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		<title>Briefing of the ICRC and the IFRC on the humanitarian situation and their activities</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-of-the-icrc-and-the-ifrc-on-the-humanitarian-situation-andtheir-activities/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 10:03:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Humanitarian Issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=24500</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>12 October 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-of-the-icrc-and-the-ifrc-on-the-humanitarian-situation-andtheir-activities/">Briefing of the ICRC and the IFRC on the humanitarian situation and their activities</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<h1><strong>Briefing of the ICRC and the IFRC on the humanitarian situation and their activities </strong></h1>
<p>
</div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 12 October 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (13 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1373<sup>rd</sup> session to receive a briefing from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on its activities and the humanitarian situation in Africa, and a briefing by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October 2026, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Mirjana Spoljaric Egger, ICRC President, is expected to deliver a presentation. This is followed by a presentation by Kate Forbes, President of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session is expected to be the IFRC’s first briefing to the PSC. The IFRC supports Africa’s National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in responding to disasters, disease outbreaks, hunger and displacement, while strengthening local capacity and community resilience. In view of the growing gap between humanitarian needs and international support, there is a heightening demand for enhancing national humanitarian capacity. The role of IFRC in working with and supporting national societies is thus gaining significance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Since becoming a statutory meeting in 2007, the session has been meant to provide updates on major humanitarian issues across Africa and developments in humanitarian aid. Tomorrow’s briefing, delivered by the President of the ICRC for the first time since assuming her role in October 2022, will build on the Council’s 1307th session, held on 24 October 2025. In the outcome of the 1307<sup>th</sup> session, the PSC pressed for regular joint ICRC-IFRC briefings to the PSC, accompanied by more concrete assistance from the wider Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, especially for the refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons. Furthermore, it called for the ‘expedited development of the Common African Position on IHL and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in warfare’ and the imperative for the ‘development of an AU Humanitarian Diplomacy Framework.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The humanitarian situation in Africa in 2026 is severe, marked by the <em>triple conditions of increasing need, constrained humanitarian space, and a significant funding shortfall</em>. More than 160 million people across the continent are in need of humanitarian assistance. This condition has been significantly compounded by restrictive operating environments and the crisis in the Middle East, which has driven up fuel, transport and food costs; disrupted supply chains; and placed additional strain on already fragile economies and food systems.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Some of the conflict situations, notably Sudan, led to the emergence of the largest displacement crisis in the world. More than 45 million people are reported to be forcibly displaced on the continent, mostly owing to conflicts.</p>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Figure: Countries with the Highest Number of Refugees and IDPs by the End of 2025 (Source: UNHCR Global Trends; International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2025)</figcaption></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Eastern Africa</strong> remains one of the world&#8217;s most <a href="https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/eastern-africa-humanitarian-snapshot-june-2026">severe humanitarian hotspots</a>, with 48.5 million people in need of assistance in 2026 driven by conflict, displacement, climate shocks, disease outbreaks and food insecurity. Food insecurity worsened in the second quarter, with 40.5 million people facing Crisis (<a href="https://www.wfp.org/stories/5-steps-food-security-famine">IPC Phase 3</a>) or worse levels, 1.6 million more than in the first quarter and the sharpest rises were reported, in the context of the super El Niño event, in <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/countries-in-focus-archive/issue-148/en/">South Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/countries-in-focus-archive/issue-146/en/">Kenya</a>, <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/countries-in-focus-archive/issue-151/en/">Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1163286/">Tanzania</a>. In the <a href="https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-ethiopia-sudan-democratic-republic-congo-yemen-ukraine">Democratic Republic of the Congo</a> (DRC), the Ebola outbreak is deepening an already severe crisis, with more than 6.1 million people displaced and 26.6 million facing acute food insecurity, mostly in the conflict-affected east. Continued fighting is expected to drive further displacement, loss of livelihoods and serious violations against civilians, including conflict-related sexual violence.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In West Africa, another humanitarian hotspot on the continent, OCHA <a href="https://unowas.unmissions.org/en/node/136341">estimates</a> that 24.3 million people across the Sahel will need humanitarian assistance and protection in 2026, with deteriorating security as the main driver. In the Central Sahel, 2.8 million people are internally displaced and 401,000 children suffer from severe acute malnutrition. Seasonal flooding has added to the strain. As of the end of September 2026, seasonal rains had triggered widespread flooding throughout West and Central Africa, affecting 1.5 million people in 15 countries, with Nigeria, Ghana and DRC accounting for almost 90 per cent of those affected. The floods displaced some 595,000 people, damaged or destroyed 117,000 homes, claimed 533 lives and injured around 1,500, while also hitting 300 schools, 26 health facilities, cropland and livestock.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite these growing humanitarian needs, only about 26.7 per cent of the required humanitarian funding has been mobilised. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to shed light on both immediate humanitarian challenges and the longer-term question of how Africa can develop more sustainable solutions to the persistence of humanitarian crises on the continent. Africa needs to adopt both <strong>mitigation measures</strong> geared towards addressing the immediate needs and risks and <strong>resolution measures </strong>seeking to address the conditions that induce and sustain humanitarian crises, including displacement. Particular attention should be given to conflict prevention and resolution, considering that conflicts and political and security crises account for much of the humanitarian crises on the continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The humanitarian consequences of public health crises remain significant. In addition to the risks associated with the persistence of the Ebola outbreak in DRC, the session may also examine the growing intersection between public health emergencies, conflict, and displacement. The Ebola outbreak unfolding in DRC highlights the challenges of responding to health emergencies in environments characterised by insecurity, displacement, and weak health systems. Ongoing violence in affected areas has disrupted healthcare delivery, restricted humanitarian access, and undermined response efforts. Such situations illustrate how humanitarian crises increasingly overlap and reinforce one another, creating complex emergencies that are more difficult and costly to address.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session will also address the growing impact of climate change, with a focus on the projected 2026 super El Niño, which is expected to deepen humanitarian needs. The World Meteorological Organisation projects that Africa could face severe floods and drought between October 2026 and March 2027, as the strongest El Niño ever recorded is expected to disrupt weather patterns. This could bring heavy rainfall and severe floods to East Africa, and intense drought across Southern Africa and the Sahel. As a result, 12 countries are at the highest risk of experiencing a food crisis, including Nigeria, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Madagascar, Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Given the early warnings, whether states and relevant continental and international entities are heeding the warning and putting in place preventive interventions and preparedness for effective response and management of the impact.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the context of the AU’s 2026 theme, ‘Assuring Sustainable Water Availability and Safe Sanitation Systems,’ presenters from ICRC and IFRC are expected to draw attention to the need for safeguarding water and sanitation systems, health facilities and energy infrastructure from attacks. Protecting these infrastructures is central to strengthening humanitarian resilience, reducing the economic and social costs of conflict, and advancing the protection of civilians. As the war in Sudan and its impact on infrastructure shows, the growing use of drones, AI and autonomous functions in weapon systems raises new questions about how hostilities are conducted. Conflicts have also shifted from open battlefields into densely populated cities, where harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure is far greater.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session is also expected to pay attention to the threats facing International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in conflict situations, not just in Africa but globally. As pointed out in <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/75th-Anniversary-of-the-Geneva-Conventions_Policy-Brief.pdf">a publication</a> supported by ICRC, ‘[w]hat makes the current moment particularly alarming is not just the widespread violations of IHL rules, but the fact that these violations are occurring without any fear of accountability, thus with impunity, and are often cloaked in attempts to justify or legitimise them.’ While not unique to it, a context that illustrates the widespread perpetration of violations of IHL with impunity is the war in Sudan, as extensively <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Prioritising-Protection-of-Civilians-in-Peace-and-Security-Diplomacy-in-Sudan-Challenges-and-Options.pdf">documented</a>, including by AU and UN bodies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Against this backdrop, the ICRC briefing is expected to call on the PSC and AU member states to reinforce political commitment to uphold IHL. In this context, it may urge AU member states to join the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/global-initiative-international-humanitarian-law">Global IHL Initiative,</a> developed in response to the growing erosion in global compliance with IHL in the context of wars in various parts of the world. It is also expected to call on member states to attend the High-Level Conference scheduled to take place on 7 December 2026, in Jordan, which is the culmination of the Global IHL Initiative.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the escalating humanitarian crises across Africa, particularly the combined impact of armed conflicts, violent extremism, climate-driven extreme weather and health emergencies, as well as shrinking humanitarian financing. The Council is also expected to make a call on Member States, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), international partners, and humanitarian actors to strengthen coordinated responses to humanitarian emergencies across the continent. On financing, the PSC may call for the development of innovative and African-owned financing solutions, including stronger engagement in domestic resource mobilisation and non-traditional sources, including through establishing a <strong>strategy for private sector partnership</strong>. In the context of the 2026 AU Theme of the Year, the PSC may urge the AU Commission and Member States to give due attention to the protection of civilian objects and essential services, including water and sanitation systems, health and education facilities, energy and communications infrastructure, whose disruption can have far-reaching humanitarian consequences for civilian populations. In the context of the intensifying Ebola outbreak, the PSC may call for the need to protect the humanitarian space and health care providers and the imperative to implement preventive measures and preparedness for response to the impacts of the super El Niño. The Council may also remind States Parties of their obligations under international law to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and put in place legal frameworks for investigation and prosecution of violations of IHL. It may welcome the Global IHL Initiative and invite AU member states to support the initiative. The PSC may reiterate the need to embed the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in all humanitarian responses and stress the need to address the root causes of humanitarian crises, notably conflicts.</p>
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		<title>Information Integrity, Peace and Security in Africa</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/information-integrity-peace-and-security-in-africa/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 06:26:06 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[General Issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2025]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>8 October 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/information-integrity-peace-and-security-in-africa/">Information Integrity, Peace and Security in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-jevc-color" ><span><strong>Information Integrity, Peace and Security in Africa</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 8 October 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column text-color-jevc-color" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (9 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1372<sup>nd</sup>  Session under the theme ‘Information Integrity, Peace and Security in Africa.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks from Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make an introductory statement. Ourveena Geeresha Topsy-Sonoo, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), will then make a statement, followed by Rita Bissoonauth, Director, UNESCO Liaison Office to the AU and UNECA. Further statements are expected from Charlotte Scaddan, Senior Adviser on Information Integrity, Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Global Communications, United Nations, Ibrahima Tounkara, Head of the ICRC Delegation to the AU, Solomon A. Dersso, Executive Director of Amani Africa Media Research Services, and Omar Faruk Osman, President of the Federation of African Journalists (FAJ). A representative of the EU Delegation to the AU will also make a statement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Previously, the PSC has convened several sessions that have directly or indirectly focused on information integrity, peace and security. On 4 August 2022, the PSC convened its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/1097.1.comm_en.pdf">1097<sup>th</sup> meeting</a> on ‘Emerging Technologies and New Media: Impact on Democratic Governance, Peace and Security in Africa.’ Moreover, on 13 June 2024, the Council convened for its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1214.comm_en.pdf">1214<sup>th</sup> meeting,</a> which focused on the theme, ‘Looking into the Future: AI and its Impact on Peace and Security in Africa.’ The session tasked the AU Commission to ‘enhance efforts to combat misinformation and disinformation, as well as fake news, through AI-driven tools while also addressing the risks associated with AI-generated false information.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Most significantly, on 2 September 2024, the PSC held its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1230.press_.stat_en.pdf">1230<sup>th</sup> meeting</a> on ‘Protection of Journalists and Access to Information in Situations of Armed Conflicts in Africa.’ The session, which also addressed the spread of misinformation and disinformation, particularly on digital platforms, saw the AU Commission being tasked to ‘facilitate the development of a strategy and policy framework that enables the use of information and the media for peace-building, mediation, reconciliation, post-conflict reconstruction and peace support operations.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On 14 November 2025, the Council held its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1311.comm_en.pdf">1311<sup>th</sup> meeting </a>focusing on ‘Media, Peace and Security.’ This was its most comprehensive engagement to date on the role of the media in Africa&#8217;s peace, security and governance landscape. Of importance, it called for the expedition of ‘<strong>the development of a Continental Framework on Digital Peace and Information Integrity in Africa</strong>.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Coming within the framework of the commemoration of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/observances/information-access-day">International Day for Universal Access to Information (IDUAI)</a>, marked under the theme ‘Upholding Information Integrity in the Digital Age: The role of access to information in addressing information disorder,’ tomorrow’s session offers the PSC an opportunity to assess the threats information disorder poses to peace and security on the continent, review progress on its earlier decisions on media and digital governance, and chart practical steps toward a coherent continental approach to information integrity.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un-information-integrity-issue-brief-01.pdf">Information Integrity</a> refers to an information ecosystem in which reliable and accurate information is available to all, enabling people to engage meaningfully in public life, make informed decisions and exercise their rights. In the digital age, information integrity is not just about safeguarding rights. It is central to political stability, democratic governance, social cohesion and economic advancement. No domain of public life or industry can function optimally without information integrity.  This is particularly true for peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As the quality of information affects both the behaviour of conflict parties and the context, the absence of information integrity is detrimental to peace and security. Without information integrity, it becomes difficult to distinguish between truth and falsehood. In the absence of truth, there can be no trust. In the absence of truth and trust, war and conflict, division and violence thrive. The pursuit of peace is hugely impaired.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Thus, disinformation and the viral spread of hate speech or manipulated content can incite communal and ethnic violence and mob attacks. They can undermine electoral credibility and trigger post-election unrest, delegitimise peace processes, mediation efforts and peace operations, endanger humanitarian workers and feed recruitment and propaganda by terrorist and armed groups. They can also complicate the work of early warning by flooding the information space with false and unverified information. As such, the impact on peace and security is not marginal. It is direct and substantial.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There are examples that illustrate these damaging consequences of disinformation. <strong>In</strong> <strong>Sudan</strong>, rival factions turned digital platforms into a battlefield that shapes both the conduct of hostilities and the public’s engagement, with major consequences for the safety of civilians and fueling polarisation that undermines efforts to contain the war. Generative AI has opened a new front across the continent, with fake audio, deepfake videos and false endorsements used to sway elections and provoke instability. <strong>Nigeria</strong>&#8216;s 2023 presidential election is described as possibly the first large-scale use of <a href="https://democracyinafrica.org/ai-generated-propaganda-threatens-african-democracy/">AI-generated electoral content</a> in Africa. Following <strong>Tanzania</strong>&#8216;s October 2025 elections, the African Commission on Human and Peoples&#8217; Rights denounced the <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/news/press-releases/2025-11-01/nationwide-internet-outage-election-day-tanzania">internet shutdown</a> during the election and the AU Election Observation Mission and SADC acknowledged that the blackout hampered monitoring. <strong>Somalia</strong>&#8216;s Al-Shabaab maintains consistent narratives across Facebook, Telegram, X, YouTube and other outlets, adapting quickly to moderation by creating backup accounts and moving between platforms, and treating the online space as an integral front of its insurgency.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Challenges to information integrity arise from various sources. One source is the malicious use of, or susceptibility of, digital media and AI technologies by actors who weaponise information to orchestrate manipulation, exploitation, or harm. Related to this is the challenge of the lack of adequate safety measures in the design, development and deployment of digital platforms that have become main avenues for accessing and transmitting information. Additionally, <strong>access and distribution</strong> risks/challenges stem from the decline of independent journalism and press freedom, the prevalence of algorithmic systems that limit information availability, visibility and diversity, and persistent digital divides. There are also <strong>content-based</strong> risks/challenges such as the spread and amplification of disinformation campaigns, hate speech and harassment targeting individuals or vulnerable groups.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Information integrity is also affected by the transformation of the information ecosystem due to new technology. More and more people rely on digital platforms to access, produce, and share information. Rapid growth of generative artificial intelligence, synthetic media, algorithmic amplification and cross-border influence operations accelerate the speed and scale of the spread of disinformation. Yet, despite the growth in internet and social media use on the continent, particularly among a <a href="https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un-information-integrity-issue-brief-03.pdf">young population</a>, and the pace and scale of dissemination, <strong>local-language content moderation, fact-checking capacity, digital literacy and regulatory frameworks have not kept pace.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Another element that the PSC is likely to consider is media capture and exclusionary representation &#8211; two dynamics that seriously hinder democratic governance and peacebuilding. The first is the concentration of media ownership in the hands of political elites or business interests, often through state-controlled or state-influenced outlets, which narrows the range of information available to citizens. It weakens independent journalism, skews public discourse and leaves audiences with fewer credible sources to trust, often pushing them to unverified sources of information from digital platforms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is worth noting for the PSC from the foregoing that disinformation and other forms of information disorder have direct bearing at societal, national, regional, continental and international levels. This necessitates policy response at all these levels. At the national level, this would entail laws that set standards for safeguarding information integrity through a) prohibition of disinformation, b) the obligation of digital platforms to ensure coverage of African languages, transparency and put in place systems for detecting and taking measures against disinformation through algorithmic systems and content moderation, including labelling, suppressing, taking down misleading, harmful and manipulated content and accounts breaching community standards, c) promoting and protecting fact-checking, the functioning of free media and independent journalism, digital, media and information literacy and d) establishing regulatory bodies empowered to enforcing standards. At the continental level, the required policy action includes supporting the work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and follow up on PSC’s decision for the development of a continental framework on information integrity and peace and security. Within the African Peace and Security Architecture, it would entail the systematic integration of information integrity considerations including <strong>media analysis, digital monitoring and fact-checking</strong> into AU election monitoring and observation framework, Continental Early Warning System and in preventive diplomacy and peace processes for managing and resolving conflicts including mediation, peacemaking and peace support operations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. Council may underscore the imperative of information integrity to advance peace and security in Africa and express concern over the serious threat that information disorder, including disinformation, poses to both political stability and the promotion of peace and security. It may encourage Member States to adopt, domesticate and effectively implement access to information laws in line with the African Charter on Human and Peoples&#8217; Rights and the <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/special-mechanisms-reports/model-law-access-information-africa-2013">Model Law on Access to Information for Africa</a>, as well as promote proactive disclosure of public information as a means of countering disinformation and building public trust. Council may reiterate its call for the expedition of the Continental Framework on Digital Peace and Information Integrity in Africa, with a clear timeline for the AU Commission, along with the speeding up of and full coherence with a continental framework on ‘Information Integrity, Digital, Media and Information Literacy (MIL)’. The PSC may also highlight the need to integrate media analysis, digital monitoring and fact-checking into the Continental Early Warning System and include information integrity indicators in election observation, mediation support and peace support operations. Council may further encourage the formal establishment of the AU Group of Friends for the Safety of Journalists in Addis Ababa, the completion of the study on the legal, institutional and policy framework for the protection of journalists and access to information, and also encourage coordination among the PSC, the AU Commission, the RECs/RMs, the ACHPR, the UN and its agencies, and civil society.</p>
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		<title>Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/good-neighbourliness-and-regional-responses-to-security-and-terrorism-challenges-in-africa/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 05:53:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Terrorism and Organised Crime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=24298</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>22 September 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/good-neighbourliness-and-regional-responses-to-security-and-terrorism-challenges-in-africa/">Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 22 September 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-2" data-row="script-row-unique-2" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-2"));</script></div></div></div><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-3"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter one-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (23 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1369<sup>th</sup> session at ministerial level in New York, on the margins of the 81<sup>st</sup> United Nations General Assembly, to consider ‘Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa.’ The session was initially envisaged at the level of Heads of State and Government but was subsequently changed to ministerial level in the revised programme of work.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Corinne AMORI BRUNET, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Benin and PSC Chairperson for September, is expected to deliver opening remarks, followed by introductory remarks from Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission. A statement is also expected from the representative of the United Nations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC discussed countering terrorism and violent extremism at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1354.comm_en.pdf">1354<sup>th</sup></a> session, held at ministerial level on 21 July. The Chairperson of the AU Commission is also expected to submit a report on counterterrorism next month. At its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1354.comm_en.pdf">most recent session</a> on countering terrorism and violent extremism, the PSC expressed concern over the expanding reach and growing sophistication of terrorist groups across the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes and parts of Southern Africa (northern Mozambique). According to the <a href="https://papsrepository.africanunion.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/0acb0ecd-95c4-4fa6-8bca-cf53913cd09f/content">report</a> submitted to the PSC’s 1354<sup>th</sup> session, while global terrorism has decreased overall in recent years, Africa remains the principal epicentre of terrorist violence, accounting for an estimated 70-75 percent of terrorism related fatalities globally. Six of the ten most terrorism-affected countries globally are in Africa: Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia. In the central Sahel, JNIM and Islamic State affiliates operate across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, while militant activity has spread towards the borderlands of Benin and Togo. Around Lake Chad, Boko Haram and ISWAP move through territory shared by Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, while the emergence of Lakurawa has added to insecurity around the Nigeria-Niger border. In the Horn of Africa, Al-Shabaab remains a serious threat in Somalia and neighbouring countries, while the Islamic State in Somalia has still been active in Puntland despite the counterterrorism efforts. In eastern DRC, the Allied Democratic Forces originated in Uganda and remains active across a frontier affected by other armed groups. In Southern Africa, the insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province also persists nine years after it began. The groups and the dynamics may differ, but their use of borderlands, cross-border movement and transnational supply networks exposes the limits of responses organised within individual states.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The regional consequences of other conflicts also reinforce the same point. The crisis in eastern DRC has drawn in neighbouring countries and reignited inter-state tensions. Sudan’s war has also generated displacement and security pressures across its borders. As more states become entangled, the conflict risks escalating into a broader regional conflagration.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Africa has established several continental and regional mechanisms to address the scourge of terrorism. They include the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre, AFRIPOL and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa; the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes; the Accra Initiative; the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin; and the AU mission in Somalia. Their effectiveness, however, depends on the willingness of states to cooperate through them. Fragmentation of regional arrangements and deteriorating relations among neighbours have made that increasingly difficult.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session provides an opportunity to move beyond a review of trends in the threat and the technical means in addressing it, such as the role of institutions such as the AU Counter Terrorism Centre. It is rather expected to focus on a political and strategic question: how the state of relations among neighbouring countries affects their ability to respond collectively to terrorism and other security threats? This question gives particular importance to the principle of good neighbourliness at a time when threats cross borders, but cooperation among affected states has deteriorated in various parts of the continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf">2004 Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy</a>  (CADS Policy) provides a basis for the discussion. It affirms sovereign equality, respect for borders, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference and the prohibition of the use or threat of force. It also prohibits a member state from allowing its territory to serve as a base for aggression or subversion against another. The Policy goes further in recognising the indivisibility of African security: ‘the security of one African country is inseparably linked’ to that of other African countries and the continent as a whole. On this basis, it treats a threat to one country as a matter of concern for others.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Most notably, a key element of the objectives of the Policy is to ‘promote mutual trust and confidence among African states.’ This objective is critical to advancing good neighbourliness. The importance of this objective is emphasised in the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/declaration-on-a-code-of-conduct-for-inter-african-relations.pdf">Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations</a> adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in June 1994 and serves as a pillar of the CADS Policy. The Declaration accordingly affirmed the resolve of African states ‘to develop and strengthen the amicable relations and cooperation existing among our States and to promote friendship among our peoples. The challenges facing us can be met only through concerted action, cooperation and solidarity.’ However, ‘concerted action, cooperation and solidarity’ in responding to regional or international threats to peace and security is possible only where mutual trust and good neighbourliness thrive. Thus, the Declaration asserts that ‘every cooperation effort is doomed to failure in an environment devoid of stability, trust and security.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In West Africa, rising mistrust in the context of the response to the military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger has disrupted the regional order. Amid the resultant mounting regional tension, the three countries withdrew from ECOWAS and formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). As the threat to regional security continues to proliferate, regional responses such as the Accra Initiative have struggled to take off the ground. The relationship of individual members of the AES with some of their neighbours has led to diplomatic strains. Ties between Niger and Nigeria deteriorated after the 2023 coup, as did relations between Niger and Benin. Mali’s relations with Algeria have also suffered a blow. Relations between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire remain strained. Some of these relations have shown signs of improvement (Algeria-Mali, Benin-Niger), but restoring diplomatic contact is only a first step.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF in 2025 has likewise raised concern about coordination in the Lake Chad Basin. The situation in the region is further aggravated by the geopolitical contestation involving Russia, France and increasingly Ukraine.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Apart from weakening the West African regional order, the resultant erosion of good neighbourliness and trust continues to fragment regional efforts for responding to various security threats, including terrorism. Where neighbouring governments distrust one another, intelligence sharing, joint border operations and cooperation against recruitment and illicit financial flows become harder to sustain. Armed groups and criminal networks can exploit the resulting gaps. As a result, the terrorism menace destablising the Sahel is creeping into the coastal states of West Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Fragmentation fuelled by growing mistrust is evident elsewhere. Rwanda’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of Central African States in 2025 followed a dispute over the organisation’s rotational chairmanship against the backdrop of tensions over eastern DRC. In the Horn of Africa, tensions among member states have constrained IGAD’s political role, with Eritrea announcing its withdrawal from the struggling regional body. These developments reduce the capacity of regional organisations to bring states together around a common assessment of threats and a coordinated response.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Even where states agree to a common regional response through deployment of peace operations, strained relations can limit its effectiveness. In Somalia, tensions among neighbouring states have complicated the environment in which the AU mission operates. In Mozambique, lack of coordination and trust issues between Mozambican forces, Rwanda’s bilateral deployment and the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) limited the scope for a unified response. Meanwhile, eastern DRC shows how divergent expectations can affect regional forces. Competing regional deployments by the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) in November 2022 and the SADC deployment in DRC (SAMIDRC) in December 2023 also caused friction that led to the withdrawal of EACRF by December 2023 after Kinshasa declined to renew the Status of Force Agreement. The experience points to the need for shared understanding among the affected state, neighbouring countries and regional organisations on a force’s mandate, objectives and relationship to wider political efforts. A deployment cannot resolve political differences that its main stakeholders have left unsettled.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Beyond the Sahel, geopolitical rivalries and the growing involvement of middle powers are also reshaping Africa’s regional security arrangements and bilateral relations. As neighbouring states turn to different external partners, agreement on collective action against terrorism and other shared threats becomes harder to achieve. Indeed, one of the major factors behind the fragmentation of the Horn of Africa regional order is the intensification of the entanglement of various middle powers, including Gulf states, Turkey, and Iran and the emergence of competing alliances into which countries in the Horn of Africa are being sucked.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Against this backdrop, tomorrow’s session should consider how these political and strategic difficulties affect good neighborliness and trust among neighbors, which is critical both for achieving a shared perception of common threats and for developing a common strategy for deploying an effective response. As clearly articulated in the CADS Policy, good neighbourliness requires states to refrain from actions that threaten their neighbours. These necessitate keeping and constantly cultivating channels of exchange and communication as well as consultation, as envisaged in the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Without trust among neighbouring countries, collective responses to terrorism and other security threats will remain limited. The session therefore offers an opportunity to reaffirm good neighbourliness as a practical condition for effective regional security response.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the fragmentation of regional arrangements, deteriorating bilateral relations among some member states, and the impact of geopolitical dynamics on collective security efforts. It may underscore the urgency of curtailing these developments for effectively deploying the relevant instruments and mobilizing the collective action necessary for effective response to threats to regional security and terrorism. The PSC may underscore the need for reaffirming the principles of the Common African Defence and Security Policy, including the indivisibility of security and the obligation of states not to allow their territory to be used against their neighbours. It may also reaffirm the commitment of Member States to the standards set in the OAU Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations. In this regard, the Council may urge Member States to uphold the principles of good neighbourliness reflected in various AU foundational documents, including the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and the Common African Defence and Security Policy; settle disagreements peacefully; and resolve their differences in a spirit of Pan-African solidarity. The Council may emphasise that effective regional responses to cross-border threats depend on member states honouring these commitments in practice. <strong>As a practical step, the PSC may task the AU Commission Chairperson, working in close coordination with Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms and the United Nations, to initiate and deploy various confidence-building measures, engage in sustained shuttle diplomacy and present a report to the next AU Assembly in January 2027 on ways and means of deepening mutual trust, good neighborliness, amicable relations and cooperation among African states.</strong></p>
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		<title>Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005))</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/protection-of-child-soldiers-in-africa-unscr-1612-2005/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Robel Mohammed]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 11:44:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Other Thematic Issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=24208</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>1 September 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/protection-of-child-soldiers-in-africa-unscr-1612-2005/">Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005))</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005))</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 1 September 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (2 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1368th meeting to discuss the theme, ‘Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005)).’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Hervé Djokpe, Permanent Representative of Benin to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for September, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Jainaba Jagne, AU Special Envoy for Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC), is also expected to make a statement, followed by Robert Doya Nanima, Special Rapporteur on Children and Armed Conflict. In addition, the session is also likely to get statements from the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, a representative of the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to the AU and a representative from the African Platform on Children affected by Armed Conflicts (AP CAAC) &#8211; as Co-Chair. A Save the Children representative may also be present.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is worth recalling that UN Security Council Resolution 1612, adopted in 2005, established the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on children and armed conflict, creating a systematic framework for documenting the six grave violations against children in conflict zones, which include killing and maiming, recruitment and use as child soldiers, sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, abduction and denial of humanitarian access.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The UN Secretary-General&#8217;s 2026 annual <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-2026-357.php">report</a> on children and armed conflict, released in June and covering January–December 2025, which also marked the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the mandate, verified 38,558 grave violations against 24,174 children, including 3,176 subjected to multiple violations. For the first time in three decades of UN monitoring, state and government forces were responsible for more grave violations than non-state armed groups, a significant shift from the pattern that has traditionally shaped PSC discussions on the issue. Among African situations, the DRC (4,114 violations), Nigeria (2,560) and Somalia (2,195) recorded the highest verified totals, ranking among the five worst-affected situations globally. Recruitment and use of children remained a major concern, continuing a trend identified in the 2025 report, which recorded 7,402 verified cases worldwide. In a February 2026 <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/joint-statement-by-the-african-union-commissioner-for-political-affairs-peace-and-security-eu-high-representative-for-foreign-affairs-and-security-policy-vice-president-of-the-european-commission-hr-vp-united-nations-usg-srsg-for-children-and-armed-conf">Joint Statement</a> by the AU, EU and UN on the International Day against the Use of Child Soldiers, it was highlighted that one in five children worldwide lives in conflict-affected settings. The statement went further and called on all parties in conflict situations to ‘comply fully with international law, to immediately and unconditionally release all children from their ranks, and to ensure that children associated with parties to conflict are treated first and foremost as victims.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC, on its part, has a long track record of engaging with the issue of child soldiers, having taken it up in substantive discussions and decisions across several sessions. Notably, at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/420-acerwc-18-2-2014.pdf">420<sup>th</sup> session</a>, held on 18 February 2014, the Council decided, among other things, to hold a session each year dedicated to issues affecting children on the continent. This engagement has since intensified, with the PSC now holding even two sessions annually on the theme. This will be the second session this year under the theme of child protection in Conflict Situations, following the Council’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1357.comm_en.pdf">1357<sup>th</sup></a> meeting in August 2026, which focused on ‘Education in Conflict Situations in Africa.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">From the meeting, the PSC tasked the AU Commission, in coordination with the ACERWC, ‘to organise an advocacy meeting with Member States that have not yet signed or ratified relevant international and continental instruments [including the ACERWC] and the Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict… and to report back to the PSC.’ In the same vein, the PSC went further and tasked the AU Commission, ‘based on documented sources and proven evidence, to develop and maintain a concise, disaggregated continental monitoring framework tracking attacks on schools, closures, military use, safe reopening, enrolment, retention, learning outcomes, and inclusion metrics.’ It is worth recalling that the same meeting considered the <a href="https://papsrepository.africanunion.org/bitstreams/45b3ae5d-28a1-426b-9f84-a43426059401/download">implementation matrix</a> as part of the PSC working documents developed following the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1296.comm_en.pdf">1296<sup>th</sup></a> PSC meeting, which aims to translate Council decisions into 18 time-bound actions with designated lead institutions. This implementation matrix model should extend to the PSC&#8217;s entire body of work on children and armed conflict. Many past decisions on the theme remain hard to track precisely because they were never anchored to a time-bound implementation tool. Retroactively applying the matrix, even in condensed form, would let the Council audit what has actually been delivered against decades of commitments, rather than simply ‘recalling’ prior sessions without clarity on follow-through. This would also ease the resourcing and coordination gaps flagged periodically, make duplication easier to spot, and give the Council a concrete basis for review each time it revisits the theme.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In addition, its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1314.comm_en.pdf">1314<sup>th</sup> meeting</a> held in November 2025 on ‘Children Affected by Armed Conflicts’ tasked the Chairperson of the AU Commission to ‘commission a comprehensive study on the nexus between armed conflicts and violations against children.’ Relatedly, the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1262.comm_en.pdf">1262<sup>nd</sup> </a>PSC meeting held in February 2025 on the ‘Fight Against the Use of Child Soldiers in Africa’ tasked the ACERWC to expedite finalisation of the comprehensive study on child soldiers in Africa. Earlier this year, ACERWC initiated and commissioned the <a href="https://www.acerwc.africa/en/opportunities/consultancy/terms-reference-study-recruitment-children-armed-forces-and-armed-groups">Terms of Reference</a> for the conduct of the study. The study will aim to examine the nature, scale, patterns and drivers of the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and armed groups in West and Central Africa, including the DRC, Chad, Nigeria, Niger, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso and Mali. In North, East and Southern Africa, it will include Sudan, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Mozambique. The study will assess the political, socio-economic, security, governance and community-level factors driving emerging risks, and to evaluate the adequacy, effectiveness and alignment of existing legal, policy, institutional, prevention, accountability, rehabilitation and reintegration responses with the African Children&#8217;s Charter and relevant regional and international standards. It will also seek to identify key gaps and good practices and put forward actionable recommendations to strengthen coordinated, multidisciplinary, and child-centred responses among States Parties, AU organs, RECs, National Human Rights Institutions, civil society organisations, communities and other relevant stakeholders.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This upcoming PSC meeting will therefore provide an opportunity to follow up on the implementation of these decisions and provide a platform for the Council to reflect on the conclusions of the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/ENG-Conclusions-Ministerial-and-High-level-Open-_231222.pdf">Banjul Process,</a> which took place in December 2023. During this ministerial, high-level session, participants agreed on the imperative to ‘develop a Continental Child Justice Framework addressing both punitive measures and, as well as the recourse and restitution elements for child survivors.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué.  The PSC is expected to condemn all attacks against children and their abduction and recruitment by armed groups and to strictly comply with International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. Taking note of her appointment in February 2026, Council is also likely to emphasise the imperative of providing the office of Jainaba Jagne, the AU Special Envoy on CAAC, with the necessary financial, human and technical resources to enable her to discharge her mandate effectively. It may also reiterate its previous calls on Member States who have not yet done so to sign, ratify and domesticate the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other international instruments, such as the Safe Schools Declaration and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child with regard to the inclusion of children in armed conflicts. It may also encourage Member States to integrate mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), school feeding, water and sanitation (WASH), and child protection referral pathways into education responses. The PSC may also reiterate the need for Member States, RECs/RMs, and the AU Commission to mainstream child protection in early warning mechanisms and conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacemaking and peace-building processes, as well as in post-conflict reconstruction and development.</p>
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		<title>Coordination between AUCTC-APRM-CISSA-AFRIPOL on Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning Systems</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/coordination-between-auctc-aprm-cissa-afripol-on-continental-early-warning-systems/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 23 Aug 2026 15:02:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC meetings with AU Organs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=24133</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>23 August 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/coordination-between-auctc-aprm-cissa-afripol-on-continental-early-warning-systems/">Coordination between AUCTC-APRM-CISSA-AFRIPOL on Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning Systems</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Coordination between AUCTC-APRM-CISSA-AFRIPOL on Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning Systems</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 23 August 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (24 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1364<sup>th</sup> meeting to discuss the theme ‘Coordination between the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) – the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) – the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) – the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) on Continental Early Warning System (CEWS): Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning System (EWS).’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of August, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), will make a statement. The representatives of AUCTC, APRM, CISSA and AFRIPOL are then expected to deliver briefings.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The last time the PSC met on the theme of Early Warning was in December 2025 at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1320.comm_en.pdf">1320<sup>th</sup> meeting</a>. From the communiqué, the PSC, among other things, underlined the need to strengthen the analytical convergence between AUCTC, CISSA, AFRIPOL and the RECs/RMs. The same meeting further saw the PSC reiterating its request to the AU Commission ‘to collaborate with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM to introduce and institutionalise a dynamic tool for mapping risks and threats to peace and security in Africa, as adopted by the PSC through its communiqué <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1298.comm_en.pdf">PSC/PR/COMM.1298 (2025)</a> of 27 August 2025, in order to enable Council to enhance its conflict prevention efforts.’ It is expected that this will be central to the discussions therein. Noteworthy also, the session comes just slightly over a month following PSC Committee of Experts level consultations on the ‘Proposed AU Model on Trigger Mechanism for Early Warning and Early Action,’ <a href="https://x.com/AUC_PAPS/status/2079258092131287255?s=20">held</a> in July 2026. The proposed model ‘seeks to strengthen timely and proportionate AU responses by establishing clear triggers, thresholds and response options to address emerging risks before they escalate into violent conflict.’ It is expected to serve as a decision-support tool for the PSC, connecting early warning analysis with preventive action through existing AU governance and peace and security mechanisms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session comes amidst continuing security crises and an ever-evolving security landscape whose scale, complexity and changing character increasingly outpace the capacity of existing early-warning architecture.  The <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Global-Terrorism-Index-2026-Report.pdf">Global Terrorism Index 2026 report</a> recorded 5,582 terrorism deaths across 2,944 incidents in 2025, a 28 per cent fall from the previous year, with the impact of terrorism falling in 81 countries, the highest number of annual improvements since 2021 Sub-Saharan Africa remains the global epicenter, accounting for over half of all terrorism fatalities, with six of the ten most-impacted countries located on the continent: Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, and the DRC. Fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence in Africa surpassed 20,000 for the fourth consecutive year, spread across the Sahel, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, and Mozambique. In the Sahel specifically, JNIM (al-Qaeda-linked) and ISWAP/ISSP (Islamic State-linked) now collectively control more territory than at any point since the 2012 Mali crisis, with JNIM combining guerrilla attacks with governance strategies, providing basic services and arbitration in areas under its control.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With the evolving security landscape, there have also been significant operational shifts. Drone warfare has become a genuine insurgent capability. In Nigeria&#8217;s northeast, ISWAP is deploying combat drones in the Lake Chad basin at operational scale for the first time. Amani Africa’s Special Research Report, ‘<a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/towards-a-new-agenda-for-peace-and-security-in-africa/">Towards a New Agenda for Peace and Security in Africa: New Security Threats and the Future of the Peace and Security Council</a>’ highlighted that one of the new security threats in Africa arises from the expansion of the use of emerging technologies. In addition, jihadist groups are no longer content with launching attacks; rather, they now administer territories and control trade routes, with their influence gradually pushing all the way to the Gulf of Guinea. JNIM&#8217;s strategy against Mali in 2026 illustrates a shift toward strangulation rather than storming capitals: JNIM formally declared an economic blockade of Bamako in April 2026, exploiting the fact that Mali imports about 95% of its fuel by road, with convoy attacks causing rationing, fuel queues and power shortages. Previously, the AU Commission, CISSA, AFRIPOL and AUCTC, were tasked to ‘thoroughly investigate the scourge of illicit financial flows, highlighting the networks and to report to PSC as soon as possible’ and called for ‘the establishment of a continental working group on illicit financing, which will inter alia, ensure the mapping of hawala/mobile money networks used by extremist terrorist groups and networks and the launch of a cross-border early warning protocol for suspicious transfers linked to convergence zones.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Institutionally, the AU’s February 2026 <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/46188-Assembly_Decisions_31_March_E.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">Assembly decision</a> called for the full operationalisation of the Continental Security Cartography and directed the AU Commission, together with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM, to establish a dynamic and continuously updated risk-mapping tool capable of providing the PSC with ‘a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities, and potential triggers’. It also called for fast-tracking the CEWS–AUCTC Joint Analytical Cell, closer harmonisation of RECs/RMs early-warning tools with CEWS, and development of a draft AU Early Action Guideline that ‘defines triggers, thresholds, and institutionalises response with timelines’ for consideration by the PSC. Taken together, these measures situate the forthcoming validation within a broader effort to move from parallel institutional reporting towards a more integrated continental risk picture and to strengthen the link between early warning and early action. The validation exercise therefore provides an opportunity to assess whether the emerging risk-mapping architecture is being designed as a decision-support mechanism capable of prompting timely preventive action, rather than as another analytical product whose warnings are not systematically translated into response.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The process acquired further operational content at the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1345.comm-EN.pdf">1345<sup>th</sup></a> PSC meeting on ‘Transnational Organised Crimes’ held in May 2026. The session saw the AU Commission, AFRIPOL, AUCTC, CISSA and APRM being tasked to ‘finalise by the end of 2026 a matrix of risks and threats to peace and security in Africa as a tool of the Continental Early Warning System.’ It also tasked AFRIPOL, in coordination with the Commission and RECs/RMs, to establish a continental criminal-intelligence mechanism for the ‘continuous mapping, analysis and dissemination of criminal flows, corridors and networks’ and to produce an annual consolidated continental threat assessment. This broadens the scope of continental early warning beyond conventional conflict indicators to include the evolving nexus among terrorism, organised crime, illicit economies and cross-border security threats.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The governance dimension has advanced in parallel. At its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1349.comm_en.pdf">1349<sup>th</sup></a> meeting, the PSC welcomed the APRM’s development of ‘an early warning system dedicated to governance within the APRM’ and its inclusion in the matrix of risks and threats being finalised by relevant AU structures, while urging Member States to integrate APRM assessments into CEWS. The <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/5th-PSC-APRM-Declaration-EN.pdf">Joint Burayu Declaration</a> similarly called for institutionalised data- and information-sharing so that APRM country findings ‘feed systematically into APSA early warning and mediation planning,’ within the wider coordination involving AUCTC, AFRIPOL and CISSA. This direction was reinforced by the <a href="https://aprm.au.int/sites/default/files/files/2026-02/enfinal-communique-35th-apr-summit-14-2-2026-002.pdf">35<sup>th</sup></a> APRM Forum in February 2026, which called for efforts to ‘position the APRM as an effective early-warning tool for conflict prevention on the continent,’ and by the March <a href="https://aprm.au.int/en/news/press-releases/2026-03-16/african-union-commission-deputy-chairperson-pays-courtesy-visit-aprm">engagement</a> between the AUC Deputy Chairperson and APRM leadership, where discussions focused particularly on ‘governance monitoring, early warning and conflict prevention.’ The key question is therefore whether governance indicators will be integrated into a common analytical picture rather than treated as a parallel stream of information.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The most recent <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1354.comm_en.pdf">1354<sup>th</sup></a> ministerial session on counter-terrorism held in July 2026 added another specialised layer. Alongside adopting the <a href="https://papsrepository.africanunion.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/c0d6f6fc-feb8-4a30-ad5a-c6b5e448ec06/content">African Union Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Countering Terrorism in Africa (2026 -2030)</a>, the Council called for ‘specific indicators on radicalisation and violent extremism’ to be integrated into CEWS ‘to enable early detection and timely intervention.’ This places terrorism-specific early warning within the implementation of a broader continental counter-terrorism framework. Taken together with parallel efforts on criminal intelligence and governance-related risks, these decisions point to an increasingly ambitious system in which terrorism analysis, criminal intelligence, governance vulnerabilities and broader conflict indicators are expected to inform one continental warning architecture. The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to take note of the briefings by AUCTC, APRM, CISSA and AFRIPOL and may welcome progress towards validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and the APRM Early Warning System. Council may underscore that the validation should support the institutionalisation of a dynamic and continuously updated continental risk-mapping mechanism capable of providing an integrated picture of emerging threats, vulnerabilities and potential triggers. It may further emphasise the need for the validated tools to strengthen analytical convergence among AUCTC, APRM, CISSA, AFRIPOL and CEWS, including through common analytical standards, greater methodological alignment and secure information-sharing arrangements. Building on earlier decisions, the PSC may emphasise the imperative of regular consolidated horizon-scanning briefings covering emerging and escalating risks, indicators requiring preventive action, cross-border contagion dynamics and scenario options requiring Council guidance, while also encouraging systematic circulation of early-warning products to Member States to inform timely responses. It may also call for adequate technical, human and financial resources for the operationalisation, regular updating and sustained use of the tools, and for governance-related risks identified through the APRM EWS, alongside specialised terrorism and organised-crime indicators, to be systematically incorporated into the broader CEWS architecture.</p>
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		<title>PSC – ACHPR Consultation</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/psc-achpr-consultation/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 08:10:07 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC meetings with AU Organs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=24118</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>20 August 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/psc-achpr-consultation/">PSC – ACHPR Consultation</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>PSC – ACHPR Consultation</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 20 August 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (21 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1363<sup>rd</sup> session for a consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. The Chairperson of the ACHPR is also expected to deliver a briefing to the PSC on the ACHPR&#8217;s work as it relates to peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The consultative meeting is being convened pursuant to Article 19 of the PSC Protocol, which calls for close cooperation between the PSC and the ACHPR in advancing peace, security, and stability across the continent. Building on this provision, the PSC, at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/866th-MEETING-August-08-2019-On-its-consultation-with-the-African-Commission-on-Human-and-Peoples-Rights-ACHPR.pdf">866<sup>th</sup> Session</a> in August 2019, resolved to institutionalise the engagement through annual joint consultative sessions with the ACHPR. This commitment rests on a shared legal and normative foundation: Article 3(f) of the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/PSC-Protocol.pdf">PSC Protocol</a> identifies the promotion of human rights as integral to conflict prevention, Article 45 of the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011_-_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_e.pdf">African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights</a> mandates the ACHPR to promote and protect the rights of individuals and communities, and Article 23 of the African Charter affirms the right of all peoples to live in peace and security. Taken together, these provisions position the PSC-ACHPR consultation as the institutional space through which the AU’s peace and security architecture and its human rights architecture are meant to speak to one another.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s meeting follows the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1284.2.comm_en.pdf">1284<sup>th</sup> session</a> held on 19 June 2025, which marked the resumption of joint consultations after a three-year interruption. While the session reaffirmed its commitment to deepening collaboration with the ACHPR, notably through consistent information exchange and by institutionalising and regularising the consultation as an annual fixture, the session outcome document was largely couched in general terms and missed critical opportunities to operationalise concrete cooperation. Specifically, the session <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/June-Monthly-Digest-2025.pdf">failed</a> to build upon practical modalities established during the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/866th-MEETING-August-08-2019-On-its-consultation-with-the-African-Commission-on-Human-and-Peoples-Rights-ACHPR.pdf">866<sup>th</sup></a> session.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The overarching question for the consultation is how the PSC and ACHPR can pool their respective mandates, tools and networks to translate human rights protection into a more effective conflict prevention, peacebuilding and sustaining peace. This matters because human rights violations are not only consequences of armed conflict but can themselves function as early-warning indicators and drivers of conflict. The ACHPR’s own report on addressing Human Rights issues in conflict situations has identified monitoring and response, prevention, the mainstreaming of human rights across the conflict cycle, remedial action and institutional coordination as the areas requiring the greatest attention. Its Special Rapporteurs, Working Groups, and fact-finding and promotional missions generate a significant body of information and expertise that could strengthen the PSC’s preventive and protective action, provided that information is translated into timely political engagement rather than remaining confined within the human rights system.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The effectiveness of these mechanisms, however, also depends on their ability to draw on information and perspectives from actors closest to the situations they monitor. This places civil society organisations at an important intersection between human rights monitoring and the AU’s peace and security efforts. CSOs can channel information from communities that might not otherwise reach AU institutions, contribute to early warning, document violations, support victims and survivors, facilitate dialogue, and contribute to accountability and reconciliation. The ACHPR’s Joint Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan illustrates this value directly: its evidentiary record has drawn substantially on testimony from victims, witnesses and other stakeholders, including through direct engagement with Sudanese refugees in Chad, and its mandate, extended in May 2026, emphasised the need for independent monitoring, preservation of evidence, a victim-centred approach, accountability and civilian protection. The relevance of this channel is sharpened by deteriorating civic space in several conflict and crisis settings, which the ACHPR addressed directly in its June 2026 Resolution <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/663-achprres663lxxxvii-2026">ACHPR/Res.663 (LXXXVII)</a> on the Situation of Human and Peoples’ Rights Defenders in Africa, expressing concern over the criminalisation of legitimate civil society activity and calling on States to protect freedoms of association and peaceful assembly. The consultation could therefore explore how the ACHPR’s extensive networks of NGOs, National Human Rights Institutions and special mechanisms might be connected more systematically to the PSC’s early-warning and conflict-prevention architecture, while ensuring that civil society actors engaged in this work are themselves protected, an approach that could strengthen the quality and timeliness of information available to the Council, particularly where official reporting is limited, contested or delayed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Sudan experience illustrates the potential of such cooperation in practice. The ACHPR&#8217;s Joint Fact-Finding Mission, established in 2024 and extended for a further year in May 2026, has documented serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and its May 2026 Banjul Joint Declaration with the UN&#8217;s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission stressed that a sustainable future for Sudan requires an inclusive, civilian-led political process with the meaningful participation of women, youth, civil society and communities from all regions, treating human rights findings, political process and peacebuilding as connected rather than separate tracks. A similar logic runs through the Commission&#8217;s other conflict-related work: its recent promotional mission to the DRC highlighted the continuing human rights and humanitarian consequences of conflict there, while its earlier engagement on South Sudan linked escalating violence to stalled implementation of the peace agreement. Both cases underline the value of ensuring the ACHPR&#8217;s country-level findings reach the PSC while situations remain under active consideration, rather than only after the fact, and both point toward the accountability question that the 953<sup>rd</sup> and 1019<sup>th</sup> sessions had already begun to address. At those sessions, the Council acknowledged the ACHPR&#8217;s contribution to transitional justice and called for the peaceful resolution of conflicts through dialogue, negotiation, mediation and consensual transitional justice mechanisms, alongside investigation of violations and accountability for perpetrators. Tomorrow&#8217;s consultation offers an occasion to examine how that expertise can complement the PSC&#8217;s political and mediation efforts more directly, including on reparations, reconciliation and guarantees of non-recurrence.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session is also expected to centre on the strategic priorities of the ACHPR’s new Bureau and their contribution to peace and security. The election of a new Bureau in October 2025, the adoption of the Commission’s Strategic Plan 2026 &#8211; 2028, and the subsequent adoption of the implementation, planning, monitoring and evaluation frameworks by the <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/news/final-communiques/2026-05-20/final-communique-87th-ordinary-session">87th Ordinary Session</a>, provide an opportunity for the PSC to engage early with the Bureau’s priorities and identify areas of mutual reinforcement, particularly given the breadth of the Commission’s current conflict-related work. Beyond the Sudan Fact-Finding Mission, the ACHPR has undertaken a <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/news/press-releases/2026-06-19/press-release-end-promotional-mission-african-commission">promotional mission</a> to the DRC, strengthened engagement with international human rights mechanisms, and, at its 87<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session, adopted further resolutions with direct implications for conflict prevention and civic space. As such, the presentation offers an opportunity to identify where joint planning, information sharing, and the complementary use of institutional tools could generate greater preventive impact.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Session is also expected to follow up on previous decisions and assess how to move from six years of accumulated commitments to measurable action. Given the strength of the practical modalities agreed at the 866<sup>th</sup> session, particular attention is likely to be given to their implementation, including undertaking joint field visits to conflict-affected and post-conflict countries, communicating PSC decisions with human rights implications to the ACHPR, and facilitating regular ACHPR briefings on the human rights dimensions of situations on the PSC agenda. This suggests that the key challenge is one of implementation rather than a lack of substantive agreement, making a review of the implementation matrix an opportunity to identify which commitments have been fulfilled, which remain outstanding, the constraints affecting implementation, and the responsibilities and timelines required to address these gaps. This is particularly important for early warning: the 866<sup>th</sup> session requested that ‘the AU Commission and the ACHPR Secretariat propose a modality for the establishment of a coordinated early warning mechanism on human rights-related issues on the Continent between the two Organs’. The consultation could thus provide an opportunity to revisit these commitments and consider practical modalities for systematically feeding ACHPR-generated information into CEWS assessments, allowing human rights-related warning signals to inform preventive action before violations escalate.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC and ACHPR may renew their commitment to strengthened cooperation and joint action. The communiqué may identify specific roles for NGOs, National Human Rights Institutions and other civil society actors in early warning, monitoring, mediation, protection, accountability and reconciliation, while encouraging the ACHPR to draw more systematically on its civil society networks and special mechanisms, with due attention to their own protection. The Council may welcome the strategic priorities of the ACHPR’s new Bureau and encourage closer alignment between the Strategic Plan 2026-2028 and AU peace and security priorities through coordinated work planning and information-sharing. It may further underscore the importance of mainstreaming human rights standards throughout conflict prevention, management, stabilisation, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, including through the integration of ACHPR analysis into the CEWS. On implementation, the communiqué may call for an updated joint implementation matrix with clearly identified responsibilities, timelines and follow-up mechanisms covering outstanding commitments, regular information-sharing, ACHPR participation in relevant PSC sessions, joint field or assessment missions and early-warning cooperation. It may also encourage continued ACHPR advisory support on transitional justice and accountability, and underscore the importance of integrating women’s meaningful participation and prevention of conflict-related sexual violence into AU peace and security efforts, so that the consultation moves beyond reaffirming complementarity towards a partnership in which human rights information and tools are put to active use in early warning, prevention, protection and sustaining peace.</p>
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		<title>Consultative Meeting Between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP)</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/consultative-meeting-between-the-peace-and-security-council-psc-and-the-pan-african-parliament-pap/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 16:05:39 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC meetings with AU Organs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>18 August 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/consultative-meeting-between-the-peace-and-security-council-psc-and-the-pan-african-parliament-pap/">Consultative Meeting Between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Consultative Meeting Between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) </strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 18 August 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (19 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1362<sup>nd</sup> Session dedicated to a Consultation between the PSC and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC Chair for the month and Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU, Mohamed Khaled, will deliver the opening remarks. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to make a statement. The President of PAP, Fateh Boutbig of Algeria, is also expected to deliver a statement. This will be his first time briefing the PSC following his <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260430/pan-african-parliament-elects-new-bureau-leadership">election</a> to serve as president of the institution in April 2026, during the Extraordinary Session of the Seventh Legislature held at the PAP headquarters in Midrand, South Africa. He will serve for a three-year term, to 2029.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is worth recalling that the annual engagement emanates from the decision of the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/1160.comm_en.pdf">1160<sup>th</sup> Meeting</a> held in June 2023, which was dedicated to the annual consultative meeting between the two bodies. From the meeting, the two bodies decided to institutionalise and regularise their annual joint meeting on peace and security in Africa, to be hosted alternately between Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Midrand, South Africa. The annual consultation is grounded in two complementary legal foundations. First, the mandates of the PAP and the PSC are closely linked. According to the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36301-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">2001 Protocol</a> to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the PAP, one of the PAP&#8217;s central objectives is to promote peace, security and stability. As a result, the PAP&#8217;s mandate has a component that overlaps with that of the PSC, even though the PSC retains primary responsibility for peace and security matters. Second, and more importantly, the session will also be held pursuant to <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/PSC-Protocol.pdf">Article 18</a> of the PSC Protocol. This provision calls for a close working relationship between the PSC and the PAP, in recognition of the complementary nature of the roles each body plays in advancing peace, security and stability across the continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This year’s meeting will be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, building on the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1290.comm_en.pdf">1290<sup>th</sup> meeting</a> held in July 2025, in which it adopted the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Final-Adopted-Conclusions-PSC-PAP-Consultative-Meeting-17-18-July-2025_EN.pdf">Conclusions</a> of their Inaugural Joint Consultative meeting held on 17 and 18 July 2025 in Midrand, South Africa. In an effort to give greater structure and substance to their cooperation, the two bodies agreed on several concrete steps to strengthen their collaboration.  These commitments are expected to be central to this year’s discussions, alongside an update on activities conducted since the past interaction vis-à-vis issues related to advancing peace, security and stability in Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Firstly, the session comes just days after PAP’s First Ordinary Session of the Seventh Legislature and the launch of its three new <a href="https://x.com/afrikparliament/status/2084006602630471718?s=46">Model Laws</a>, namely: i) Model Law on Gender Equality and Equity ii) Model Law on Labour Migration and iii) Model Law on Sustainable Soil Management, established to provide voluntary legislative frameworks to guide AU Member States in developing and strengthening national laws in line with Agenda 2063. This follows a call made from the Inaugural session between PSC and PAP on the need to adopt a model law on AU Agenda 2063. In this context, Member States were ‘encouraged to adopt and integrate the agenda into their national policy frameworks and programs, including aligning national development plans with the continental framework and ensuring that the agenda’s goals and priorities are reflected in national policies and legislation.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Secondly, the PAP and PSC Secretariats were tasked to jointly develop a draft roadmap on structured collaboration between the two organs, identifying concrete areas of cooperation and mechanisms for monitoring progress. This also included the need for experience sharing and lessons learned between the two organs on issues related to peace and security and governance, as well as capacity building in areas such as mediation and preventive diplomacy. It is expected that tomorrow’s session will give an opportunity to get an update on this particular decision, given that the draft roadmap was ‘to be presented at the next Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and PAP.’ It will provide an opportunity for the two bodies to assess the evolution of their engagement and how they can translate their complementary mandates into more regular and coordinated action. The two bodies previously called for structured and regularised engagement between them, including through the establishment of clear thematic areas of focus and fostering communication and collaboration through various mechanisms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Relatedly, and in furtherance of a call made from the conclusions of the Inaugural meeting on ‘the need for regular engagement between the PSC and PAP though, among others, PSC Chairperson participating in PAP Sessions, the PSC Troika/PAP bureau engagement,’ the PSC Chair for <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/provisional-programme-of-work-of-the-peace-and-security-council-for-july2026/">July 2026</a>, Rebecca Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU, participated in a joint <a href="https://x.com/AGA_Platform/status/2080632073681764582?s=20">capacity-building</a> training by the PAP Committee on Justice and Human Rights and the Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance facilitated by the secretariat of the AGA-APSA Platform, to advance democratic governance in Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC&#8217;s relevance, in this context, extended beyond Ambassador Otengo&#8217;s participation in the capacity-building training. The Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution (CCIRCR), one of the ten Permanent Committees of PAP, during the Permanent Committee sittings held from 21-25 July 2026 in Midrand, South Africa, convened a <a href="https://www.africanparliamentarynews.com/2026/07/pan-african-parliament-calls-for.html#:~:text=The%20Committee%20on%20Cooperation%2C%20International%20Relations%20and,deteriorating%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20the%20country.">joint sitting</a> alongside the Permanent Committee on Justice and Human Rights. It is worth noting that pursuant to Rule 26(d) of the PAP Rules of Procedure, the CCIRCR has specific responsibility for introducing issues of peace and security in Africa for consideration of the Chamber. This July joint session focused on addressing the security crisis in Sudan, its humanitarian impact and developing recommendations for African-led intervention and civilian protection, calling for the Pan-African Parliament to consider convening a dedicated parliamentary session on Sudan to help the Parliament monitor the implementation of decisions of the AU PSC and the recommendations of the African Commission’s Fact-Finding Mission.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In its consultative/advisory role, PAP has since its earlier years sent various fact-finding missions to different conflict areas across the continent, including Côte d&#8217;Ivoire, Darfur/Sudan, Libya, Rwanda, Mauritania and Chad. These missions have produced reports used to inform recommendations, and PAP has also adopted resolutions addressing specific conflicts. Despite PAP&#8217;s mandate to forward these recommendations to relevant bodies, including the PSC, no standing mechanism exists for systematically transmitting them. For much of PAP&#8217;s history, this gap was compounded by the near-total absence of direct engagement between the two organs, particularly between 2008 and 2023. Only two interactive sessions took place under Article 18 of the PSC Protocol, in 2008 and 2012. That pattern has, however, begun to shift when the two bodies held a Joint Consultative Meeting in July 2025, and tomorrow’s session is expected to be a follow-up session to discuss a roadmap for structured collaboration. Even so, this emerging engagement has centred on institutional relations rather than on a dedicated channel for PAP&#8217;s fact-finding recommendations specifically, so it remains difficult to assert that the Parliament&#8217;s recommendations have been directly reflected in PSC decisions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Beyond this, there are also institutional challenges that affect the effective operationalisation of the relationship. One such challenge relates to the continued non-ratification of the 2014 Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the AU Relating to PAP (the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7806-treaty-0047_-_protocol_to_the_constitutive_act_of_the_african_union_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">2014 PAP Protocol</a>), which seeks to provide the PAP with an enhanced legislative mandate within the AU institutional framework. In its February 2026 decision, the AU Assembly requested ‘the Bureau of PAP and all PAP Members of Parliament with the support of the AUC to intensify sensitisation and outreach to Member States on the ratification of the Malabo Protocol.’ Today, around 23 Member States have signed and 15 have deposited the instrument of ratification for the 2014 PAP Protocol. It is worth noting that progress remains slow, with the Protocol still well short of the majority of 28 AU Member States required for entry into force. Drawing on PSC&#8217;s experience with other AU bodies, notably the African Commission on Human and Peoples&#8217; Rights under Article 19 of the PSC Protocol, it would be most effective for the proposal on operationalising Article 18 to come from PAP itself, having regard to its mandate and how that mandate can best be leveraged in implementing the objectives of the PSC Protocol.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Financing issues may also feature during the discussions. The two bodies previously called for ‘advocacy for increased AU Member State voluntary contributions to the Peace Fund, to advance African ownership and self-reliance in peace and security financing.’ In this regard, and in addition to the call for the development of a plan of action to identify concrete areas of collaboration and monitor progress, they also agreed to establish a corresponding financing plan, to support peace and security activities involving both organs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The youth dimension, on the other hand, is also likely to be discussed. The Conclusions of the Inaugural consultations highlighted ‘the growing disillusionment among Africa&#8217;s youth, marked by unemployment, social exclusion, and political apathy [and] underlined the need for more inclusion of youth, and women in all efforts aimed at addressing the conflicts on the continent and in Africa’s development agenda.’ The previous meeting highlighted the need for ‘the PAP to champion the establishment of socio-economic programs aimed at economically empowering people, especially women, youth, children and special interest groups on the continent, including post-conflict reconstruction and development programmes.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the new leadership of PAP and commend the body for its contribution to the promotion of peace, security, stability and for representing the African people in the development and integration of the Continent. The PSC is also expected to welcome updates from the PAP on the activities undertaken in relation to peace and security and to continue cooperation through the annual consultative meeting within the framework of Article 18. The session is also likely to encourage those Member States who have not yet done so to consider signing and ratifying the Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the AU relating to the PAP. The meeting may also stress the importance of regular engagement and coordination of the two bodies’ efforts in complementing each other in addressing governance, peace and security challenges. The meeting may underline the imperative for the two organs to actively advocate for the reform of global institutions to better represent African interests and ensure more equitable global governance. Finally, the PSC may also stress the imperative of establishing a mechanism for the communication of decisions and recommendations of PAP on peace and security in order to ensure coherence and complementarity in decision-making processes.</p>
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		<title>Consultation between the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/consultation-between-the-psc-the-aga-apsa-platform-and-the-prc-sub-committee-on-human-rights-democracy-and-governance/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 06:13:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC meetings with AU Organs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=24096</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>13 August 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/consultation-between-the-psc-the-aga-apsa-platform-and-the-prc-sub-committee-on-human-rights-democracy-and-governance/">Consultation between the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Consultation between the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 13 August 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (14 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1361<sup>st</sup> meeting, an annual consultation with the African Governance Architecture–African Peace and Security Architecture (AGA–APSA) Platform and the Permanent Representatives Committee Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following the opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and PSC Chairperson for August 2026, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), will deliver introductory remarks. Presentations are also expected from Jevin Pillay Ponisamy of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Office to the AU, in his capacity as Vice Chairperson of the AGA-APSA Platform, on behalf of Khaled Mohamed, Chairperson of the AGA-APSA Platform, as well as from Willy Nyamitwe, Permanent Representative of Burundi to the AU and Vice Chairperson of the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC last held this joint consultation at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1295.comm_en.pdf">1295<sup>th</sup></a> meeting on 8 August 2025. It requested a comprehensive matrix of AU legal frameworks on governance, human rights, peace and security, assessing whether they remain ‘fit for purpose’, together with an action plan for their review. It also reiterated the need to operationalise the African Governance Facility and integrate governance and human-rights indicators into the PSC’s early-warning systems. This consultation seeks to strengthen synergies between the AU’s governance and human-rights mechanisms and the PSC’s early-warning and preventive responsibilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This year’s consultation coincides with a notable institutional shift. For 2026–2028, the PSC chairs the AGA–APSA Platform at both levels: the PSC Chairperson for the month at the political level and the Head of the PSC Secretariat at the technical level. This gives the Council a more direct opportunity to steer cooperation across governance, human rights, democracy, peace and security, and to advance an ‘AU delivery as one’ approach through aligned priorities, coordinated action and stronger follow-up. The tripartite engagement also reflects the mutually reinforcing nature of these agendas and provides a practical forum for reducing institutional silos and drawing on the comparative strengths of the participating bodies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The consultation is expected to revolve around four closely connected areas: strengthening sustained institutional cooperation among the PSC, the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG and the AGA–APSA Platform; improving the exchange and joint analysis of information on governance, democracy, human rights, peace and security trends; identifying priorities for coordinated responses to governance-related risks; and examining governance deficits and institutional weaknesses, including gaps in accountability, inclusion, transparency and institutional effectiveness, that can contribute to conflict and instability.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In terms of institutional synergy, coordination and sustained engagement, the consultation provides an opportunity to assess how the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG can translate their complementary mandates into more regular and coordinated action. The September 2025 <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/draft-press-release-limiisabeladirectorcpaps-final.pdf">review</a> of the High-Level Panel of Eminent African Experts on the Review of AU Governance, Peace and Security Frameworks found the AU’s governance, peace and security frameworks largely relevant, but constrained by limited political will, weak prioritisation, resource constraints and changing geopolitical dynamics, and called in particular for stronger AGA–APSA synergies, institutional coherence and implementation. Although the review focused primarily on AGA and APSA, its findings are relevant to the tripartite consultation because they underline the wider need for stronger coordination and follow-through across governance, human-rights and peace and security mechanisms. The consultation can therefore consider whether existing arrangements among the three bodies are sufficient to sustain cooperation and implementation beyond the annual engagement. An Amani Africa <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/AUs-Review-of-the-African-Peace-and-Security-Architecture-should-focus-on-implementation-deficit.pdf">policy brief</a> provides a complementary APSA-focused perspective, highlighting implementation deficits, institutional follow-through and the early warning–early action gap.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A related outstanding issue concerns cooperation measures requested in earlier PSC decisions and carried forward in 2025. These include joint promotional activities supporting ratification and domestication of AU shared-values instruments and closer PSC participation in AGA–APSA flagship initiatives. Subsequent engagement indicates progress, but does not establish whether the joint visits occurred or specific PSC responsibilities were assigned for flagship implementation and monitoring. The consultation may therefore seek reporting and a regular mechanism for sustaining PSC involvement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A notable development was the AGA–APSA Platform’s first statutory technical <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260209/2026-statuary-technical-meeting-aga-apsa-platform-kick">meeting</a> of 2026, convened from 9-10 February, which reviewed the Secretariat’s activities and work plan, the proposed flagship initiative, the Governance, Peace and Security Programme and revised Rules of Procedure. At the political meeting on 10 February, which included PSC and PRC Sub-Committee participation, Bankole Adeoye urged the Platform to accelerate implementation of its decisions and communiqués. He identified youth empowerment as the proposed flagship, called for implementation of the AGA–APSA Youth Engagement Strategy and, stressing the need to move from policy to action, <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/speeches/45940-sp-AGA-APSA_Platfrom_-_Draft_Statement_-_CPAPS_-_10.02.2026.pdf">stated</a>: ‘We do have the strategy already, the AGA–APSA Youth Engagement Strategy; we just need to action it.’ While this indicates some follow-up, the PSC’s precise role in planning, implementation and monitoring remains unclear. The consultation may therefore seek clarity on political endorsement of the revised Rules of Procedure, allocation of responsibilities and the status of the Joint Roadmap, framework matrix, African Governance Facility and decision-tracking mechanism. Without consolidated reporting and clear follow-up, annual consultations risk repeating commitments while leaving previous assignments unresolved.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The consultation may focus on how the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG can make more systematic use of governance, human-rights and electoral information for early warning and preventive action. The February 2026 <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/46188-Assembly_Decisions_31_March_E.pdf">Assembly decision</a> called for stronger CEWS monitoring of electoral processes and a human-rights-based approach to early warning through Preventive Action Cells, standardised indicators and support to National Human Rights Institutions and national early-warning mechanisms. This provides an important basis for establishing clearer arrangements through which information generated across the AU governance and human rights mechanisms can inform joint analysis and timely political engagement. Amani Africa’s Special Research Reports (<a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Re-energising-Conflict-Prevention-and-Resolution-in-Africa-a-Quest-to-Salvage-the-APSA.pdf">here</a> and <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Towards-a-New-Agenda-for-Peace-and-Security-in-Africa.pdf">here</a>) similarly underlined the need to strengthen prevention and place greater reliance on political and diplomatic tools. The consultation could therefore consider practical arrangements for pooling analysis across the three bodies and translating it into coordinated preventive engagement in countries facing elevated governance and conflict risks.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU generates substantial governance and human-rights information. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) activity <a href="https://achpr.au.int/sites/default/files/files/2026-03/ex-cl-1659-xlviiieng.pdf">report</a> illustrates the human-rights information already available within the AU and records the Commission’s June 2025 consultation with the PSC on strengthening institutional synergies, regular information exchange and a rights-based approach across the conflict cycle. The challenge is therefore less the absence of information than ensuring that relevant information reaches preventive structures early, in an accessible and actionable form, and is linked to political follow-up. Election-related risks provide an entry point. The February 2026 Assembly Decision encouraged early deployment of technical teams and Heads of Mission during the pre-election phase and stronger CEWS monitoring of electoral processes, while the ACHPR’s 2026 <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/achprres655lxxxvi-2026">resolution</a> on elections calls for adherence to relevant human-rights obligations ‘before, during and after the electoral process,’ including protections relating to political participation, freedom of expression and assembly, electoral-body independence and election-related violations. Joint pre-election risk assessments could therefore link electoral expertise with human-rights monitoring, governance analysis and preventive diplomacy, shifting attention beyond election-day observation to restrictions on political competition, institutional distrust, inflammatory mobilisation, contested constitutional changes and unimplemented recommendations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The fifth joint PSC–APRM retreat, held in Burayu on 29 and 30 April 2026, offers a practical model. Its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/5th-PSC-APRM-Declaration-EN.pdf">Joint Declaration</a> called for regular interaction among the PSC, the African Peer Review (APR) Panel of Eminent Persons, Panel of the Wise, WiseYouth, FemWise and AGA–APSA Platform, and for ‘institutionalising data and information sharing’ so that APRM country findings feed systematically into APSA early warning and mediation planning. At its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1349.comm_en.pdf">1349<sup>th</sup></a> meeting on 21 May, the PSC welcomed the APRM’s development of an early-warning system dedicated to governance and ongoing work to include it in the continental risk-and-threat matrix, while urging Member States to integrate APRM assessments into CEWS and establish national structures able to ‘translate early warnings into immediate preventive actions.’ Building on these developments, the consultation could identify practical arrangements for pooling information, conducting joint assessments and establishing clear pathways for political follow-up. The consultation could also consider how the findings and recommendations of the Africa Governance Report can secure political uptake and follow-up by Member States, particularly where governance assessments identify vulnerabilities with implications for peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Such arrangements could also strengthen coordinated responses to governance-related risks beyond elections. Joint assessment could extend to countries facing elevated risks from political transitions, constitutional disputes, emerging transnational and geopolitical risks, including external interference, institutional breakdown or severe deterioration in civic space. Bringing the PSC’s political authority, the AGA-APSA Platform’s coordination role and the Sub-Committee’s Member State engagement to enable earlier and more coherent preventive diplomacy. A similarly integrated approach could inform post-conflict reconstruction, consistent with the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/44015-ASSEMBLY_AU_DEC_866_-_902_XXXVII_E.pdf">revised</a> AU PCRD Policy, by linking governance, human-rights, institutional-reform and rule-of-law priorities to efforts to prevent relapse into conflict.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The youth dimension should likewise be connected more directly to governance and prevention. The AGA-APSA statutory meetings have identified youth empowerment as a flagship priority, while preparations for the Africa Governance Report 2027, under the theme ‘Youth in Governance: From Promise to Prosperity,’ provide a further opportunity to link youth participation to governance and preventive processes. The <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/45581-doc-FINAL_-_CES_2025_-_2030.pdf">Citizens’ Engagement Strategy 2025–2030</a> provides a complementary framework for broadening citizen participation in AU processes. The consultation could therefore encourage country-level, time-bound implementation of the AGA–APSA Youth Engagement Strategy and stronger involvement of women, youth, civil society and marginalised communities in governance assessments and preventive initiatives.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Finally, the consultation may consider how existing AU norms and mechanisms can be used more consistently to address governance deficits and structural drivers of instability. The February 2026 Assembly decision recognised ‘governance deficits, human rights violations’ among the structural drivers of unconstitutional changes of government. The comprehensive matrix requested in 2025 could help identify outstanding ratifications, domestication and reporting gaps, overlapping mandates, implementation deficits and areas requiring normative review. The decision also placed the proposed 2028 AU Theme of the Year on human rights, democracy and governance within this broader agenda. The joint consultation can therefore provide the opportunity not only to improve information exchange, but to connect information to joint analysis, early political engagement and sustained follow-up on governance and human rights commitments.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC may reaffirm the importance of strengthening the linkages between governance, human rights, democracy, peace and security, while supporting the continued institutionalisation and strengthening of its annual engagement with the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG. It may call for deeper collaboration beyond the annual consultation through concrete joint actions that strengthen conflict prevention, democratic governance and sustainable peace, consistent with a stronger ‘One AU Approach’. The Council may also encourage more systematic information-sharing and joint analysis of governance, democracy, human rights, peace and security trends, and agree on priority recommendations and coordinated responses to emerging governance challenges and risks. The PSC may reiterate the call on Member States that have not yet done so to ratify the ACDEG and other AU Shared Values instruments, while urging States Parties to strengthen implementation and meet applicable reporting obligations. It may also encourage mobilisation of political, institutional, technical and financial support for preparations related to the proposed 2028 AU Theme of the Year and associated flagship initiatives, including support from AU organs and institutions, Member States, RECs/RMs and partners, as well as measures to strengthen the institutional and operational capacity of the AGA–APSA Secretariat.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/consultation-between-the-psc-the-aga-apsa-platform-and-the-prc-sub-committee-on-human-rights-democracy-and-governance/">Consultation between the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap: Revitalisation</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/progress-made-in-silencingtheguns-in-africa-roadmap-revitalisation/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sisay Shifferaw]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2026 08:38:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[STG Initiative]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>11 August 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/progress-made-in-silencingtheguns-in-africa-roadmap-revitalisation/">Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap: Revitalisation</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-9"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding one-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap: Revitalisation</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 11 August 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (12 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene to deliberate on the theme ‘Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap: Revitalization’.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of the People&#8217;s Democratic Republic of Algeria to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for August.  Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, is expected to deliver a briefing on the agenda item.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is to be recalled that to translate the vision into practical steps, the Peace and Security Council developed the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns, which was adopted by the 29<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in January 2017. The <a href="https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/170201_au_silencing_the_guns_roadmap.pdf">Lusaka Master Roadmap (2016)</a> provided a framework for addressing the root causes of conflict, focusing on five interlinked areas: political governance, economic development, societal cohesion, environmental sustainability and peace and security. The roadmap emphasises strengthening conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, advancing post-conflict reconstruction, addressing governance and economic drivers of conflict, fostering democracy and the rule of law, and curbing the proliferation of illicit arms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The lack of adequate progress to achieve the 2020 timeline led the AU Assembly, at its <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ext-assembly-au-dec-1-and-decl-1-xiv-e.pdf">14th Extraordinary Session</a> in December 2020, to extend the implementation timeline to 2030 and to review the initiative&#8217;s implementation every two years. Subsequently, a Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism to strengthen implementation and accountability was developed in 2021.</strong> It is expected that tomorrow’s deliberation may also include how to approach the 2030 deadline in view of the persistent challenges to peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The last time the PSC held a session on STGs was at its 1252<sup>nd</sup> meeting of 18 December 2024. Recognising the need for an assessment of the state of implementation of the STGs as the 2030 deadline fast approaches and in view of the worsening state of peace and security on the continent, the key aspect of the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1252.comm_en.pdf">outcome of the session</a> was the call on the AU Commission to convene a high-level reflection or strategic review of the STGs. Subsequently, the AU Commission convened in June 2025 a <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-meeting-on-mid-term-strategic-evaluation-of-the-au-master-roadmap-of-practical-steps-to-silence-the-guns-in-africa-by-the-year-2030-concludes-in-djibouti">Mid-Term Strategic Evaluation of the AU Master Roadmap on Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns by the Year 2030. </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session provides an opportunity to follow up on the previous session of the PSC, including on its request for regular briefing from the AU High Representative at least every two years, and take stock of where the implementation of the Silencing the Guns (STG) initiative stands.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As the continent passed the midpoint of the extended 2030 timeline, the question before the PSC is therefore no longer simply whether progress has been made, but <strong>why the trajectory of Africa’s peace and security landscape remains so starkly at odds with the 2030 ambition, where implementation is falling short, and what needs to change to reverse that trajectory</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This question is particularly consequential for the ongoing review of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), since the experience of STG provides a practical test of APSA’s capacity to translate its norms, institutions and tools into effective conflict prevention, timely response, sustained peace processes and peace consolidation. With the Extraordinary AU Summit on strengthening conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms scheduled to convene in Luanda later this month, the session also offers a timely opportunity to connect the STG assessment to the broader APSA review and to shape the Summit’s deliberations around concrete, measurable and time-bound measures to address the implementation gaps. In this sense, the session is expected to seek not another declaratory recommitment to the STG roadmap, but a clearer determination of what must change in the approach and posture of the continent’s peace and security architecture towards the peace and security situation on the continent and how those changes can be translated into delivery during the remaining period to 2030.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Amani Africa’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/MEMO-TO-THE-NEW-AU-COMMISSION-LEADERSHIP.pdf">assessment</a> of the first decade of STG (2013 – 2023) established that the gap between the initiative’s ambition and the realities on the ground had widened considerably. The number of conflict situations on the PSC agenda increased nearly threefold between 2013 and 2023, while the number of internally displaced persons and refugees tripled. The updated data suggests that this deterioration remains largely unchanged.</p>
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</div><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-24071" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10.png" width="1672" height="1000" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10.png 1672w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10-300x179.png 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10-1024x612.png 1024w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10-768x459.png 768w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10-1536x919.png 1536w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10-350x209.png 350w" sizes="(max-width: 1672px) 100vw, 1672px" /></div>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Figure 1: No. of conflict situations on the agenda of the PSC (Source: own data collected from PSC activities)</figcaption></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This increase in the number and geographic spread of conflicts is also notable in the increase in the number of situations on the agenda of the PSC, whose proliferation is in part attributable to the unprecedented surge in military coups.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">According to the data from different conflict data sets, the most notable trend is the sharp increase in recorded conflict events, rising from 1,671 in 2013 to 6,124 in 2025. Although annual variations exist, the overall trajectory has been consistently upward, particularly after 2019. The nature of conflict has also evolved from concentrated hotspots to a more dispersed continental security challenge. While traditional conflict theatres such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sudan, and the Central African Republic remain major centres of violence, new areas of instability have emerged. The Sahel represents the clearest example, with Burkina Faso experiencing a dramatic escalation from 2 (two) recorded conflict events in 2016 to 657 in 2025. The spread of insecurity into coastal West Africa, including Benin, as well as emerging concerns in countries such as Togo and Tanzania, demonstrates the expanding geographic reach of armed groups and regional insecurity.</p>
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</div><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-24072" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5.png" width="1588" height="991" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5.png 1588w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5-300x187.png 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5-1024x639.png 1024w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5-768x479.png 768w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5-1536x959.png 1536w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5-350x218.png 350w" sizes="(max-width: 1588px) 100vw, 1588px" /></div>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Figure 2: Number of conflict events in Africa (2013 -2025) (Source: Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg, Organised violence 1989–2025, and violent political protests, Journal of Peace Research, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopres/xjag046)</figcaption></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When disaggregating the data by conflict type, the surge is concentrated in just two categories rather than evenly spread. State‑based conflict nearly quadrupled between 2013 and 2025 (906 to 3,573, now 58% of all events), and one‑sided violence against civilians more than tripled (536 to 1,840). By contrast, non‑state conflict (588 to 733) and internationalised conflict rose only modestly. Sudan’s civil war, which erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, exemplifies both drivers and accounts for much of the sharp 2023–2025 escalation. The RSF’s 2024–2025 siege and October 2025 capture of El Fasher, where UN investigators documented mass executions, sexual violence, and thousands of civilian deaths, provides a direct real‑world instance of the one-sided violence spike. The Sahel reflects a similar dual dynamic: JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province simultaneously battle state militaries (state‑based) and massacre civilians in contested villages (one‑sided violence). Additional weight comes from the M23 resurgence in the DRC since 2022 and Ethiopia’s 2020–2022 Tigray war, both adding to the state‑based conflict totals in this period.</p>
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</div><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-24073" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1.png" width="1607" height="979" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1.png 1607w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1-300x183.png 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1-1024x624.png 1024w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1-768x468.png 768w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1-1536x936.png 1536w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1-350x213.png 350w" sizes="(max-width: 1607px) 100vw, 1607px" /></div>
					</div>
				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Figure 3: Number of conflict events by conflict types (2013 – 2015), (Source: Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg, Organized violence 1989–2025, and violent political protests, Journal of Peace Research, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopres/xjag046)</figcaption></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The humanitarian impact, captured in the graph below, is the direct result of the substantial increase in the incidence, intensity and geographic spread of armed violence, while also particularly affected by the dynamics of specific conflicts.</p>
<p>
</div><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-24074" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4.png" width="1619" height="971" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4.png 1619w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4-300x180.png 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4-1024x614.png 1024w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4-768x461.png 768w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4-1536x921.png 1536w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4-350x210.png 350w" sizes="(max-width: 1619px) 100vw, 1619px" /></div>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Figure 4: Number of Refugees and IDPs in Africa Between 2010 – 2025 (Source: UNHCR Global Trends; International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)</figcaption></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Measured against the pillars of the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38304-doc-1_au_roadmap_silencing_guns_2020_pdf_en.pdf">AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns</a>, the data reveals a widening gap between the ambition of the STGs agenda and the conditions required for its realisation. By AU’s own admission, some of the limited progress achieved is a far cry from the lofty goals and objectives set out in the AU Master Roadmap and the scale of peace and security challenges. Parts of the continent remain mired in conflict, and new challenges to peace and security have proliferated.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The growing number and geographic spread of conflicts are linked to the increased involvement of terrorist and violent extremist groups, deteriorating political governance, the persistence and expansion of armed conflicts, the fragility of peace agreements, and the continued proliferation of arms. These trends show that the challenge extends beyond the failure to end individual conflicts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Closing this structural gap requires not only addressing the root causes of conflict but also ensuring that early‑warning systems are translated into timely political action. Early warning remains vital, but the persistent gap between warning and political action points to the need to operationalise the Roadmap by making early-warning outputs more systematically actionable. In this regard, the PSC has in its recent sessions emphasised the centrality of early responses to early warning in enhancing its conflict prevention mandate. It is therefore expected that the PSC, building on its 1247<sup>th</sup>, 1298<sup>th</sup> session, and 1320<sup>th</sup> session, will follow up on progress in the operationalisation of its decisions, particularly the dynamic risk-mapping tool and regular horizon-scanning briefings by AUCTC, CISSA and AFRIPOL.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Furthermore, the PSC may also use the opportunity to examine how to ensure that CEWS analysis products directly inform its agenda-setting and decisions, including through regular confidential briefings, periodic horizon-scanning sessions, and by improving AU–REC/RMs information-sharing, while giving greater attention to emerging threats such as digital radicalisation and illicit financial flows that increasingly underpin the evolution and cross-border expansion of conflicts. The central issue for follow-up is therefore how to ensure that early-warning information consistently triggers timely political decisions and preventive action, rather than being repeatedly generated without corresponding response.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">These experiences suggest that the challenge for the AU is not simply to expand mediation efforts, but to develop conflict-specific strategies that combine sustained political engagement with security, humanitarian, development and peacebuilding instruments. They also reinforce the importance of African agency and institutional coherence, while external engagement can provide important diplomatic leverage and resources; fragmented mediation can dilute African ownership and create parallel processes. Strengthening AU–RECs/RMs coordination, clarifying the respective roles of regional and continental actors, and ensuring that external engagement complements rather than substitutes African-led processes will therefore be essential to making mediation and preventive diplomacy more effective in the changing conflict landscape.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The experience of the past thirteen years also demonstrates that ending active hostilities does not necessarily amount to silencing the guns. The lesson is that peace agreements should not be treated as the endpoint of conflict resolution. They are the beginning of a longer process of transforming the political, security and socioeconomic conditions that produced conflict in the first place.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This also points to a weakness in the way success in peace processes is often measured. A more meaningful measure of progress would examine whether peace agreements are being implemented, whether political institutions are becoming more inclusive, whether displaced populations can return safely, whether former combatants are effectively reintegrated, whether communities experience improved security and whether institutions are capable of resolving grievances without violence. Amani Africa’s earlier work on PCRD has highlighted the importance of linking security, political governance, humanitarian assistance, socioeconomic reconstruction, justice and reconciliation, and women and youth in sustaining peace. The challenge for the PSC is therefore to strengthen the connection between mediation and post-conflict support, ensuring that the political attention and resources mobilised to secure peace agreements are sustained during implementation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. It is expected that the PSC will underscore the need for a revitalised and more effective implementation of the Silencing the Guns Master Roadmap, taking into account the prevailing peace and security situation on the continent. The PSC may emphasise the importance of identifying and addressing the political, institutional and operational gaps that have impeded the implementation of the Roadmap, including the persistent gap between early warning and early action. It may call for strengthening the AU’s preventive diplomacy and mediation capacities and adapting approaches to conflict prevention and resolution to the evolving nature of armed conflicts, while enhancing coordination between the AU and RECs/RMs and reinforcing African ownership of peace processes. In view of the widening gap between the STG ambition and developments on the ground, the PSC may call for concrete, measurable and time-bound measures to accelerate implementation during the remaining period to 2030, including more systematic follow-up and accountability for the implementation of STG commitments. The PSC may also decide that a quarterly ministerial-level meeting dedicated to the adoption of measures specific to various conflict situations and constant review and, as necessary, updating of implementation of such measures in order to push significant progress by 2030. The PSC may also consider more concrete and measurable targets to register tangible progress by 2030 and request a report for making a determination on how to adapt and continue the agenda beyond 2030.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/progress-made-in-silencingtheguns-in-africa-roadmap-revitalisation/">Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap: Revitalisation</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Quarterly briefing by the A3 to the PSC</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Aug 2026 06:47:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC Meetings on A3]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23999</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>4 August 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/quarterly-briefing-by-the-a3-to-the-psc/">Quarterly briefing by the A3 to the PSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Quarterly briefing by the A3 to the PSC </strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 4 August 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (5 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1358<sup>th</sup> session to receive a quarterly briefing by the A3 to the PSC on its activities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session will commence with opening remarks by the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and PSC Chairperson for August 2026, Mohamed Khaled, followed by an introductory statement by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. The Council is also expected to receive briefings from Lewis G. Brown, Permanent Representative of of Liberia and Coordinator of the A3, and Mohamed Edrees, Permanent Representative of the African Union to the United Nations in New York. In addition, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), will deliver a statement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s briefing is being convened pursuant to the first Conclusions of the High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, held in Algiers in December 2013, which agreed that the A3 would brief the PSC quarterly on African issues on the UN Security Council’s agenda. This was reaffirmed in the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Manual-of-Engagement-on-Engagement-between-PSC-and-A3-HLS-EN.pdf">Manual</a> on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3, with a view to facilitating information-sharing and enabling the PSC to provide the necessary guidance. More than a decade later, the briefings remain irregular, although there are signs of improvement this year.  The A3 last briefed the PSC on 20 April 2026, during its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1340.comm_en.pdf">1340<sup>th</sup></a> session, covering activities during the first quarter of 2026. During that session, the PSC directed the AU Commission to assess the feasibility of holding one quarterly briefing at AU headquarters and to develop a matrix of Common African Positions, as well as an annual plan of action for advancing those positions and reflecting relevant PSC decisions in the resolution of the UN Security Council. Tomorrow’s engagement is expected to follow up on these decisions and review the A3’s activities during the second quarter of 2026.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One area the briefing is expected to highlight is the steps taken to strengthen internal cohesion. As noted in Amani Africa’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/making-africas-voice-matter-in-the-un-security-council-bridging-the-gap-between-ambition-and-reality-in-the-role-of-the-african-three-members-of-the-unsc/">Special Research Report on the A3</a>, the group has become a force that others within the UN Security Council reckon with and has demonstrated its capacity to exert influence in its decision-making processes. When acting as one and speaking with one voice, its influence can go as far as operating as a ‘de facto veto power,’ requiring other members, including the P5, to consult the A3, particularly on the African files.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One way of articulating their collective positions is through joint statements. Both their frequency and scope have expanded considerably: according to a <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/A3_research_report_2025.pdf">study</a> by the Security Council Report, the number increased from six in 2018 to 105 in 2024. Initially focused on African country situations, they now extend to thematic agenda items and non-African files. Publicly available information indicates that, between April and June 2026, the A3 delivered joint statements on at least 20 occasions. As observed by Security Council Report, speaking with one voice has increased the visibility of African positions; made it easier for other Council members to support or align with them; and enabled delegations with limited capacity to share the drafting burden while drawing on individual members’ regional expertise. This is an important step towards strengthening cohesion and amplifying African positions. The A3’s next stage of development should, however, be judged by whether its collective positions shape negotiations, influence voting behaviour and affect Security Council decisions and actions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Although outside the review period, the briefing is likely to highlight the Arria-formula meeting convened by DRC during its July 2026 presidency as an encouraging experience. Held on 13 July and titled ‘The Normative Gaps Linking Natural Resources and Peace: Foundations and Perspectives,’ it built on Sierra Leone’s July 2025 meeting on critical minerals and their links to insecurity in Africa. The A3 have used Arria-formula meetings less frequently than other Council members, but their growing recourse to this mechanism is welcome. Used strategically, Arria-formula meetings can help shape subsequent Security Council deliberations and enable the A3 to move from responding to agendas set by others towards exercising a more proactive agenda-setting and drafting role. This was evident when, following the Arria-formula meeting, the DRC convened a high-level open debate on natural resource governance on 22 July under the agenda item ‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A3 members are also trying to expand their penholding or co-penholding role on African files and other issues of interest to the continent as called for in the communiqué of the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/983rd-psc-meeting-unified-role-of-a3-in-the-unsc-4-march-2021.pdf">983<sup>rd</sup> session</a> of the PSC. At its 1340<sup>th</sup> session, the PSC encouraged the A3 to assume greater responsibility in shaping Security Council outcomes through such arrangements. So far, these roles have mainly covered West Africa and the Sahel and the Central African region. As pointed out in <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Sierra-Leones-2024-2025-UN-Security-Council-Tenure-and-Africas-Recalibration-in-a-Retreating-International-Law-Based-Order.pdf">a recent publication</a> on the tenure of Sierra Leone, leadership is exercised additionally ‘through sanctions and working group responsibilities, including chairing the 1533 Sanctions Committee concerning the DRC, the 2206 Sanctions Committee concerning South Sudan and the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite the A3’s emergence as a cohesive negotiating bloc with significant influence on Security Council dynamics—and its support becoming a ‘de facto requirement’ for the adoption of Security Council products concerning African files—, there remains significant room for improvement. Several challenges continue to limit the group’s role in agenda-setting and its influence over Security Council outcomes and are worth highlighting in tomorrow’s engagement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The first is the lack of strong strategic and political guidance from the AU, as well as inadequate coordination and timely, proactive engagement between Addis Ababa and New York. In the absence of clear and timely AU guidance, the A3 cannot effectively influence Security Council dynamics and remains vulnerable to division. Various PSC sessions, including the 983<sup>rd</sup> and 1340<sup>th</sup> sessions, the Oran Process and the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3 have identified mechanisms to address this. The difficulty lies not in the absence of modalities but in their limited operationalisation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Modalities that have not been implemented regularly include inviting the A3 to PSC meetings on items also under UN Security Council discussion; holding quarterly videoconferences between the PSC Troika and the A3; facilitating interactions between their experts; and aligning the two Councils’ programmes of work on African files. Although the PSC’s 1340<sup>th</sup> session requested that its deliberations precede, to the extent possible, discussion of the same issues in the UN Security Council, thereby providing clear continental guidance, this rarely happens. Responses from Addis Ababa are often late. The AU Permanent Observer Mission, which serves as the A3 Secretariat and is expected to provide technical, administrative and logistical support to the group, remains under-resourced, while the request for a dedicated focal point within the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security has not been acted upon. Similarly, while the A3 increasingly serves as penholder or co-penholder on some files, the P3 still control most African files and usually initiates meetings and drafts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">These shortcomings have political consequences. Without timely continental guidance, the A3 formulates positions after negotiations on UNSC outcome documents are underway. Under these circumstances, its ability to influence first drafts declines, national positions can displace collective ones, and exposure to permanent-member pressure increases. Regular contact is therefore a condition of political cohesion, not an administrative formality.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Against this backdrop, tomorrow’s sessions should focus on operationalising agreed modalities for coordination outlined in various PSC session outcome documents on the A3 and in the Manual. As underscored in its 983<sup>rd</sup> session, the PSC should also reflect in its Programme of Work African files expected to feature in the UNSC agenda so that African positions are settled before, not after, Security Council negotiations begin.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Second, it is important that a clear set of continental priorities is set for A3 leadership in the UNSC. The Annual Plan of Action requested at the 1340<sup>th</sup> session should identify a) the files on which the A3 is expected to seek concrete Council outcomes, b) the principles that should guide A3 engagement, and c) the positions to be advanced and the coalitions required.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Third, there is also a need to expand its coalition base within and outside the Security Council. Building on the A3 Plus arrangement created with Caribbean members, the group should build a constituency among the E10—the ten elected non-permanent members. Beyond the Security Council, closer engagement with the wider African Group in New York and members of the UN from the Global South, including within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement, could reinforce support around African common positions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Finally, accountability of the A3 to the AU should be ensured. AU endorsement and leadership of the A3 are not nice things to have but a strategic necessity.  They should become part of the strategic framework that anchors the role of the A3 and the projection of collective influence rather than a routine regional process. The AU Assembly in Decision Assembly/ AU/Dec.598 (XXVI) adopted in January 2016 explicitly <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/how-africa-is-using-the-a3-as-a-de-facto-permanent-power-block-in-global-peace-and-security-decision-making/">inscribed</a> the A3’s special responsibility to ensure that the decisions of the PSC are well reflected in the decision-making process of the Security Council on peace and security issues of concern to Africa. As such, the A3 seat carries not only national responsibilities but also continental ones. In addition to the annual seminar and the quarterly briefing, one way of strengthening accountability could be inviting African candidates for the Security Council seeking AU endorsement, both during their candidatures and at the conclusion of their mandates, to provide an assessment of how they have advanced agreed African positions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC may commend the progress made over the years, during which the A3 has evolved into a major power bloc within the UN Security Council. It may also welcome continued efforts to strengthen the A3’s influence and advance Common African Positions with one voice, including through the delivery of joint statements. The PSC may emphasise the importance of operationalising the agreed modalities for enhancing coordination between the A3 and the PSC, with a view to ensuring timely and proactive guidance on African files. To this end, it may request that the AU Commission and the AU Permanent Observer Mission report on the challenges to the implementation of the modalities for coordination and provide proposals on how to address those challenges. Taking note of the lessons from Sierra Leone’s tenure, the PSC may also encourage A3 members to expand their influence through chairing sanctions committees and informal working groups of the UNSC. It may also welcome the emerging use of Arria-formula meetings for setting agendas and shaping UNSC engagement on particular issues and encourage the A3 to use Arria-formula meetings strategically.</p>
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