Tomorrow (20 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1340^th session to receive a briefing from the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3).

The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026, followed by a statement from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The representatives of the A3 members, Somalia as the coordinator of the group for the first quarter, are expected to brief the PSC on the activities of the A3.

Since January 2026, the three elected African members (A3) of the UN Security Council (UNSC) comprise the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Somalia for the 2026–2027 term. Somalia joined the Council in January 2025 after more than five decades, while 2026 marks the return of Liberia after a 65-year absence and the return of the DRC after 35 years. Notably, the DRC concurrently serves on the PSC, creating an opportunity to strengthen coordination and coherence between the two councils.

With Guyana concluding its term at the end of 2025, there is currently no Caribbean representation on the Council. Consequently, unlike during the 2020–2021 and 2024–2025 terms, there is no prospect of expanding the A3 into an ‘A3+1’ configuration.

Tomorrow’s briefing takes place within the framework of longstanding efforts to strengthen coordination between the AU and the UNSC. This engagement traces back to the first conclusion of the High-Level Seminar (HLS) on peace and security in Africa, held in Algiers in December 2013, which established the practice of the A3 providing quarterly briefings to the PSC on African issues on the UNSC agenda, although, in practice, these briefings have not been delivered consistently.

This commitment has since been consistently reinforced. It was reaffirmed during the 11^th Oran Process in 2024 and further institutionalised through the adoption of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3 at the PSC’s 1289^th session on 24 July 2025, formalising requirements for regular reporting and structured engagement.

During the most recent A3+ briefing to the PSC in August 2025, the PSC not only decided to institutionalise consultative meetings between the PSC and the A3+ at ambassadorial level as a statutory activity within its annual indicative programme, but also reiterated its request for the A3+ to brief and consult the PSC on a quarterly basis and whenever necessary, on African issues under consideration by the UNSC.

In this context, the A3 are expected to brief the PSC on their activities within the UNSC since the beginning of 2026, highlighting their continued efforts to advance coordinated African positions and to ensure that the continent’s perspectives are effectively reflected in Council deliberations and outcomes. In this regard, the A3 have sustained an active and consistent engagement across a wide range of agenda items through the delivery of joint statements, covering both African country-specific situations and broader thematic and global issues. On African files, the A3 are likely to highlight their sustained engagement on situations such as the Central African Republic, DRC, Libya, Sudan, and South Sudan. Beyond African situations, the A3 have also demonstrated engagement on broader international peace and security issues, including developments in the Middle East. These interventions have generally underscored key principles, such as the primacy of political solutions, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the protection of civilians, and adherence to international law, while also reaffirming the central role of the AU and regional mechanisms in addressing conflicts on the continent. These positions underscore the A3’s efforts to situate Africa as an active stakeholder in global peace and security discussions, beyond continent-specific concerns.

In addition to statements, the A3 are also expected to reflect on their growing role in influencing Security Council outcome documents through engagement in negotiations on draft resolutions and other Council outcome documents. Recent examples include their involvement in ongoing negotiations on the resolution of situations relating to Libya and a resolution and a press statement on South Sudan. Another instance is A3’s initiative in shaping Council engagement on Sudan, by initiating, together with the United Kingdom as penholder, a Security Council meeting in March, following a strike on a hospital in East Darfur state. These efforts point to the increasing role of the A3 in engaging with penholders and other Council members to ensure that African perspectives are reflected in the formulation of Security Council decisions.

The session is also expected to feature discussions as a follow-up to previous decisions of the PSC aimed at strengthening communication and coordination with the A3. In this regard, PSC members may draw on past precedents, such as, the communiqué adopted at its 1221^st Session in July 2024 on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), which reiterated the call for the total lifting of the arms embargo on the CAR and encouraged the A3 to promote a unified position on this matter within the UN Security Council. Building on such precedents, the session may also reflect on recommendations emerging from the 11th and 12th High-Level Seminars on Peace and Security in Africa (Oran Process), which underscored the need for more systematic information sharing and the synchronisation of meetings between the PSC and the UN Security Council on issues under their joint mandate.

The meeting is also expected to provide an opportunity to reflect on the outcomes of the 5^th Annual A3 Retreat held on 4 February, which brought together incoming, current, and former A3+ members for strategic reflection and planning. The Retreat underscored the importance of strengthening coordination, unity, and synergy with the PSC, while enhancing Africa’s strategic positioning within the Security Council. In this context, discussions may reflect on the need to address the continued challenges faced by the A3 in influencing Council outcomes, particularly their role in pen-holding and drafting processes while navigating through the current complex geopolitical competition.

Building on these reflections, the PSC session may recall the discussion that took place during the 6^th A3 High-Level Meeting held on 13 February on the margins of the 39^th AU Assembly, which focused on advancing African agency and leadership in peace and security within a changing global order. Discussions at that meeting emphasised the need to strengthen the A3 as a strategic mechanism guided by African priorities, enhance its proactive role within the Security Council, and advance predictable and sustainable financing for AU-led peace support operations. In this regard, particular attention may be given to the importance of enhancing AU–UN cooperation frameworks, including through the effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719. The adoption of the UNSC Resolution 2719 in December 2023 stands as a notable illustration of what coordinated A3 engagement can achieve in advancing a common African position. As such, the effective implementation and operationalisation of this resolution will be critical for further strengthening the AU–UN strategic partnership and ensuring sustained support for AU-led peace operations.

Tomorrow’s briefing outcome is expected to be a communiqué, and in this regard, the PSC is expected to welcome the briefing by the A3 and express appreciation for their continued efforts to articulate and advance coordinated African positions within the UNSC, while also commending the sustained cohesion, coordination, and unity demonstrated by the A3 since the beginning of their 2026–2027 term. Building on this, the PSC may acknowledge the growing role of the A3 in influencing UNSC outcomes, as well as their interaction with penholders and other Council members to ensure that African priorities and perspectives are adequately reflected, and in doing so, the Council may underscore the importance of strengthening coordination and coherence between the PSC and the UNSC. In the same vein, the PSC may further reiterate the need for the A3 to uphold, promote, and defend the decisions and positions of the PSC in their engagement within the UNSC, in line with relevant AU Assembly decisions and the conclusions of the High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa (Oran Process). In this regard, the PSC may also emphasise the importance of the effective implementation of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3, particularly with regard to ensuring regular reporting, structured engagement, and timely exchange of information between the two bodies. In this context, it may call for enhanced regularity and predictability in the provision of briefings by the A3, in line with the agreed quarterly framework, and encourage more systematic consultations to facilitate timely guidance from the PSC on African issues under consideration by the UNSC, while at the same time encouraging further strengthening of practical cooperation between the PSC and the A3, including through the synchronisation of their respective programmes of work, enhanced interaction between the experts of the PSC and the UNSC, and the establishment of effective information-sharing mechanisms. Furthermore, the PSC may highlight the importance of enhancing the role of the A3 in pen-holding and drafting processes within the UNSC, while encouraging continued efforts to navigate geopolitical dynamics and safeguard African priorities. Finally, the PSC may stress the importance of strengthening AU–UN cooperation frameworks, including through the effective implementation and operationalisation of UNSC Resolution 2719 as a key instrument for ensuring predictable and sustainable financing of AU-led peace support operations.

Tomorrow (16 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1339^th session on ‘Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security in Africa’. The session will be held at the Ministerial level.

Following opening remarks by Gedion Timothewos Hessebon, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Chairperson of the PSC for April 2026, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission will make the introductory statement. The meeting will then receive briefings from Worku Gachena Negera, Director General of Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute, and Samson Itodo, Chairperson of the African Union Advisory Group on Artificial Intelligence. Bernardo Mariano Junior, Assistant Secretary-General, Chief Information Technology Officer, UN Office of Information and Communications Technology (UNOICT) will also make a statement.

 The rapid development of AI and its accelerating deployment across the political, social, economic, cultural, and security fields is attracting growing policy attention. Not surprisingly, there has been a burgeoning engagement on this matter during the past few years on the part of the UN and AU peace and security and governance policy-making bodies. In view of various technical and regulatory gaps and inbuilt flaws associated with AI, the widespread optimism that characterises the adaptation and deployment of AI in Africa requires critical engagement on ways of harnessing its benefits and mitigating its risks, some of which are particular to Africa. It has been reported that AI is projected to add between $ 2.9 trillion and $ 4.8 trillion to Africa’s economy by 2030, presenting an opportunity for the youth who constitute the majority of the African population.   Industries from agriculture and healthcare to education and finance are on the brink of major transformation.

In terms of the deployment of AI, the continent faces a ‘non-linear’ development path marked by significant regional disparities. While East and South Africa possess more mature ecosystems, Central Africa remains in a nascent stage due to infrastructure and digital literacy constraints. There are persisting challenges across the continent affecting the potential of AI, including unreliable electricity, fragmented data regulations, a lack of a policy framework and the erosion of local talent to global companies.

Africa currently represents only about 1% of the world’s AI computing capacity. Without intentional investment and strong governance, the continent risks remaining largely a consumer of technologies built elsewhere, systems designed for different environments and not always aligned with African needs and realities.

As noted in the various engagements of the AU and the UN, there is recognition that AI is reshaping the global governance, development and security environment. At the level of the UN, engagement on the implications of AI is gaining momentum both in the UNSC and the UN General Assembly. Among others, the UNGA adopted Resolution 79/239 on Artificial Intelligence in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security. Along with the ongoing effort for developing a global governance framework, these developments and the need for addressing the specific needs and concerns of Africa in relation to AI necessitate that Africa and the AU engage actively, among others, on issues of data protection, addressing the digital divide, developing capabilities for adapting and developing AI for Africa, regulatory and technical gaps, protection of vulnerable groups and deployment of AI in the military domain.

It is against this background that the PSC started convening sessions dedicated to the theme of AI and its governance and peace and security implications. On 13 June 2024 – as part of its 20^th anniversary commemoration – the AUPSC held its first session dedicated to ‘AI and its impact on peace and security in Africa’. This  1214^th session of the Council underscored AI’s transformative potential for peacebuilding, including its applications in early warning systems, conflict prevention, and post-conflict recovery. Most notably, however, it recognised the risks associated with its rapid development in a regulatory vacuum. The meeting tasked the AU Commission to ‘undertake a comprehensive study on the impact and implications of AI on peace, security, stability, democracy and development in Africa and submit the Report to the PSC as soon as possible.’ It also assigned the AU Commission, in particular the PAPS Department, in coordination with the Department of Infrastructure and Energy, to ‘establish a multidisciplinary Advisory Group on AI, peace, security and good governance in Africa; and to propose options for Continental Artificial Intelligence governance, including its military application and to report to Council every six months.’

Subsequently, the PSC held the first ministerial-level meeting on 20 March 2025 as its 1267^th session under the theme ‘AI and its Impact on Peace and Security in Africa’. Building on its initial session (1214^th), the 1267^th session proposed the mainstreaming of AI in peace support operations, early warning systems, and preventive diplomacy, while also calling for the development of a Common African Position on AI and an African Charter on AI to guide its responsible use. Some progress has since been made in implementing these decisions, notably through the establishment of the AU AI Advisory Group on Governance, Peace and Security in March 2025. In December 2025, the Advisory Group convened in Nairobi, Kenya, to discuss its future plans, including the development of a Common African Position on AI, and to deliberate on emerging AI trends, opportunities and risks in Africa, as well as their implications for governance, conflict prevention and stability. Additionally, a technical workshop on the Strategic Assessment and Review of the Continental Early Warning System was held in November 2025 in Kigali, Rwanda, which resulted in the adoption of a joint AU–RECs/RMs Roadmap to integrate AI into early warning processes.

In March 2026, convened under the theme ‘Women, Peace and Security in Africa: Women’s Leadership in Addressing Emerging Threats to Peace and Security: Artificial Intelligence and Technology-Facilitated Violence,’ the PSC’s 1334^th meeting drew attention to the implications of AI on women, peace and security. It served as a useful occasion for highlighting the deleterious consequences of the adoption of new technology, including AI, particularly in accentuating existing patterns of discrimination and prejudice, including technology-facilitated gender-based violence, online harassment, misinformation and disinformation, which undermines women’s effective leadership, credibility, reputation, participation, safety and authority. In this regard, the Council, among other decisions, directed the AU Commission, in particular the AI Advisory Group on Governance, Peace and Security, to ensure the inclusion of issues relating to women in the development of the Common African Position on AI Governance, Peace and Security.

Tomorrow’s meeting is being held just a day before the PSC undertakes a field visit to the Ethiopian AI Institute and the Science and Technology Museum, as part of its activities planned for April 2026. It should be recalled that the 39^th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union held in February 2026 endorsed Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, as the AU Champion for AI. Relatedly, one of the Decisions during the Summit – particularly under the briefing by Cyril Ramaphosa, president of South Africa, on the outcomes of the November 2025 G20 leaders’ summit, was ‘to establish an annual AI for Africa Conference,’ following the inaugural Conference convened in Cape Town in September 2025.

It is expected that the upcoming session will build on and further expand the PSC’s consideration of AI and governance and peace and security in Africa. Of particular interest in this respect for tomorrow’s session is the role that Africa plays on the one hand in bolstering national and continental technical and regulatory infrastructure for harnessing the benefits and mitigating the risks of AI for governance, development, and peace and security in Africa and on the other hand in participating actively and contributing to shaping the development of global AI governance systems.

Tomorrow’s session will additionally be an opportunity to follow up on its previous decisions and chart a way forward, particularly during its 1267^th session in which it highlighted the importance of setting up a mechanism ‘to monitor and assess the impact of AI on peace and security, such as an AU Watch Center with a mandate to monitor AI developments worldwide and in Africa, and to regularly inform AU Member States, RECs/RMs and the AU on the state of AI, particularly its impact on governance, peace and security in Africa.’ It may also follow on the decision tasking the AU Commission ‘to organise an African forum bringing together relevant partners and stakeholders to discuss AI as a key tool suited to share best practices and strategies for peace, security and governance in Africa’ and ‘to develop training programmes on AI in support of AU Member States in investing in human capital by training and capturing African talents in the fields of AI.’

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the need for developing technical and regulatory infrastructure, both at the national and continental levels, to position the continent for both harnessing the benefits and containing the risks of the use of AI in Africa. The Council may also emphasise that AI and its use, including in the military domain, are subject to international law rules, including human rights and international humanitarian laws. It may urge Member States to adopt national legislation aligned with the continental strategy and framework to regulate the use of AI, particularly as it relates to governance, peace and security. The PSC may also encourage the Members of the AU Advisory Group on AI in Peace, Security and Governance Group to expedite the development of the Common African Position on AI and its impact on peace, security, democracy and development in Africa in consultation with all AU Member States. Council may also reiterate the importance of ensuring greater representation of Africa on global AI regulatory and governance bodies and mobilise efforts and complementarity among the various initiatives dealing with the issue of AI at the continental and international levels. The PSC may also encourage all Member States to create conducive conditions for more meaningful and effective engagement of women and youth in digital governance, AI policy, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and decision-making, ensuring equitable access to digital tools, literacy and platforms.

Tomorrow (9 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene an informal consultation on the ‘Impact of the Middle East Crisis on the Peace and Security Situation of Africa.’

Following opening remarks by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for April 2026, the AU Commission is expected to share its tracking of how the situation in the Middle East is impacting peace and security in Africa. Apart from the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the AU Department of Economic Development, Trade, Tourism, Industry and Minerals may also brief the Council.

While the AU, through the Chairperson of the Commission and individual member states, made statements which also drew attention to the consequences of the war, this is the first time the issue featured as an agenda item of a policy organ of the AU. It is to be recalled that this was not initially on the April 2026 Programme of Work. It appears that it was added in view of the deepening consequences of the war and recent signs of its possible expansion to the Red Sea, with all its risks of directly drawing the Horn of Africa into the conflict.

There are at least three aspects to the impact of this war that may be of interest to members of the PSC. Given the high-level vulnerability and dependence of many in Africa on global supply chains, the disruption this war caused would have direct implications for the social and economic well-being of many countries. As the AU Commission Chairperson noted in a statement he issued on 8 April, the repercussions of the conflict have been felt across the world, including Africa, where disruptions to fuel supplies have driven inflation and increased the cost of basic commodities.’ This can strain, and if prolonged, potentially trigger instability in fragile social and political contexts. A defining feature of this crisis is also the energy crunch triggered by the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which has removed nearly 20% of the global oil supply from the market and driven crude prices towards well over $100 per barrel. This surge has created a widespread energy shock that affects even African oil exporters, and with other countries, including Kenya, Ethiopia and Zambia, reporting shortages.

Second, this conflict, both by dominating and diverting diplomatic and international attention, can also lead to not only the overshadowing but also the neglect of conflict situations in Africa, such as in Sudan. Third, without some measure of containment of the war, it can draw Africa more directly as the risk of its expansion to the Red Sea increases.

The policy brief that the AU, UNECA, AfDB and UNDP published on 2 April provides further details of the assessment of these institutions on how this war is impacting Africa. It projected a loss of 0.2 percentage points on Africa’s GDP in 2026, particularly if it persists over six months. It may also precipitate not only a cost-of-living crisis but also food insecurity, which can be particularly consequential due to the disruption of the supply of fertilisers.  It also raises the spectre of heightened geopolitical competition in fragile settings already affected by external interference, such as Sudan, Somalia and Libya.

AU statements over the course of this crisis reflect the growing concern over these implications. On 28 February 2026, the AU Commission issued two statements (here and here) warning that escalation ‘threatens to worsen global instability, with serious implications for energy markets, food security and socio-economic resilience, particularly in Africa. Where conflict and economic pressures remain acute.’ On 9 March 2026, the chairperson of the Commission issued a statement stressing the implications of the crisis for energy security, trade routes and African economies. On 3 April 2026, the Chairperson welcomed the China-Pakistan Five-Point Initiative, in which he expressed further deep concern over the consequences of the continuation of the conflict to Africa. On 8 April 2026, the Chairperson also welcomed the US-Iran ceasefire agreement while highlighting the effects of the conflict on Africa through inflation, fuel supply disruption and the rising cost of basic commodities.

One of the concerns expected to feature during tomorrow’s informal session is the Horn of Africa-Red Sea nexus. Among African sub-regions, the Horn is one of those most directly exposed to the interaction between Middle Eastern rivalries, maritime insecurity and external military interests. This concern is sharpened by the Houthis’ declared entry into the current war, which raises the prospect of renewed threats to Red Sea shipping and a further deterioration of the security environment along one of Africa’s most strategic maritime corridors. In this respect, tensions in the Middle East affect Africa not only economically, but also through security and geopolitical competition, particularly in the Red Sea corridor. Indeed, the active and sustained participation of the Houthis in Yemen could also increase the risk of potential use of the Horn of Africa in responding to the Houthis’ involvement, thereby exposing the region to direct retaliatory attacks.

The other issue is the humanitarian dimension, alongside the related question of fuel supply disruption. One of the more immediate implications for Africa is that instability in the Gulf and surrounding shipping lanes can complicate the movement of essential supplies and increase both transport costs and the cost of humanitarian delivery into already fragile contexts. This is particularly relevant for Sudan and Somalia, where questions of access, cost, energy supply and donor attention are already major concerns. From this perspective, the PSC may consider these humanitarian effects not merely as economic consequences, but as part of the wider peace and security implications of the crisis for states already affected by conflict and displacement.

A fourth issue relates to Africa’s diplomatic posture. AU statements issued over the course of the crisis sought to tread carefully, inclined largely to toe the middle ground. It has exposed the AU to be charged with a crisis of inconsistency. This is in part attributed to failure to name the initial act as a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, opting to remain vague in characterising the nature of the act, while the statement on retaliatory measures was ‘anything but vague’ as it expressed strong condemnation, defining it as ‘a clear violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity.’ Given that the only weight the AU can mobilise is moral authority and international law-based principled consistency in its policy pronouncements and positions, the lack of these deprives it of any credibility.

As possible courses of action, the PSC may wish to move beyond a purely declaratory response. One option may be to call for more sustained attention to the implications of the crisis for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, particularly regarding maritime security, humanitarian access and the wider consequences for fragile settings. Another may be to encourage more systematic reflection of these risks in the AU’s early warning and preventive work. The session may also offer an opportunity to reaffirm an African posture anchored in principled respect for international law rules, rather than one shaped by the alignments to external actors. Importantly, it may task the AU to further flesh out the short, medium and long-term implications of this conflict and the policy measures that need to be adopted along those different timelines as set out in the joint AU-UNECA-AfDB-UNDB briefing.

Since the session will be held in an informal format, no outcome document is expected to be adopted.

Tomorrow (16 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene a briefing on the continental early warning and security outlook in the afternoon.

Following opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for December 2025, a representative of the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. It is also expected that the Executive Secretary of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Service of Africa (CISSA), Jackson V. Hamata, and a representative of the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) will make statements, followed by a briefing that the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) will deliver on its analytical report on the security and terrorism landscape on the continent.

The last time the PSC met on this theme was in August 2025, at its 1298^th meeting. From the communiqué it adopted after the session, among the decisions Council had was tasking the AU Commission, together with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), ‘to establish and institutionalise, by December 2025, a dynamic and continuously updated risk mapping tool to allow the PSC to strengthen its ability to engage in early warning for early action, by providing a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities and potential triggers, including colour-coded risk levels linked to a pre-authorised menu of diplomatic, security and stabilisation tools’ as well as ‘an annual review of acted/missed alerts with lessons-learned.’

Africa’s security landscape remains volatile, accentuated by the global surge in insecurity, with terrorism and armed conflict continuing to drive widespread and persistent political violence across the continent. The Sahel remains the structural epicentre of the terrorism threat on the continent, with the central Sahel – Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – facing the most protracted and escalating terrorist violence. In this environment of institutional, socio-economic and climatic vulnerability, extremist groups exploit shared ethnic, commercial, and migratory networks, facilitating the seamless movement of fighters, weapons, and resources across porous borders. A recent UN Security Council Report highlighted that in Mali, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaida affiliate, has attacked more than 100 fuel tankers and abducted fuel truck drivers near the capital, Bamako, and other parts of the country. The group’s months-long siege has disrupted access to essential supplies to Bamako. The prolonged fuel blockade had precipitated a severe nationwide fuel crisis, forcing the closure of schools and universities while triggering a sharp contraction in economic activity. Diplomatic missions significantly reduced their staffing, and several partner governments issued urgent travel advisories urging their citizens to depart the country. These developments represent a profound escalation in JNIM’s economic warfare strategy, seeking to undermine the military government’s legitimacy, exacerbating humanitarian vulnerabilities – including reduced lifesaving aid operations and risks to millions dependent on them – and raising fears of broader instability that could further erode state control and fuel regional spillover effects.

In Niger, the recent attack in Assamakka killed six Nigerien Soldiers. JNIM claimed it had taken control of the border post there. The Nigerian military confirmed that militants from the Mali-based JNIM killed one soldier during an ambush in western Kwara State, near the border with Benin. This marked JNIM’s first confirmed attack inside Nigeria, a move which underscored the expanding reach of Sahelian extremist groups deeper into West Africa, which signals a new multi-front threat in the region. A recent Amani Africa analysis on the situation in the Sahel also highlighted that the Tillabéri region – bordering Mali and Burkina Faso – has seen a sharp rise in terrorist attacks. In early September, an ambush in the region resulted in the deaths of 14 soldiers, according to the Nigerian Ministry of Defence.

Burkina Faso also remains one of the most severely affected countries. Extremist groups exert control or significant influence over vast rural areas – estimates ranging from 40% to as much as 60% of the national territory outside major urban centres. In these regions, groups such as the JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) function as the de facto authorities, operating checkpoints to regulate movement, imposing taxes on transport, commerce, and local economies (including ‘zakat’ funds and levies on smuggling routes), adjudicating disputes under their interpretation of sharia, and controlling access to land, water, and resources. While a full encirclement of Ouagadougou is not imminent, ongoing territorial gains, blockades of peripheral towns, and disruptions to supply routes have made isolation of the capital an increasingly plausible scenario should the collapse of outlying areas persist.

Somalia, on the other hand, remains mired in a deepening crisis, marked by a resurgent jihadist insurgency led by al-Shabaab. Without a fundamental shift in strategy and if the serious challenges facing the AU mission are not addressed, plausible near-term outcomes include the collapse of the federal government or an al-Shabaab seizure of the capital, with severe implications for regional stability. As the group launched a major offensive across central Somalia in early 2025 – intensifying from April onward – the group has since captured a series of strategic towns from Somali forces. By July, the militants had advanced to within roughly 50 kilometres of the capital, effectively encircling much of it, establishing checkpoints on approaches, and prompting many foreign embassies to evacuate non-essential staff to Kenya. The advance then inexplicably stalled, allowing the federal government to declare a tentative ‘victory.’ The group has since focused on building forces around Mogadishu while escalating attacks within the city. In October 2025, an al-Shabaab suicide squad stormed a high-security facility run by the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), destroying critical intelligence assets and freeing dozens of prisoners – just meters from the presidential palace at Villa Somalia.

Beyond the foregoing, it would be of major interest for the PSC to consider in its discussion the need to fully reinstitutionalise the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to effectively anticipate and address conflicts, as highlighted in its 1251^st meeting held in December 2024. Measures also need to be stepped up to address structural drivers which fuel the geographic expansion of terrorism and violent extremist actors across Africa, including: weak governance and state fragility, pervasive poverty and youth marginalisation, socioeconomic inequalities, intercommunal tensions, and the proliferation of illicit economies linked to transnational organised crime. The effects of climate change cannot go unmentioned, as it exacerbates these underlying pressures by accelerating desertification, disrupting rainfall patterns, depleting scarce resources, and triggering widespread displacement. These environmental stresses erode livelihoods and heighten competition over dwindling land, water, and pasture, creating vulnerabilities that extremist groups skillfully exploit – positioning themselves as alternative providers of resource access, mediators in local disputes, or protectors of marginalised communities.

More so, illicit economies serve as vital revenue sources for extremist groups across Africa, embedding them deeply within complex transnational supply chains. Activities such as artisanal gold mining, fuel trafficking, narcotics transhipment, illegal logging, wildlife poaching, human smuggling, and maritime piracy not only generate substantial funds but also enable these actors to exert influence over local communities and cross-border networks. Kidnapping for ransom also remains a particularly pernicious financing mechanism, undermining continental counter-terrorism efforts.

In addition, Amani Africa’s Special Research Report, ‘Towards a New Agenda for Peace and Security in Africa: New Security Threats and the Future of the Peace and Security Council’ highlighted that one of the new security threats in Africa arises from the expansion of the use of emerging technologies. Technological advancements have revolutionised the operational landscape for extremist groups, enabling the use of drones for surveillance, targeted strikes, and intimidation; encrypted platforms for decentralised coordination and agile tactics, including mobilisation of resources; and sophisticated online ecosystems – including AI-generated propaganda – to manipulate narratives, undermine state legitimacy, sow communal divisions, and recruit transnationally. Crypto-based transactions and mobile money systems further evade oversight, with digital laundering techniques complicating tracing and accountability efforts.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to note the briefing and updates from AUCTC, AFRIPOL, and CISSA, and may underscore the need for continued cooperation and collaboration in enhancing early warning, intelligence sharing, and coordinated responses to terrorism and transnational organised crime. The PSC is also likely to condemn all acts of terrorism and violent extremism, as well as the exploitation of communities and the use of illicit economies by armed groups. It may stress the imperative to bridge the early warning-early action gap, critical for the PSC, AU institutions, and Member States to take timely, evidence-informed preventive actions early enough against threats like conflict, terrorism, and organised crime. Council is also expected to emphasise the need for enhanced collaboration, including information sharing, between and among Member States, as well as with international partners, including technology firms, to more effectively counter the exploitation of digital platforms by terrorist and violent extremist groups. Council may also reiterate its 1298^th meeting statement on the need for AU’s risk capacity to anticipate risks through the CEWS, and to ensure that its analysis directly informs the PSC’s agenda-setting and deliberations. It may also reiterate the need for restoring the institutional base of CEWS and for making CEWS the anchor of the early warning and early action initiatives of the AU, working in coordination with the APRM, AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and the early warning systems of the Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms.