Tomorrow (25 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a meeting with two agenda items, one of them being a ‘Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review.’ Although the session is scheduled for tomorrow, the initial June 2026 Programme of Work had scheduled it to happen on 30 June.

The Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for the month of June, Nasir Aminu, will deliver opening remarks. This will be followed by a briefing from the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is entrusted with a relevant mandate, may also brief the PSC on its critical role.

Structural conflict prevention is closely linked to the AU’s core principles as set out in its Constitutive Act, which requires Member States to uphold democratic values, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, while also advancing socio-economic development and regional integration. Over the years, the AU has adopted several normative and policy instruments designed to facilitate the structural prevention of conflicts. In addition to the APRM that proved effective in detecting risks and vulnerabilities of reviewed AU member states, within the framework of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), steps were taken to develop tools aimed at facilitating the identification of a country’s structural vulnerability to conflict at an early stage. Of significance in this respect is the CSVRA and the accompanying Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS).

The CSVRA, developed as a follow-up to PSC’s 360^th session, held in March 2013, forms part of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF). The CSCPF has been developed to facilitate a Commission-wide and coordinated approach to structural conflict prevention with the aim of identifying and addressing structural weaknesses that have the potential to cause violent conflicts if left unaddressed.

During its 463^rd session of October 2014, the PSC, taking note of its efforts to finalise the elaboration of the CSCPF and the development of the CSVRA, requested the Commission to expedite the process. PSC’s 502^nd session, convened in April 2015, adopted the CSVRA/CSVMS tools, and requested the Commission, in collaboration with the RECs, to provide all the necessary assistance to Member States and popularise the tools while encouraging Member States to fully take advantage of these tools in their efforts towards the structural prevention of conflict. At its 901^st meeting of December 2019, the PSC encouraged Member States to make full use of the Commission’s tools for structural conflict prevention, including the CSVRA.

The PSC’s last meeting on the theme was held in December 2024, as its 1251^st session, in which, it tasked the AU Commission in partnership with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), ‘to take the necessary measures, in accordance with the rules and procedures of each organ and in compliance with their respective mandates, to establish a harmonised framework for the CSVRA and the CSVMS, including integration of CSVRA/CSVM into the APRM Questionnaire for the improvement of governance in Africa, by adopting coordinated and multi-sectoral approaches aimed at promoting the peace, security and development nexus on the continent.’ It further urged the AU Commission ‘to submit the draft harmonised framework to the PSC for approval.’ This was taken further when the PSC tasked the AU Commission to ‘undertake a comprehensive review of the CEWS, CSVRA and CSVMS with a view to reengineering the tools to effectively respond to threats to peace and security and proposing appropriate interventions’; and to ‘establish a comprehensive coordination mechanism, in collaboration with RECs/RMs and the APRM, aimed at optimising resource utilisation, strengthening synergy, and effectively integrating national, regional, and continental early warning systems, and submit the proposed coordination mechanism for its consideration by June 2025.’

Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to give an update on the ten-Year CSVRA review, and follow up on the tasks from the 1251^st session. Of concern, however, as the CSVRA undergoes its ten-year review, several persistent challenges have come into sharper focus. One of the issues that would be in the spotlight is the concern that the PSC expressed during that session, over the limited accession of Member States to the CSCPF tools – CSVRA and CSVMS, nine (9) years after adoption. Since then, the Malawi draft report validation meeting was held in November 2025, and the Strategic Review of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) methodology was held in Rwanda in November 2025, which included reviewing the CSCPF implementation (which considered the CSVRA and CSVMS). Additionally, the restructuring that integrated the Political Affairs and Peace and Security Departments into the PAPS Department effectively dismantled the dedicated CEWS division, leaving the CSVRA without a clear institutional anchor or dedicated personnel to promote and implement the mechanism. There is also the question of the alignment between and integration of the CSVRA into the APRM review processes to avoid duplication and ensure coherence.

It would also be of interest to the PSC to look into the decision of the February 2022 35^th AU summit requesting the Commission to establish a ‘Monitoring and Oversight Committee’ comprising the AU Commission, RECs/RMs, APRM and Member States to facilitate effective coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In tomorrow’s session, PSC may follow up on progress made towards the implementation of this decision. The other issue that is expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the update that the AU Commission may provide on the lessons learned from the implementation of the CSVRA on how it helps identify risks or vulnerabilities for conflict and facilitating the initiation of measures to mitigate or address those risks or vulnerabilities in the countries that volunteered to undertake the CSVRA review.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the importance of enhanced action for addressing structural causes of conflicts and the need for the full utilisation of the CSVRA towards mitigating and resolving the underlying causes and drivers of conflicts in Africa. The PSC may also reiterate the need for strengthening coordination between relevant entities for enhancing the effective implementation of the CSVRA without duplication. It may, in this regard, underscore the importance of the Monitoring and Oversight Committee that the AU Assembly tasked the AU Commission to establish at its 35^th session in February 2022. The PSC may also encourage both the AU Commission and member states that undertook the CSVRA review to document and share lessons learned from the review in order to improve the role of the CSVRA to tackle the underlying causes and drivers of conflict. The PSC may encourage Member States to fully take advantage of the CSVRA and CSVMS as instruments for the consolidation of peace and stability.

Tomorrow (25 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a session to receive an update on the AU’s Compliance and Accountability Framework.

The session will commence with opening remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for June, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS).

The session takes place as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is set to review the implementation of Resolution 2719 (2023) later this year, three years after its adoption, as required under the resolution. The Resolution stresses the operational necessity for AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) to access UN-assessed contributions to be planned and conducted in compliance with the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework, the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), and aligns with relevant UN frameworks and policies. Although Resolution 2719 has yet to be applied, the AU and the UN have, over the past two and a half years, undertaken a range of preparatory efforts to facilitate its implementation. These efforts have included a series of meetings of the AU–UN Joint Task Force, culminating in the development of a joint roadmap for the implementation of Resolution 2719, which is structured around four workstreams, one of which focuses on compliance and the protection of civilians.

In tomorrow’s session, the AU Commission is expected to brief the PSC on where the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework (AUCF) currently stands, progress made in strengthening and operationalising the Framework, the state of AU–UN coordination and institutional readiness for the implementation of Resolution 2719 in the context of compliance requirements, challenges encountered so far, and the way forward.

The issue of compliance began to feature prominently within the AU in the context of institutional reform efforts and the revitalisation of the Peace Fund from 2016 onwards. The Report on Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa, prepared by the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund, Donald Kaberuka, and endorsed by the AU Assembly at its 27^th Ordinary Session in July 2016, recommended the development of an AU Compliance Framework outlining applicable international legal obligations and due diligence requirements. The recommendation reflected the AU’s growing role in the deployment of PSOs across the continent and the legal and moral imperative for such operations to adhere to obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Strengthening compliance was seen not only as essential to enhancing the legitimacy, effectiveness, and credibility of AU peace operations, fostering trust among local populations, and contributing to sustainable peace and stability, but also as one of the conditions for AU-led PSOs to access UN-assessed contributions.

The PSC subsequently reinforced this agenda at its 689^th session, held on 30 May 2017, where it underscored the importance of adherence to international humanitarian law, human rights standards, and conduct and discipline requirements in the conduct of PSOs. The Council further agreed that the operationalisation of financing arrangements for AU-led PSOs authorised by the UNSC should be predicated, inter alia, upon strengthening the AU’s human rights due diligence capabilities, including preventing and combating sexual exploitation and abuse.

Efforts to strengthen the AU’s compliance framework gained further momentum during negotiations on a UNSC resolution on the financing of AU-led PSOs, which intensified between 2018 and 2023 and culminated in the adoption of Resolution 2719 in December 2023. Throughout these negotiations, several UNSC members repeatedly emphasised the need for the AU to establish a robust compliance framework capable of meeting UN standards on human rights due diligence, conduct and discipline, and accountability. In response, the AU progressively consolidated its compliance architecture.

Notable milestones included the adoption by the PSC, at its 813^th session in November 2018, of the AU Policy on Conduct and Discipline for PSOs and the AU Policy on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in PSOs, both of which were subsequently endorsed by the 32^nd AU Assembly in February 2019. Compliance and accountability principles were further mainstreamed into the 2021 AU Doctrine on Peace Support Operations. Additional progress was made through the adoption of the Policy on Child Protection in AU PSOs and the Policy on Mainstreaming Child Protection into the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) during its 14^th ordinary session. The framework received a further boost in January 2023 when the 15^th STCDSS adopted three key instruments: the AU Strategic Framework for Compliance and Accountability in PSOs, the AU Policy on Protection of Civilians in PSOs, and the AU Policy on Selection and Screening of Personnel for PSOs.

To further institutionalise the compliance and accountability framework and strengthen implementation efforts, the AU entered into a Tripartite Project with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations in February 2022 on AUCF for PSOs. The project aims to ensure that AU-led PSOs are planned, conducted and managed in compliance with IHL, IHRL, and applicable standards of conduct and discipline. Through this initiative, the AU has benefited from additional staffing, technical expertise and dedicated programmatic resources to support the implementation of the framework. Currently, there is a dedicated AUCF Project Focal Point within the Peace Support Operations Division of the Conflict Management Directorate.

Recent developments indicate continued progress in strengthening the framework. In May 2026, the AU–EU–UN Strategic Steering Committee (SSC) of the AUCF launched the next phase of the project covering the period 2026–2030. AU also officially launched the Case Management System (CMS) for PSOs under the AUCF. The CMS serves as a critical mechanism for the prevention, reporting, investigation, tracking and management of allegations relating to violations of IHL and IHRL, as well as other forms of misconduct. It is also intended to facilitate corrective action, accountability processes and redress for affected individuals. In addition, a Third-Party Compensation Policy has been developed, while the AU’s compliance training curriculum—originally developed in 2018—has undergone a comprehensive review to ensure its continued relevance and responsiveness to the evolving operational requirements of AU-mandated and authorised PSOs.

Encouraging steps have also been taken to integrate the AU’s compliance architecture into ongoing peace operations. The March 2026 report on joint AU–Federal Government of Somalia–UN progress against benchmarks and the AUSSOM mission configuration plan highlighted several advances, including the role of the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC). The mechanism enables the mission to identify, assess and analyse incidents involving civilian harm and supports the implementation of mitigation measures, operational adjustments and accountability actions where necessary. To strengthen accountability and transparency, AUSSOM has also established Boards of Inquiry (BOIs) at both contingent and Mission Headquarters levels. These bodies serve as formal investigative mechanisms responsible for examining incidents involving potential violations, operational failures, and breaches of conduct and discipline.

Despite these progresses, challenges remain in the implementation of the compliance and accountability framework. AU PSOs are often deployed in highly volatile and complex conflict environments characterised by asymmetric warfare involving terrorist and other non-state armed groups, which complicates compliance efforts. Mission management dynamics can also pose challenges. In some instances, troop-contributing countries retain varying degrees of operational control over their contingents, which may constrain the AU’s authority over mission personnel and impede the consistent application of compliance and accountability measures. Most of all, at the continental level, the growing emergence of ad hoc security arrangements and regionally led deployments operating outside established continental frameworks highlights major challenges in the effective implementation of the AUCF. Sustained support is required not only to uphold compliance standards but also to facilitate investigations, disciplinary processes, remedial measures, and cooperation with oversight mechanisms.

Institutionally, the project-based nature of elements of the framework raises questions regarding sustainability and continuity. While external partnerships have played a critical role in advancing the framework, long-term institutionalisation will require predictable funding, dedicated staffing, and enhanced technical capacity. Adequate resources are particularly important to support continuous training, monitoring and evaluation, investigations, victim assistance, and compensation mechanisms.

Challenges also persist in AU–UN coordination, particularly in the context of operationalising Resolution 2719. While the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat have maintained regular engagement on the technical and operational requirements for the application of the resolution through the various workstream configurations, progress in unpacking and operationalising compliance-related requirements appears to have been relatively limited. While major progress has been registered on all workstreams, including compliance, compared to other workstreams—most notably joint planning, decision-making and reporting, and mission support— there are areas in which the Human Rights Compliance and Protection of Civilians workstream lags behind, such as the existence of a full staff complement dedicated to this at strategic headquarters towards full operational readiness.

It is not yet clear whether tomorrow’s session will adopt an outcome document in the form of a communiqué or press statement. However, the PSC may welcome the achievements of the first phase of the AU–EU–UN tripartite project on the AUCF, as well as the launch of its second phase covering the period 2026–2030. The Council may also take note of the progress made over the years in strengthening the AU’s compliance architecture and its institutionalisation and operationalisation, including the adoption of key policy instruments, the recent launch of the AUCF Case Management System, the development of a Third-Party Compensation Policy, and the revision of the compliance training curriculum. While acknowledging progress made in unpacking and operationalising Resolution 2719 through the four workstreams, the PSC may request the AU Commission to intensify engagements with the UN Secretariat in order to develop a common understanding of the compliance requirements under the Resolution and the steps necessary to meet them, as the UN Security Council prepares to review its implementation later this year.

Tomorrow (15 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1346^th meeting to receive an ‘Update on the Status of the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF).’

Following the opening remarks from Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the progress made in the operationalisation of the Force.

The last time the PSC discussed this theme was during its 1257^th session held on 30 January 2025, in which, it provided an opportunity for the PSC to assess the status of ASF’s readiness, key challenges to ASF’s operationalisation, and the ongoing strategic review process aimed at enhancing its effectiveness as Africa’s primary mechanism for peace support operations (PSOs), and the integration of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law (IHL and IHRL) into the ASF doctrine.

In tomorrow’s session, two recent developments are expected to feature. The first is the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities and the Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) on the Use of the ASF, during the 39th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in February 2026. The Assembly directed the AU Commission to expedite its signing and its operationalisation, which is scheduled to take place in June 2026 on the margins of the AU Mid-Year Coordination meeting to be held in Egypt. The second development is the endorsement of completion of the ASF Strategic Review by the same Assembly session, which further tasked the AU Commission to ‘expedite the implementation of its recommendations, with emphasis on readiness, interoperability, and sustainable financing mechanisms.’ It is to be recalled that during Council’s 1159^th meeting held at the ministerial level on 22 June 2023, it requested the AU Commission, among other things, to expedite ‘the strategic review of the ASF in order to align it with contemporary security challenges facing the continent’ drawing on Conclusions of the Inaugural Lessons Learned Forum on AU Peace Support Operations and the ASF that was held in November 2022, in Abuja, Nigeria. Despite the Assembly decision indicating the completion of the review, the outcomes of the process were expected to be tabled before the PSC and the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) in early 2026, as agreed during the second Lessons Learned Forum on AU PSOs and the ASF held in November 2025, unless the review process was concluded without prior presentation to the PSC and the STCDSS.

Meanwhile, a recent PSC meeting, 1341^st meeting, held on 27 April 2026 on ‘Peace Support Operations in Africa,’ saw the Council, among other things, calling for the need for ‘regular strategic reviews of AU PSOs, drawing on lessons learned to inform necessary adjustments to the PSO framework, in line with the outcomes of the Abuja Lessons Learned Forum on PSOs and the ASF,’ and called for systematic follow-up and integration of the outcomes of the Abuja Forum into ongoing AGA-APSA and PSO reform processes. The same meeting also saw the PSC calling for the need to ‘improve rapid deployment capacity, force readiness (training and equipment for ASF battalions), and key enablers (aviation, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance – ISR, engineering, medical, and mobility).’

It is also anticipated that, during tomorrow’s session, the Commission will provide updates on its consultations with key stakeholders as part of the ASF strategic review process, amid its full operationalisation. A major impediment to the operationalisation of the Force has been the lack of political consensus and institutional alignment between the AU and RECs/RMs. The adoption of the MoU during the 15^th STCDSS in May 2023 clarified roles and responsibilities in planning, deployment, and post-deployment stages, as well as political sensitivities. However, competing regional interests continue to hinder coordination. Differences over authority, particularly between the AU and RECs, have complicated decision-making and affected the ASF’s readiness across regions. While ECOWAS, SADC and EASF have made notable progress, other regions continue to face challenges related to resources, coordination, and harmonisation. The PSC during its 1341^st session called for the need to ensure ‘multidimensional strategic management at the AU and within the Planning Elements (PLANELMs) of the RECs/RMs.’ This arises from previous consultations between the AU Commission and the five ASF PLANELMs, including the first phase, held from 2 to 4 December 2024 in Algiers, Algeria, involving a Technical Consultative Meeting and dedicated consultations between the ASF RECs/RMs PLANELMs and TCEs/Tis, to strengthen coordination and harmonise decision-making in line with the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative advantage.

Logistical and operational readiness also remain significant obstacles to the ASF’s effectiveness. Although the establishment of the Continental Logistics Base in Douala, Cameroon, in 2018 marked important progress, the incomplete development of Regional Logistics Depots and inadequate strategic airlift capabilities continue to constrain rapid deployment. The PSC’s 1159^th session, therefore, called on the AU Commission to expedite assessments and agreements related to pledged strategic lift assets to support troop deployment, reinforcement, casualty evacuation, and logistics supply. Maritime readiness also requires further investment despite ongoing preparations for the ASF’s first maritime exercise. Tomorrow’s sessions will also provide the opportunity to advance discussions on the council’s previous decision at its 1159^th meeting on the ‘need for a maritime component within the ASF, among others, to facilitate maritime trade and ultimately the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area.’ At the same time, the ASF’s potential role in counter-terrorism has gained strategic importance amid growing insecurity in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and other regions. The proposed establishment of a counter-terrorism unit within the ASF, first endorsed during the PSC’s 960^th session in October 2020, remains a key priority for enhancing the ASF’s response to asymmetric threats.

Despite these challenges, the ASF framework continues to offer significant opportunities for strengthening Africa’s peace and security architecture through standardised training, improved interoperability, and enhanced institutional resilience. ASF-led training programmes have contributed to a shared understanding of operational procedures, while integrating regional and ad hoc peace support initiatives into the ASF framework could optimise collective security efforts. In this vein, from 1 to 5 December 2025, the 17^th African Standby Force Training Implementation Workshop (TIW) took place in Harare, Zimbabwe, under the theme, ‘Enhancing Efficiency in Mandate Implementation: Reassessing Capacity Needs Assessments.’ The workshop brought together stakeholders to review progress and challenges in implementing the ASF Training Directives (2024–2026) and the recommendations from the 16^th TIW, while emphasising the importance of Training Needs Assessment (TNA) as a key instrument for aligning training with PSOs’ mandate requirements and strengthening operational effectiveness. Among others, the discussions also focused on enhancing strategic analysis, promoting collaboration, and harmonising training efforts among the AU, RECs/RMs, PSOs, training centres, and partners through the exchange of best practices and lessons learned.

Conversely, the ASF strategic review process has been slowed by funding gaps, with recent consultations focusing on legal and policy frameworks, operational challenges, financing, and capacity enhancement. Finally, the ASF’s effectiveness in addressing terrorism, violent extremism, and other complex threats depends on sustained political commitment, strategic investment, and the resolution of institutional ambiguities between the AU and RECs. The PSC’s directive to integrate ASF principles into all AU PSOs and align the ASF concept with the AU doctrine on PSOs represents an important step toward institutionalising the framework and ensuring that the ASF remains a practical mechanism for advancing African-led peace and security.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session could be a communique or a summary record. Council may call for enhanced collaboration and coordination between the Planning Elements (PLANELMs) of the RECs/RMs and the Continental PLANEL, to facilitate harmonisation of decision-making on the deployment of the ASF based on the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantages. Council may further underscore the need for a maritime component within the ASF, among others, to facilitate maritime trade and ultimately the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area. Regarding funding, Council may highlight the importance of intensifying efforts to address the perennial challenge of unpredictable, inadequate and unsustainable funding for AU peace and security efforts, including the commitment by Member States to make contributions to the AU Peace Fund according to the approved scales of assessment.

Tomorrow (20 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1340^th session to receive a briefing from the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3).

The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026, followed by a statement from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The representatives of the A3 members, Somalia as the coordinator of the group for the first quarter, are expected to brief the PSC on the activities of the A3.

Since January 2026, the three elected African members (A3) of the UN Security Council (UNSC) comprise the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Somalia for the 2026–2027 term. Somalia joined the Council in January 2025 after more than five decades, while 2026 marks the return of Liberia after a 65-year absence and the return of the DRC after 35 years. Notably, the DRC concurrently serves on the PSC, creating an opportunity to strengthen coordination and coherence between the two councils.

With Guyana concluding its term at the end of 2025, there is currently no Caribbean representation on the Council. Consequently, unlike during the 2020–2021 and 2024–2025 terms, there is no prospect of expanding the A3 into an ‘A3+1’ configuration.

Tomorrow’s briefing takes place within the framework of longstanding efforts to strengthen coordination between the AU and the UNSC. This engagement traces back to the first conclusion of the High-Level Seminar (HLS) on peace and security in Africa, held in Algiers in December 2013, which established the practice of the A3 providing quarterly briefings to the PSC on African issues on the UNSC agenda, although, in practice, these briefings have not been delivered consistently.

This commitment has since been consistently reinforced. It was reaffirmed during the 11^th Oran Process in 2024 and further institutionalised through the adoption of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3 at the PSC’s 1289^th session on 24 July 2025, formalising requirements for regular reporting and structured engagement.

During the most recent A3+ briefing to the PSC in August 2025, the PSC not only decided to institutionalise consultative meetings between the PSC and the A3+ at ambassadorial level as a statutory activity within its annual indicative programme, but also reiterated its request for the A3+ to brief and consult the PSC on a quarterly basis and whenever necessary, on African issues under consideration by the UNSC.

In this context, the A3 are expected to brief the PSC on their activities within the UNSC since the beginning of 2026, highlighting their continued efforts to advance coordinated African positions and to ensure that the continent’s perspectives are effectively reflected in Council deliberations and outcomes. In this regard, the A3 have sustained an active and consistent engagement across a wide range of agenda items through the delivery of joint statements, covering both African country-specific situations and broader thematic and global issues. On African files, the A3 are likely to highlight their sustained engagement on situations such as the Central African Republic, DRC, Libya, Sudan, and South Sudan. Beyond African situations, the A3 have also demonstrated engagement on broader international peace and security issues, including developments in the Middle East. These interventions have generally underscored key principles, such as the primacy of political solutions, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the protection of civilians, and adherence to international law, while also reaffirming the central role of the AU and regional mechanisms in addressing conflicts on the continent. These positions underscore the A3’s efforts to situate Africa as an active stakeholder in global peace and security discussions, beyond continent-specific concerns.

In addition to statements, the A3 are also expected to reflect on their growing role in influencing Security Council outcome documents through engagement in negotiations on draft resolutions and other Council outcome documents. Recent examples include their involvement in ongoing negotiations on the resolution of situations relating to Libya and a resolution and a press statement on South Sudan. Another instance is A3’s initiative in shaping Council engagement on Sudan, by initiating, together with the United Kingdom as penholder, a Security Council meeting in March, following a strike on a hospital in East Darfur state. These efforts point to the increasing role of the A3 in engaging with penholders and other Council members to ensure that African perspectives are reflected in the formulation of Security Council decisions.

The session is also expected to feature discussions as a follow-up to previous decisions of the PSC aimed at strengthening communication and coordination with the A3. In this regard, PSC members may draw on past precedents, such as, the communiqué adopted at its 1221^st Session in July 2024 on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), which reiterated the call for the total lifting of the arms embargo on the CAR and encouraged the A3 to promote a unified position on this matter within the UN Security Council. Building on such precedents, the session may also reflect on recommendations emerging from the 11th and 12th High-Level Seminars on Peace and Security in Africa (Oran Process), which underscored the need for more systematic information sharing and the synchronisation of meetings between the PSC and the UN Security Council on issues under their joint mandate.

The meeting is also expected to provide an opportunity to reflect on the outcomes of the 5^th Annual A3 Retreat held on 4 February, which brought together incoming, current, and former A3+ members for strategic reflection and planning. The Retreat underscored the importance of strengthening coordination, unity, and synergy with the PSC, while enhancing Africa’s strategic positioning within the Security Council. In this context, discussions may reflect on the need to address the continued challenges faced by the A3 in influencing Council outcomes, particularly their role in pen-holding and drafting processes while navigating through the current complex geopolitical competition.

Building on these reflections, the PSC session may recall the discussion that took place during the 6^th A3 High-Level Meeting held on 13 February on the margins of the 39^th AU Assembly, which focused on advancing African agency and leadership in peace and security within a changing global order. Discussions at that meeting emphasised the need to strengthen the A3 as a strategic mechanism guided by African priorities, enhance its proactive role within the Security Council, and advance predictable and sustainable financing for AU-led peace support operations. In this regard, particular attention may be given to the importance of enhancing AU–UN cooperation frameworks, including through the effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719. The adoption of the UNSC Resolution 2719 in December 2023 stands as a notable illustration of what coordinated A3 engagement can achieve in advancing a common African position. As such, the effective implementation and operationalisation of this resolution will be critical for further strengthening the AU–UN strategic partnership and ensuring sustained support for AU-led peace operations.

Tomorrow’s briefing outcome is expected to be a communiqué, and in this regard, the PSC is expected to welcome the briefing by the A3 and express appreciation for their continued efforts to articulate and advance coordinated African positions within the UNSC, while also commending the sustained cohesion, coordination, and unity demonstrated by the A3 since the beginning of their 2026–2027 term. Building on this, the PSC may acknowledge the growing role of the A3 in influencing UNSC outcomes, as well as their interaction with penholders and other Council members to ensure that African priorities and perspectives are adequately reflected, and in doing so, the Council may underscore the importance of strengthening coordination and coherence between the PSC and the UNSC. In the same vein, the PSC may further reiterate the need for the A3 to uphold, promote, and defend the decisions and positions of the PSC in their engagement within the UNSC, in line with relevant AU Assembly decisions and the conclusions of the High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa (Oran Process). In this regard, the PSC may also emphasise the importance of the effective implementation of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3, particularly with regard to ensuring regular reporting, structured engagement, and timely exchange of information between the two bodies. In this context, it may call for enhanced regularity and predictability in the provision of briefings by the A3, in line with the agreed quarterly framework, and encourage more systematic consultations to facilitate timely guidance from the PSC on African issues under consideration by the UNSC, while at the same time encouraging further strengthening of practical cooperation between the PSC and the A3, including through the synchronisation of their respective programmes of work, enhanced interaction between the experts of the PSC and the UNSC, and the establishment of effective information-sharing mechanisms. Furthermore, the PSC may highlight the importance of enhancing the role of the A3 in pen-holding and drafting processes within the UNSC, while encouraging continued efforts to navigate geopolitical dynamics and safeguard African priorities. Finally, the PSC may stress the importance of strengthening AU–UN cooperation frameworks, including through the effective implementation and operationalisation of UNSC Resolution 2719 as a key instrument for ensuring predictable and sustainable financing of AU-led peace support operations.

Tomorrow (16 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1339^th session on ‘Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security in Africa’. The session will be held at the Ministerial level.

Following opening remarks by Gedion Timothewos Hessebon, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Chairperson of the PSC for April 2026, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission will make the introductory statement. The meeting will then receive briefings from Worku Gachena Negera, Director General of Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute, and Samson Itodo, Chairperson of the African Union Advisory Group on Artificial Intelligence. Bernardo Mariano Junior, Assistant Secretary-General, Chief Information Technology Officer, UN Office of Information and Communications Technology (UNOICT) will also make a statement.

 The rapid development of AI and its accelerating deployment across the political, social, economic, cultural, and security fields is attracting growing policy attention. Not surprisingly, there has been a burgeoning engagement on this matter during the past few years on the part of the UN and AU peace and security and governance policy-making bodies. In view of various technical and regulatory gaps and inbuilt flaws associated with AI, the widespread optimism that characterises the adaptation and deployment of AI in Africa requires critical engagement on ways of harnessing its benefits and mitigating its risks, some of which are particular to Africa. It has been reported that AI is projected to add between $ 2.9 trillion and $ 4.8 trillion to Africa’s economy by 2030, presenting an opportunity for the youth who constitute the majority of the African population.   Industries from agriculture and healthcare to education and finance are on the brink of major transformation.

In terms of the deployment of AI, the continent faces a ‘non-linear’ development path marked by significant regional disparities. While East and South Africa possess more mature ecosystems, Central Africa remains in a nascent stage due to infrastructure and digital literacy constraints. There are persisting challenges across the continent affecting the potential of AI, including unreliable electricity, fragmented data regulations, a lack of a policy framework and the erosion of local talent to global companies.

Africa currently represents only about 1% of the world’s AI computing capacity. Without intentional investment and strong governance, the continent risks remaining largely a consumer of technologies built elsewhere, systems designed for different environments and not always aligned with African needs and realities.

As noted in the various engagements of the AU and the UN, there is recognition that AI is reshaping the global governance, development and security environment. At the level of the UN, engagement on the implications of AI is gaining momentum both in the UNSC and the UN General Assembly. Among others, the UNGA adopted Resolution 79/239 on Artificial Intelligence in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security. Along with the ongoing effort for developing a global governance framework, these developments and the need for addressing the specific needs and concerns of Africa in relation to AI necessitate that Africa and the AU engage actively, among others, on issues of data protection, addressing the digital divide, developing capabilities for adapting and developing AI for Africa, regulatory and technical gaps, protection of vulnerable groups and deployment of AI in the military domain.

It is against this background that the PSC started convening sessions dedicated to the theme of AI and its governance and peace and security implications. On 13 June 2024 – as part of its 20^th anniversary commemoration – the AUPSC held its first session dedicated to ‘AI and its impact on peace and security in Africa’. This  1214^th session of the Council underscored AI’s transformative potential for peacebuilding, including its applications in early warning systems, conflict prevention, and post-conflict recovery. Most notably, however, it recognised the risks associated with its rapid development in a regulatory vacuum. The meeting tasked the AU Commission to ‘undertake a comprehensive study on the impact and implications of AI on peace, security, stability, democracy and development in Africa and submit the Report to the PSC as soon as possible.’ It also assigned the AU Commission, in particular the PAPS Department, in coordination with the Department of Infrastructure and Energy, to ‘establish a multidisciplinary Advisory Group on AI, peace, security and good governance in Africa; and to propose options for Continental Artificial Intelligence governance, including its military application and to report to Council every six months.’

Subsequently, the PSC held the first ministerial-level meeting on 20 March 2025 as its 1267^th session under the theme ‘AI and its Impact on Peace and Security in Africa’. Building on its initial session (1214^th), the 1267^th session proposed the mainstreaming of AI in peace support operations, early warning systems, and preventive diplomacy, while also calling for the development of a Common African Position on AI and an African Charter on AI to guide its responsible use. Some progress has since been made in implementing these decisions, notably through the establishment of the AU AI Advisory Group on Governance, Peace and Security in March 2025. In December 2025, the Advisory Group convened in Nairobi, Kenya, to discuss its future plans, including the development of a Common African Position on AI, and to deliberate on emerging AI trends, opportunities and risks in Africa, as well as their implications for governance, conflict prevention and stability. Additionally, a technical workshop on the Strategic Assessment and Review of the Continental Early Warning System was held in November 2025 in Kigali, Rwanda, which resulted in the adoption of a joint AU–RECs/RMs Roadmap to integrate AI into early warning processes.

In March 2026, convened under the theme ‘Women, Peace and Security in Africa: Women’s Leadership in Addressing Emerging Threats to Peace and Security: Artificial Intelligence and Technology-Facilitated Violence,’ the PSC’s 1334^th meeting drew attention to the implications of AI on women, peace and security. It served as a useful occasion for highlighting the deleterious consequences of the adoption of new technology, including AI, particularly in accentuating existing patterns of discrimination and prejudice, including technology-facilitated gender-based violence, online harassment, misinformation and disinformation, which undermines women’s effective leadership, credibility, reputation, participation, safety and authority. In this regard, the Council, among other decisions, directed the AU Commission, in particular the AI Advisory Group on Governance, Peace and Security, to ensure the inclusion of issues relating to women in the development of the Common African Position on AI Governance, Peace and Security.

Tomorrow’s meeting is being held just a day before the PSC undertakes a field visit to the Ethiopian AI Institute and the Science and Technology Museum, as part of its activities planned for April 2026. It should be recalled that the 39^th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union held in February 2026 endorsed Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, as the AU Champion for AI. Relatedly, one of the Decisions during the Summit – particularly under the briefing by Cyril Ramaphosa, president of South Africa, on the outcomes of the November 2025 G20 leaders’ summit, was ‘to establish an annual AI for Africa Conference,’ following the inaugural Conference convened in Cape Town in September 2025.

It is expected that the upcoming session will build on and further expand the PSC’s consideration of AI and governance and peace and security in Africa. Of particular interest in this respect for tomorrow’s session is the role that Africa plays on the one hand in bolstering national and continental technical and regulatory infrastructure for harnessing the benefits and mitigating the risks of AI for governance, development, and peace and security in Africa and on the other hand in participating actively and contributing to shaping the development of global AI governance systems.

Tomorrow’s session will additionally be an opportunity to follow up on its previous decisions and chart a way forward, particularly during its 1267^th session in which it highlighted the importance of setting up a mechanism ‘to monitor and assess the impact of AI on peace and security, such as an AU Watch Center with a mandate to monitor AI developments worldwide and in Africa, and to regularly inform AU Member States, RECs/RMs and the AU on the state of AI, particularly its impact on governance, peace and security in Africa.’ It may also follow on the decision tasking the AU Commission ‘to organise an African forum bringing together relevant partners and stakeholders to discuss AI as a key tool suited to share best practices and strategies for peace, security and governance in Africa’ and ‘to develop training programmes on AI in support of AU Member States in investing in human capital by training and capturing African talents in the fields of AI.’

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the need for developing technical and regulatory infrastructure, both at the national and continental levels, to position the continent for both harnessing the benefits and containing the risks of the use of AI in Africa. The Council may also emphasise that AI and its use, including in the military domain, are subject to international law rules, including human rights and international humanitarian laws. It may urge Member States to adopt national legislation aligned with the continental strategy and framework to regulate the use of AI, particularly as it relates to governance, peace and security. The PSC may also encourage the Members of the AU Advisory Group on AI in Peace, Security and Governance Group to expedite the development of the Common African Position on AI and its impact on peace, security, democracy and development in Africa in consultation with all AU Member States. Council may also reiterate the importance of ensuring greater representation of Africa on global AI regulatory and governance bodies and mobilise efforts and complementarity among the various initiatives dealing with the issue of AI at the continental and international levels. The PSC may also encourage all Member States to create conducive conditions for more meaningful and effective engagement of women and youth in digital governance, AI policy, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and decision-making, ensuring equitable access to digital tools, literacy and platforms.

Tomorrow (9 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene an informal consultation on the ‘Impact of the Middle East Crisis on the Peace and Security Situation of Africa.’

Following opening remarks by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for April 2026, the AU Commission is expected to share its tracking of how the situation in the Middle East is impacting peace and security in Africa. Apart from the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the AU Department of Economic Development, Trade, Tourism, Industry and Minerals may also brief the Council.

While the AU, through the Chairperson of the Commission and individual member states, made statements which also drew attention to the consequences of the war, this is the first time the issue featured as an agenda item of a policy organ of the AU. It is to be recalled that this was not initially on the April 2026 Programme of Work. It appears that it was added in view of the deepening consequences of the war and recent signs of its possible expansion to the Red Sea, with all its risks of directly drawing the Horn of Africa into the conflict.

There are at least three aspects to the impact of this war that may be of interest to members of the PSC. Given the high-level vulnerability and dependence of many in Africa on global supply chains, the disruption this war caused would have direct implications for the social and economic well-being of many countries. As the AU Commission Chairperson noted in a statement he issued on 8 April, the repercussions of the conflict have been felt across the world, including Africa, where disruptions to fuel supplies have driven inflation and increased the cost of basic commodities.’ This can strain, and if prolonged, potentially trigger instability in fragile social and political contexts. A defining feature of this crisis is also the energy crunch triggered by the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which has removed nearly 20% of the global oil supply from the market and driven crude prices towards well over $100 per barrel. This surge has created a widespread energy shock that affects even African oil exporters, and with other countries, including Kenya, Ethiopia and Zambia, reporting shortages.

Second, this conflict, both by dominating and diverting diplomatic and international attention, can also lead to not only the overshadowing but also the neglect of conflict situations in Africa, such as in Sudan. Third, without some measure of containment of the war, it can draw Africa more directly as the risk of its expansion to the Red Sea increases.

The policy brief that the AU, UNECA, AfDB and UNDP published on 2 April provides further details of the assessment of these institutions on how this war is impacting Africa. It projected a loss of 0.2 percentage points on Africa’s GDP in 2026, particularly if it persists over six months. It may also precipitate not only a cost-of-living crisis but also food insecurity, which can be particularly consequential due to the disruption of the supply of fertilisers.  It also raises the spectre of heightened geopolitical competition in fragile settings already affected by external interference, such as Sudan, Somalia and Libya.

AU statements over the course of this crisis reflect the growing concern over these implications. On 28 February 2026, the AU Commission issued two statements (here and here) warning that escalation ‘threatens to worsen global instability, with serious implications for energy markets, food security and socio-economic resilience, particularly in Africa. Where conflict and economic pressures remain acute.’ On 9 March 2026, the chairperson of the Commission issued a statement stressing the implications of the crisis for energy security, trade routes and African economies. On 3 April 2026, the Chairperson welcomed the China-Pakistan Five-Point Initiative, in which he expressed further deep concern over the consequences of the continuation of the conflict to Africa. On 8 April 2026, the Chairperson also welcomed the US-Iran ceasefire agreement while highlighting the effects of the conflict on Africa through inflation, fuel supply disruption and the rising cost of basic commodities.

One of the concerns expected to feature during tomorrow’s informal session is the Horn of Africa-Red Sea nexus. Among African sub-regions, the Horn is one of those most directly exposed to the interaction between Middle Eastern rivalries, maritime insecurity and external military interests. This concern is sharpened by the Houthis’ declared entry into the current war, which raises the prospect of renewed threats to Red Sea shipping and a further deterioration of the security environment along one of Africa’s most strategic maritime corridors. In this respect, tensions in the Middle East affect Africa not only economically, but also through security and geopolitical competition, particularly in the Red Sea corridor. Indeed, the active and sustained participation of the Houthis in Yemen could also increase the risk of potential use of the Horn of Africa in responding to the Houthis’ involvement, thereby exposing the region to direct retaliatory attacks.

The other issue is the humanitarian dimension, alongside the related question of fuel supply disruption. One of the more immediate implications for Africa is that instability in the Gulf and surrounding shipping lanes can complicate the movement of essential supplies and increase both transport costs and the cost of humanitarian delivery into already fragile contexts. This is particularly relevant for Sudan and Somalia, where questions of access, cost, energy supply and donor attention are already major concerns. From this perspective, the PSC may consider these humanitarian effects not merely as economic consequences, but as part of the wider peace and security implications of the crisis for states already affected by conflict and displacement.

A fourth issue relates to Africa’s diplomatic posture. AU statements issued over the course of the crisis sought to tread carefully, inclined largely to toe the middle ground. It has exposed the AU to be charged with a crisis of inconsistency. This is in part attributed to failure to name the initial act as a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, opting to remain vague in characterising the nature of the act, while the statement on retaliatory measures was ‘anything but vague’ as it expressed strong condemnation, defining it as ‘a clear violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity.’ Given that the only weight the AU can mobilise is moral authority and international law-based principled consistency in its policy pronouncements and positions, the lack of these deprives it of any credibility.

As possible courses of action, the PSC may wish to move beyond a purely declaratory response. One option may be to call for more sustained attention to the implications of the crisis for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, particularly regarding maritime security, humanitarian access and the wider consequences for fragile settings. Another may be to encourage more systematic reflection of these risks in the AU’s early warning and preventive work. The session may also offer an opportunity to reaffirm an African posture anchored in principled respect for international law rules, rather than one shaped by the alignments to external actors. Importantly, it may task the AU to further flesh out the short, medium and long-term implications of this conflict and the policy measures that need to be adopted along those different timelines as set out in the joint AU-UNECA-AfDB-UNDB briefing.

Since the session will be held in an informal format, no outcome document is expected to be adopted.