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	<title>Thematic Insights Archives - Amani Africa</title>
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	<title>Thematic Insights Archives - Amani Africa</title>
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		<title>Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005))</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/protection-of-child-soldiers-in-africa-unscr-1612-2005/</link>
					<comments>https://amaniafrica-et.org/protection-of-child-soldiers-in-africa-unscr-1612-2005/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Robel Mohammed]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 11:44:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005))]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Other Thematic Issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=24208</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>1 September 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/protection-of-child-soldiers-in-africa-unscr-1612-2005/">Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005))</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-0"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding single-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005))</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 1 September 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (2 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1368th meeting to discuss the theme, ‘Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005)).’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Hervé Djokpe, Permanent Representative of Benin to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for September, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Jainaba Jagne, AU Special Envoy for Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC), is also expected to make a statement, followed by Robert Doya Nanima, Special Rapporteur on Children and Armed Conflict. In addition, the session is also likely to get statements from the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, a representative of the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to the AU and a representative from the African Platform on Children affected by Armed Conflicts (AP CAAC) &#8211; as Co-Chair. A Save the Children representative may also be present.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is worth recalling that UN Security Council Resolution 1612, adopted in 2005, established the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on children and armed conflict, creating a systematic framework for documenting the six grave violations against children in conflict zones, which include killing and maiming, recruitment and use as child soldiers, sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, abduction and denial of humanitarian access.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The UN Secretary-General&#8217;s 2026 annual <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-2026-357.php">report</a> on children and armed conflict, released in June and covering January–December 2025, which also marked the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the mandate, verified 38,558 grave violations against 24,174 children, including 3,176 subjected to multiple violations. For the first time in three decades of UN monitoring, state and government forces were responsible for more grave violations than non-state armed groups, a significant shift from the pattern that has traditionally shaped PSC discussions on the issue. Among African situations, the DRC (4,114 violations), Nigeria (2,560) and Somalia (2,195) recorded the highest verified totals, ranking among the five worst-affected situations globally. Recruitment and use of children remained a major concern, continuing a trend identified in the 2025 report, which recorded 7,402 verified cases worldwide. In a February 2026 <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/joint-statement-by-the-african-union-commissioner-for-political-affairs-peace-and-security-eu-high-representative-for-foreign-affairs-and-security-policy-vice-president-of-the-european-commission-hr-vp-united-nations-usg-srsg-for-children-and-armed-conf">Joint Statement</a> by the AU, EU and UN on the International Day against the Use of Child Soldiers, it was highlighted that one in five children worldwide lives in conflict-affected settings. The statement went further and called on all parties in conflict situations to ‘comply fully with international law, to immediately and unconditionally release all children from their ranks, and to ensure that children associated with parties to conflict are treated first and foremost as victims.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC, on its part, has a long track record of engaging with the issue of child soldiers, having taken it up in substantive discussions and decisions across several sessions. Notably, at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/420-acerwc-18-2-2014.pdf">420<sup>th</sup> session</a>, held on 18 February 2014, the Council decided, among other things, to hold a session each year dedicated to issues affecting children on the continent. This engagement has since intensified, with the PSC now holding even two sessions annually on the theme. This will be the second session this year under the theme of child protection in Conflict Situations, following the Council’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1357.comm_en.pdf">1357<sup>th</sup></a> meeting in August 2026, which focused on ‘Education in Conflict Situations in Africa.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">From the meeting, the PSC tasked the AU Commission, in coordination with the ACERWC, ‘to organise an advocacy meeting with Member States that have not yet signed or ratified relevant international and continental instruments [including the ACERWC] and the Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict… and to report back to the PSC.’ In the same vein, the PSC went further and tasked the AU Commission, ‘based on documented sources and proven evidence, to develop and maintain a concise, disaggregated continental monitoring framework tracking attacks on schools, closures, military use, safe reopening, enrolment, retention, learning outcomes, and inclusion metrics.’ It is worth recalling that the same meeting considered the <a href="https://papsrepository.africanunion.org/bitstreams/45b3ae5d-28a1-426b-9f84-a43426059401/download">implementation matrix</a> as part of the PSC working documents developed following the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1296.comm_en.pdf">1296<sup>th</sup></a> PSC meeting, which aims to translate Council decisions into 18 time-bound actions with designated lead institutions. This implementation matrix model should extend to the PSC&#8217;s entire body of work on children and armed conflict. Many past decisions on the theme remain hard to track precisely because they were never anchored to a time-bound implementation tool. Retroactively applying the matrix, even in condensed form, would let the Council audit what has actually been delivered against decades of commitments, rather than simply ‘recalling’ prior sessions without clarity on follow-through. This would also ease the resourcing and coordination gaps flagged periodically, make duplication easier to spot, and give the Council a concrete basis for review each time it revisits the theme.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In addition, its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1314.comm_en.pdf">1314<sup>th</sup> meeting</a> held in November 2025 on ‘Children Affected by Armed Conflicts’ tasked the Chairperson of the AU Commission to ‘commission a comprehensive study on the nexus between armed conflicts and violations against children.’ Relatedly, the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1262.comm_en.pdf">1262<sup>nd</sup> </a>PSC meeting held in February 2025 on the ‘Fight Against the Use of Child Soldiers in Africa’ tasked the ACERWC to expedite finalisation of the comprehensive study on child soldiers in Africa. Earlier this year, ACERWC initiated and commissioned the <a href="https://www.acerwc.africa/en/opportunities/consultancy/terms-reference-study-recruitment-children-armed-forces-and-armed-groups">Terms of Reference</a> for the conduct of the study. The study will aim to examine the nature, scale, patterns and drivers of the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and armed groups in West and Central Africa, including the DRC, Chad, Nigeria, Niger, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso and Mali. In North, East and Southern Africa, it will include Sudan, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Mozambique. The study will assess the political, socio-economic, security, governance and community-level factors driving emerging risks, and to evaluate the adequacy, effectiveness and alignment of existing legal, policy, institutional, prevention, accountability, rehabilitation and reintegration responses with the African Children&#8217;s Charter and relevant regional and international standards. It will also seek to identify key gaps and good practices and put forward actionable recommendations to strengthen coordinated, multidisciplinary, and child-centred responses among States Parties, AU organs, RECs, National Human Rights Institutions, civil society organisations, communities and other relevant stakeholders.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This upcoming PSC meeting will therefore provide an opportunity to follow up on the implementation of these decisions and provide a platform for the Council to reflect on the conclusions of the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/ENG-Conclusions-Ministerial-and-High-level-Open-_231222.pdf">Banjul Process,</a> which took place in December 2023. During this ministerial, high-level session, participants agreed on the imperative to ‘develop a Continental Child Justice Framework addressing both punitive measures and, as well as the recourse and restitution elements for child survivors.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué.  The PSC is expected to condemn all attacks against children and their abduction and recruitment by armed groups and to strictly comply with International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. Taking note of her appointment in February 2026, Council is also likely to emphasise the imperative of providing the office of Jainaba Jagne, the AU Special Envoy on CAAC, with the necessary financial, human and technical resources to enable her to discharge her mandate effectively. It may also reiterate its previous calls on Member States who have not yet done so to sign, ratify and domesticate the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other international instruments, such as the Safe Schools Declaration and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child with regard to the inclusion of children in armed conflicts. It may also encourage Member States to integrate mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), school feeding, water and sanitation (WASH), and child protection referral pathways into education responses. The PSC may also reiterate the need for Member States, RECs/RMs, and the AU Commission to mainstream child protection in early warning mechanisms and conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacemaking and peace-building processes, as well as in post-conflict reconstruction and development.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/protection-of-child-soldiers-in-africa-unscr-1612-2005/">Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005))</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Coordination between AUCTC-APRM-CISSA-AFRIPOL on Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning Systems</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/coordination-between-auctc-aprm-cissa-afripol-on-continental-early-warning-systems/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 23 Aug 2026 15:02:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC meetings with AU Organs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=24133</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>23 August 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/coordination-between-auctc-aprm-cissa-afripol-on-continental-early-warning-systems/">Coordination between AUCTC-APRM-CISSA-AFRIPOL on Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning Systems</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-1"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding single-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Coordination between AUCTC-APRM-CISSA-AFRIPOL on Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning Systems</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 23 August 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (24 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1364<sup>th</sup> meeting to discuss the theme ‘Coordination between the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) – the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) – the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) – the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) on Continental Early Warning System (CEWS): Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning System (EWS).’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of August, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), will make a statement. The representatives of AUCTC, APRM, CISSA and AFRIPOL are then expected to deliver briefings.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The last time the PSC met on the theme of Early Warning was in December 2025 at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1320.comm_en.pdf">1320<sup>th</sup> meeting</a>. From the communiqué, the PSC, among other things, underlined the need to strengthen the analytical convergence between AUCTC, CISSA, AFRIPOL and the RECs/RMs. The same meeting further saw the PSC reiterating its request to the AU Commission ‘to collaborate with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM to introduce and institutionalise a dynamic tool for mapping risks and threats to peace and security in Africa, as adopted by the PSC through its communiqué <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1298.comm_en.pdf">PSC/PR/COMM.1298 (2025)</a> of 27 August 2025, in order to enable Council to enhance its conflict prevention efforts.’ It is expected that this will be central to the discussions therein. Noteworthy also, the session comes just slightly over a month following PSC Committee of Experts level consultations on the ‘Proposed AU Model on Trigger Mechanism for Early Warning and Early Action,’ <a href="https://x.com/AUC_PAPS/status/2079258092131287255?s=20">held</a> in July 2026. The proposed model ‘seeks to strengthen timely and proportionate AU responses by establishing clear triggers, thresholds and response options to address emerging risks before they escalate into violent conflict.’ It is expected to serve as a decision-support tool for the PSC, connecting early warning analysis with preventive action through existing AU governance and peace and security mechanisms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session comes amidst continuing security crises and an ever-evolving security landscape whose scale, complexity and changing character increasingly outpace the capacity of existing early-warning architecture.  The <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Global-Terrorism-Index-2026-Report.pdf">Global Terrorism Index 2026 report</a> recorded 5,582 terrorism deaths across 2,944 incidents in 2025, a 28 per cent fall from the previous year, with the impact of terrorism falling in 81 countries, the highest number of annual improvements since 2021 Sub-Saharan Africa remains the global epicenter, accounting for over half of all terrorism fatalities, with six of the ten most-impacted countries located on the continent: Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, and the DRC. Fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence in Africa surpassed 20,000 for the fourth consecutive year, spread across the Sahel, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, and Mozambique. In the Sahel specifically, JNIM (al-Qaeda-linked) and ISWAP/ISSP (Islamic State-linked) now collectively control more territory than at any point since the 2012 Mali crisis, with JNIM combining guerrilla attacks with governance strategies, providing basic services and arbitration in areas under its control.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With the evolving security landscape, there have also been significant operational shifts. Drone warfare has become a genuine insurgent capability. In Nigeria&#8217;s northeast, ISWAP is deploying combat drones in the Lake Chad basin at operational scale for the first time. Amani Africa’s Special Research Report, ‘<a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/towards-a-new-agenda-for-peace-and-security-in-africa/">Towards a New Agenda for Peace and Security in Africa: New Security Threats and the Future of the Peace and Security Council</a>’ highlighted that one of the new security threats in Africa arises from the expansion of the use of emerging technologies. In addition, jihadist groups are no longer content with launching attacks; rather, they now administer territories and control trade routes, with their influence gradually pushing all the way to the Gulf of Guinea. JNIM&#8217;s strategy against Mali in 2026 illustrates a shift toward strangulation rather than storming capitals: JNIM formally declared an economic blockade of Bamako in April 2026, exploiting the fact that Mali imports about 95% of its fuel by road, with convoy attacks causing rationing, fuel queues and power shortages. Previously, the AU Commission, CISSA, AFRIPOL and AUCTC, were tasked to ‘thoroughly investigate the scourge of illicit financial flows, highlighting the networks and to report to PSC as soon as possible’ and called for ‘the establishment of a continental working group on illicit financing, which will inter alia, ensure the mapping of hawala/mobile money networks used by extremist terrorist groups and networks and the launch of a cross-border early warning protocol for suspicious transfers linked to convergence zones.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Institutionally, the AU’s February 2026 <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/46188-Assembly_Decisions_31_March_E.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">Assembly decision</a> called for the full operationalisation of the Continental Security Cartography and directed the AU Commission, together with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM, to establish a dynamic and continuously updated risk-mapping tool capable of providing the PSC with ‘a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities, and potential triggers’. It also called for fast-tracking the CEWS–AUCTC Joint Analytical Cell, closer harmonisation of RECs/RMs early-warning tools with CEWS, and development of a draft AU Early Action Guideline that ‘defines triggers, thresholds, and institutionalises response with timelines’ for consideration by the PSC. Taken together, these measures situate the forthcoming validation within a broader effort to move from parallel institutional reporting towards a more integrated continental risk picture and to strengthen the link between early warning and early action. The validation exercise therefore provides an opportunity to assess whether the emerging risk-mapping architecture is being designed as a decision-support mechanism capable of prompting timely preventive action, rather than as another analytical product whose warnings are not systematically translated into response.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The process acquired further operational content at the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1345.comm-EN.pdf">1345<sup>th</sup></a> PSC meeting on ‘Transnational Organised Crimes’ held in May 2026. The session saw the AU Commission, AFRIPOL, AUCTC, CISSA and APRM being tasked to ‘finalise by the end of 2026 a matrix of risks and threats to peace and security in Africa as a tool of the Continental Early Warning System.’ It also tasked AFRIPOL, in coordination with the Commission and RECs/RMs, to establish a continental criminal-intelligence mechanism for the ‘continuous mapping, analysis and dissemination of criminal flows, corridors and networks’ and to produce an annual consolidated continental threat assessment. This broadens the scope of continental early warning beyond conventional conflict indicators to include the evolving nexus among terrorism, organised crime, illicit economies and cross-border security threats.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The governance dimension has advanced in parallel. At its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1349.comm_en.pdf">1349<sup>th</sup></a> meeting, the PSC welcomed the APRM’s development of ‘an early warning system dedicated to governance within the APRM’ and its inclusion in the matrix of risks and threats being finalised by relevant AU structures, while urging Member States to integrate APRM assessments into CEWS. The <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/5th-PSC-APRM-Declaration-EN.pdf">Joint Burayu Declaration</a> similarly called for institutionalised data- and information-sharing so that APRM country findings ‘feed systematically into APSA early warning and mediation planning,’ within the wider coordination involving AUCTC, AFRIPOL and CISSA. This direction was reinforced by the <a href="https://aprm.au.int/sites/default/files/files/2026-02/enfinal-communique-35th-apr-summit-14-2-2026-002.pdf">35<sup>th</sup></a> APRM Forum in February 2026, which called for efforts to ‘position the APRM as an effective early-warning tool for conflict prevention on the continent,’ and by the March <a href="https://aprm.au.int/en/news/press-releases/2026-03-16/african-union-commission-deputy-chairperson-pays-courtesy-visit-aprm">engagement</a> between the AUC Deputy Chairperson and APRM leadership, where discussions focused particularly on ‘governance monitoring, early warning and conflict prevention.’ The key question is therefore whether governance indicators will be integrated into a common analytical picture rather than treated as a parallel stream of information.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The most recent <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1354.comm_en.pdf">1354<sup>th</sup></a> ministerial session on counter-terrorism held in July 2026 added another specialised layer. Alongside adopting the <a href="https://papsrepository.africanunion.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/c0d6f6fc-feb8-4a30-ad5a-c6b5e448ec06/content">African Union Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Countering Terrorism in Africa (2026 -2030)</a>, the Council called for ‘specific indicators on radicalisation and violent extremism’ to be integrated into CEWS ‘to enable early detection and timely intervention.’ This places terrorism-specific early warning within the implementation of a broader continental counter-terrorism framework. Taken together with parallel efforts on criminal intelligence and governance-related risks, these decisions point to an increasingly ambitious system in which terrorism analysis, criminal intelligence, governance vulnerabilities and broader conflict indicators are expected to inform one continental warning architecture. The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to take note of the briefings by AUCTC, APRM, CISSA and AFRIPOL and may welcome progress towards validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and the APRM Early Warning System. Council may underscore that the validation should support the institutionalisation of a dynamic and continuously updated continental risk-mapping mechanism capable of providing an integrated picture of emerging threats, vulnerabilities and potential triggers. It may further emphasise the need for the validated tools to strengthen analytical convergence among AUCTC, APRM, CISSA, AFRIPOL and CEWS, including through common analytical standards, greater methodological alignment and secure information-sharing arrangements. Building on earlier decisions, the PSC may emphasise the imperative of regular consolidated horizon-scanning briefings covering emerging and escalating risks, indicators requiring preventive action, cross-border contagion dynamics and scenario options requiring Council guidance, while also encouraging systematic circulation of early-warning products to Member States to inform timely responses. It may also call for adequate technical, human and financial resources for the operationalisation, regular updating and sustained use of the tools, and for governance-related risks identified through the APRM EWS, alongside specialised terrorism and organised-crime indicators, to be systematically incorporated into the broader CEWS architecture.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/coordination-between-auctc-aprm-cissa-afripol-on-continental-early-warning-systems/">Coordination between AUCTC-APRM-CISSA-AFRIPOL on Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning Systems</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>PSC – ACHPR Consultation</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/psc-achpr-consultation/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 08:10:07 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC meetings with AU Organs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>20 August 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/psc-achpr-consultation/">PSC – ACHPR Consultation</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>PSC – ACHPR Consultation</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 20 August 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (21 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1363<sup>rd</sup> session for a consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. The Chairperson of the ACHPR is also expected to deliver a briefing to the PSC on the ACHPR&#8217;s work as it relates to peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The consultative meeting is being convened pursuant to Article 19 of the PSC Protocol, which calls for close cooperation between the PSC and the ACHPR in advancing peace, security, and stability across the continent. Building on this provision, the PSC, at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/866th-MEETING-August-08-2019-On-its-consultation-with-the-African-Commission-on-Human-and-Peoples-Rights-ACHPR.pdf">866<sup>th</sup> Session</a> in August 2019, resolved to institutionalise the engagement through annual joint consultative sessions with the ACHPR. This commitment rests on a shared legal and normative foundation: Article 3(f) of the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/PSC-Protocol.pdf">PSC Protocol</a> identifies the promotion of human rights as integral to conflict prevention, Article 45 of the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011_-_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_e.pdf">African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights</a> mandates the ACHPR to promote and protect the rights of individuals and communities, and Article 23 of the African Charter affirms the right of all peoples to live in peace and security. Taken together, these provisions position the PSC-ACHPR consultation as the institutional space through which the AU’s peace and security architecture and its human rights architecture are meant to speak to one another.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s meeting follows the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1284.2.comm_en.pdf">1284<sup>th</sup> session</a> held on 19 June 2025, which marked the resumption of joint consultations after a three-year interruption. While the session reaffirmed its commitment to deepening collaboration with the ACHPR, notably through consistent information exchange and by institutionalising and regularising the consultation as an annual fixture, the session outcome document was largely couched in general terms and missed critical opportunities to operationalise concrete cooperation. Specifically, the session <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/June-Monthly-Digest-2025.pdf">failed</a> to build upon practical modalities established during the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/866th-MEETING-August-08-2019-On-its-consultation-with-the-African-Commission-on-Human-and-Peoples-Rights-ACHPR.pdf">866<sup>th</sup></a> session.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The overarching question for the consultation is how the PSC and ACHPR can pool their respective mandates, tools and networks to translate human rights protection into a more effective conflict prevention, peacebuilding and sustaining peace. This matters because human rights violations are not only consequences of armed conflict but can themselves function as early-warning indicators and drivers of conflict. The ACHPR’s own report on addressing Human Rights issues in conflict situations has identified monitoring and response, prevention, the mainstreaming of human rights across the conflict cycle, remedial action and institutional coordination as the areas requiring the greatest attention. Its Special Rapporteurs, Working Groups, and fact-finding and promotional missions generate a significant body of information and expertise that could strengthen the PSC’s preventive and protective action, provided that information is translated into timely political engagement rather than remaining confined within the human rights system.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The effectiveness of these mechanisms, however, also depends on their ability to draw on information and perspectives from actors closest to the situations they monitor. This places civil society organisations at an important intersection between human rights monitoring and the AU’s peace and security efforts. CSOs can channel information from communities that might not otherwise reach AU institutions, contribute to early warning, document violations, support victims and survivors, facilitate dialogue, and contribute to accountability and reconciliation. The ACHPR’s Joint Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan illustrates this value directly: its evidentiary record has drawn substantially on testimony from victims, witnesses and other stakeholders, including through direct engagement with Sudanese refugees in Chad, and its mandate, extended in May 2026, emphasised the need for independent monitoring, preservation of evidence, a victim-centred approach, accountability and civilian protection. The relevance of this channel is sharpened by deteriorating civic space in several conflict and crisis settings, which the ACHPR addressed directly in its June 2026 Resolution <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/663-achprres663lxxxvii-2026">ACHPR/Res.663 (LXXXVII)</a> on the Situation of Human and Peoples’ Rights Defenders in Africa, expressing concern over the criminalisation of legitimate civil society activity and calling on States to protect freedoms of association and peaceful assembly. The consultation could therefore explore how the ACHPR’s extensive networks of NGOs, National Human Rights Institutions and special mechanisms might be connected more systematically to the PSC’s early-warning and conflict-prevention architecture, while ensuring that civil society actors engaged in this work are themselves protected, an approach that could strengthen the quality and timeliness of information available to the Council, particularly where official reporting is limited, contested or delayed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Sudan experience illustrates the potential of such cooperation in practice. The ACHPR&#8217;s Joint Fact-Finding Mission, established in 2024 and extended for a further year in May 2026, has documented serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and its May 2026 Banjul Joint Declaration with the UN&#8217;s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission stressed that a sustainable future for Sudan requires an inclusive, civilian-led political process with the meaningful participation of women, youth, civil society and communities from all regions, treating human rights findings, political process and peacebuilding as connected rather than separate tracks. A similar logic runs through the Commission&#8217;s other conflict-related work: its recent promotional mission to the DRC highlighted the continuing human rights and humanitarian consequences of conflict there, while its earlier engagement on South Sudan linked escalating violence to stalled implementation of the peace agreement. Both cases underline the value of ensuring the ACHPR&#8217;s country-level findings reach the PSC while situations remain under active consideration, rather than only after the fact, and both point toward the accountability question that the 953<sup>rd</sup> and 1019<sup>th</sup> sessions had already begun to address. At those sessions, the Council acknowledged the ACHPR&#8217;s contribution to transitional justice and called for the peaceful resolution of conflicts through dialogue, negotiation, mediation and consensual transitional justice mechanisms, alongside investigation of violations and accountability for perpetrators. Tomorrow&#8217;s consultation offers an occasion to examine how that expertise can complement the PSC&#8217;s political and mediation efforts more directly, including on reparations, reconciliation and guarantees of non-recurrence.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session is also expected to centre on the strategic priorities of the ACHPR’s new Bureau and their contribution to peace and security. The election of a new Bureau in October 2025, the adoption of the Commission’s Strategic Plan 2026 &#8211; 2028, and the subsequent adoption of the implementation, planning, monitoring and evaluation frameworks by the <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/news/final-communiques/2026-05-20/final-communique-87th-ordinary-session">87th Ordinary Session</a>, provide an opportunity for the PSC to engage early with the Bureau’s priorities and identify areas of mutual reinforcement, particularly given the breadth of the Commission’s current conflict-related work. Beyond the Sudan Fact-Finding Mission, the ACHPR has undertaken a <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/news/press-releases/2026-06-19/press-release-end-promotional-mission-african-commission">promotional mission</a> to the DRC, strengthened engagement with international human rights mechanisms, and, at its 87<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session, adopted further resolutions with direct implications for conflict prevention and civic space. As such, the presentation offers an opportunity to identify where joint planning, information sharing, and the complementary use of institutional tools could generate greater preventive impact.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Session is also expected to follow up on previous decisions and assess how to move from six years of accumulated commitments to measurable action. Given the strength of the practical modalities agreed at the 866<sup>th</sup> session, particular attention is likely to be given to their implementation, including undertaking joint field visits to conflict-affected and post-conflict countries, communicating PSC decisions with human rights implications to the ACHPR, and facilitating regular ACHPR briefings on the human rights dimensions of situations on the PSC agenda. This suggests that the key challenge is one of implementation rather than a lack of substantive agreement, making a review of the implementation matrix an opportunity to identify which commitments have been fulfilled, which remain outstanding, the constraints affecting implementation, and the responsibilities and timelines required to address these gaps. This is particularly important for early warning: the 866<sup>th</sup> session requested that ‘the AU Commission and the ACHPR Secretariat propose a modality for the establishment of a coordinated early warning mechanism on human rights-related issues on the Continent between the two Organs’. The consultation could thus provide an opportunity to revisit these commitments and consider practical modalities for systematically feeding ACHPR-generated information into CEWS assessments, allowing human rights-related warning signals to inform preventive action before violations escalate.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC and ACHPR may renew their commitment to strengthened cooperation and joint action. The communiqué may identify specific roles for NGOs, National Human Rights Institutions and other civil society actors in early warning, monitoring, mediation, protection, accountability and reconciliation, while encouraging the ACHPR to draw more systematically on its civil society networks and special mechanisms, with due attention to their own protection. The Council may welcome the strategic priorities of the ACHPR’s new Bureau and encourage closer alignment between the Strategic Plan 2026-2028 and AU peace and security priorities through coordinated work planning and information-sharing. It may further underscore the importance of mainstreaming human rights standards throughout conflict prevention, management, stabilisation, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, including through the integration of ACHPR analysis into the CEWS. On implementation, the communiqué may call for an updated joint implementation matrix with clearly identified responsibilities, timelines and follow-up mechanisms covering outstanding commitments, regular information-sharing, ACHPR participation in relevant PSC sessions, joint field or assessment missions and early-warning cooperation. It may also encourage continued ACHPR advisory support on transitional justice and accountability, and underscore the importance of integrating women’s meaningful participation and prevention of conflict-related sexual violence into AU peace and security efforts, so that the consultation moves beyond reaffirming complementarity towards a partnership in which human rights information and tools are put to active use in early warning, prevention, protection and sustaining peace.</p>
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		<title>Consultative Meeting Between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP)</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/consultative-meeting-between-the-peace-and-security-council-psc-and-the-pan-african-parliament-pap/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 16:05:39 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC meetings with AU Organs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=24113</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>18 August 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/consultative-meeting-between-the-peace-and-security-council-psc-and-the-pan-african-parliament-pap/">Consultative Meeting Between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-3"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding single-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Consultative Meeting Between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) </strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 18 August 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (19 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1362<sup>nd</sup> Session dedicated to a Consultation between the PSC and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC Chair for the month and Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU, Mohamed Khaled, will deliver the opening remarks. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to make a statement. The President of PAP, Fateh Boutbig of Algeria, is also expected to deliver a statement. This will be his first time briefing the PSC following his <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260430/pan-african-parliament-elects-new-bureau-leadership">election</a> to serve as president of the institution in April 2026, during the Extraordinary Session of the Seventh Legislature held at the PAP headquarters in Midrand, South Africa. He will serve for a three-year term, to 2029.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is worth recalling that the annual engagement emanates from the decision of the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/1160.comm_en.pdf">1160<sup>th</sup> Meeting</a> held in June 2023, which was dedicated to the annual consultative meeting between the two bodies. From the meeting, the two bodies decided to institutionalise and regularise their annual joint meeting on peace and security in Africa, to be hosted alternately between Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Midrand, South Africa. The annual consultation is grounded in two complementary legal foundations. First, the mandates of the PAP and the PSC are closely linked. According to the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36301-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">2001 Protocol</a> to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the PAP, one of the PAP&#8217;s central objectives is to promote peace, security and stability. As a result, the PAP&#8217;s mandate has a component that overlaps with that of the PSC, even though the PSC retains primary responsibility for peace and security matters. Second, and more importantly, the session will also be held pursuant to <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/PSC-Protocol.pdf">Article 18</a> of the PSC Protocol. This provision calls for a close working relationship between the PSC and the PAP, in recognition of the complementary nature of the roles each body plays in advancing peace, security and stability across the continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This year’s meeting will be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, building on the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1290.comm_en.pdf">1290<sup>th</sup> meeting</a> held in July 2025, in which it adopted the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Final-Adopted-Conclusions-PSC-PAP-Consultative-Meeting-17-18-July-2025_EN.pdf">Conclusions</a> of their Inaugural Joint Consultative meeting held on 17 and 18 July 2025 in Midrand, South Africa. In an effort to give greater structure and substance to their cooperation, the two bodies agreed on several concrete steps to strengthen their collaboration.  These commitments are expected to be central to this year’s discussions, alongside an update on activities conducted since the past interaction vis-à-vis issues related to advancing peace, security and stability in Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Firstly, the session comes just days after PAP’s First Ordinary Session of the Seventh Legislature and the launch of its three new <a href="https://x.com/afrikparliament/status/2084006602630471718?s=46">Model Laws</a>, namely: i) Model Law on Gender Equality and Equity ii) Model Law on Labour Migration and iii) Model Law on Sustainable Soil Management, established to provide voluntary legislative frameworks to guide AU Member States in developing and strengthening national laws in line with Agenda 2063. This follows a call made from the Inaugural session between PSC and PAP on the need to adopt a model law on AU Agenda 2063. In this context, Member States were ‘encouraged to adopt and integrate the agenda into their national policy frameworks and programs, including aligning national development plans with the continental framework and ensuring that the agenda’s goals and priorities are reflected in national policies and legislation.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Secondly, the PAP and PSC Secretariats were tasked to jointly develop a draft roadmap on structured collaboration between the two organs, identifying concrete areas of cooperation and mechanisms for monitoring progress. This also included the need for experience sharing and lessons learned between the two organs on issues related to peace and security and governance, as well as capacity building in areas such as mediation and preventive diplomacy. It is expected that tomorrow’s session will give an opportunity to get an update on this particular decision, given that the draft roadmap was ‘to be presented at the next Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and PAP.’ It will provide an opportunity for the two bodies to assess the evolution of their engagement and how they can translate their complementary mandates into more regular and coordinated action. The two bodies previously called for structured and regularised engagement between them, including through the establishment of clear thematic areas of focus and fostering communication and collaboration through various mechanisms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Relatedly, and in furtherance of a call made from the conclusions of the Inaugural meeting on ‘the need for regular engagement between the PSC and PAP though, among others, PSC Chairperson participating in PAP Sessions, the PSC Troika/PAP bureau engagement,’ the PSC Chair for <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/provisional-programme-of-work-of-the-peace-and-security-council-for-july2026/">July 2026</a>, Rebecca Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU, participated in a joint <a href="https://x.com/AGA_Platform/status/2080632073681764582?s=20">capacity-building</a> training by the PAP Committee on Justice and Human Rights and the Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance facilitated by the secretariat of the AGA-APSA Platform, to advance democratic governance in Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC&#8217;s relevance, in this context, extended beyond Ambassador Otengo&#8217;s participation in the capacity-building training. The Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution (CCIRCR), one of the ten Permanent Committees of PAP, during the Permanent Committee sittings held from 21-25 July 2026 in Midrand, South Africa, convened a <a href="https://www.africanparliamentarynews.com/2026/07/pan-african-parliament-calls-for.html#:~:text=The%20Committee%20on%20Cooperation%2C%20International%20Relations%20and,deteriorating%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20the%20country.">joint sitting</a> alongside the Permanent Committee on Justice and Human Rights. It is worth noting that pursuant to Rule 26(d) of the PAP Rules of Procedure, the CCIRCR has specific responsibility for introducing issues of peace and security in Africa for consideration of the Chamber. This July joint session focused on addressing the security crisis in Sudan, its humanitarian impact and developing recommendations for African-led intervention and civilian protection, calling for the Pan-African Parliament to consider convening a dedicated parliamentary session on Sudan to help the Parliament monitor the implementation of decisions of the AU PSC and the recommendations of the African Commission’s Fact-Finding Mission.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In its consultative/advisory role, PAP has since its earlier years sent various fact-finding missions to different conflict areas across the continent, including Côte d&#8217;Ivoire, Darfur/Sudan, Libya, Rwanda, Mauritania and Chad. These missions have produced reports used to inform recommendations, and PAP has also adopted resolutions addressing specific conflicts. Despite PAP&#8217;s mandate to forward these recommendations to relevant bodies, including the PSC, no standing mechanism exists for systematically transmitting them. For much of PAP&#8217;s history, this gap was compounded by the near-total absence of direct engagement between the two organs, particularly between 2008 and 2023. Only two interactive sessions took place under Article 18 of the PSC Protocol, in 2008 and 2012. That pattern has, however, begun to shift when the two bodies held a Joint Consultative Meeting in July 2025, and tomorrow’s session is expected to be a follow-up session to discuss a roadmap for structured collaboration. Even so, this emerging engagement has centred on institutional relations rather than on a dedicated channel for PAP&#8217;s fact-finding recommendations specifically, so it remains difficult to assert that the Parliament&#8217;s recommendations have been directly reflected in PSC decisions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Beyond this, there are also institutional challenges that affect the effective operationalisation of the relationship. One such challenge relates to the continued non-ratification of the 2014 Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the AU Relating to PAP (the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7806-treaty-0047_-_protocol_to_the_constitutive_act_of_the_african_union_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">2014 PAP Protocol</a>), which seeks to provide the PAP with an enhanced legislative mandate within the AU institutional framework. In its February 2026 decision, the AU Assembly requested ‘the Bureau of PAP and all PAP Members of Parliament with the support of the AUC to intensify sensitisation and outreach to Member States on the ratification of the Malabo Protocol.’ Today, around 23 Member States have signed and 15 have deposited the instrument of ratification for the 2014 PAP Protocol. It is worth noting that progress remains slow, with the Protocol still well short of the majority of 28 AU Member States required for entry into force. Drawing on PSC&#8217;s experience with other AU bodies, notably the African Commission on Human and Peoples&#8217; Rights under Article 19 of the PSC Protocol, it would be most effective for the proposal on operationalising Article 18 to come from PAP itself, having regard to its mandate and how that mandate can best be leveraged in implementing the objectives of the PSC Protocol.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Financing issues may also feature during the discussions. The two bodies previously called for ‘advocacy for increased AU Member State voluntary contributions to the Peace Fund, to advance African ownership and self-reliance in peace and security financing.’ In this regard, and in addition to the call for the development of a plan of action to identify concrete areas of collaboration and monitor progress, they also agreed to establish a corresponding financing plan, to support peace and security activities involving both organs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The youth dimension, on the other hand, is also likely to be discussed. The Conclusions of the Inaugural consultations highlighted ‘the growing disillusionment among Africa&#8217;s youth, marked by unemployment, social exclusion, and political apathy [and] underlined the need for more inclusion of youth, and women in all efforts aimed at addressing the conflicts on the continent and in Africa’s development agenda.’ The previous meeting highlighted the need for ‘the PAP to champion the establishment of socio-economic programs aimed at economically empowering people, especially women, youth, children and special interest groups on the continent, including post-conflict reconstruction and development programmes.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the new leadership of PAP and commend the body for its contribution to the promotion of peace, security, stability and for representing the African people in the development and integration of the Continent. The PSC is also expected to welcome updates from the PAP on the activities undertaken in relation to peace and security and to continue cooperation through the annual consultative meeting within the framework of Article 18. The session is also likely to encourage those Member States who have not yet done so to consider signing and ratifying the Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the AU relating to the PAP. The meeting may also stress the importance of regular engagement and coordination of the two bodies’ efforts in complementing each other in addressing governance, peace and security challenges. The meeting may underline the imperative for the two organs to actively advocate for the reform of global institutions to better represent African interests and ensure more equitable global governance. Finally, the PSC may also stress the imperative of establishing a mechanism for the communication of decisions and recommendations of PAP on peace and security in order to ensure coherence and complementarity in decision-making processes.</p>
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		<title>Consultation between the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/consultation-between-the-psc-the-aga-apsa-platform-and-the-prc-sub-committee-on-human-rights-democracy-and-governance/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 06:13:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC meetings with AU Organs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=24096</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>13 August 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/consultation-between-the-psc-the-aga-apsa-platform-and-the-prc-sub-committee-on-human-rights-democracy-and-governance/">Consultation between the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Consultation between the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 13 August 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (14 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1361<sup>st</sup> meeting, an annual consultation with the African Governance Architecture–African Peace and Security Architecture (AGA–APSA) Platform and the Permanent Representatives Committee Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following the opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and PSC Chairperson for August 2026, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), will deliver introductory remarks. Presentations are also expected from Jevin Pillay Ponisamy of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Office to the AU, in his capacity as Vice Chairperson of the AGA-APSA Platform, on behalf of Khaled Mohamed, Chairperson of the AGA-APSA Platform, as well as from Willy Nyamitwe, Permanent Representative of Burundi to the AU and Vice Chairperson of the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC last held this joint consultation at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1295.comm_en.pdf">1295<sup>th</sup></a> meeting on 8 August 2025. It requested a comprehensive matrix of AU legal frameworks on governance, human rights, peace and security, assessing whether they remain ‘fit for purpose’, together with an action plan for their review. It also reiterated the need to operationalise the African Governance Facility and integrate governance and human-rights indicators into the PSC’s early-warning systems. This consultation seeks to strengthen synergies between the AU’s governance and human-rights mechanisms and the PSC’s early-warning and preventive responsibilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This year’s consultation coincides with a notable institutional shift. For 2026–2028, the PSC chairs the AGA–APSA Platform at both levels: the PSC Chairperson for the month at the political level and the Head of the PSC Secretariat at the technical level. This gives the Council a more direct opportunity to steer cooperation across governance, human rights, democracy, peace and security, and to advance an ‘AU delivery as one’ approach through aligned priorities, coordinated action and stronger follow-up. The tripartite engagement also reflects the mutually reinforcing nature of these agendas and provides a practical forum for reducing institutional silos and drawing on the comparative strengths of the participating bodies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The consultation is expected to revolve around four closely connected areas: strengthening sustained institutional cooperation among the PSC, the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG and the AGA–APSA Platform; improving the exchange and joint analysis of information on governance, democracy, human rights, peace and security trends; identifying priorities for coordinated responses to governance-related risks; and examining governance deficits and institutional weaknesses, including gaps in accountability, inclusion, transparency and institutional effectiveness, that can contribute to conflict and instability.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In terms of institutional synergy, coordination and sustained engagement, the consultation provides an opportunity to assess how the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG can translate their complementary mandates into more regular and coordinated action. The September 2025 <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/draft-press-release-limiisabeladirectorcpaps-final.pdf">review</a> of the High-Level Panel of Eminent African Experts on the Review of AU Governance, Peace and Security Frameworks found the AU’s governance, peace and security frameworks largely relevant, but constrained by limited political will, weak prioritisation, resource constraints and changing geopolitical dynamics, and called in particular for stronger AGA–APSA synergies, institutional coherence and implementation. Although the review focused primarily on AGA and APSA, its findings are relevant to the tripartite consultation because they underline the wider need for stronger coordination and follow-through across governance, human-rights and peace and security mechanisms. The consultation can therefore consider whether existing arrangements among the three bodies are sufficient to sustain cooperation and implementation beyond the annual engagement. An Amani Africa <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/AUs-Review-of-the-African-Peace-and-Security-Architecture-should-focus-on-implementation-deficit.pdf">policy brief</a> provides a complementary APSA-focused perspective, highlighting implementation deficits, institutional follow-through and the early warning–early action gap.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A related outstanding issue concerns cooperation measures requested in earlier PSC decisions and carried forward in 2025. These include joint promotional activities supporting ratification and domestication of AU shared-values instruments and closer PSC participation in AGA–APSA flagship initiatives. Subsequent engagement indicates progress, but does not establish whether the joint visits occurred or specific PSC responsibilities were assigned for flagship implementation and monitoring. The consultation may therefore seek reporting and a regular mechanism for sustaining PSC involvement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A notable development was the AGA–APSA Platform’s first statutory technical <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260209/2026-statuary-technical-meeting-aga-apsa-platform-kick">meeting</a> of 2026, convened from 9-10 February, which reviewed the Secretariat’s activities and work plan, the proposed flagship initiative, the Governance, Peace and Security Programme and revised Rules of Procedure. At the political meeting on 10 February, which included PSC and PRC Sub-Committee participation, Bankole Adeoye urged the Platform to accelerate implementation of its decisions and communiqués. He identified youth empowerment as the proposed flagship, called for implementation of the AGA–APSA Youth Engagement Strategy and, stressing the need to move from policy to action, <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/speeches/45940-sp-AGA-APSA_Platfrom_-_Draft_Statement_-_CPAPS_-_10.02.2026.pdf">stated</a>: ‘We do have the strategy already, the AGA–APSA Youth Engagement Strategy; we just need to action it.’ While this indicates some follow-up, the PSC’s precise role in planning, implementation and monitoring remains unclear. The consultation may therefore seek clarity on political endorsement of the revised Rules of Procedure, allocation of responsibilities and the status of the Joint Roadmap, framework matrix, African Governance Facility and decision-tracking mechanism. Without consolidated reporting and clear follow-up, annual consultations risk repeating commitments while leaving previous assignments unresolved.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The consultation may focus on how the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG can make more systematic use of governance, human-rights and electoral information for early warning and preventive action. The February 2026 <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/46188-Assembly_Decisions_31_March_E.pdf">Assembly decision</a> called for stronger CEWS monitoring of electoral processes and a human-rights-based approach to early warning through Preventive Action Cells, standardised indicators and support to National Human Rights Institutions and national early-warning mechanisms. This provides an important basis for establishing clearer arrangements through which information generated across the AU governance and human rights mechanisms can inform joint analysis and timely political engagement. Amani Africa’s Special Research Reports (<a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Re-energising-Conflict-Prevention-and-Resolution-in-Africa-a-Quest-to-Salvage-the-APSA.pdf">here</a> and <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Towards-a-New-Agenda-for-Peace-and-Security-in-Africa.pdf">here</a>) similarly underlined the need to strengthen prevention and place greater reliance on political and diplomatic tools. The consultation could therefore consider practical arrangements for pooling analysis across the three bodies and translating it into coordinated preventive engagement in countries facing elevated governance and conflict risks.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU generates substantial governance and human-rights information. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) activity <a href="https://achpr.au.int/sites/default/files/files/2026-03/ex-cl-1659-xlviiieng.pdf">report</a> illustrates the human-rights information already available within the AU and records the Commission’s June 2025 consultation with the PSC on strengthening institutional synergies, regular information exchange and a rights-based approach across the conflict cycle. The challenge is therefore less the absence of information than ensuring that relevant information reaches preventive structures early, in an accessible and actionable form, and is linked to political follow-up. Election-related risks provide an entry point. The February 2026 Assembly Decision encouraged early deployment of technical teams and Heads of Mission during the pre-election phase and stronger CEWS monitoring of electoral processes, while the ACHPR’s 2026 <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/achprres655lxxxvi-2026">resolution</a> on elections calls for adherence to relevant human-rights obligations ‘before, during and after the electoral process,’ including protections relating to political participation, freedom of expression and assembly, electoral-body independence and election-related violations. Joint pre-election risk assessments could therefore link electoral expertise with human-rights monitoring, governance analysis and preventive diplomacy, shifting attention beyond election-day observation to restrictions on political competition, institutional distrust, inflammatory mobilisation, contested constitutional changes and unimplemented recommendations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The fifth joint PSC–APRM retreat, held in Burayu on 29 and 30 April 2026, offers a practical model. Its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/5th-PSC-APRM-Declaration-EN.pdf">Joint Declaration</a> called for regular interaction among the PSC, the African Peer Review (APR) Panel of Eminent Persons, Panel of the Wise, WiseYouth, FemWise and AGA–APSA Platform, and for ‘institutionalising data and information sharing’ so that APRM country findings feed systematically into APSA early warning and mediation planning. At its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1349.comm_en.pdf">1349<sup>th</sup></a> meeting on 21 May, the PSC welcomed the APRM’s development of an early-warning system dedicated to governance and ongoing work to include it in the continental risk-and-threat matrix, while urging Member States to integrate APRM assessments into CEWS and establish national structures able to ‘translate early warnings into immediate preventive actions.’ Building on these developments, the consultation could identify practical arrangements for pooling information, conducting joint assessments and establishing clear pathways for political follow-up. The consultation could also consider how the findings and recommendations of the Africa Governance Report can secure political uptake and follow-up by Member States, particularly where governance assessments identify vulnerabilities with implications for peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Such arrangements could also strengthen coordinated responses to governance-related risks beyond elections. Joint assessment could extend to countries facing elevated risks from political transitions, constitutional disputes, emerging transnational and geopolitical risks, including external interference, institutional breakdown or severe deterioration in civic space. Bringing the PSC’s political authority, the AGA-APSA Platform’s coordination role and the Sub-Committee’s Member State engagement to enable earlier and more coherent preventive diplomacy. A similarly integrated approach could inform post-conflict reconstruction, consistent with the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/44015-ASSEMBLY_AU_DEC_866_-_902_XXXVII_E.pdf">revised</a> AU PCRD Policy, by linking governance, human-rights, institutional-reform and rule-of-law priorities to efforts to prevent relapse into conflict.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The youth dimension should likewise be connected more directly to governance and prevention. The AGA-APSA statutory meetings have identified youth empowerment as a flagship priority, while preparations for the Africa Governance Report 2027, under the theme ‘Youth in Governance: From Promise to Prosperity,’ provide a further opportunity to link youth participation to governance and preventive processes. The <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/45581-doc-FINAL_-_CES_2025_-_2030.pdf">Citizens’ Engagement Strategy 2025–2030</a> provides a complementary framework for broadening citizen participation in AU processes. The consultation could therefore encourage country-level, time-bound implementation of the AGA–APSA Youth Engagement Strategy and stronger involvement of women, youth, civil society and marginalised communities in governance assessments and preventive initiatives.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Finally, the consultation may consider how existing AU norms and mechanisms can be used more consistently to address governance deficits and structural drivers of instability. The February 2026 Assembly decision recognised ‘governance deficits, human rights violations’ among the structural drivers of unconstitutional changes of government. The comprehensive matrix requested in 2025 could help identify outstanding ratifications, domestication and reporting gaps, overlapping mandates, implementation deficits and areas requiring normative review. The decision also placed the proposed 2028 AU Theme of the Year on human rights, democracy and governance within this broader agenda. The joint consultation can therefore provide the opportunity not only to improve information exchange, but to connect information to joint analysis, early political engagement and sustained follow-up on governance and human rights commitments.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC may reaffirm the importance of strengthening the linkages between governance, human rights, democracy, peace and security, while supporting the continued institutionalisation and strengthening of its annual engagement with the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG. It may call for deeper collaboration beyond the annual consultation through concrete joint actions that strengthen conflict prevention, democratic governance and sustainable peace, consistent with a stronger ‘One AU Approach’. The Council may also encourage more systematic information-sharing and joint analysis of governance, democracy, human rights, peace and security trends, and agree on priority recommendations and coordinated responses to emerging governance challenges and risks. The PSC may reiterate the call on Member States that have not yet done so to ratify the ACDEG and other AU Shared Values instruments, while urging States Parties to strengthen implementation and meet applicable reporting obligations. It may also encourage mobilisation of political, institutional, technical and financial support for preparations related to the proposed 2028 AU Theme of the Year and associated flagship initiatives, including support from AU organs and institutions, Member States, RECs/RMs and partners, as well as measures to strengthen the institutional and operational capacity of the AGA–APSA Secretariat.</p>
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		<title>Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap: Revitalisation</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/progress-made-in-silencingtheguns-in-africa-roadmap-revitalisation/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sisay Shifferaw]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2026 08:38:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[STG Initiative]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=24077</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>11 August 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/progress-made-in-silencingtheguns-in-africa-roadmap-revitalisation/">Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap: Revitalisation</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap: Revitalisation</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 11 August 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (12 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene to deliberate on the theme ‘Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap: Revitalization’.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of the People&#8217;s Democratic Republic of Algeria to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for August.  Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, is expected to deliver a briefing on the agenda item.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is to be recalled that to translate the vision into practical steps, the Peace and Security Council developed the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns, which was adopted by the 29<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in January 2017. The <a href="https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/170201_au_silencing_the_guns_roadmap.pdf">Lusaka Master Roadmap (2016)</a> provided a framework for addressing the root causes of conflict, focusing on five interlinked areas: political governance, economic development, societal cohesion, environmental sustainability and peace and security. The roadmap emphasises strengthening conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, advancing post-conflict reconstruction, addressing governance and economic drivers of conflict, fostering democracy and the rule of law, and curbing the proliferation of illicit arms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The lack of adequate progress to achieve the 2020 timeline led the AU Assembly, at its <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ext-assembly-au-dec-1-and-decl-1-xiv-e.pdf">14th Extraordinary Session</a> in December 2020, to extend the implementation timeline to 2030 and to review the initiative&#8217;s implementation every two years. Subsequently, a Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism to strengthen implementation and accountability was developed in 2021.</strong> It is expected that tomorrow’s deliberation may also include how to approach the 2030 deadline in view of the persistent challenges to peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The last time the PSC held a session on STGs was at its 1252<sup>nd</sup> meeting of 18 December 2024. Recognising the need for an assessment of the state of implementation of the STGs as the 2030 deadline fast approaches and in view of the worsening state of peace and security on the continent, the key aspect of the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1252.comm_en.pdf">outcome of the session</a> was the call on the AU Commission to convene a high-level reflection or strategic review of the STGs. Subsequently, the AU Commission convened in June 2025 a <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-meeting-on-mid-term-strategic-evaluation-of-the-au-master-roadmap-of-practical-steps-to-silence-the-guns-in-africa-by-the-year-2030-concludes-in-djibouti">Mid-Term Strategic Evaluation of the AU Master Roadmap on Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns by the Year 2030. </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session provides an opportunity to follow up on the previous session of the PSC, including on its request for regular briefing from the AU High Representative at least every two years, and take stock of where the implementation of the Silencing the Guns (STG) initiative stands.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As the continent passed the midpoint of the extended 2030 timeline, the question before the PSC is therefore no longer simply whether progress has been made, but <strong>why the trajectory of Africa’s peace and security landscape remains so starkly at odds with the 2030 ambition, where implementation is falling short, and what needs to change to reverse that trajectory</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This question is particularly consequential for the ongoing review of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), since the experience of STG provides a practical test of APSA’s capacity to translate its norms, institutions and tools into effective conflict prevention, timely response, sustained peace processes and peace consolidation. With the Extraordinary AU Summit on strengthening conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms scheduled to convene in Luanda later this month, the session also offers a timely opportunity to connect the STG assessment to the broader APSA review and to shape the Summit’s deliberations around concrete, measurable and time-bound measures to address the implementation gaps. In this sense, the session is expected to seek not another declaratory recommitment to the STG roadmap, but a clearer determination of what must change in the approach and posture of the continent’s peace and security architecture towards the peace and security situation on the continent and how those changes can be translated into delivery during the remaining period to 2030.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Amani Africa’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/MEMO-TO-THE-NEW-AU-COMMISSION-LEADERSHIP.pdf">assessment</a> of the first decade of STG (2013 – 2023) established that the gap between the initiative’s ambition and the realities on the ground had widened considerably. The number of conflict situations on the PSC agenda increased nearly threefold between 2013 and 2023, while the number of internally displaced persons and refugees tripled. The updated data suggests that this deterioration remains largely unchanged.</p>
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</div><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="wp-image-24071" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10.png" width="1672" height="1000" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10.png 1672w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10-300x179.png 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10-1024x612.png 1024w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10-768x459.png 768w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10-1536x919.png 1536w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1-10-350x209.png 350w" sizes="(max-width: 1672px) 100vw, 1672px" /></div>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Figure 1: No. of conflict situations on the agenda of the PSC (Source: own data collected from PSC activities)</figcaption></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This increase in the number and geographic spread of conflicts is also notable in the increase in the number of situations on the agenda of the PSC, whose proliferation is in part attributable to the unprecedented surge in military coups.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">According to the data from different conflict data sets, the most notable trend is the sharp increase in recorded conflict events, rising from 1,671 in 2013 to 6,124 in 2025. Although annual variations exist, the overall trajectory has been consistently upward, particularly after 2019. The nature of conflict has also evolved from concentrated hotspots to a more dispersed continental security challenge. While traditional conflict theatres such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sudan, and the Central African Republic remain major centres of violence, new areas of instability have emerged. The Sahel represents the clearest example, with Burkina Faso experiencing a dramatic escalation from 2 (two) recorded conflict events in 2016 to 657 in 2025. The spread of insecurity into coastal West Africa, including Benin, as well as emerging concerns in countries such as Togo and Tanzania, demonstrates the expanding geographic reach of armed groups and regional insecurity.</p>
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</div><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-24072" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5.png" width="1588" height="991" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5.png 1588w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5-300x187.png 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5-1024x639.png 1024w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5-768x479.png 768w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5-1536x959.png 1536w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-5-350x218.png 350w" sizes="(max-width: 1588px) 100vw, 1588px" /></div>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Figure 2: Number of conflict events in Africa (2013 -2025) (Source: Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg, Organised violence 1989–2025, and violent political protests, Journal of Peace Research, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopres/xjag046)</figcaption></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When disaggregating the data by conflict type, the surge is concentrated in just two categories rather than evenly spread. State‑based conflict nearly quadrupled between 2013 and 2025 (906 to 3,573, now 58% of all events), and one‑sided violence against civilians more than tripled (536 to 1,840). By contrast, non‑state conflict (588 to 733) and internationalised conflict rose only modestly. Sudan’s civil war, which erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, exemplifies both drivers and accounts for much of the sharp 2023–2025 escalation. The RSF’s 2024–2025 siege and October 2025 capture of El Fasher, where UN investigators documented mass executions, sexual violence, and thousands of civilian deaths, provides a direct real‑world instance of the one-sided violence spike. The Sahel reflects a similar dual dynamic: JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province simultaneously battle state militaries (state‑based) and massacre civilians in contested villages (one‑sided violence). Additional weight comes from the M23 resurgence in the DRC since 2022 and Ethiopia’s 2020–2022 Tigray war, both adding to the state‑based conflict totals in this period.</p>
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</div><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-24073" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1.png" width="1607" height="979" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1.png 1607w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1-300x183.png 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1-1024x624.png 1024w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1-768x468.png 768w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1-1536x936.png 1536w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/3-1-350x213.png 350w" sizes="(max-width: 1607px) 100vw, 1607px" /></div>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Figure 3: Number of conflict events by conflict types (2013 – 2015), (Source: Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg, Organized violence 1989–2025, and violent political protests, Journal of Peace Research, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopres/xjag046)</figcaption></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The humanitarian impact, captured in the graph below, is the direct result of the substantial increase in the incidence, intensity and geographic spread of armed violence, while also particularly affected by the dynamics of specific conflicts.</p>
<p>
</div><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-24074" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4.png" width="1619" height="971" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4.png 1619w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4-300x180.png 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4-1024x614.png 1024w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4-768x461.png 768w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4-1536x921.png 1536w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/4-350x210.png 350w" sizes="(max-width: 1619px) 100vw, 1619px" /></div>
					</div>
				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Figure 4: Number of Refugees and IDPs in Africa Between 2010 – 2025 (Source: UNHCR Global Trends; International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)</figcaption></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Measured against the pillars of the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38304-doc-1_au_roadmap_silencing_guns_2020_pdf_en.pdf">AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns</a>, the data reveals a widening gap between the ambition of the STGs agenda and the conditions required for its realisation. By AU’s own admission, some of the limited progress achieved is a far cry from the lofty goals and objectives set out in the AU Master Roadmap and the scale of peace and security challenges. Parts of the continent remain mired in conflict, and new challenges to peace and security have proliferated.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The growing number and geographic spread of conflicts are linked to the increased involvement of terrorist and violent extremist groups, deteriorating political governance, the persistence and expansion of armed conflicts, the fragility of peace agreements, and the continued proliferation of arms. These trends show that the challenge extends beyond the failure to end individual conflicts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Closing this structural gap requires not only addressing the root causes of conflict but also ensuring that early‑warning systems are translated into timely political action. Early warning remains vital, but the persistent gap between warning and political action points to the need to operationalise the Roadmap by making early-warning outputs more systematically actionable. In this regard, the PSC has in its recent sessions emphasised the centrality of early responses to early warning in enhancing its conflict prevention mandate. It is therefore expected that the PSC, building on its 1247<sup>th</sup>, 1298<sup>th</sup> session, and 1320<sup>th</sup> session, will follow up on progress in the operationalisation of its decisions, particularly the dynamic risk-mapping tool and regular horizon-scanning briefings by AUCTC, CISSA and AFRIPOL.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Furthermore, the PSC may also use the opportunity to examine how to ensure that CEWS analysis products directly inform its agenda-setting and decisions, including through regular confidential briefings, periodic horizon-scanning sessions, and by improving AU–REC/RMs information-sharing, while giving greater attention to emerging threats such as digital radicalisation and illicit financial flows that increasingly underpin the evolution and cross-border expansion of conflicts. The central issue for follow-up is therefore how to ensure that early-warning information consistently triggers timely political decisions and preventive action, rather than being repeatedly generated without corresponding response.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">These experiences suggest that the challenge for the AU is not simply to expand mediation efforts, but to develop conflict-specific strategies that combine sustained political engagement with security, humanitarian, development and peacebuilding instruments. They also reinforce the importance of African agency and institutional coherence, while external engagement can provide important diplomatic leverage and resources; fragmented mediation can dilute African ownership and create parallel processes. Strengthening AU–RECs/RMs coordination, clarifying the respective roles of regional and continental actors, and ensuring that external engagement complements rather than substitutes African-led processes will therefore be essential to making mediation and preventive diplomacy more effective in the changing conflict landscape.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The experience of the past thirteen years also demonstrates that ending active hostilities does not necessarily amount to silencing the guns. The lesson is that peace agreements should not be treated as the endpoint of conflict resolution. They are the beginning of a longer process of transforming the political, security and socioeconomic conditions that produced conflict in the first place.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This also points to a weakness in the way success in peace processes is often measured. A more meaningful measure of progress would examine whether peace agreements are being implemented, whether political institutions are becoming more inclusive, whether displaced populations can return safely, whether former combatants are effectively reintegrated, whether communities experience improved security and whether institutions are capable of resolving grievances without violence. Amani Africa’s earlier work on PCRD has highlighted the importance of linking security, political governance, humanitarian assistance, socioeconomic reconstruction, justice and reconciliation, and women and youth in sustaining peace. The challenge for the PSC is therefore to strengthen the connection between mediation and post-conflict support, ensuring that the political attention and resources mobilised to secure peace agreements are sustained during implementation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. It is expected that the PSC will underscore the need for a revitalised and more effective implementation of the Silencing the Guns Master Roadmap, taking into account the prevailing peace and security situation on the continent. The PSC may emphasise the importance of identifying and addressing the political, institutional and operational gaps that have impeded the implementation of the Roadmap, including the persistent gap between early warning and early action. It may call for strengthening the AU’s preventive diplomacy and mediation capacities and adapting approaches to conflict prevention and resolution to the evolving nature of armed conflicts, while enhancing coordination between the AU and RECs/RMs and reinforcing African ownership of peace processes. In view of the widening gap between the STG ambition and developments on the ground, the PSC may call for concrete, measurable and time-bound measures to accelerate implementation during the remaining period to 2030, including more systematic follow-up and accountability for the implementation of STG commitments. The PSC may also decide that a quarterly ministerial-level meeting dedicated to the adoption of measures specific to various conflict situations and constant review and, as necessary, updating of implementation of such measures in order to push significant progress by 2030. The PSC may also consider more concrete and measurable targets to register tangible progress by 2030 and request a report for making a determination on how to adapt and continue the agenda beyond 2030.</p>
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		<title>Quarterly briefing by the A3 to the PSC</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/quarterly-briefing-by-the-a3-to-the-psc/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Aug 2026 06:47:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC Meetings on A3]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23999</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>4 August 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/quarterly-briefing-by-the-a3-to-the-psc/">Quarterly briefing by the A3 to the PSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-6"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding one-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Quarterly briefing by the A3 to the PSC </strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 4 August 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (5 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1358<sup>th</sup> session to receive a quarterly briefing by the A3 to the PSC on its activities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session will commence with opening remarks by the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and PSC Chairperson for August 2026, Mohamed Khaled, followed by an introductory statement by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. The Council is also expected to receive briefings from Lewis G. Brown, Permanent Representative of of Liberia and Coordinator of the A3, and Mohamed Edrees, Permanent Representative of the African Union to the United Nations in New York. In addition, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), will deliver a statement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s briefing is being convened pursuant to the first Conclusions of the High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, held in Algiers in December 2013, which agreed that the A3 would brief the PSC quarterly on African issues on the UN Security Council’s agenda. This was reaffirmed in the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Manual-of-Engagement-on-Engagement-between-PSC-and-A3-HLS-EN.pdf">Manual</a> on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3, with a view to facilitating information-sharing and enabling the PSC to provide the necessary guidance. More than a decade later, the briefings remain irregular, although there are signs of improvement this year.  The A3 last briefed the PSC on 20 April 2026, during its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1340.comm_en.pdf">1340<sup>th</sup></a> session, covering activities during the first quarter of 2026. During that session, the PSC directed the AU Commission to assess the feasibility of holding one quarterly briefing at AU headquarters and to develop a matrix of Common African Positions, as well as an annual plan of action for advancing those positions and reflecting relevant PSC decisions in the resolution of the UN Security Council. Tomorrow’s engagement is expected to follow up on these decisions and review the A3’s activities during the second quarter of 2026.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One area the briefing is expected to highlight is the steps taken to strengthen internal cohesion. As noted in Amani Africa’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/making-africas-voice-matter-in-the-un-security-council-bridging-the-gap-between-ambition-and-reality-in-the-role-of-the-african-three-members-of-the-unsc/">Special Research Report on the A3</a>, the group has become a force that others within the UN Security Council reckon with and has demonstrated its capacity to exert influence in its decision-making processes. When acting as one and speaking with one voice, its influence can go as far as operating as a ‘de facto veto power,’ requiring other members, including the P5, to consult the A3, particularly on the African files.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One way of articulating their collective positions is through joint statements. Both their frequency and scope have expanded considerably: according to a <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/A3_research_report_2025.pdf">study</a> by the Security Council Report, the number increased from six in 2018 to 105 in 2024. Initially focused on African country situations, they now extend to thematic agenda items and non-African files. Publicly available information indicates that, between April and June 2026, the A3 delivered joint statements on at least 20 occasions. As observed by Security Council Report, speaking with one voice has increased the visibility of African positions; made it easier for other Council members to support or align with them; and enabled delegations with limited capacity to share the drafting burden while drawing on individual members’ regional expertise. This is an important step towards strengthening cohesion and amplifying African positions. The A3’s next stage of development should, however, be judged by whether its collective positions shape negotiations, influence voting behaviour and affect Security Council decisions and actions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Although outside the review period, the briefing is likely to highlight the Arria-formula meeting convened by DRC during its July 2026 presidency as an encouraging experience. Held on 13 July and titled ‘The Normative Gaps Linking Natural Resources and Peace: Foundations and Perspectives,’ it built on Sierra Leone’s July 2025 meeting on critical minerals and their links to insecurity in Africa. The A3 have used Arria-formula meetings less frequently than other Council members, but their growing recourse to this mechanism is welcome. Used strategically, Arria-formula meetings can help shape subsequent Security Council deliberations and enable the A3 to move from responding to agendas set by others towards exercising a more proactive agenda-setting and drafting role. This was evident when, following the Arria-formula meeting, the DRC convened a high-level open debate on natural resource governance on 22 July under the agenda item ‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A3 members are also trying to expand their penholding or co-penholding role on African files and other issues of interest to the continent as called for in the communiqué of the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/983rd-psc-meeting-unified-role-of-a3-in-the-unsc-4-march-2021.pdf">983<sup>rd</sup> session</a> of the PSC. At its 1340<sup>th</sup> session, the PSC encouraged the A3 to assume greater responsibility in shaping Security Council outcomes through such arrangements. So far, these roles have mainly covered West Africa and the Sahel and the Central African region. As pointed out in <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Sierra-Leones-2024-2025-UN-Security-Council-Tenure-and-Africas-Recalibration-in-a-Retreating-International-Law-Based-Order.pdf">a recent publication</a> on the tenure of Sierra Leone, leadership is exercised additionally ‘through sanctions and working group responsibilities, including chairing the 1533 Sanctions Committee concerning the DRC, the 2206 Sanctions Committee concerning South Sudan and the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite the A3’s emergence as a cohesive negotiating bloc with significant influence on Security Council dynamics—and its support becoming a ‘de facto requirement’ for the adoption of Security Council products concerning African files—, there remains significant room for improvement. Several challenges continue to limit the group’s role in agenda-setting and its influence over Security Council outcomes and are worth highlighting in tomorrow’s engagement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The first is the lack of strong strategic and political guidance from the AU, as well as inadequate coordination and timely, proactive engagement between Addis Ababa and New York. In the absence of clear and timely AU guidance, the A3 cannot effectively influence Security Council dynamics and remains vulnerable to division. Various PSC sessions, including the 983<sup>rd</sup> and 1340<sup>th</sup> sessions, the Oran Process and the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3 have identified mechanisms to address this. The difficulty lies not in the absence of modalities but in their limited operationalisation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Modalities that have not been implemented regularly include inviting the A3 to PSC meetings on items also under UN Security Council discussion; holding quarterly videoconferences between the PSC Troika and the A3; facilitating interactions between their experts; and aligning the two Councils’ programmes of work on African files. Although the PSC’s 1340<sup>th</sup> session requested that its deliberations precede, to the extent possible, discussion of the same issues in the UN Security Council, thereby providing clear continental guidance, this rarely happens. Responses from Addis Ababa are often late. The AU Permanent Observer Mission, which serves as the A3 Secretariat and is expected to provide technical, administrative and logistical support to the group, remains under-resourced, while the request for a dedicated focal point within the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security has not been acted upon. Similarly, while the A3 increasingly serves as penholder or co-penholder on some files, the P3 still control most African files and usually initiates meetings and drafts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">These shortcomings have political consequences. Without timely continental guidance, the A3 formulates positions after negotiations on UNSC outcome documents are underway. Under these circumstances, its ability to influence first drafts declines, national positions can displace collective ones, and exposure to permanent-member pressure increases. Regular contact is therefore a condition of political cohesion, not an administrative formality.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Against this backdrop, tomorrow’s sessions should focus on operationalising agreed modalities for coordination outlined in various PSC session outcome documents on the A3 and in the Manual. As underscored in its 983<sup>rd</sup> session, the PSC should also reflect in its Programme of Work African files expected to feature in the UNSC agenda so that African positions are settled before, not after, Security Council negotiations begin.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Second, it is important that a clear set of continental priorities is set for A3 leadership in the UNSC. The Annual Plan of Action requested at the 1340<sup>th</sup> session should identify a) the files on which the A3 is expected to seek concrete Council outcomes, b) the principles that should guide A3 engagement, and c) the positions to be advanced and the coalitions required.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Third, there is also a need to expand its coalition base within and outside the Security Council. Building on the A3 Plus arrangement created with Caribbean members, the group should build a constituency among the E10—the ten elected non-permanent members. Beyond the Security Council, closer engagement with the wider African Group in New York and members of the UN from the Global South, including within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement, could reinforce support around African common positions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Finally, accountability of the A3 to the AU should be ensured. AU endorsement and leadership of the A3 are not nice things to have but a strategic necessity.  They should become part of the strategic framework that anchors the role of the A3 and the projection of collective influence rather than a routine regional process. The AU Assembly in Decision Assembly/ AU/Dec.598 (XXVI) adopted in January 2016 explicitly <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/how-africa-is-using-the-a3-as-a-de-facto-permanent-power-block-in-global-peace-and-security-decision-making/">inscribed</a> the A3’s special responsibility to ensure that the decisions of the PSC are well reflected in the decision-making process of the Security Council on peace and security issues of concern to Africa. As such, the A3 seat carries not only national responsibilities but also continental ones. In addition to the annual seminar and the quarterly briefing, one way of strengthening accountability could be inviting African candidates for the Security Council seeking AU endorsement, both during their candidatures and at the conclusion of their mandates, to provide an assessment of how they have advanced agreed African positions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC may commend the progress made over the years, during which the A3 has evolved into a major power bloc within the UN Security Council. It may also welcome continued efforts to strengthen the A3’s influence and advance Common African Positions with one voice, including through the delivery of joint statements. The PSC may emphasise the importance of operationalising the agreed modalities for enhancing coordination between the A3 and the PSC, with a view to ensuring timely and proactive guidance on African files. To this end, it may request that the AU Commission and the AU Permanent Observer Mission report on the challenges to the implementation of the modalities for coordination and provide proposals on how to address those challenges. Taking note of the lessons from Sierra Leone’s tenure, the PSC may also encourage A3 members to expand their influence through chairing sanctions committees and informal working groups of the UNSC. It may also welcome the emerging use of Arria-formula meetings for setting agendas and shaping UNSC engagement on particular issues and encourage the A3 to use Arria-formula meetings strategically.</p>
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		<title>Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/countering-terrorism-and-violent-extremism-in-africa/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 05:59:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Terrorism and Organised Crime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23880</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>20 July 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/countering-terrorism-and-violent-extremism-in-africa/">Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-7"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding one-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 20 July 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (21 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its virtual 1354<sup>th</sup> ministerial-level meeting on ‘Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa’.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uganda and Chairperson of the PSC for July, Haruna Kyeyune Kasolo, will deliver opening remarks, followed by introductory remarks by Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission. The AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, and a representative of the United Nations (UN) will also deliver statements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session will build on and follows the PSC’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1266.comm_en.pdf">1266<sup>th</sup></a> meeting of March 2025 on ‘Deradicalisation as a Leverage for the Fight against Violent Extremism in Africa’ expressed grave concern over increased terrorist activity and the return or relocation of foreign terrorist fighters, highlighted structural drivers of radicalisation and called for counter-radicalisation measures to be incorporated into the AU action plan on preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism. It also offers an opportunity to follow up on the PSC’s <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/eng-communique-for-the-1111th-psc-meeting-at-ministerial-level-on-dev-and-deradicalization-7-october-2022.pdf">1111<sup>th</sup></a> meeting of October 2022, which emphasised national reconciliation and social cohesion, including dialogue and negotiation to facilitate voluntary surrender and rehabilitation, and requested the AU Commission to develop a compendium of African best practices.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session is expected to assess recent trends and whether and how to adapt the mobilisation of effective response to the threat that terrorism continues to pose in various parts of the continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The more consequential test is whether the Council identifies practical follow-up measures. The AU does not lack frameworks. Its architecture includes the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37289-treaty-0020_-_oau_convention_on_the_prevention_and_combating_of_terrorism_e.pdf">OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999)</a>, its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37291-treaty-0030_-_protocol_to_the_oau_convention_on_the_prevention_and_combating_of_terrorism_e.pdf">Protocol (2004)</a>, and the <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220528/declaration-terrorism-and-unconstitutional-changes-government-africa">Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2022)</a>. These are the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/press-release-nouakchott-process-25-27-november-2024-dakar-senegal.pdf">Nouakchott Process</a>, the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), AFRIPOL, CISSA and the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc.conclusions.1st-meeting.hiss.igad.eac.ms.djibouti.pdf">Djibouti Process (2015)</a>. The gap lies in implementation, coordination, institutional follow-through, and the political and socio-economic governance deficit-based diagnosis for anchoring responses.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Related to implementation and in terms of response, two issues stand out for tomorrow’s PSC session. The first relates to the impact of major power geopolitical rivalry, such as the rivalry between Russia and France in the Sahel, on regional and continental strategy for countering terrorism and violent extremism. The second concerns the state of political cohesion at the regional and continental levels for advancing an effective strategy for countering terrorism and violent extremism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As a 2022 <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/The-growing-threat-of-terrorism-in-Africa.pdf">special research report</a> observed, policy has remained disproportionately security-centred despite the political, governance, socioeconomic and environmental dimensions of the threat, particularly in marginalised territories with weak state–society relations, deficient local governance and absence of service delivery. Tomorrow’s session may therefore steer the PSC towards an implementation-oriented roadmap that combines the provision of capable and legitimate security institutions along with the consolidation of legitimate local governance, the delivery of essential services, development, and community-centred prevention and stabilization measures. The <a href="https://dbdcgroup.com/asec-2026-concludes-in-accra-with-renewed-call-for-african-led-security-innovation/">13<sup>th</sup></a> Africa Security Symposium, held in Accra from 7 to 9 July 2026, similarly underscored African-led solutions, inclusive partnerships, practical cross-border cooperation and translating diagnosis into action.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify;">The first substantive issue for tomorrow’s session is the geography of terrorism in Africa. According to <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Global-Terrorism-Index-2026-Report.pdf">GTI 2026</a>, despite a 28% global decline in terrorism deaths in 2025, Africa remained the principal geographic concentration of terrorism-related deaths and highly affected countries. Six of the ten countries most affected by terrorism worldwide were in the region. The Sahel alone accounted for more than half of global terrorism deaths, compared with less than 1% in 2007, while four African countries were among the five states that together accounted for 70% of global fatalities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This persistence of the threat of terrorism nevertheless coexists with uneven and, in some respects, improving regional trends. Across much of Africa, terrorism deaths fell by 23.5% and incidents by nearly 28%. Eighteen countries improved their overall GTI scores, while only four deteriorated. These aggregate declines may, however, obscure the consolidation of territorial influence by some groups, such as through imposing economic blockades.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Thus, it is of particular significance for tomorrow’s session that account is given to recent developments illustrating terrorism’s regionalised and adaptive geography across the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, coastal West Africa and Somalia. In Mali, coordinated <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/26/malis-defence-minister-sadio-camara-killed-amid-coordinated-attacks">attacks</a> on 25 April struck Kati and several other locations, including Bamako, Gao, Kidal and Sévaré. The attacks also killed Defence Minister Sadio Camara when assailants targeted his residence in Kati. In Niger, the January IS-claimed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/30/isil-claims-deadly-attack-on-air-base-near-niger">attack</a> on the airbase at Diori Hamani International Airport, the April <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/fighting-between-sahel-based-jihadist-rivals-spills-into-niger-2026-04-09/">spillover</a> of fighting between JNIM and IS into Tillabéri, and the June <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/attack-niger-airport-kills-11-members-security-forces-government-says-2026-06-18/">attack</a> on the airport and adjoining military airbase, which killed 11 security personnel and two civilians, demonstrated growing pressure on strategic infrastructure and centres of power. Chad’s Lake Chad region similarly illustrated Boko Haram’s continuing lethality. The May <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/chads-army-says-23-personnel-killed-boko-haram-attack-2026-05-05/">attack</a> on the Barka Tolorom military base killed at least 23 soldiers and wounded 26, followed two days later by an <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/7/chad-declares-national-mourning-after-deadly-boko-haram-ambush">ambush</a> that killed two Chadian generals. Further analyses (<a href="https://acleddata.com/report/new-frontlines-jihadist-expansion-reshaping-benin-niger-and-nigeria-borderlands">here</a> and <a href="https://acleddata.com/report/jihadist-groups-pose-growing-and-expanding-threat-africa">here</a>) point to the consolidation of jihadist activity across the Benin–Niger–Nigeria borderlands and the southward expansion of Sahel-based groups towards coastal West Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the Horn of Africa, the <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/777">UN Panel</a> identifies al-Shabaab as the most immediate threat to peace, security and stability in Somalia and the wider region, highlighted by its activities during 2025. Apart from the 18 March 2025 attempted assassination of the Somali President near the presidential palace, in the first quarter of 2025, the group’s monthly attacks increased by about 50% compared with 2024 in areas such as Hiraan and Middle Shabelle. It also averaged around six attacks per month in Kenya, while the estimated number of Ethiopian fighters within its ranks rose to approximately 600, highlighting the increasing regionalisation of the group’s reach.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other issue that is also expected to feature in tomorrow’s session is how terrorist groups are increasingly leveraging advanced technologies to mobilise support, recruit, undertake reconnaissance operations and increasingly carry out attacks. Terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab and ISWAP have leveraged the digital era by utilising a variety of tools and platforms to plan, communicate, and organise their operations. Some terrorist groups, for example, as highlighted in relation to the Lake Chad Basin region, Boko haram, have sought to use drone technology for surveillance and weapon delivery. The ISWAP, for instance, <a href="https://twitter.com/HKaaman/status/1507758016170446849">increased</a> its use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED). In the Sahel too, drone use has increased in 2025. JNIM has conducted repeated drone-enabled attacks across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Togo in 2025, often coordinating drone use with ground assaults. Attention should also be paid to the risk that such actors may employ cyber warfare tactics to disrupt crucial infrastructure and communication networks.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Another issue that tomorrow’s session is expected to address relates to the terrorism–transnational crime nexus. Terrorist groups sustain their operations through illicit taxation, smuggling, kidnapping, illegal mining, livestock theft, fuel trafficking and protection economies. It is worth recalling that the PSC’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1345.comm-EN.pdf">1345<sup>th</sup></a> meeting warned of an ‘integrated, hybrid and transnational criminal ecosystem’ in which terrorism, trafficking, environmental crime, cybercrime and financial crime share corridors, financing mechanisms and logistics.’ The 2026 UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) <a href="https://unicri.org/sites/default/files/2026-05/Dangerous-Liaisons-Assessing-the-Nexus-between-Terrorism-and-Criminal-Activities-in-Africa-2026.pdf">report</a> frames the relationship as a continuum from transactional cooperation and coexistence to, more rarely, organisational convergence. Among the terrorist groups operating in West Africa, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) are <a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/260257/24994116/Interlinkage+of+terrorism+and+transnational+organized+crime+in+West+Africa.pdf/365e8684-5070-3a94-671c-d115e30a5a5e?version=1.0&amp;t=1687255283323">known</a> for taking advantage of transnational criminal networks, including for financing their activities and the recruitment of new members.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Counter-terrorism cannot therefore be effective without addressing the economic factors that enable and sustain terrorist groups, including arms trafficking, illicit financial flows and illicit natural resource extraction. The analytical <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1320-Analytical-Report-EN.pdf">report</a> accompanying the PSC’s 1320<sup>th</sup> meeting similarly presents terrorism and violent extremism as interconnected threats sustained by illicit economies, digital recruitment, cross-border financing and governance gaps. The resulting <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1320.comm_en.pdf">communiqué</a> placed greater emphasis on institutional coordination, early warning and early action.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The prevention dimension should focus on conditions that enable recruitment rather than on treating radicalisation as predominantly ideological. UNDP’s ‘Journey to Extremism’ <a href="https://www.undp.org/publications/journey-extremism-africa-pathways-recruitment-and-disengagement">study</a> shows that recruitment in sub-Saharan Africa is shaped by economic hardship, limited opportunities, fractured state–society relations and security-force abuses rather than religion alone. 17 % of voluntary recruits cited religious ideas as their primary motivation, while 25% identified employment opportunities. Among the 48% who experienced a specific tipping-point event, 71% cited government action, including the killing or arrest of family members or friends. These findings echo Amani Africa’s aforementioned assessment that terrorism has often been misdiagnosed primarily as a security threat, producing excessive reliance on militarised responses despite the political, governance and development conditions sustaining it. Strengthening state legitimacy, accountable governance, socioeconomic development and community resilience should therefore be treated as central components of a sustainable counter-terrorism strategy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its concern over the continuing scourge of terrorism and violent extremism, particularly in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, coastal West Africa and the Horn of Africa. It may also express concern over their growing convergence with illicit economies, transnational organised crime, and the use of new technologies, including digital and drones. It may underscore the importance of adopting a comprehensive and multidimensional counter-terrorism strategy that combines security measures undertaken by legitimate security institutions with prevention, deradicalisation, stabilisation, recovery, reconciliation, dialogue, service delivery, and the building of legitimate local governance infrastructure. The PSC may also emphasise the need for member states to put aside their difference when it comes to the mobilisation of collective action to address the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism. In this respect, it may emphasise the need for AU, ECOWAS and UN to join ranks in support of the counter-terrorism efforts of the Sahel countries that are the major theatre of terrorist activities on the continent, with a growing threat of expansion into coastal West Africa. It may also call for strengthened coordination among the AU Commission, AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA, RECs/RMs and relevant regional mechanisms, particularly in advancing intelligence-sharing, border management, and investigations into terrorist financing. Furthermore, the PSC may call on the AU Commission to develop an implementation-oriented roadmap identifying priority borderlands, practical channels for operational cooperation, support for national and regional deradicalisation programmes, and stronger linkages between counter-terrorism operations, civilian protection, stabilisation and recovery.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/countering-terrorism-and-violent-extremism-in-africa/">Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Third Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AU PSC and ECOWAS MSC</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/third-annual-joint-consultative-meeting-between-the-au-psc-and-ecowas-msc/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 05:18:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC meetings with RECs/RMs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>29 June 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/third-annual-joint-consultative-meeting-between-the-au-psc-and-ecowas-msc/">Third Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AU PSC and ECOWAS MSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Third Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AU PSC and ECOWAS MSC</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 29 June 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (30 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its Third Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mediation and Security Council (MSC), in Abuja, Nigeria.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Julius Sandy, Chair of the ECOWAS MSC, and Nasir Aminu, Nigeria’s Permanent Representative to the AU and stand-in PSC Chairperson for June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), and Dr Alieu Omar Touray, President of the ECOWAS Commission, are expected to deliver statements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The last Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and ECOWAS MSC was held on 16 May 2025 in Addis Ababa. The meeting, among others, agreed on the need to continue engaging the three countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES); developing a security cooperation framework involving the AU and ECOWAS engagement with these countries; reinvigoration of the Nouakchott Process, the ECOWAS Plan of Action Against Terrorism, the Accra Initiative, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and Gulf of Guinea maritime security initiatives; a Joint Threat Fusion and Analysis Cell under an AU-ECOWAS counter-terrorism coordination platform; closer cooperation between the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN); and joint field missions, retreats, chairperson-level consultations, focal points and staff exchanges. Against this background, the third consultation, framed around the theme ‘Strengthening Regional Cooperation in Resources Mobilization to Address Evolving Peace and Security Threats in Africa’, may serve as a test of whether annual dialogue can be translated into measurable follow-up, including through a joint assessment of West Africa’s peace and security situation, particularly terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and transitions; deeper collaboration on financing peace support operations, including discussion on the practical operationalisation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 for regional peace support needs; and concrete steps for strengthening coordination and coherence between the PSC and MSC within APSA and AGA.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">That test comes against a deteriorating security, humanitarian and climate backdrop. The central Sahel remains the <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/2026a-mig-widening-militant-islamist-threat/">epicentre</a> of militant Islamist violence on the continent, with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger accounting for a major share of fatalities linked to such groups. Yet the threat is no longer confined to the central Sahel. The Lake Chad Basin recorded a 28 per cent increase in fatalities from the previous year, underscoring the continued operational threat posed by Boko Haram and ISWAP. At the same time, insecurity increasingly connects Sahelian theatres, northern Nigeria, the Lake Chad islands and coastal borderlands. These dynamics strengthen the case for closer AU-ECOWAS coordination on counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing and cross-border stabilisation, but also show that regional stabilisation cannot be treated as a purely security question. The PSC’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1344.comm_en.pdf">1344<sup>th</sup></a> session on the impact of climate change on the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel further reinforces the need to connect security responses with local resilience, climate adaptation and conflict-sensitive recovery. Around 55 million people in West and Central Africa are <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/humanitarian-aid-cuts-push-millions-deeper-hunger-amid-rising-violence-and-population">projected</a> to face crisis-level hunger or worse during the June-August 2026 lean season, while more than 13 million children are expected to suffer from malnutrition in 2026. Conflict, displacement, economic turmoil, funding shortfalls and extreme weather risks therefore make humanitarian access, resilience and recovery programming integral to any credible regional response.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Another area that may receive the attention of the consultative meeting is early warning. The AU-ECOWAS early warning <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-and-au-deepen-cooperation-on-early-warning-and-conflict-prevention-mechanisms/">cooperation</a> engagement, held from 8-10 June 2026 in Abuja, involved the AU West Africa Regional Desk, CEWS Situation Room, ECOWAS directorates, and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). It was built on the September 2025 desk-to-desk process for joint conflict analysis and governance monitoring. It is imperative that CEWS-ECOWARN cooperation is linked to political decision-making, preventive diplomacy and rapid response, rather than remain a technical exchange. This is also where the proposed AU-ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Platform and Joint Threat Fusion and Analysis Cell become important. The Councils may therefore deliberate on how such mechanisms could be operationalised.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify;">Of immediate political concern is the AES question and its effect on ECOWAS’s institutional cohesion. The previous joint communiqué’s call for engagement with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger gave institutional expression to the logic of moving <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/from-estrangement-to-engagement-psc-and-ecowas-msc-call-for-a-cooperation-framework-for-engaging-aes-states/">from estrangement to engagement</a>. The <a href="https://www.emansion.gov.lr/sites/default/files/documents/Final%20Communique_Summit_ENG%20%281%29.pdf">67<sup>th</sup></a> ECOWAS Ordinary Summit endorsed the appointment of a Chief Negotiator to lead discussions with the three states on an orderly withdrawal process, safeguarding institutional and citizens’ interests and minimising regional disruption. At the same time, the 68<sup>th</sup> Summit urged Member States and directed the ECOWAS Commission to sustain engagement with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to strengthen collaboration on the deteriorating security situation. The AU Commission Chairperson’s <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250527/auc-chairperson-engages-representatives-sahelian-member-states">consultations</a> with the Ambassadors of the three countries on 27 May 2025, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel’s <a href="https://unowas.unmissions.org/en/news/the-special-representative-of-the-secretary-general-concludes-a-working-visit-to-niger">visit</a> to Niger in April 2026,  the 22 May 2025 meeting in Bamako between the President of the ECOWAS Commission and Ministers of the three countries of the AES similarly signalled efforts to keep channels open and cooperate on shared challenges, particularly terrorism. ECOWAS has since begun to give this dialogue a more dedicated form through the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2026/03/26/ecowas-appoints-veteran-diplomat-to-mediate-with-sahel-states/">appointment</a> of former Guinean Prime Minister and former ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyaté as Chief Negotiator with the AES countries, followed by his <a href="https://beninwebtv.bj/en/burkina-lansana-kouyate-with-traore-ecowas-attempts-to-reestablish-dialogue-with-the-aes/">engagement</a> with Burkina Faso’s transitional president and current AES Chair, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, in May 2026. While near-term reintegration remains unlikely, it is in the interest of both Councils to prevent the rupture from paralysing practical cooperation on security, stability and free movement. Tinubu’s <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/at-ecowas-68th-ordinary-session/">warning</a> at the 68<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session that ‘We are most vulnerable not when challenged from outside, but when weakened from within’ speaks directly to the wider significance of the AES rupture. Beyond the question of membership, it touches on political trust, security coordination and the common regional purpose needed to sustain collective action.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Governance and constitutional order are expected to be another major pillar, as transitions and UCG remain central to West Africa’s stability agenda. The previous meeting encouraged inclusive responses to governance deficits and reaffirmed zero tolerance for UCG, but recent developments, such as the November 2025 military coup in Guinea-Bissau and the December 2025 attempted coup in Benin, demonstrate that UCG remains a persistent challenge in the region.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Peace Support Operations and financing are expected to be crucial issues for deliberation, particularly regarding how AU-ECOWAS cooperation can support more effective resource mobilisation and the practical operationalisation of Resolution 2719 to meet peace support needs. This is particularly relevant in light of the 67<sup>th</sup> ECOWAS Ordinary Summit’s decisions on missions in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, which point to mandate readjustment, final extensions, drawdown and liquidation planning, as well as the 68<sup>th</sup> Summit’s decisions on Guinea-Bissau, which indicate renewed stabilisation needs, including the protection of political leaders and national institutions. The MNJTF may also serve as a related test case, particularly given the PSC’s concern at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1347.1.comm-EN.pdf">1347<sup>th</sup></a> session over funding gaps and its request that the AUC liaise with the A3 to explore the possible application of Resolution 2719 to fund MNJTF activities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome is a Joint Communiqué. The meeting is expected to welcome the convening of the Third Annual Joint Consultative Meeting as further consolidation of the AU PSC–ECOWAS MSC consultation process and to reaffirm the two Councils’ commitment to collaboration and shared responsibility in addressing peace and security challenges in West Africa and the wider continent. It may also welcome steps to strengthen AU-ECOWAS early warning cooperation and to encourage stronger links among CEWS, ECOWARN, and rapid response. It may also call for clearer coordination mechanisms to operationalise decisions taken by statutory organs, including agreed workstreams, focal points, timelines and reporting arrangements. The Councils may highlight the need for a practical mechanism to facilitate the operationalisation of UNSC Resolution 2719 in ways relevant to West African peace support needs, including the MNJTF, ECOWAS peace support capacities and other regional security arrangements. The communiqué may further encourage the revitalisation of existing cooperation mechanisms, including the Nouakchott Process, the Accra Initiative, the MNJTF and Gulf of Guinea maritime security arrangements, alongside steps towards operationalising the previously proposed AU–ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Platform and Joint Threat Fusion and Analysis Cell. It may also stress continued dialogue with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, reaffirm ECOWAS as a key pillar of regional integration and continental peace and security, and underscore that stronger AU-ECOWAS coordination is indispensable to addressing the region’s interconnected security, governance and humanitarian pressures.</p>
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		<title>Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-onthe-10-year-country-structural-vulnerability-and-resilience-assessment-csvra-review/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 16:22:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[APSA Tools and Pillars]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>24 June 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-onthe-10-year-country-structural-vulnerability-and-resilience-assessment-csvra-review/">Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 24 June 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (25 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a meeting with two agenda items, one of them being a ‘Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review.’ Although the session is scheduled for tomorrow, the initial <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/provisional-programme-of-work-of-the-peace-and-security-council-for-june-2026/">June 2026 Programme of Work</a> had scheduled it to happen on 30 June.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for the month of June, Nasir Aminu, will deliver opening remarks. This will be followed by a briefing from the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is entrusted with a relevant mandate, may also brief the PSC on its critical role.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Structural conflict prevention is closely linked to the AU’s core principles as set out in its Constitutive Act, which requires Member States to uphold democratic values, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, while also advancing socio-economic development and regional integration. Over the years, the AU has adopted several normative and policy instruments designed to facilitate the structural prevention of conflicts. In addition to the APRM that proved effective in detecting risks and vulnerabilities of reviewed AU member states, within the framework of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), steps were taken to develop tools aimed at facilitating the identification of a country’s structural vulnerability to conflict at an early stage. Of significance in this respect is the CSVRA and the accompanying Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The CSVRA, developed as a follow-up to PSC’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/360.prev_.dipl_.22.03.pdf">360<sup>th</sup> </a>session, held in March 2013, forms part of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF). The CSCPF has been developed to facilitate a Commission-wide and coordinated approach to structural conflict prevention with the aim of identifying and addressing structural weaknesses that have the potential to cause violent conflicts if left unaddressed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/463-com-states-fragile-situations-27-10-2014andconceptnote.pdf">463<sup>rd</sup></a> session of October 2014, the PSC, taking note of its efforts to finalise the elaboration of the CSCPF and the development of the CSVRA, requested the Commission to expedite the process. PSC’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/502.com_.cews_.29.4.2015.pdf">502<sup>nd</sup> </a>session, convened in April 2015, adopted the CSVRA/CSVMS tools, and requested the Commission, in collaboration with the RECs, to provide all the necessary assistance to Member States and popularise the tools while encouraging Member States to fully take advantage of these tools in their efforts towards the structural prevention of conflict. At its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/901.comm_en.pdf">901<sup>st</sup></a> meeting of December 2019, the PSC encouraged Member States to make full use of the Commission’s tools for structural conflict prevention, including the CSVRA.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC’s last meeting on the theme was held in December 2024, as its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1251.comm_en.pdf">1251<sup>st</sup></a> session, in which, it tasked the AU Commission in partnership with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), ‘to take the necessary measures, in accordance with the rules and procedures of each organ and in compliance with their respective mandates, to establish a harmonised framework for the CSVRA and the CSVMS, including integration of CSVRA/CSVM into the APRM Questionnaire for the improvement of governance in Africa, by adopting coordinated and multi-sectoral approaches aimed at promoting the peace, security and development nexus on the continent.’ It further urged the AU Commission ‘to submit the draft harmonised framework to the PSC for approval.’ This was taken further when the PSC tasked the AU Commission to ‘undertake a comprehensive review of the CEWS, CSVRA and CSVMS with a view to reengineering the tools to effectively respond to threats to peace and security and proposing appropriate interventions’; and to ‘establish a comprehensive coordination mechanism, in collaboration with RECs/RMs and the APRM, aimed at optimising resource utilisation, strengthening synergy, and effectively integrating national, regional, and continental early warning systems, and submit the proposed coordination mechanism for its consideration by June 2025.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to give an update on the ten-Year CSVRA review, and follow up on the tasks from the 1251<sup>st</sup> session. Of concern, however, as the CSVRA undergoes its ten-year review, several persistent challenges have come into sharper focus. One of the issues that would be in the spotlight is the concern that the PSC expressed during that session, over the limited accession of Member States to the CSCPF tools – CSVRA and CSVMS, nine (9) years after adoption. Since then, the Malawi draft report <a href="https://x.com/auc_paps/status/1990376729945546834?s=46">validation meeting</a> was held in November 2025, and the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/strategic-review-meeting-of-the-continental-early-warning-system-concludes">Strategic Review of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) methodology</a> was held in Rwanda in November 2025, which included reviewing the CSCPF implementation (which considered the CSVRA and CSVMS). Additionally, the restructuring that integrated the Political Affairs and Peace and Security Departments into the PAPS Department effectively dismantled the dedicated CEWS division, leaving the CSVRA without a clear institutional anchor or dedicated personnel to promote and implement the mechanism. There is also the question of the alignment between and integration of the CSVRA into the APRM review processes to avoid duplication and ensure coherence.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It would also be of interest to the PSC to look into the decision of the February 2022 35<sup>th</sup> AU summit requesting the Commission to establish a ‘Monitoring and Oversight Committee’ comprising the AU Commission, RECs/RMs, APRM and Member States to facilitate effective coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In tomorrow’s session, PSC may follow up on progress made towards the implementation of this decision. The other issue that is expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the update that the AU Commission may provide on the lessons learned from the implementation of the CSVRA on how it helps identify risks or vulnerabilities for conflict and facilitating the initiation of measures to mitigate or address those risks or vulnerabilities in the countries that volunteered to undertake the CSVRA review.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the importance of enhanced action for addressing structural causes of conflicts and the need for the full utilisation of the CSVRA towards mitigating and resolving the underlying causes and drivers of conflicts in Africa. The PSC may also reiterate the need for strengthening coordination between relevant entities for enhancing the effective implementation of the CSVRA without duplication. It may, in this regard, underscore the importance of the Monitoring and Oversight Committee that the AU Assembly tasked the AU Commission to establish at its 35<sup>th</sup> session in February 2022. The PSC may also encourage both the AU Commission and member states that undertook the CSVRA review to document and share lessons learned from the review in order to improve the role of the CSVRA to tackle the underlying causes and drivers of conflict. The PSC may encourage Member States to fully take advantage of the CSVRA and CSVMS as instruments for the consolidation of peace and stability.</p>
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