eroded its credibility. Structural setbacks to the Continental Early Warning System due to the removal of the conflict prevention division housing it following AU institutional reforms, the weak link between early warning and early action, and the lack of confidence in AU processes and political denialism of Member States in the face of looming crises have further obstructed timely responses.

There is also a coordination and policy coherence gap between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities and Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), even though the PSC Protocol envisages RECs/RMs as integral parts of the APSA. Despite efforts to strengthen coordination through agreed modalities for enhanced engagement, the current state of collaboration remains far from effective. In practice, the absence of strong coordination has often led to competing or fragmented initiatives in response to conflicts and crises on the continent. This was evident in the case of Sudan, where both the AU and the regional bloc IGAD launched parallel mediation tracks in the early days of the conflict. Such uncoordinated efforts undermine coherence and hinder launching a credible, unified peacemaking initiative, while providing space for foreign actors to step in and fill the vacuum.

Another challenge relates to the rapidly changing security dynamics on the continent, which have grown increasingly complex over the years. Between 2013 and 2023, conflict incidents more than doubled, with sharp spikes after 2019. While coups and interstate tensions have resurfaced, terrorism has emerged as the most pressing threat. Conflicts are increasingly driven by non-state actors in contexts marked by governance crises, organised crime, climate shocks, and disruptive technologies.

The AU’s role has also been further eroded by foreign interference. Africa has become a theatre of renewed global rivalries, with external actors backing factions and shaping political outcomes.

Tomorrow’s deliberation will additionally explore ways of addressing these challenges and identify strategies for repositioning the APSA and restoring Africa’s agency in conflict prevention and resolution. There is a pressing need for the AU to rebuild its agency through credible peacemaking processes and the restoration of the primacy of diplomacy as the main conflict and governance crises management and resolution tool. In this context, AU and its PSC should provide technically sound and diplomatically robust strategic guidance and oversight to peacemaking initiatives, while ensuring effective coordination with all relevant actors. Member States, for their part, should reaffirm their commitment to AU instruments and work collectively. At the same time, the AU Commission should strengthen its relationship with Member States and restore trust through the impartial delivery of its responsibilities and the provision of credible technical input.

Conflict prevention should also be placed at the core of AU’s peace and security work by strengthening the credibility of early warning, enhancing the profile, standing, and working methods of the Panel of the Wise, and increasing the use of non-intrusive and discrete preventive diplomacy. Conflict resolution, meanwhile, should be based on a clear strategy tailored to each situation, backed by adequate technical, diplomatic, and financial resources. Similarly, the AU needs to shift from a security-heavy posture toward a comprehensive approach that restores the primacy of politics. Given that many conflict dynamics are increasingly transregional and often require the engagement of more than one REC/RM, a more effective and conflict-sensitive working arrangement is needed—one that leverages and prioritises coordination between the AU and the concerned RECs/RMs and incentivises co-leadership and joint action rather than the tension-inducing principle of subsidiarity.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the ongoing APSA review. The Council may reaffirm the importance of reclaiming the AU’s agency and credibility in conflict prevention and resolution. It may underscore the need to restore diplomacy as the primary tool of conflict management and call on the AU Commission to focus its attention on the enhanced use of the diplomatic tools of persuasion, consensus building and mobilisation of support for conflict prevention and resolution. It may also call for consistent application of AU norms and even-handed response to conflicts and crises. The PSC may also reaffirm the commitment of the AU and its member states to the principle of non-indifference and the imperative of protection of civilians. It may emphasise that appointments for preventive or peace-making efforts prioritise gravitas, diplomatic skills and a track record of commitment to peace-making. The PSC may also call upon foreign actors to refrain from interfering in the continent’s conflicts, stressing that such interference is exacerbating the humanitarian toll and complicating their resolution. In addition, the PSC may urge Member States and RECs/RMs to reaffirm their commitment to the principles and norms of the AU. Finally, it may emphasise the importance of strong collaboration and coordination with regional and international actors in resolving conflicts on the continent, while underscoring that all peacemaking initiatives respect the AU’s leading role and leverage and respect the AU’s norms.

For a more detailed discussion on re-energising conflict prevention and resolution in Africa, please refer to our latest Policy Brief on the subject.