Thematic Insights Archives - Amani Africa

17th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and EUPSC

Amani Africa — Thu, 05 Nov 2026 06:15:21 +0000

17^th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and EUPSC

Date | 5 November 2026

Tomorrow (6 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 17^th annual joint consultative meeting, following the 9^th informal joint retreat taking place today.

Antonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for November, and Lene Vensild, Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, are expected to deliver opening remarks.

The preparatory work has been undertaken by the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE). While there were initial engagements in October focusing in particular on the agenda for both the informal retreat and the annual consultative meeting, the CoE held the preparatory meetings on 2 and 3 November to work on allocation of speaking responsibilities and finalise work on the draft joint communique for the joint consultative meeting. During the negotiation on the agenda for the informal retreat and the consultative meeting, there were some items that were proposed by both sides that did not make it to the final agenda due to a lack of agreement. These include Peace Support Operations and UNSC Resolution 2719, the role of exploitation of natural resources in conflicts, Somalia, the situation in the Horn of Africa & Ukraine as a standalone agenda.

The agenda remains largely unchanged from last year, except that the item previously framed as Somalia and AUSSOM now focuses exclusively on AUSSOM. Other agenda items include the situations in Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. Notably, South Sudan remains absent from the agenda despite the significant deterioration in its political and security situation since March and the country’s planned first elections since independence in 2011, scheduled for 22 December 2026. As in last year’s meeting, the two sides are also expected to discuss global geopolitical developments under ‘Any Other Business’, at the initiative of the EUPSC.

On AUSSOM

Ethiopia, Uganda, and Côte d’Ivoire are expected to take the lead in delivering the intervention from the AU PSC side, and Finland, Cyprus, Slovakia and Denmark from the EU side. The engagement comes at a critical juncture for the AU mission in Somalia, as AUSSOM faces mounting financial, logistical, political and operational challenges that cast uncertainty over its immediate future.

On 2 November, Uganda’s acting military spokesperson announced the commencement of troop withdrawals from Somalia after two decades of deployment. According to the spokesperson, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) had begun withdrawing troops deployed under bilateral arrangements with the Federal Government of Somalia, effective immediately. The withdrawal of around 2,000 troops under these arrangements is expected to be completed within days, while Ugandan troops serving under AUSSOM will be withdrawn gradually by the end of 2027.

This development adds to the uncertainty surrounding AUSSOM, which has faced severe funding shortfalls since its launch in January 2025. These challenges were further compounded by the announcement from the US in July 2026 that it would not support the continuation of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond AUSSOM’s current authorisation, which expires at the end of this year.

It was against this context that AUSSOM troop-contributing countries (TCCs) convened their second Extraordinary Summit in Kampala on 31 July. The Summit called for a unified, integrated mission support capability mandated by the UN Security Council to ensure uninterrupted support for 18–24 months. Such an arrangement would facilitate the achievement of agreed milestones, strengthen Somali security institutions and enable an orderly transfer of security responsibilities. The Summit also mandated the foreign ministers of TCCs, in coordination with the AU and Somalia, to establish a Joint Task Force to mobilise diplomatic and financial support, including through a donors’ and partners’ conference.

While the US later on announced that it would allow a one-year period for the drawdown of UNSOS by the end of 2027 without a commitment to extend the logistical support by UNSOS to AUSSOM, there is so far no plan on how to fill in the end of the logistical support from UNSOS.

In tomorrow’s consultations, the PSC and EUPSC are therefore expected to exchange on options for managing the financial and logistical uncertainty facing AUSSOM at the end of its current mandate by the end of December 2026 and the associated security vacuum this may create. The application of Resolution 2719 is likely to remain a key issue, particularly as successive PSC–UN Security Council consultations have failed to reach agreement on its application to AUSSOM due to US opposition. It remains to be seen whether the PSC and EUPSC will reaffirm their common position on the framework as a viable financing mechanism, as they did last year. It is recalled that the joint communiqué adopted at their previous consultative meeting stressed the need to fully and effectively implement Resolution 2719 to ensure predictable, sustainable and adequate financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations, including AUSSOM, as the only viable way of securing the gains that have been made so far. Given that the EU has been the largest single financial contributor to the AU missions in Somalia, providing nearly €2.7 billion since 2007, the two sides may also call on other international partners to increase their support for AUSSOM.

Most significant for tomorrow’s consultation is the preparation and implementation of a realistic transition plan for the managed unwinding of AUSSOM, as well as mitigating security risks that may arise from an unplanned and rushed withdrawal of AUSSOM.

Sudan

In terms of leading interventions, it is envisaged that DRC, Ethiopia, Algeria and Somalia will make statements from the AUPSC side and Slovenia, Poland, the Netherlands, France and Germany will make lead remarks for the EUPSC side.

Discussions are expected to build on the PSC’s August field mission to Khartoum, with some from the PSC likely to share observations on what they encountered and established during the field mission. There have been notable developments since then, both in the conflict dynamics and the regional and extra-regional entanglement in the conflict, which may also attract some engagement. The consultation is also expected to focus on ongoing diplomatic initiatives and peace efforts. In this regard, both sides may highlight recent engagements of the Quintet (AU, IGAD, League of Arab States, EU and UN), including its September Good Offices Mission to Khartoum and October consultations with Sudanese civil society and political groups in Addis Ababa.

Efforts to coordinate diplomatic initiatives would also receive attention. On 23 September, the Quintet and Quad held their first joint high-level meeting, bringing together the two coordination mechanisms. This was followed by the sixth consultative meeting on enhancing coordination of peace initiatives in Sudan, held in Geneva on 21 October. The meeting brought together countries sponsoring major peace initiatives, members of the Quad, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the Quintet, and neighbouring and regional countries, with the aim of aligning diplomatic efforts around the urgent needs of the Sudanese people.

On the domestic political front, the SAF-backed Preparatory Committee for a Sudanese-led dialogue was established in late August, an initiative welcomed by the AU Commission Chairperson. However, Sudanese authorities indicated that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) would be excluded from the process. The Civil Democratic Alliance for Revolutionary Forces (Somoud) rejected the initiative and criticised the position of the Commission, warning that a military-controlled political process without a ceasefire could entrench Sudan’s de facto division. Against this backdrop, the PSC and EUPSC are likely to reaffirm the need for a humanitarian truce and cessation of hostilities as steps towards a permanent ceasefire, followed by an inclusive national dialogue and civilian-led political transition.

External involvement in the conflict may also feature in tomorrow’s discussion. The September 2026 report of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan highlighted foreign recruitment and external support networks fuelling the conflict. The two sides are therefore expected to condemn external interference and call on external actors to cease providing support to the belligerents.

Eastern DRC

The draft agenda envisages that France, Croatia, Belgium and Germany will take the lead in delivering intervention from the side of the EU, while South Africa and Gabon will take the lead on the side of the AU. The two sides are expected to review developments on the ground and progress across the various mediation tracks, particularly AU-led mediation efforts. The PSC may highlight the AU High-Level Panel of Facilitators’ shuttle diplomacy in October, which included meetings with AFC/M23 leaders in Goma on 5 October, President Paul Kagame in Kigali on 7 October and President Félix Tshisekedi in Kinshasa on 9 October, aimed at advancing existing peace commitments.

Under the Qatar-led Doha process, the Congolese government and AFC/M23 met in Switzerland from 17 to 21 August, agreeing on a mechanism to address implementation challenges and a roadmap for negotiating outstanding protocols under the November 2025 Doha Framework for Peace. Progress has also been made in operationalising the ICGLR-led Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), including the establishment of its secretariat and reconnaissance missions to Minembwe and Masisi in October. Meanwhile, the US-led Washington process continued through the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism, which held its seventh meeting in Geneva on 16–17 September. This was followed by a meeting of military officials from the DRC and Rwanda, alongside representatives of the AU, the US and Qatar, in Garmisch, Germany, on 20–22 October. However, tensions have persisted, with the US imposing financial and asset-blocking sanctions on Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence and the Zagima Credit and Saving Society, a financial institution serving Rwanda’s security services, on 28 October, citing continued support for M23. On 2 November, the US also announced the termination of Rwanda’s eligibility under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).

Despite these diplomatic efforts, the security and humanitarian situation remains dire, with continued fighting in North and South Kivu, increasing use of armed drones and mounting civilian suffering. According to Africa CDC figures, the latest Ebola outbreak has surpassed 10,000 cases and 5,000 deaths. Another notable development was the announcement in Goma on 12 October of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), a new political-military coalition comprising M23 and other groups under former President Joseph Kabila, further complicating the conflict dynamics. During a recent engagement with UN officials led by MONUSCO head James Swan, the coalition reportedly threatened to withdraw from the Doha Framework Agreement if the government proceeded with its proposed constitutional referendum.

As in previous consultations, the PSC and EUPSC are expected to condemn the destabilising activities of armed groups in eastern DRC, call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and demand the unconditional withdrawal of all uninvited foreign forces, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2773 (2025). They may also call for the dismantling of parallel administrative structures established by M23 in areas under its control and reiterate their condemnation of the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources in eastern DRC.

Sahel and Lake Chad

The draft agenda envisages that Spain, Czechia, Malta and Denmark will take a lead in making an intervention from the side of the EU, while Morocco, DRC, Nigeria, Algeria and Cameroon will lead the intervention from the side of the PSC.

The security situation in the Sahel has deteriorated further since the October 2025 PSC–EUPSC consultative meeting, marked by intensified terrorist attacks. On 25 April, JNIM and Tuareg separatist fighters launched coordinated attacks across Mali, targeting Bamako and military installations. In Niger, the January attack on Diori Hamani International Airport by Islamic State Sahel Province was followed by another attack by JNIM in June.

PSC may highlight the AU’s intensified diplomatic engagement with Sahelian states. AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf visited Mali in July and subsequently Burkina Faso, reaffirming the AU’s commitment to constructive engagement. At its 1356^th session, the PSC welcomed these efforts and called for continued high-level engagement, including with Niger, to support political transitions and confidence-building. The AU High Representative Mamadou Tangara also participated in the inaugural ECOWAS–AES ministerial dialogue in Dakar on 17 October, reaffirming the AU’s readiness to facilitate cooperation between the two blocs through MISAHEL.

On the EUPSC side, it may also highlight that the EU has recalibrated its engagement, including the appointment of Birgitte Nygaard Markussen as its new Special Representative for the Sahel in July to advance its renewed regional approach and strengthen political dialogue. The European Parliament also examined options for re-engaging with the Sahel in July.

The Dakar talks between ECOWAS and AES, which established joint working groups to develop a framework for future cooperation, offer an opportunity to rebuild regional security coordination despite the AES countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS. The PSC and EUPSC are likely to welcome this development during tomorrow’s consultations and may explore ways to better coordinate their approaches and support efforts to comprehensively address the multidimensional challenges of the region.

With respect to Lake Chad, as in previous years, tomorrow’s consultations are expected to focus on the security and humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin, progress in implementing the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR), and the operations and support needs of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The two sides are likely to express concern over the persistent threats posed by Boko Haram, ISWAP and other terrorist groups despite the MNJTF’s efforts to degrade their operational capabilities. Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF in March 2025 has further complicated regional security efforts. At its 1347^th session, the PSC expressed deep concern over the resulting security vulnerabilities and urged Niger to reconsider its decision and resume full participation in the MNJTF, a call the two sides may reiterate.

The MNJTF’s financial constraints and operational gaps are also expected to feature during the consultation. In this regard, the PSC may reiterate its position from the 1318^th session and explore with its EU counterparts the possibility of applying UN Security Council Resolution 2719 to support the MNJTF. The two sides may also commend the EU’s sustained support for the MNJTF and broader peace, security, stabilisation, recovery and resilience efforts in the region.

AOB (for information only)

As in last year’s meeting, the agenda also includes an item under Any Other Business (AOB) to discuss global geopolitical developments, proposed by the EUPSC. While Cyprus, Sweden, Estonia and Lithuania are envisaged to lead the intervention on the side of the EU, no representation is envisaged from the side of the AU. As in past years, it is anticipated that the situation in Ukraine is expected to be the main focus of the intervention of the representatives of the four countries from the EU side.

The consultative meeting will conclude with closing remarks by the joint chairs of the consultative meeting, the EUPSC Permanent Chair and the AU PSC Chairperson.

Joint communiqué

As host of the consultation, the PSC initiated a draft joint communiqué, which it finalised and shared with the EUPSC on the afternoon of 3 November. It is recalled that the two sides failed to adopt a joint communiqué between 2022 and 2024 due to disagreements over the inclusion of language referencing the war in Ukraine. Last year, however, they broke this trend and succeeded in adopting a joint communiqué, raising expectations that they will do so again at this year’s consultative meeting. It is anticipated that, while there will be no standalone statement or paragraph dedicated to Ukraine, the formulation used during the last consultative meeting will cover Ukraine in a list of conflict situations about which the two sides are concerned.

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9th Informal Joint Retreat of the AU PSC and EUPSC

Amani Africa — Wed, 04 Nov 2026 05:40:33 +0000

9^th Informal Joint Retreat of the AU PSC and EUPSC

Date | 4 November 2026

Tomorrow (5 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 9^th informal joint retreat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, ahead of their 17^th annual joint consultative meeting on 6 November.

Antonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for November, and Lene Vensild, Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, are expected to co-chair the informal seminar. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and a representative from the EU are also expected to address the retreat.

Since 2015, the PSC and EUPSC have institutionalised informal retreats ahead of their annual consultations to address thematic peace and security issues. This year’s retreat will cover four items: maritime security; AU/EU efforts on countering terrorism and violent extremism in Africa; AI governance, peace and security; and Women, Peace and Security.

Maritime Security

The agenda envisages that Spain, Greece and Romania will take the lead in delivering intervention on the side of the EU. It is to be recalled that this agenda featured in last year’s informal retreat. It is worth recalling that this item also featured in the AU-EU ministerial meeting held in May 2025, whereby the ministers in their Joint Communiqué ‘renewed their commitment to maintaining a rules-based maritime order in accordance with the principles of international law as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and called for greater exchange of information, improvement of operational coordination and provision of enforcement capacity to protect sea lanes and combat transnational crimes, including drug trafficking and piracy. The ministers also committed to work together to end Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, take action to conserve and sustainably use the ocean and sea, as well as promote science-based management of marine resources.’

As in the earlier retreat, the two sides are expected to review developments across Africa’s maritime domain, assess existing cooperation and identify priorities for strengthening joint responses. There are dynamic developments in the Mediterranean and Red Seas and in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans that affect the maritime interests of African states and the maritime and trade route interests of European states. As choke point geopolitics intensifies and the maritime domain acquires increasing economic significance, there is a rising need in Africa to secure and invest in Africa’s maritime zones and in both Africa and Europe to enhance the security of global trade routes. In terms of recent developments, it is expected that the impact of agreements on ports and maritime zones in the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea may attract attention. The decline in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, supported by the Yaoundé Architecture and coordinated regional and international efforts, constitutes a major progress. Yet maritime insecurity has become increasingly complex, with persistent threats from illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, trafficking, oil theft and transnational organised crime. In the Red Sea, some of the notable developments involve conflicts and geopolitical tensions, including the impact of the war between the US and Israel against Iran and the emergence of Houthi threats on the Red Sea, endangering major maritime corridors, including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, forcing shipping diversions around the Cape of Good Hope and contributing to the resurgence of piracy activities off the Somali coast. The expansion of terrorist activities towards West Africa’s coastal states also raises concerns over maritime routes being exploited for arms trafficking, illicit financing and movement of fighters.

The PSC side may highlight continental and regional frameworks, notably the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy, the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa, the Yaoundé Architecture and the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Particular attention may be given to progress towards operationalising the Combined Maritime Task Force in the Gulf of Guinea, which the PSC considers an important step towards an African-led, ready-to-deploy maritime security capability. For its part, the EUPSC is expected to highlight its maritime engagements, including Operations ASPIDES and ATALANTA in the Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean, both mandated until February 2027; the Coordinated Maritime Presences initiative in the Gulf of Guinea; and the various maritime capacity-building programmes across the continent. Another recent development that may feature under this agenda item is the July 2026 EU–Djibouti Status of Forces Agreement for ASPIDES.

Against this background, a key issue for the retreat is how to leverage and boost existing African-led maritime governance frameworks and security arrangements at continental, regional and national levels for enhancing the safety of maritime trade routes, coordination between existing AU and EU maritime initiatives, particularly through intelligence sharing, maritime surveillance, joint operational planning and capacity-building.

AU/EU Efforts on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa

It is expected that Ethiopia, Cameroon, Somalia and Togo will take the lead in delivering the intervention from the AU PSC side, and Austria, Hungary and Slovakia from the EU side. Terrorism remains one of Africa’s most pressing security threats. Despite a global decline in terrorism-related fatalities, Africa has become the main epicentre of terrorist violence, accounting for around 70–75 per cent of global fatalities, according to a report presented at the PSC’s 1354^th session in July 2026.

The PSC may highlight efforts to strengthen Africa’s counterterrorism architecture, including the AU Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Countering Terrorism in Africa (2026–2030), initiatives to establish an African Arrest Warrant and a database of terrorist groups and their supporters, as well as the operationalisation of the PSC Subcommittee on Counter Terrorism. However, mistrust among neighbouring states and regional fragmentation continue to undermine cooperation against transnational terrorist threats. These challenges informed the PSC’s ministerial meeting on ‘Good Neighbourliness and Regional Response to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa,’ held on the margins of the 81^st UN General Assembly in September. At its 1354^th session, the PSC also expressed its grave concern about the ‘downturn in international cooperation, including the withdrawal of technical and financial support to peace support operations in Africa, attributed to the shift in national policies and escalating geopolitical fragmentation,’ a concern that the PSC is likely to raise during tomorrow’s engagement.

For its part, the EUPSC may highlight its extensive counterterrorism engagement in Africa, combining operational assistance with support for criminal justice institutions and prevention of violent extremism. According to EU figures, Africa receives 72 per cent of its €659 million counterterrorism and prevention programming. Through the European Peace Facility, the EU has supported AU missions in Somalia, the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin and the SADC mission in Mozambique, alongside bilateral military assistance. Its support also extends to counterterrorism training, intelligence sharing, border security, countering terrorist financing and community-based prevention programmes, particularly in the Sahel, West African coastal states and East Africa. Recent initiatives include the €45 million SecFin Africa programme (2024–2028) targeting illicit financial flows and terrorist financing, and the €30 million Multidimensional Security and Stabilisation Programme (2024–2028), supporting security and criminal justice capacities in West Africa.

In this context, the retreat offers an opportunity to address gaps in coordination and the sustainability of counterterrorism efforts, particularly amid declining international financing for African-led peace operations, including the AU mission in Somalia. Beyond sustaining operational support and coordination, as well as the role that natural resources exploitation is playing in fueling war economies in affected regions, there are also major issues, including how to address the trust deficit that affects policy coherence both on the continent and between the AU and EU and the need for a shift from security-heavy instruments to investment in long-term interventions that address underlying conditions of fragility.

AI Governance, Peace and Security

In terms of leading interventions, it is envisaged that Poland and Latvia will speak for the EU and Nigeria, Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire and DRC are expected to lead in making interventions on the side of the AU. Artificial intelligence (AI) has gained increasing prominence on the agenda of the PSC. During tomorrow’s retreat, the PSC may highlight its efforts to establish a continental AI governance framework and the progress made so far. Its engagement on AI governance, peace and security began at its 1214^th session in June 2024, which recognised AI’s potential for conflict prevention, early warning and peacebuilding, while raising concerns over the risks associated with its rapid development in the absence of adequate regulation. At that session, the Council requested a comprehensive study on the impact and implications of AI on peace, security, stability, democracy and development in Africa, and the establishment of a multidisciplinary Advisory Group on AI, peace, security and governance to propose continental governance options, including for military applications. The advisory group was established in March 2025.

At its 1267^th session, held at the ministerial level in March 2025, the PSC called for mainstreaming AI in peace support operations, early warning and preventive diplomacy, alongside the development of a Common African Position on AI and an African Charter on AI to guide its responsible use. At another ministerial-level meeting, its 1339^th session in April 2026, the Council emphasised the need for Africa to shape, develop and control its own AI technologies to safeguard its sovereignty across the AI ecosystem. It also underscored the importance of digital and data sovereignty and requested the AU Commission to expedite the establishment of an African Fund for AI. Given Africa’s limited influence over the development of AI systems, the Council further stressed the need to strengthen Africa’s participation in international norm-setting through coordinated continental positions and strategic engagement in multilateral forums.

The retreat provides an opportunity for both sides to exchange experiences and explore practical areas of cooperation in AI governance, peace and security. Particular attention could be given to translating the AU’s growing policy commitments into institutional capabilities, including through capacity-building, knowledge-sharing and cooperation on the responsible use of AI in conflict prevention, particularly by exploring the integration of AI-enabled tools into the Continental Early Warning System. The discussions could also explore ways to strengthen coordination on emerging international AI norms, ensuring that African perspectives and priorities are adequately reflected in global AI norms and governance.

Women, Peace and Security

It is expected that South Africa and Uganda will lead the AU’s intervention on this agenda, and Ireland, Malta and Italy will take the lead on the side of the EU. The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has been a standing agenda item of the PSC since March 2010. Over the subsequent fifteen years, the Council held 28 dedicated sessions, progressively expanding its engagement from the protection of women in conflict to their meaningful participation in conflict prevention, mediation, peace support operations and post-conflict reconstruction. Key institutional developments include the Office of the AU Special Envoy on WPS, FemWise-Africa, the Continental Results Framework (CRF) for monitoring implementation, and the Swakopmund Process, a biennial, rotational platform for PSC engagement with WPS actors that has contributed to advancing gender parity policy for all AU-led and co-led mediation processes.

This is an area on which there has been growing collaboration between the AU and the EU. The EU and individual EU member states have provided and remain major sources of support to AU’s work on the WPS agenda, including the work of the AU Special Envoy on WPS. In the context of the emergence of some powerful currents against gender equality and the WPS agenda, tomorrow’s retreat is likely to highlight the impact these developments are having and the responses to the threat these developments pose. In the context of these developments, discussions may focus on deepening the convergence between the AU and the EU for safeguarding the gains registered over the years and supporting initiatives to this end, building on existing collaboration between the AU and the EU. In view of the growing focus on bridging the gap between normative commitments and implementation, the discussion on this agenda is also expected to focus on ways of enhancing steps to translate normative and institutional investment into operational reality, not least of all in enhanced women’s participation in peace processes. As Amani Africa’s fifteen-year review of the WPS agenda of the PSC underscores, the priority is to move beyond regular deliberations towards systematic implementation.

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Open Session on the Review of Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa

Amani Africa — Sun, 01 Nov 2026 10:11:07 +0000

Open Session on the Review of Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa

Date | 1 November 2026

Tomorrow (2 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1376^thsession on the ‘Review of Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa.’ The meeting will be held as an open session.

Following opening remarks from Anthonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November 2026, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make introductory remarks. A representative of Egypt, as AU Champion on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), is also expected to make a statement. Further statements are expected from PSC Members, AU Member States, Representatives of RECs/RMs and partners.

The last time the PSC convened on PCRD was at its 1312^th session held on 17 November 2025. The PSC requested the AU Commission to ‘extend the period for the commemoration of the PCRD Awareness Raising from one week to one month, effective from 2026.’ This 6^th edition of the AU PCRD commemoration marks the first transition from PCRD Awareness Week to a month-long observance, from 1 to 30 November 2026. This year’s commemoration also marks the 20^th anniversary since the adoption of the AU PCRD Policy in Banjul in 2006. Marked under the theme ‘Twenty Years of Building and Sustaining Peace: From Policy to Action,’ this PCRD Month will provide an opportunity to take stock of the 20-year journey, reflect on lessons learned and identify priorities for implementation of the revised AU PCRD Policy for the next decade, having regard to the profound changes both on the continent and globally. Tomorrow’s session is the first of the month-long engagement on AU PCRD and is the most authoritative platform for taking stock of and outlining the strategic direction in AU’s pursuit of its PCRD policy.

Tomorrow’s session is expected to reflect on, among other things, progress made towards the operationalisation of the policy framework over the last 20 years. In this respect, a major development since the 2006 adoption of the PCRD policy was the revision of the Policy following the AU Assembly decision at its 35^th Ordinary Session of February 2022, calling for the urgent review of the 2006 PCRD Policy with a view to realigning and adapting to the evolving continental security dynamics. It is to be recalled that the PSC, at its 1047^th session in November 2021, emphasised the imperative of broadening the scope of AU PCRD activities, which includes incorporating a peacebuilding dimension, thus covering the entire conflict cycle phase — pre-conflict, during conflict and post-conflict. Following the review process, in January 2024 the PSC, at its 1198^th meeting, adopted the revised AU PCRD Policy, which now comprises of nine pillars, including Political Governance and Transition, Security Governance, Humanitarian Assistance, Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development, Women, Peace, and Security, Human Rights, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation, Youth Inclusion, Child Protection, and Environmental Sustainability. It was subsequently endorsed by the AU Assembly during the 37^th Ordinary Session held in February 2024.

In terms of the institutional architecture of the PCRD, a major development was the official launch of the PCRD Centre in December 2021. The Centre became fully operational with the appointment of its head in 2023 and the designation of a dedicated office infrastructure. Subsequently, in August 2025, the PSC convened its 1297^th session, in which it adopted the Terms of Reference for this Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee, established under Article 8(5) of the PSC Protocol, is sought to serve as a mechanism to receive assignments and mandates on specific post-conflict situations from the PSC (see our insight here for a comprehensive overview and analysis of the PSC Sub-Committee on PCRD and its ToR).

Against this background, several developments have happened since then. The sub-committee on PCRD had its inaugural meeting in February 2026, chaired by Haidy Ahmed Abdelghani of Egypt, as Chair of the subsidiary body for that month. The meeting featured Libakiso Matiho, Executive Secretary of the AU-PCRD Centre, who briefed the Sub-Committee on the Centre’s priorities and key focus areas. The meeting further deliberated on ways to support the Centre in achieving full operational capacity, while recommending that it avoids duplication of efforts and strengthen coordination with relevant AU entities to ensure complementarity.

In terms of the translation of the ambition of the policy into operational reality shaping the transitional trajectory of countries coming out of conflict, there remains a huge gap between ambition and reality. Some implementation efforts, including the implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Peace Strengthening Projects (PSPs) in Somalia; the development of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy for the Lake Chad Basin and the Stabilisation Strategy for the Sahel; and the AU’s support in the areas of reconciliation and healing (e.g. South Sudan), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), as well as Security Sector Reform (SSR), as in the case of Central African Republic (CAR), can be cited as some of the best practices in terms of AU’s PCRD interventions. The most notable PCRD policy implementation in a specific transitional setting was the PSC’s deployment of a PCRD mission to The Gambia, the AU Technical Support Team to The Gambia (AUTSTG). Unfortunately, this mission ended owing to a lack of funding before the conclusion of its objectives.

It is to be recalled that the PSC in its 1157^th session and most particularly its 1221 session of 11 July 2024 tasked the AU Commission, through its PCRD Centre, to urgently conduct needs assessment in CAR to identify priority areas for peacebuilding. In May 2026, the PCRD Centre, through AU PAPS, conducted a 2-day mission to Bangui, CAR, to assess priority needs and identify Quick Impact Projects to support implementation of the revised AU PCRD Policy. The mission engaged government institutions, health sector stakeholders, youth associations and local partners to strengthen access to quality healthcare, youth inclusion, peacebuilding and sustainable development in the country.

On 9 June 2026, the AUC-PCRD, in collaboration with the Africa Business Council (AfBC) and the Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA), convened a High-Level Dialogue themed ‘Towards a Roadmap for AUC-PCRD and Private Sector Partnership: Unlocking African Private Sector Engagement and Business Opportunities,’ in Cairo, Egypt. The forum aimed to explore innovative approaches to strengthen private sector engagement, mobilise African solidarity and advance the implementation of PCRD activities. This was followed by a Consultative Meeting on the Review of the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI) under the theme, ‘Towards an African Mutual Support Strategy for Peacebuilding,’ on 10 and 11 June 2026, still in Cairo. This meeting aimed to discuss how to transform continental solidarity into tangible action through technical cooperation, in-kind support and mutual assistance that respond directly to nationally identified priorities. It is worth recalling that the African Solidarity Initiative was launched at the 19^th Ordinary Session of the policy organs of the Union that was held in Addis Ababa, in July 2012, as an AU-led process for mobilising support from within the continent for countries emerging from conflict, in line with the AU PCRD framework adopted in 2006. The ASI, however, has largely failed at its core goal of raising resources. Previously, its two pledging conferences (2014 and 2017) raised only about US$25,000 in traceable donations. The initiative has not been formally abandoned; however, it was cited in AU communiqués as needing revitalisation.

Furthermore, on 16 and 17 September 2026, the PCRD Centre convened a two-day Validation Workshop in Cairo, Egypt, to review, discuss and validate the 2026 – 2028 Strategic Framework. The Strategic Framework is aimed at guiding the Centre’s strategic direction and priorities for the coming years. Tomorrow’s session serves as a useful occasion for the presentation of the strategic framework to the PSC.

Various challenges remain in terms of the implementation of the PCRD policy. The first of these is funding. Some of the options proposed include the establishment of an African PCRD Fund (this was considered by the Council during its 528^th meeting) and dedicating a percentage of the AU Peace Fund to PCRD activities as suggested by the Council at its 593^rd and 958^th sessions. Another challenge relates to the planning of PCRD as part of AU’s peace processes. In a Press Release of 31 October 2026, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, commemorating the 20^th anniversary of the AU PCRD Policy, pointed out that sustaining peace requires recovery to be planned from the earliest stages of peace efforts and supported beyond immediate crisis responses. He also calls for more predictable and sustained financing for recovery, with transparent management, effective oversight and clear accountability for results.

Tomorrow’s session therefore provides an opportunity to assess not only the strides made since the last PSC session, but also in the context of the commemoration of the 20^th anniversary of the AU PCRD policy. It will be important for the discussions to rethink and approach differently several interlinked challenges, especially that the PSC may wish to consider in reviewing of PCRD in Africa. The most pressing is the persistent resource gap: the stalling of ASI and pledges made at the 2014 conference remain unhonored, while declining official development assistance deepens dependence on unpredictable external donors. The Peace Fund’s PCRD contribution is still modest. Institutional follow-through is, on the other hand, also a concern, while at the same time the Cairo-based PCRD Centre requires adequate resources. The policy-to-practice disconnect is evident in fragile transitions such as South Sudan, CAR and Libya and finally, the PSC may wish to note the weak African ownership of PCRD knowledge production and the limited local capacity for emerging technologies such as AI-based early warning.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. Among others, the Council may commend the progress made in the operationalisation of the PCRD Policy during the past twenty years, including the establishment of the PCRD Centre and the operationalisation of the PSC sub-committee. The PSC may underscore the need to sustain the emerging practice to mainstream PCRD programmes in all relevant country and thematic agendas of the PSC. The PSC is also likely to encourage the AU Commission, through the AU PCRD Centre, to always pursue the implementation of the PCRD Policy through and with AU peace support operations (PSOs), and AU Liaison Offices (AULOS), which remain platforms for AU’s national-level engagements. The PSC may also echo the Chairperson’s statement that PCRD needs to be planned from the earliest stages of peace efforts and, as such, should be reflected when initiating peacemaking or mediation processes. The PSC may also affirm the importance of the strategic leadership of the PSC in the implementation and deployment of PCRD interventions. It may also reaffirm the importance of securing adequate, predictable and sustainable funding for AU’s PCRD and peacebuilding initiatives to fully realise the objectives outlined in the revised Policy.

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Briefing by the INTERPOL

Amani Africa — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 06:08:48 +0000

Briefing by the INTERPOL

Date | 29 October 2026

Tomorrow (30 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a session to receive a briefing from the Secretary-General of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and PSC Chairperson for October, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver an introductory statement. The Secretary-General of INTERPOL, Valdecy Urquiza, is expected to brief the PSC.

This will not be INTERPOL’s first briefing to the PSC, although its previous briefings have generally taken place in the context of the Council’s sessions on transnational organised crime, which has been one of its standing thematic agenda items since 2019. INTERPOL last briefed the Council at its 1345^th session, held on 6 May 2026, under the theme ‘African strategies for combating transnational organised crime in Africa.’ It was the organisation’s Special Representative to the AU who delivered a statement. Representatives of INTERPOL also addressed the Council during its previous sessions on transnational organised crime in Africa, including the 845^th (2019), 1082^nd (2022) and 1279^th (2025) sessions.

At its 1345^th session, the PSC directed the AU Commission, working in close collaboration with African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), to establish a structured and integrated continental mechanism inspired by INTERPOL’s system of notices, coupled with an African ‘continental warrant’ framework. During its 1082^nd session, the PSC also requested AFRIPOL, in collaboration with INTERPOL, to develop in-depth, research-based regional information papers on combating transnational organised crime. At its 1279^th session, the PSC requested the AU Commission to coordinate with AFRIPOL, INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other relevant stakeholders in developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including through joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities.

At tomorrow’s session, the Secretary-General of INTERPOL is expected to brief the PSC on the activities of the organisation across the continent to combat transnational crime and terrorism, its support to Member States’ law enforcement agencies, and ways of strengthening its partnership with the AU, particularly its relevant institutions, such as AFRIPOL and Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA).

Against this background, the Secretary-General is likely to highlight the longstanding cooperation between INTERPOL and the AU on matters such as the sharing of resources and expertise and the development of joint responses to Africa’s policing needs. This cooperation was formalised through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and INTERPOL in 2011, followed by a further cooperation agreement in 2019 aimed at ensuring complementarity between INTERPOL and AFRIPOL, avoiding duplication of efforts among common member countries and promoting synergies.

In May 2016, INTERPOL also established the Office of the Special Representative to the AU to serve as a liaison and strengthen cooperation between the two organisations. The INTERPOL Support Programme for the AU in relation to AFRIPOL (ISPA) was launched in 2020 for an initial three-year period (Phase 1) to assist AFRIPOL in developing its functions across the continent. The programme was subsequently extended until December 2026 under its second phase. With the second phase set to conclude in two months, tomorrow’s session may also provide an opportunity to review the progress registered and discuss the future of the programme.

The ISPA Programme supports AFRIPOL in five key areas: strengthening its governance and legal framework; enhancing its capacity to combat terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime and financial crime; establishing secure information-sharing and communication systems through INTERPOL’s I-24/7 network; strengthening criminal intelligence analysis through equipment, training and mentoring; and building the capacities of AFRIPOL and INTERPOL’s common member countries through needs assessments and targeted workshops. Under the ISPA Programme, various forms of technical assistance have been provided to AFRIPOL and Member States’ law enforcement agencies to strengthen their capacity to combat transnational crime across the continent. These include the provision of advanced cybercrime investigation equipment and comprehensive training to AFRIPOL and at least 36 African member countries, covering cybercrime investigation tools, blockchain analysis software and digital forensic capabilities.

In addition, the Secretary-General is likely to highlight other achievements of the programme, notably the series of joint AFRIPOL–INTERPOL operations that demonstrate growing cooperation in combating transnational organised crime, terrorism, cybercrime, human trafficking and illicit trade across Africa. Beginning with Operation Flash-IPPA (2021), the first jointly coordinated pan-African police operation targeting pharmaceutical crime, cooperation expanded through operations such as WEKA II and Flash-WEKA (2022–2023), which collectively resulted in over 1,300 arrests and the rescue of more than 1,500 trafficking victims. (For more details on the programme and its achievements, see here)

Cybercrime operations, notably Africa Cyber Surge (2022–2023) and Serengeti (2024), disrupted thousands of criminal networks, with Serengeti alone resulting in 1,006 arrests across 19 countries. Counterterrorism operations, including Flash-ARISE (2024) and Catalyst (2025), strengthened cross-border intelligence sharing and led to 120 arrests. Other significant initiatives, including First Light (2024), Djembe (2025) and the Nigerian inter-agency operation (2024), further demonstrated the value of coordinated law enforcement, intelligence sharing and cooperation among national agencies.

The Secretary-General is particularly expected to highlight the latest operation, Operation Serengeti III (2026), coordinated by INTERPOL between 29 June and 31 August 2026, which brought together law enforcement agencies from 21 countries to combat cyber-enabled fraud, ransomware, business email compromise, online scams and digital extortion. The operation resulted in 1,462 arrests, the disruption of 10,909 malicious networks and the recovery of over USD 105 million in illicit funds. It also identified 65,929 victims and criminal activities linked to financial losses exceeding USD 385 million. Major achievements included the dismantling of transnational investment and pension fraud networks in Uganda, illegal cryptocurrency mining operations in Angola, and phishing, investment fraud and money-laundering schemes in Nigeria, alongside cybercrime investigations in Tanzania, Gabon and the Republic of Congo. Supported by intelligence sharing, technical expertise and private-sector partnerships, the operation demonstrated the importance of coordinated international law enforcement efforts in addressing increasingly sophisticated and borderless cybercrime threats across Africa.

The briefing may also provide an opportunity to explore ways of building on these achievements and further strengthening cooperation between INTERPOL and the AU, particularly AFRIPOL. It may also address operational challenges affecting their cooperation and identify areas requiring additional technical and institutional support.

Yet, it is of interest for the PSC that tomorrow’s session is not confined to the work of INTERPOL on the continent in relation to fighting transnational crime in general. It is of particular significance that it addresses the intersection of organised crime and conflicts in Africa. As such, from the perspective of the mandate of the PSC, tomorrow’s session is important for PSC members to discuss how the expertise from and the collaboration with INTERPOL can best be leveraged in integrating analysis of the impact of transnational crime on specific conflict situations and the tools that need to be used to address such impact as part of peace processes for such conflict situations.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reaffirm the importance of the cooperation between INTERPOL and the AU, particularly AFRIPOL, as demonstrated by the various capacity-building initiatives and joint operations involving Member States’ law enforcement agencies, including the latest Operation Serengeti III. The Council may also follow up on its previous decisions, particularly those concerning the establishment of a structured and integrated continental mechanism, the development of in-depth, research-based regional information papers on combating transnational organised crime, and the establishment of tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of criminal corridors, including through joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities. In this regard, the PSC may encourage INTERPOL to provide the necessary technical and operational support to the AU Commission and AFRIPOL to facilitate the implementation of these decisions. The Council may encourage INTERPOL’s regular briefings during its annual thematic sessions on transnational organised crime in Africa. Given the increasing intersection between organised crime and conflicts, the Council may request that the AU Commission, working in coordination with AFRIPOL and INTERPOL, present a report on how transnational organised crime shapes current conflicts and affects the stability of states on the continent, with recommendations on how to address the impact of organised crime on peace and security, including the tools to be deployed as part of peace processes.

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Briefing of the ICRC and the IFRC on the humanitarian situation and their activities

Amani Africa — Mon, 12 Oct 2026 10:03:59 +0000

Briefing of the ICRC and the IFRC on the humanitarian situation and their activities

Date | 12 October 2026

Tomorrow (13 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1373^rd session to receive a briefing from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on its activities and the humanitarian situation in Africa, and a briefing by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October 2026, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Mirjana Spoljaric Egger, ICRC President, is expected to deliver a presentation. This is followed by a presentation by Kate Forbes, President of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

Tomorrow’s session is expected to be the IFRC’s first briefing to the PSC. The IFRC supports Africa’s National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in responding to disasters, disease outbreaks, hunger and displacement, while strengthening local capacity and community resilience. In view of the growing gap between humanitarian needs and international support, there is a heightening demand for enhancing national humanitarian capacity. The role of IFRC in working with and supporting national societies is thus gaining significance.

Since becoming a statutory meeting in 2007, the session has been meant to provide updates on major humanitarian issues across Africa and developments in humanitarian aid. Tomorrow’s briefing, delivered by the President of the ICRC for the first time since assuming her role in October 2022, will build on the Council’s 1307th session, held on 24 October 2025. In the outcome of the 1307^th session, the PSC pressed for regular joint ICRC-IFRC briefings to the PSC, accompanied by more concrete assistance from the wider Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, especially for the refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons. Furthermore, it called for the ‘expedited development of the Common African Position on IHL and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in warfare’ and the imperative for the ‘development of an AU Humanitarian Diplomacy Framework.’

The humanitarian situation in Africa in 2026 is severe, marked by the triple conditions of increasing need, constrained humanitarian space, and a significant funding shortfall. More than 160 million people across the continent are in need of humanitarian assistance. This condition has been significantly compounded by restrictive operating environments and the crisis in the Middle East, which has driven up fuel, transport and food costs; disrupted supply chains; and placed additional strain on already fragile economies and food systems.

Some of the conflict situations, notably Sudan, led to the emergence of the largest displacement crisis in the world. More than 45 million people are reported to be forcibly displaced on the continent, mostly owing to conflicts.

Figure: Countries with the Highest Number of Refugees and IDPs by the End of 2025 (Source: UNHCR Global Trends; International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2025)

Eastern Africa remains one of the world’s most severe humanitarian hotspots, with 48.5 million people in need of assistance in 2026 driven by conflict, displacement, climate shocks, disease outbreaks and food insecurity. Food insecurity worsened in the second quarter, with 40.5 million people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse levels, 1.6 million more than in the first quarter and the sharpest rises were reported, in the context of the super El Niño event, in South Sudan, Kenya, Sudan and Tanzania. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Ebola outbreak is deepening an already severe crisis, with more than 6.1 million people displaced and 26.6 million facing acute food insecurity, mostly in the conflict-affected east. Continued fighting is expected to drive further displacement, loss of livelihoods and serious violations against civilians, including conflict-related sexual violence.

In West Africa, another humanitarian hotspot on the continent, OCHA estimates that 24.3 million people across the Sahel will need humanitarian assistance and protection in 2026, with deteriorating security as the main driver. In the Central Sahel, 2.8 million people are internally displaced and 401,000 children suffer from severe acute malnutrition. Seasonal flooding has added to the strain. As of the end of September 2026, seasonal rains had triggered widespread flooding throughout West and Central Africa, affecting 1.5 million people in 15 countries, with Nigeria, Ghana and DRC accounting for almost 90 per cent of those affected. The floods displaced some 595,000 people, damaged or destroyed 117,000 homes, claimed 533 lives and injured around 1,500, while also hitting 300 schools, 26 health facilities, cropland and livestock.

Despite these growing humanitarian needs, only about 26.7 per cent of the required humanitarian funding has been mobilised. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to shed light on both immediate humanitarian challenges and the longer-term question of how Africa can develop more sustainable solutions to the persistence of humanitarian crises on the continent. Africa needs to adopt both mitigation measures geared towards addressing the immediate needs and risks and resolution measures seeking to address the conditions that induce and sustain humanitarian crises, including displacement. Particular attention should be given to conflict prevention and resolution, considering that conflicts and political and security crises account for much of the humanitarian crises on the continent.

The humanitarian consequences of public health crises remain significant. In addition to the risks associated with the persistence of the Ebola outbreak in DRC, the session may also examine the growing intersection between public health emergencies, conflict, and displacement. The Ebola outbreak unfolding in DRC highlights the challenges of responding to health emergencies in environments characterised by insecurity, displacement, and weak health systems. Ongoing violence in affected areas has disrupted healthcare delivery, restricted humanitarian access, and undermined response efforts. Such situations illustrate how humanitarian crises increasingly overlap and reinforce one another, creating complex emergencies that are more difficult and costly to address.

Tomorrow’s session will also address the growing impact of climate change, with a focus on the projected 2026 super El Niño, which is expected to deepen humanitarian needs. The World Meteorological Organisation projects that Africa could face severe floods and drought between October 2026 and March 2027, as the strongest El Niño ever recorded is expected to disrupt weather patterns. This could bring heavy rainfall and severe floods to East Africa, and intense drought across Southern Africa and the Sahel. As a result, 12 countries are at the highest risk of experiencing a food crisis, including Nigeria, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Madagascar, Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Given the early warnings, whether states and relevant continental and international entities are heeding the warning and putting in place preventive interventions and preparedness for effective response and management of the impact.

In the context of the AU’s 2026 theme, ‘Assuring Sustainable Water Availability and Safe Sanitation Systems,’ presenters from ICRC and IFRC are expected to draw attention to the need for safeguarding water and sanitation systems, health facilities and energy infrastructure from attacks. Protecting these infrastructures is central to strengthening humanitarian resilience, reducing the economic and social costs of conflict, and advancing the protection of civilians. As the war in Sudan and its impact on infrastructure shows, the growing use of drones, AI and autonomous functions in weapon systems raises new questions about how hostilities are conducted. Conflicts have also shifted from open battlefields into densely populated cities, where harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure is far greater.

Tomorrow’s session is also expected to pay attention to the threats facing International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in conflict situations, not just in Africa but globally. As pointed out in a publication supported by ICRC, ‘[w]hat makes the current moment particularly alarming is not just the widespread violations of IHL rules, but the fact that these violations are occurring without any fear of accountability, thus with impunity, and are often cloaked in attempts to justify or legitimise them.’ While not unique to it, a context that illustrates the widespread perpetration of violations of IHL with impunity is the war in Sudan, as extensively documented, including by AU and UN bodies.

Against this backdrop, the ICRC briefing is expected to call on the PSC and AU member states to reinforce political commitment to uphold IHL. In this context, it may urge AU member states to join the Global IHL Initiative, developed in response to the growing erosion in global compliance with IHL in the context of wars in various parts of the world. It is also expected to call on member states to attend the High-Level Conference scheduled to take place on 7 December 2026, in Jordan, which is the culmination of the Global IHL Initiative.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the escalating humanitarian crises across Africa, particularly the combined impact of armed conflicts, violent extremism, climate-driven extreme weather and health emergencies, as well as shrinking humanitarian financing. The Council is also expected to make a call on Member States, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), international partners, and humanitarian actors to strengthen coordinated responses to humanitarian emergencies across the continent. On financing, the PSC may call for the development of innovative and African-owned financing solutions, including stronger engagement in domestic resource mobilisation and non-traditional sources, including through establishing a strategy for private sector partnership. In the context of the 2026 AU Theme of the Year, the PSC may urge the AU Commission and Member States to give due attention to the protection of civilian objects and essential services, including water and sanitation systems, health and education facilities, energy and communications infrastructure, whose disruption can have far-reaching humanitarian consequences for civilian populations. In the context of the intensifying Ebola outbreak, the PSC may call for the need to protect the humanitarian space and health care providers and the imperative to implement preventive measures and preparedness for response to the impacts of the super El Niño. The Council may also remind States Parties of their obligations under international law to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and put in place legal frameworks for investigation and prosecution of violations of IHL. It may welcome the Global IHL Initiative and invite AU member states to support the initiative. The PSC may reiterate the need to embed the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in all humanitarian responses and stress the need to address the root causes of humanitarian crises, notably conflicts.

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Information Integrity, Peace and Security in Africa

Amani Africa — Thu, 08 Oct 2026 06:26:06 +0000

Information Integrity, Peace and Security in Africa

Date | 8 October 2026

Tomorrow (9 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1372^nd Session under the theme ‘Information Integrity, Peace and Security in Africa.’

Following opening remarks from Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make an introductory statement. Ourveena Geeresha Topsy-Sonoo, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), will then make a statement, followed by Rita Bissoonauth, Director, UNESCO Liaison Office to the AU and UNECA. Further statements are expected from Charlotte Scaddan, Senior Adviser on Information Integrity, Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Global Communications, United Nations, Ibrahima Tounkara, Head of the ICRC Delegation to the AU, Solomon A. Dersso, Executive Director of Amani Africa Media Research Services, and Omar Faruk Osman, President of the Federation of African Journalists (FAJ). A representative of the EU Delegation to the AU will also make a statement.

Previously, the PSC has convened several sessions that have directly or indirectly focused on information integrity, peace and security. On 4 August 2022, the PSC convened its 1097^th meeting on ‘Emerging Technologies and New Media: Impact on Democratic Governance, Peace and Security in Africa.’ Moreover, on 13 June 2024, the Council convened for its 1214^th meeting, which focused on the theme, ‘Looking into the Future: AI and its Impact on Peace and Security in Africa.’ The session tasked the AU Commission to ‘enhance efforts to combat misinformation and disinformation, as well as fake news, through AI-driven tools while also addressing the risks associated with AI-generated false information.’

Most significantly, on 2 September 2024, the PSC held its 1230^th meeting on ‘Protection of Journalists and Access to Information in Situations of Armed Conflicts in Africa.’ The session, which also addressed the spread of misinformation and disinformation, particularly on digital platforms, saw the AU Commission being tasked to ‘facilitate the development of a strategy and policy framework that enables the use of information and the media for peace-building, mediation, reconciliation, post-conflict reconstruction and peace support operations.’

On 14 November 2025, the Council held its 1311^th meeting focusing on ‘Media, Peace and Security.’ This was its most comprehensive engagement to date on the role of the media in Africa’s peace, security and governance landscape. Of importance, it called for the expedition of ‘the development of a Continental Framework on Digital Peace and Information Integrity in Africa.’

Coming within the framework of the commemoration of the International Day for Universal Access to Information (IDUAI), marked under the theme ‘Upholding Information Integrity in the Digital Age: The role of access to information in addressing information disorder,’ tomorrow’s session offers the PSC an opportunity to assess the threats information disorder poses to peace and security on the continent, review progress on its earlier decisions on media and digital governance, and chart practical steps toward a coherent continental approach to information integrity.

Information Integrity refers to an information ecosystem in which reliable and accurate information is available to all, enabling people to engage meaningfully in public life, make informed decisions and exercise their rights. In the digital age, information integrity is not just about safeguarding rights. It is central to political stability, democratic governance, social cohesion and economic advancement. No domain of public life or industry can function optimally without information integrity. This is particularly true for peace and security.

As the quality of information affects both the behaviour of conflict parties and the context, the absence of information integrity is detrimental to peace and security. Without information integrity, it becomes difficult to distinguish between truth and falsehood. In the absence of truth, there can be no trust. In the absence of truth and trust, war and conflict, division and violence thrive. The pursuit of peace is hugely impaired.

Thus, disinformation and the viral spread of hate speech or manipulated content can incite communal and ethnic violence and mob attacks. They can undermine electoral credibility and trigger post-election unrest, delegitimise peace processes, mediation efforts and peace operations, endanger humanitarian workers and feed recruitment and propaganda by terrorist and armed groups. They can also complicate the work of early warning by flooding the information space with false and unverified information. As such, the impact on peace and security is not marginal. It is direct and substantial.

There are examples that illustrate these damaging consequences of disinformation. In Sudan, rival factions turned digital platforms into a battlefield that shapes both the conduct of hostilities and the public’s engagement, with major consequences for the safety of civilians and fueling polarisation that undermines efforts to contain the war. Generative AI has opened a new front across the continent, with fake audio, deepfake videos and false endorsements used to sway elections and provoke instability. Nigeria‘s 2023 presidential election is described as possibly the first large-scale use of AI-generated electoral content in Africa. Following Tanzania‘s October 2025 elections, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights denounced the internet shutdown during the election and the AU Election Observation Mission and SADC acknowledged that the blackout hampered monitoring. Somalia‘s Al-Shabaab maintains consistent narratives across Facebook, Telegram, X, YouTube and other outlets, adapting quickly to moderation by creating backup accounts and moving between platforms, and treating the online space as an integral front of its insurgency.

Challenges to information integrity arise from various sources. One source is the malicious use of, or susceptibility of, digital media and AI technologies by actors who weaponise information to orchestrate manipulation, exploitation, or harm. Related to this is the challenge of the lack of adequate safety measures in the design, development and deployment of digital platforms that have become main avenues for accessing and transmitting information. Additionally, access and distribution risks/challenges stem from the decline of independent journalism and press freedom, the prevalence of algorithmic systems that limit information availability, visibility and diversity, and persistent digital divides. There are also content-based risks/challenges such as the spread and amplification of disinformation campaigns, hate speech and harassment targeting individuals or vulnerable groups.

Information integrity is also affected by the transformation of the information ecosystem due to new technology. More and more people rely on digital platforms to access, produce, and share information. Rapid growth of generative artificial intelligence, synthetic media, algorithmic amplification and cross-border influence operations accelerate the speed and scale of the spread of disinformation. Yet, despite the growth in internet and social media use on the continent, particularly among a young population, and the pace and scale of dissemination, local-language content moderation, fact-checking capacity, digital literacy and regulatory frameworks have not kept pace.

Another element that the PSC is likely to consider is media capture and exclusionary representation – two dynamics that seriously hinder democratic governance and peacebuilding. The first is the concentration of media ownership in the hands of political elites or business interests, often through state-controlled or state-influenced outlets, which narrows the range of information available to citizens. It weakens independent journalism, skews public discourse and leaves audiences with fewer credible sources to trust, often pushing them to unverified sources of information from digital platforms.

It is worth noting for the PSC from the foregoing that disinformation and other forms of information disorder have direct bearing at societal, national, regional, continental and international levels. This necessitates policy response at all these levels. At the national level, this would entail laws that set standards for safeguarding information integrity through a) prohibition of disinformation, b) the obligation of digital platforms to ensure coverage of African languages, transparency and put in place systems for detecting and taking measures against disinformation through algorithmic systems and content moderation, including labelling, suppressing, taking down misleading, harmful and manipulated content and accounts breaching community standards, c) promoting and protecting fact-checking, the functioning of free media and independent journalism, digital, media and information literacy and d) establishing regulatory bodies empowered to enforcing standards. At the continental level, the required policy action includes supporting the work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and follow up on PSC’s decision for the development of a continental framework on information integrity and peace and security. Within the African Peace and Security Architecture, it would entail the systematic integration of information integrity considerations including media analysis, digital monitoring and fact-checking into AU election monitoring and observation framework, Continental Early Warning System and in preventive diplomacy and peace processes for managing and resolving conflicts including mediation, peacemaking and peace support operations.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. Council may underscore the imperative of information integrity to advance peace and security in Africa and express concern over the serious threat that information disorder, including disinformation, poses to both political stability and the promotion of peace and security. It may encourage Member States to adopt, domesticate and effectively implement access to information laws in line with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa, as well as promote proactive disclosure of public information as a means of countering disinformation and building public trust. Council may reiterate its call for the expedition of the Continental Framework on Digital Peace and Information Integrity in Africa, with a clear timeline for the AU Commission, along with the speeding up of and full coherence with a continental framework on ‘Information Integrity, Digital, Media and Information Literacy (MIL)’. The PSC may also highlight the need to integrate media analysis, digital monitoring and fact-checking into the Continental Early Warning System and include information integrity indicators in election observation, mediation support and peace support operations. Council may further encourage the formal establishment of the AU Group of Friends for the Safety of Journalists in Addis Ababa, the completion of the study on the legal, institutional and policy framework for the protection of journalists and access to information, and also encourage coordination among the PSC, the AU Commission, the RECs/RMs, the ACHPR, the UN and its agencies, and civil society.

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Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa

Amani Africa — Tue, 22 Sep 2026 05:53:37 +0000

Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa

Date | 22 September 2026

Tomorrow (23 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1369^th session at ministerial level in New York, on the margins of the 81^st United Nations General Assembly, to consider ‘Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa.’ The session was initially envisaged at the level of Heads of State and Government but was subsequently changed to ministerial level in the revised programme of work.

Corinne AMORI BRUNET, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Benin and PSC Chairperson for September, is expected to deliver opening remarks, followed by introductory remarks from Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission. A statement is also expected from the representative of the United Nations.

The PSC discussed countering terrorism and violent extremism at its 1354^th session, held at ministerial level on 21 July. The Chairperson of the AU Commission is also expected to submit a report on counterterrorism next month. At its most recent session on countering terrorism and violent extremism, the PSC expressed concern over the expanding reach and growing sophistication of terrorist groups across the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes and parts of Southern Africa (northern Mozambique). According to the report submitted to the PSC’s 1354^th session, while global terrorism has decreased overall in recent years, Africa remains the principal epicentre of terrorist violence, accounting for an estimated 70-75 percent of terrorism related fatalities globally. Six of the ten most terrorism-affected countries globally are in Africa: Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia. In the central Sahel, JNIM and Islamic State affiliates operate across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, while militant activity has spread towards the borderlands of Benin and Togo. Around Lake Chad, Boko Haram and ISWAP move through territory shared by Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, while the emergence of Lakurawa has added to insecurity around the Nigeria-Niger border. In the Horn of Africa, Al-Shabaab remains a serious threat in Somalia and neighbouring countries, while the Islamic State in Somalia has still been active in Puntland despite the counterterrorism efforts. In eastern DRC, the Allied Democratic Forces originated in Uganda and remains active across a frontier affected by other armed groups. In Southern Africa, the insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province also persists nine years after it began. The groups and the dynamics may differ, but their use of borderlands, cross-border movement and transnational supply networks exposes the limits of responses organised within individual states.

The regional consequences of other conflicts also reinforce the same point. The crisis in eastern DRC has drawn in neighbouring countries and reignited inter-state tensions. Sudan’s war has also generated displacement and security pressures across its borders. As more states become entangled, the conflict risks escalating into a broader regional conflagration.

Africa has established several continental and regional mechanisms to address the scourge of terrorism. They include the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre, AFRIPOL and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa; the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes; the Accra Initiative; the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin; and the AU mission in Somalia. Their effectiveness, however, depends on the willingness of states to cooperate through them. Fragmentation of regional arrangements and deteriorating relations among neighbours have made that increasingly difficult.

Tomorrow’s session provides an opportunity to move beyond a review of trends in the threat and the technical means in addressing it, such as the role of institutions such as the AU Counter Terrorism Centre. It is rather expected to focus on a political and strategic question: how the state of relations among neighbouring countries affects their ability to respond collectively to terrorism and other security threats? This question gives particular importance to the principle of good neighbourliness at a time when threats cross borders, but cooperation among affected states has deteriorated in various parts of the continent.

The 2004 Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADS Policy) provides a basis for the discussion. It affirms sovereign equality, respect for borders, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference and the prohibition of the use or threat of force. It also prohibits a member state from allowing its territory to serve as a base for aggression or subversion against another. The Policy goes further in recognising the indivisibility of African security: ‘the security of one African country is inseparably linked’ to that of other African countries and the continent as a whole. On this basis, it treats a threat to one country as a matter of concern for others.

Most notably, a key element of the objectives of the Policy is to ‘promote mutual trust and confidence among African states.’ This objective is critical to advancing good neighbourliness. The importance of this objective is emphasised in the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in June 1994 and serves as a pillar of the CADS Policy. The Declaration accordingly affirmed the resolve of African states ‘to develop and strengthen the amicable relations and cooperation existing among our States and to promote friendship among our peoples. The challenges facing us can be met only through concerted action, cooperation and solidarity.’ However, ‘concerted action, cooperation and solidarity’ in responding to regional or international threats to peace and security is possible only where mutual trust and good neighbourliness thrive. Thus, the Declaration asserts that ‘every cooperation effort is doomed to failure in an environment devoid of stability, trust and security.’

In West Africa, rising mistrust in the context of the response to the military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger has disrupted the regional order. Amid the resultant mounting regional tension, the three countries withdrew from ECOWAS and formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). As the threat to regional security continues to proliferate, regional responses such as the Accra Initiative have struggled to take off the ground. The relationship of individual members of the AES with some of their neighbours has led to diplomatic strains. Ties between Niger and Nigeria deteriorated after the 2023 coup, as did relations between Niger and Benin. Mali’s relations with Algeria have also suffered a blow. Relations between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire remain strained. Some of these relations have shown signs of improvement (Algeria-Mali, Benin-Niger), but restoring diplomatic contact is only a first step.

Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF in 2025 has likewise raised concern about coordination in the Lake Chad Basin. The situation in the region is further aggravated by the geopolitical contestation involving Russia, France and increasingly Ukraine.

Apart from weakening the West African regional order, the resultant erosion of good neighbourliness and trust continues to fragment regional efforts for responding to various security threats, including terrorism. Where neighbouring governments distrust one another, intelligence sharing, joint border operations and cooperation against recruitment and illicit financial flows become harder to sustain. Armed groups and criminal networks can exploit the resulting gaps. As a result, the terrorism menace destablising the Sahel is creeping into the coastal states of West Africa.

Fragmentation fuelled by growing mistrust is evident elsewhere. Rwanda’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of Central African States in 2025 followed a dispute over the organisation’s rotational chairmanship against the backdrop of tensions over eastern DRC. In the Horn of Africa, tensions among member states have constrained IGAD’s political role, with Eritrea announcing its withdrawal from the struggling regional body. These developments reduce the capacity of regional organisations to bring states together around a common assessment of threats and a coordinated response.

Even where states agree to a common regional response through deployment of peace operations, strained relations can limit its effectiveness. In Somalia, tensions among neighbouring states have complicated the environment in which the AU mission operates. In Mozambique, lack of coordination and trust issues between Mozambican forces, Rwanda’s bilateral deployment and the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) limited the scope for a unified response. Meanwhile, eastern DRC shows how divergent expectations can affect regional forces. Competing regional deployments by the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) in November 2022 and the SADC deployment in DRC (SAMIDRC) in December 2023 also caused friction that led to the withdrawal of EACRF by December 2023 after Kinshasa declined to renew the Status of Force Agreement. The experience points to the need for shared understanding among the affected state, neighbouring countries and regional organisations on a force’s mandate, objectives and relationship to wider political efforts. A deployment cannot resolve political differences that its main stakeholders have left unsettled.

Beyond the Sahel, geopolitical rivalries and the growing involvement of middle powers are also reshaping Africa’s regional security arrangements and bilateral relations. As neighbouring states turn to different external partners, agreement on collective action against terrorism and other shared threats becomes harder to achieve. Indeed, one of the major factors behind the fragmentation of the Horn of Africa regional order is the intensification of the entanglement of various middle powers, including Gulf states, Turkey, and Iran and the emergence of competing alliances into which countries in the Horn of Africa are being sucked.

Against this backdrop, tomorrow’s session should consider how these political and strategic difficulties affect good neighborliness and trust among neighbors, which is critical both for achieving a shared perception of common threats and for developing a common strategy for deploying an effective response. As clearly articulated in the CADS Policy, good neighbourliness requires states to refrain from actions that threaten their neighbours. These necessitate keeping and constantly cultivating channels of exchange and communication as well as consultation, as envisaged in the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations.

Without trust among neighbouring countries, collective responses to terrorism and other security threats will remain limited. The session therefore offers an opportunity to reaffirm good neighbourliness as a practical condition for effective regional security response.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the fragmentation of regional arrangements, deteriorating bilateral relations among some member states, and the impact of geopolitical dynamics on collective security efforts. It may underscore the urgency of curtailing these developments for effectively deploying the relevant instruments and mobilizing the collective action necessary for effective response to threats to regional security and terrorism. The PSC may underscore the need for reaffirming the principles of the Common African Defence and Security Policy, including the indivisibility of security and the obligation of states not to allow their territory to be used against their neighbours. It may also reaffirm the commitment of Member States to the standards set in the OAU Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations. In this regard, the Council may urge Member States to uphold the principles of good neighbourliness reflected in various AU foundational documents, including the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and the Common African Defence and Security Policy; settle disagreements peacefully; and resolve their differences in a spirit of Pan-African solidarity. The Council may emphasise that effective regional responses to cross-border threats depend on member states honouring these commitments in practice. As a practical step, the PSC may task the AU Commission Chairperson, working in close coordination with Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms and the United Nations, to initiate and deploy various confidence-building measures, engage in sustained shuttle diplomacy and present a report to the next AU Assembly in January 2027 on ways and means of deepening mutual trust, good neighborliness, amicable relations and cooperation among African states.

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Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005))

Robel Mohammed — Tue, 01 Sep 2026 11:44:30 +0000

Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005))

Date | 1 September 2026

Tomorrow (2 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1368th meeting to discuss the theme, ‘Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005)).’

Following opening remarks by Hervé Djokpe, Permanent Representative of Benin to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for September, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Jainaba Jagne, AU Special Envoy for Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC), is also expected to make a statement, followed by Robert Doya Nanima, Special Rapporteur on Children and Armed Conflict. In addition, the session is also likely to get statements from the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, a representative of the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to the AU and a representative from the African Platform on Children affected by Armed Conflicts (AP CAAC) – as Co-Chair. A Save the Children representative may also be present.

It is worth recalling that UN Security Council Resolution 1612, adopted in 2005, established the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on children and armed conflict, creating a systematic framework for documenting the six grave violations against children in conflict zones, which include killing and maiming, recruitment and use as child soldiers, sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, abduction and denial of humanitarian access.

The UN Secretary-General’s 2026 annual report on children and armed conflict, released in June and covering January–December 2025, which also marked the 30^th anniversary of the mandate, verified 38,558 grave violations against 24,174 children, including 3,176 subjected to multiple violations. For the first time in three decades of UN monitoring, state and government forces were responsible for more grave violations than non-state armed groups, a significant shift from the pattern that has traditionally shaped PSC discussions on the issue. Among African situations, the DRC (4,114 violations), Nigeria (2,560) and Somalia (2,195) recorded the highest verified totals, ranking among the five worst-affected situations globally. Recruitment and use of children remained a major concern, continuing a trend identified in the 2025 report, which recorded 7,402 verified cases worldwide. In a February 2026 Joint Statement by the AU, EU and UN on the International Day against the Use of Child Soldiers, it was highlighted that one in five children worldwide lives in conflict-affected settings. The statement went further and called on all parties in conflict situations to ‘comply fully with international law, to immediately and unconditionally release all children from their ranks, and to ensure that children associated with parties to conflict are treated first and foremost as victims.’

The PSC, on its part, has a long track record of engaging with the issue of child soldiers, having taken it up in substantive discussions and decisions across several sessions. Notably, at its 420^th session, held on 18 February 2014, the Council decided, among other things, to hold a session each year dedicated to issues affecting children on the continent. This engagement has since intensified, with the PSC now holding even two sessions annually on the theme. This will be the second session this year under the theme of child protection in Conflict Situations, following the Council’s 1357^th meeting in August 2026, which focused on ‘Education in Conflict Situations in Africa.’

From the meeting, the PSC tasked the AU Commission, in coordination with the ACERWC, ‘to organise an advocacy meeting with Member States that have not yet signed or ratified relevant international and continental instruments [including the ACERWC] and the Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict… and to report back to the PSC.’ In the same vein, the PSC went further and tasked the AU Commission, ‘based on documented sources and proven evidence, to develop and maintain a concise, disaggregated continental monitoring framework tracking attacks on schools, closures, military use, safe reopening, enrolment, retention, learning outcomes, and inclusion metrics.’ It is worth recalling that the same meeting considered the implementation matrix as part of the PSC working documents developed following the 1296^th PSC meeting, which aims to translate Council decisions into 18 time-bound actions with designated lead institutions. This implementation matrix model should extend to the PSC’s entire body of work on children and armed conflict. Many past decisions on the theme remain hard to track precisely because they were never anchored to a time-bound implementation tool. Retroactively applying the matrix, even in condensed form, would let the Council audit what has actually been delivered against decades of commitments, rather than simply ‘recalling’ prior sessions without clarity on follow-through. This would also ease the resourcing and coordination gaps flagged periodically, make duplication easier to spot, and give the Council a concrete basis for review each time it revisits the theme.

In addition, its 1314^th meeting held in November 2025 on ‘Children Affected by Armed Conflicts’ tasked the Chairperson of the AU Commission to ‘commission a comprehensive study on the nexus between armed conflicts and violations against children.’ Relatedly, the 1262^nd PSC meeting held in February 2025 on the ‘Fight Against the Use of Child Soldiers in Africa’ tasked the ACERWC to expedite finalisation of the comprehensive study on child soldiers in Africa. Earlier this year, ACERWC initiated and commissioned the Terms of Reference for the conduct of the study. The study will aim to examine the nature, scale, patterns and drivers of the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and armed groups in West and Central Africa, including the DRC, Chad, Nigeria, Niger, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso and Mali. In North, East and Southern Africa, it will include Sudan, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Mozambique. The study will assess the political, socio-economic, security, governance and community-level factors driving emerging risks, and to evaluate the adequacy, effectiveness and alignment of existing legal, policy, institutional, prevention, accountability, rehabilitation and reintegration responses with the African Children’s Charter and relevant regional and international standards. It will also seek to identify key gaps and good practices and put forward actionable recommendations to strengthen coordinated, multidisciplinary, and child-centred responses among States Parties, AU organs, RECs, National Human Rights Institutions, civil society organisations, communities and other relevant stakeholders.

This upcoming PSC meeting will therefore provide an opportunity to follow up on the implementation of these decisions and provide a platform for the Council to reflect on the conclusions of the Banjul Process, which took place in December 2023. During this ministerial, high-level session, participants agreed on the imperative to ‘develop a Continental Child Justice Framework addressing both punitive measures and, as well as the recourse and restitution elements for child survivors.’

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to condemn all attacks against children and their abduction and recruitment by armed groups and to strictly comply with International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. Taking note of her appointment in February 2026, Council is also likely to emphasise the imperative of providing the office of Jainaba Jagne, the AU Special Envoy on CAAC, with the necessary financial, human and technical resources to enable her to discharge her mandate effectively. It may also reiterate its previous calls on Member States who have not yet done so to sign, ratify and domesticate the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other international instruments, such as the Safe Schools Declaration and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child with regard to the inclusion of children in armed conflicts. It may also encourage Member States to integrate mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), school feeding, water and sanitation (WASH), and child protection referral pathways into education responses. The PSC may also reiterate the need for Member States, RECs/RMs, and the AU Commission to mainstream child protection in early warning mechanisms and conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacemaking and peace-building processes, as well as in post-conflict reconstruction and development.

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Coordination between AUCTC-APRM-CISSA-AFRIPOL on Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning Systems

Amani Africa — Sun, 23 Aug 2026 15:02:44 +0000

Coordination between AUCTC-APRM-CISSA-AFRIPOL on Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning Systems

Date | 23 August 2026

Tomorrow (24 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1364^th meeting to discuss the theme ‘Coordination between the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) – the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) – the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) – the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) on Continental Early Warning System (CEWS): Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning System (EWS).’

Following opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of August, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), will make a statement. The representatives of AUCTC, APRM, CISSA and AFRIPOL are then expected to deliver briefings.

The last time the PSC met on the theme of Early Warning was in December 2025 at its 1320^th meeting. From the communiqué, the PSC, among other things, underlined the need to strengthen the analytical convergence between AUCTC, CISSA, AFRIPOL and the RECs/RMs. The same meeting further saw the PSC reiterating its request to the AU Commission ‘to collaborate with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM to introduce and institutionalise a dynamic tool for mapping risks and threats to peace and security in Africa, as adopted by the PSC through its communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1298 (2025) of 27 August 2025, in order to enable Council to enhance its conflict prevention efforts.’ It is expected that this will be central to the discussions therein. Noteworthy also, the session comes just slightly over a month following PSC Committee of Experts level consultations on the ‘Proposed AU Model on Trigger Mechanism for Early Warning and Early Action,’ held in July 2026. The proposed model ‘seeks to strengthen timely and proportionate AU responses by establishing clear triggers, thresholds and response options to address emerging risks before they escalate into violent conflict.’ It is expected to serve as a decision-support tool for the PSC, connecting early warning analysis with preventive action through existing AU governance and peace and security mechanisms.

The session comes amidst continuing security crises and an ever-evolving security landscape whose scale, complexity and changing character increasingly outpace the capacity of existing early-warning architecture. The Global Terrorism Index 2026 report recorded 5,582 terrorism deaths across 2,944 incidents in 2025, a 28 per cent fall from the previous year, with the impact of terrorism falling in 81 countries, the highest number of annual improvements since 2021 Sub-Saharan Africa remains the global epicenter, accounting for over half of all terrorism fatalities, with six of the ten most-impacted countries located on the continent: Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, and the DRC. Fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence in Africa surpassed 20,000 for the fourth consecutive year, spread across the Sahel, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, and Mozambique. In the Sahel specifically, JNIM (al-Qaeda-linked) and ISWAP/ISSP (Islamic State-linked) now collectively control more territory than at any point since the 2012 Mali crisis, with JNIM combining guerrilla attacks with governance strategies, providing basic services and arbitration in areas under its control.

With the evolving security landscape, there have also been significant operational shifts. Drone warfare has become a genuine insurgent capability. In Nigeria’s northeast, ISWAP is deploying combat drones in the Lake Chad basin at operational scale for the first time. Amani Africa’s Special Research Report, ‘Towards a New Agenda for Peace and Security in Africa: New Security Threats and the Future of the Peace and Security Council’ highlighted that one of the new security threats in Africa arises from the expansion of the use of emerging technologies. In addition, jihadist groups are no longer content with launching attacks; rather, they now administer territories and control trade routes, with their influence gradually pushing all the way to the Gulf of Guinea. JNIM’s strategy against Mali in 2026 illustrates a shift toward strangulation rather than storming capitals: JNIM formally declared an economic blockade of Bamako in April 2026, exploiting the fact that Mali imports about 95% of its fuel by road, with convoy attacks causing rationing, fuel queues and power shortages. Previously, the AU Commission, CISSA, AFRIPOL and AUCTC, were tasked to ‘thoroughly investigate the scourge of illicit financial flows, highlighting the networks and to report to PSC as soon as possible’ and called for ‘the establishment of a continental working group on illicit financing, which will inter alia, ensure the mapping of hawala/mobile money networks used by extremist terrorist groups and networks and the launch of a cross-border early warning protocol for suspicious transfers linked to convergence zones.’

Institutionally, the AU’s February 2026 Assembly decision called for the full operationalisation of the Continental Security Cartography and directed the AU Commission, together with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM, to establish a dynamic and continuously updated risk-mapping tool capable of providing the PSC with ‘a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities, and potential triggers’. It also called for fast-tracking the CEWS–AUCTC Joint Analytical Cell, closer harmonisation of RECs/RMs early-warning tools with CEWS, and development of a draft AU Early Action Guideline that ‘defines triggers, thresholds, and institutionalises response with timelines’ for consideration by the PSC. Taken together, these measures situate the forthcoming validation within a broader effort to move from parallel institutional reporting towards a more integrated continental risk picture and to strengthen the link between early warning and early action. The validation exercise therefore provides an opportunity to assess whether the emerging risk-mapping architecture is being designed as a decision-support mechanism capable of prompting timely preventive action, rather than as another analytical product whose warnings are not systematically translated into response.

The process acquired further operational content at the 1345^th PSC meeting on ‘Transnational Organised Crimes’ held in May 2026. The session saw the AU Commission, AFRIPOL, AUCTC, CISSA and APRM being tasked to ‘finalise by the end of 2026 a matrix of risks and threats to peace and security in Africa as a tool of the Continental Early Warning System.’ It also tasked AFRIPOL, in coordination with the Commission and RECs/RMs, to establish a continental criminal-intelligence mechanism for the ‘continuous mapping, analysis and dissemination of criminal flows, corridors and networks’ and to produce an annual consolidated continental threat assessment. This broadens the scope of continental early warning beyond conventional conflict indicators to include the evolving nexus among terrorism, organised crime, illicit economies and cross-border security threats.

The governance dimension has advanced in parallel. At its 1349^th meeting, the PSC welcomed the APRM’s development of ‘an early warning system dedicated to governance within the APRM’ and its inclusion in the matrix of risks and threats being finalised by relevant AU structures, while urging Member States to integrate APRM assessments into CEWS. The Joint Burayu Declaration similarly called for institutionalised data- and information-sharing so that APRM country findings ‘feed systematically into APSA early warning and mediation planning,’ within the wider coordination involving AUCTC, AFRIPOL and CISSA. This direction was reinforced by the 35^th APRM Forum in February 2026, which called for efforts to ‘position the APRM as an effective early-warning tool for conflict prevention on the continent,’ and by the March engagement between the AUC Deputy Chairperson and APRM leadership, where discussions focused particularly on ‘governance monitoring, early warning and conflict prevention.’ The key question is therefore whether governance indicators will be integrated into a common analytical picture rather than treated as a parallel stream of information.

The most recent 1354^th ministerial session on counter-terrorism held in July 2026 added another specialised layer. Alongside adopting the African Union Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Countering Terrorism in Africa (2026 -2030), the Council called for ‘specific indicators on radicalisation and violent extremism’ to be integrated into CEWS ‘to enable early detection and timely intervention.’ This places terrorism-specific early warning within the implementation of a broader continental counter-terrorism framework. Taken together with parallel efforts on criminal intelligence and governance-related risks, these decisions point to an increasingly ambitious system in which terrorism analysis, criminal intelligence, governance vulnerabilities and broader conflict indicators are expected to inform one continental warning architecture. The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to take note of the briefings by AUCTC, APRM, CISSA and AFRIPOL and may welcome progress towards validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and the APRM Early Warning System. Council may underscore that the validation should support the institutionalisation of a dynamic and continuously updated continental risk-mapping mechanism capable of providing an integrated picture of emerging threats, vulnerabilities and potential triggers. It may further emphasise the need for the validated tools to strengthen analytical convergence among AUCTC, APRM, CISSA, AFRIPOL and CEWS, including through common analytical standards, greater methodological alignment and secure information-sharing arrangements. Building on earlier decisions, the PSC may emphasise the imperative of regular consolidated horizon-scanning briefings covering emerging and escalating risks, indicators requiring preventive action, cross-border contagion dynamics and scenario options requiring Council guidance, while also encouraging systematic circulation of early-warning products to Member States to inform timely responses. It may also call for adequate technical, human and financial resources for the operationalisation, regular updating and sustained use of the tools, and for governance-related risks identified through the APRM EWS, alongside specialised terrorism and organised-crime indicators, to be systematically incorporated into the broader CEWS architecture.

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PSC – ACHPR Consultation

Amani Africa — Thu, 20 Aug 2026 08:10:07 +0000

PSC – ACHPR Consultation

Date | 20 August 2026

Tomorrow (21 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1363^rd session for a consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).

Following opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. The Chairperson of the ACHPR is also expected to deliver a briefing to the PSC on the ACHPR’s work as it relates to peace and security.

The consultative meeting is being convened pursuant to Article 19 of the PSC Protocol, which calls for close cooperation between the PSC and the ACHPR in advancing peace, security, and stability across the continent. Building on this provision, the PSC, at its 866^th Session in August 2019, resolved to institutionalise the engagement through annual joint consultative sessions with the ACHPR. This commitment rests on a shared legal and normative foundation: Article 3(f) of the PSC Protocol identifies the promotion of human rights as integral to conflict prevention, Article 45 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights mandates the ACHPR to promote and protect the rights of individuals and communities, and Article 23 of the African Charter affirms the right of all peoples to live in peace and security. Taken together, these provisions position the PSC-ACHPR consultation as the institutional space through which the AU’s peace and security architecture and its human rights architecture are meant to speak to one another.

Tomorrow’s meeting follows the 1284^th session held on 19 June 2025, which marked the resumption of joint consultations after a three-year interruption. While the session reaffirmed its commitment to deepening collaboration with the ACHPR, notably through consistent information exchange and by institutionalising and regularising the consultation as an annual fixture, the session outcome document was largely couched in general terms and missed critical opportunities to operationalise concrete cooperation. Specifically, the session failed to build upon practical modalities established during the 866^th session.

The overarching question for the consultation is how the PSC and ACHPR can pool their respective mandates, tools and networks to translate human rights protection into a more effective conflict prevention, peacebuilding and sustaining peace. This matters because human rights violations are not only consequences of armed conflict but can themselves function as early-warning indicators and drivers of conflict. The ACHPR’s own report on addressing Human Rights issues in conflict situations has identified monitoring and response, prevention, the mainstreaming of human rights across the conflict cycle, remedial action and institutional coordination as the areas requiring the greatest attention. Its Special Rapporteurs, Working Groups, and fact-finding and promotional missions generate a significant body of information and expertise that could strengthen the PSC’s preventive and protective action, provided that information is translated into timely political engagement rather than remaining confined within the human rights system.

The effectiveness of these mechanisms, however, also depends on their ability to draw on information and perspectives from actors closest to the situations they monitor. This places civil society organisations at an important intersection between human rights monitoring and the AU’s peace and security efforts. CSOs can channel information from communities that might not otherwise reach AU institutions, contribute to early warning, document violations, support victims and survivors, facilitate dialogue, and contribute to accountability and reconciliation. The ACHPR’s Joint Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan illustrates this value directly: its evidentiary record has drawn substantially on testimony from victims, witnesses and other stakeholders, including through direct engagement with Sudanese refugees in Chad, and its mandate, extended in May 2026, emphasised the need for independent monitoring, preservation of evidence, a victim-centred approach, accountability and civilian protection. The relevance of this channel is sharpened by deteriorating civic space in several conflict and crisis settings, which the ACHPR addressed directly in its June 2026 Resolution ACHPR/Res.663 (LXXXVII) on the Situation of Human and Peoples’ Rights Defenders in Africa, expressing concern over the criminalisation of legitimate civil society activity and calling on States to protect freedoms of association and peaceful assembly. The consultation could therefore explore how the ACHPR’s extensive networks of NGOs, National Human Rights Institutions and special mechanisms might be connected more systematically to the PSC’s early-warning and conflict-prevention architecture, while ensuring that civil society actors engaged in this work are themselves protected, an approach that could strengthen the quality and timeliness of information available to the Council, particularly where official reporting is limited, contested or delayed.

The Sudan experience illustrates the potential of such cooperation in practice. The ACHPR’s Joint Fact-Finding Mission, established in 2024 and extended for a further year in May 2026, has documented serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and its May 2026 Banjul Joint Declaration with the UN’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission stressed that a sustainable future for Sudan requires an inclusive, civilian-led political process with the meaningful participation of women, youth, civil society and communities from all regions, treating human rights findings, political process and peacebuilding as connected rather than separate tracks. A similar logic runs through the Commission’s other conflict-related work: its recent promotional mission to the DRC highlighted the continuing human rights and humanitarian consequences of conflict there, while its earlier engagement on South Sudan linked escalating violence to stalled implementation of the peace agreement. Both cases underline the value of ensuring the ACHPR’s country-level findings reach the PSC while situations remain under active consideration, rather than only after the fact, and both point toward the accountability question that the 953^rd and 1019^th sessions had already begun to address. At those sessions, the Council acknowledged the ACHPR’s contribution to transitional justice and called for the peaceful resolution of conflicts through dialogue, negotiation, mediation and consensual transitional justice mechanisms, alongside investigation of violations and accountability for perpetrators. Tomorrow’s consultation offers an occasion to examine how that expertise can complement the PSC’s political and mediation efforts more directly, including on reparations, reconciliation and guarantees of non-recurrence.

Tomorrow’s session is also expected to centre on the strategic priorities of the ACHPR’s new Bureau and their contribution to peace and security. The election of a new Bureau in October 2025, the adoption of the Commission’s Strategic Plan 2026 – 2028, and the subsequent adoption of the implementation, planning, monitoring and evaluation frameworks by the 87th Ordinary Session, provide an opportunity for the PSC to engage early with the Bureau’s priorities and identify areas of mutual reinforcement, particularly given the breadth of the Commission’s current conflict-related work. Beyond the Sudan Fact-Finding Mission, the ACHPR has undertaken a promotional mission to the DRC, strengthened engagement with international human rights mechanisms, and, at its 87^th Ordinary Session, adopted further resolutions with direct implications for conflict prevention and civic space. As such, the presentation offers an opportunity to identify where joint planning, information sharing, and the complementary use of institutional tools could generate greater preventive impact.

The Session is also expected to follow up on previous decisions and assess how to move from six years of accumulated commitments to measurable action. Given the strength of the practical modalities agreed at the 866^th session, particular attention is likely to be given to their implementation, including undertaking joint field visits to conflict-affected and post-conflict countries, communicating PSC decisions with human rights implications to the ACHPR, and facilitating regular ACHPR briefings on the human rights dimensions of situations on the PSC agenda. This suggests that the key challenge is one of implementation rather than a lack of substantive agreement, making a review of the implementation matrix an opportunity to identify which commitments have been fulfilled, which remain outstanding, the constraints affecting implementation, and the responsibilities and timelines required to address these gaps. This is particularly important for early warning: the 866^th session requested that ‘the AU Commission and the ACHPR Secretariat propose a modality for the establishment of a coordinated early warning mechanism on human rights-related issues on the Continent between the two Organs’. The consultation could thus provide an opportunity to revisit these commitments and consider practical modalities for systematically feeding ACHPR-generated information into CEWS assessments, allowing human rights-related warning signals to inform preventive action before violations escalate.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC and ACHPR may renew their commitment to strengthened cooperation and joint action. The communiqué may identify specific roles for NGOs, National Human Rights Institutions and other civil society actors in early warning, monitoring, mediation, protection, accountability and reconciliation, while encouraging the ACHPR to draw more systematically on its civil society networks and special mechanisms, with due attention to their own protection. The Council may welcome the strategic priorities of the ACHPR’s new Bureau and encourage closer alignment between the Strategic Plan 2026-2028 and AU peace and security priorities through coordinated work planning and information-sharing. It may further underscore the importance of mainstreaming human rights standards throughout conflict prevention, management, stabilisation, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, including through the integration of ACHPR analysis into the CEWS. On implementation, the communiqué may call for an updated joint implementation matrix with clearly identified responsibilities, timelines and follow-up mechanisms covering outstanding commitments, regular information-sharing, ACHPR participation in relevant PSC sessions, joint field or assessment missions and early-warning cooperation. It may also encourage continued ACHPR advisory support on transitional justice and accountability, and underscore the importance of integrating women’s meaningful participation and prevention of conflict-related sexual violence into AU peace and security efforts, so that the consultation moves beyond reaffirming complementarity towards a partnership in which human rights information and tools are put to active use in early warning, prevention, protection and sustaining peace.

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