Tomorrow (27 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an informal consultation with countries in political transition—namely Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger and Sudan.

This meeting will be the latest in the PSC’s series of informal consultations, introduced into its working methods in April 2023 following the 14^th Retreat on Working Methods in November 2022. Grounded in Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol, the mechanism enables direct engagement with representatives of Member States suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG). Tomorrow’s session is expected to take stock of progress and outstanding challenges since the late 2025 consultation, in light of evolving regional dynamics.

The PSC scheduled an informal consultation on Sudan early in the month, with Sudan ahead of the PSC ministerial session held on 12 February 2026 on the situation in Sudan. While there is no public record of whether the PSC held such an informal consultation, the Foreign Minister of Sudan was present and made a statement at the opening segment of the 1330^th meeting of the PSC dedicated to the situations in Sudan and Somalia.

Tomorrow (17 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an informal consultation with countries in transition—namely Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Sudan.

This will be the fourth such informal consultation since the PSC introduced this format into its working methods in April 2023, following its 14^th Retreat on Working Methods in November 2022. The informal consultation was established to enable direct engagement with representatives of countries suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government. It drew on Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol. Tomorrow’s consultation is expected to examine progress made and challenges encountered in ongoing transitions since the last consultation in March 2025.

Two notable developments have occurred since the previous consultation. First, military coups in Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar have expanded the list of countries undergoing political transitions to seven. Second, the lifting of Gabon’s suspension from the AU despite the fact that the elections did not comply with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) on the ineligibility of perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government in elections organised to restore constitutional order. As noted in our April 2025 Monthly Digest, Nguema’s participation and victory, in clear violation of ACDEG, and the subsequent lifting of Gabon’s suspension without the PSC affirming its full commitment to Article 25(4), is not without consequences for AU’s purported policy of zero tolerance to coups. It signalled to coup makers and members of the military in other African countries that the PSC may be ‘willing not to insist on full compliance with AU norms if they opt for speeding up the ‘restoration’ of constitutional order as long as they hold elections.’

Not surprisingly, Guinea’s coup leader and interim president, Mamady Doumbouya, is poised to follow Gabon’s path as the country prepares for elections. The PSC is likely to discuss technical and financial support for credible elections and, echoing its 1284^th session, emphasise the importance of inclusivity in Guinea’s political process. In this respect, Guinea’s representative is expected to highlight progress toward the ‘restoration’ of constitutional order, particularly the September 2025 constitutional referendum and the general elections scheduled for 28 December 2025 and the electoral support the country needs. These elections are meant to conclude Guinea’s transition period. However, Doumbouya formally entered the presidential race in early November—reneging on his earlier pledge not to run. The PSC, during its field mission to Conakry in May and its 1284^th session, urged the transition authorities to honour their commitment to complete the transition by December 2025, but stopped short of reminding them of the prohibition under Article 25(4) of ACDEG against coup leaders contesting elections. With Doumbouya now a candidate—and his victory highly probable—the PSC may follow the exact approach it applied to Gabon, unless the regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), raises concern. Under the circumstances, whether or not the coup leaders in other countries will run for elections is now a matter of their choice and is not expected to face any opposition from the AU for non-compliance with Article 24(5) of ACDEG.

Similarly, Sudan’s representative may raise the issue of lifting the country’s suspension, citing the May 2025 appointment of Kamil al-Tayeb Idris as civilian Prime Minister by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chair of the Transitional Sovereign Council and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Following the appointment, it is to be recalled that the Chairperson of the AU Commission welcomed it as ‘a step towards inclusive governance.’ However, the appointment of the Prime Minister was not a result of national dialogue, nor did it involve the participation of Sudanese political and social forces. Indeed, discussions around the lifting of Sudan’s suspension remain premature under the prevailing circumstances, where the deteriorating security situation does not allow for an inclusive political process, there is no national dialogue and a clear pathway for the eventual convening of elections. These steps have ‘supposedly’ become the basic requirements the AU expects before lifting sanctions. Recent precedents of the Council suggest that sanctions can be lifted as long as a country organises a national dialogue and elections, even when the very actors who carried out a coup freely participate in those elections. It has become an acceptable shortcut around ACDEG. Additionally, the representative of Sudan may encourage the PSC to have a field mission to Port Sudan. In the light of recent developments including the fall of El Fasher, the last remaining major city in Darfur and the Heglig oilfield, into the hands of the para militaryRapid Support Forces, marking the de facto partition of Sudan and killing of civilians and the attack and the recent killing of UN Peacekeepers, the discussion may centre on deploying a mechanism for humanitarian and civilian protection in El Fasher and identifying credible pathways for accelerating efforts for peace as well as implementing the previous decisions of the PSC on the situation in Sudan.

Similarly, the situation in Madagascar is expected to feature in the consultation, given the military takeover that unfolded. In October 2025, a faction of the Madagascar Armed Forces led by Colonel Michael Randrianirina seized power amid mass protests in the capital Antananarivo, ousting President Andry Rajoelina and prompting the AU to suspend Madagascar’s membership for violating the Union’s zero-tolerance policy on unconstitutional changes of government. The PSC, at its 1305^th and subsequent emergency sessions, condemned the coup, reaffirmed its rejection of any unconstitutional seizure of power, and called on all Malagasy actors, civilian and military, to exercise restraint, engage in inclusive dialogue, and work towards a peaceful and lawful resolution within constitutional frameworks. In its recent session held on 20 November, the Council emphasised the need for coordinated AU-SADC efforts, including high-level missions and strengthening the AU Liaison Office on the ground to support mediation, reconciliation, and stabilisation. The PSC also placed strong emphasis on the need for enhanced coordination and division of labour among the AU, SADC, and the Indian Ocean Commission, while calling on the AU Commission and partners to provide financial and technical support for the electoral management body and the drafting of a new constitution, and to extend support through the Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT), conditional on the implementation of the Transition Road Map. These issues are likely to feature in tomorrow’s consultation with countries in transition, particularly the extent to which regional and continental coordination mechanisms are effectively aligned in supporting the country’s transition to a democratic order. Meanwhile, in the remaining countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—relations with the regional bloc ECOWAS remain strained, as the three states continue consolidating their alliance through the confederation established in 2024. It is becoming increasingly clear that the security situation gets in the way of and provides a pretext for the lack of focused progress in the transition process. In Mali, the National Transitional Council adopted a bill on 3 July 2025 revising the Transitional Charter, granting General Assimi Goïta a renewable five-year term as President of the Transition ‘until peace is restored.’ Similarly, in Burkina Faso, the transition period was extended for another five years, starting in July 2024—the year initially planned for its conclusion. The new charter, signed by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, also allows him to contest in the elections. Niger has taken a similar path. A national conference on rebuilding the country in February 2025 decided that the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (CNSP), which seized power in July 2023, would remain in power for five years without any clear timeline for elections.

The Council is therefore expected to reiterate the concerns expressed during its 1304^th ministerial session on 30 September 2025, which noted with ‘deep concern’ the ‘slow pace of political transition processes’ and urged the transitional authorities to accelerate inclusive transitions, engage all stakeholders, and facilitate genuine political dialogue. It may also again call on these authorities to adhere to their respective transitional roadmaps and operationalise joint transition monitoring committees.

While the issue of progress in the transition process may be the focus of the session, this cannot be separated from and is deeply tied to the possibility of arresting the deepening and widening threat facing these countries. A major issue for tomorrow’s session is the question of how AU and ECOWAS overhaul their approach by integrating the quest for restoration of constitutional order into a wider stabilisation and state authority expansion strategy backed by a security mechanism they develop and deploy together with the Sahel countries to address the existential threat facing these countries.

As such, tomorrow’s consultation needs to both situate the discussion on transition in these countries within the insecurity facing them and consider the kind of role the AU and ECOWAS bring to the counterterrorism efforts of these countries. Similar to Sudan and unlike Gabon and Guinea, the push for progress in the transitional process cannot be abstracted out of the pressing issue facing these countries, which is the terrorism menace that has grown to become an existential threat to these countries. A clear illustration of this involves the recent developments in Mali, with the capital Bamako under imminent threat and cut off from supply routes. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with al-Qaeda, has expanded operations from the north and centre into the western and southern regions of Mali. Its fuel blockade since September has caused severe shortages, power cuts, and economic paralysis in Bamako and other cities, triggering public unrest and fears of broader instability. Weekly fuel deliveries have reportedly fallen from 1,000 to 200 tankers. Facing mounting pressure, General Goïta has replaced several senior military officials, including the deputy chief of staff of the armed forces, the head of military security and the ground forces’ chief of staff, highlighting internal strains within the regime.

The PSC is also expected to discuss the AU’s recent intensified diplomatic engagement with these Sahelian countries and explore ways to enhance coordination. In May, the AU Commission Chairperson met representatives of the three countries in Addis Ababa to explore renewed engagement. This was followed by a visit from Angola’s Minister of External Relations—delivering a message from President João Lourenço, the current AU Chairperson—reaffirming the AU’s commitment to Sahel stability and counterterrorism efforts. In July, the AU Chairperson appointed President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi as Special Envoy for the Sahel. Angola also proposed hosting a summit on the Sahel in Luanda, welcomed by the PSC during its 1304^th session. Additionally, former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara was appointed as Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel, and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL). The PSC also decided to establish a Task Force to support counterterrorism in the region and called for a field visit by Special Envoy Ndayishimiye to engage directly with the transitional authorities. In this context, the informal consultation could provide an opportunity to discuss how to advance these initiatives and follow up on the decision of PSC and ECOWAS during their annual consultative meeting last May ‘to develop a security cooperation framework involving the AU and ECOWAS engagement with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, in order to more effectively address insecurity in the West Africa Region.’

In addition to the three Sahelian countries, a further concern is the widening pattern of governance instability across West Africa. This includes the recent coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau and the attempted coup in Benin, developments that underscored the growing threat of unconstitutional changes of government and prompted ECOWAS to declare a state of emergency. As such, the consultation is expected to consider the situation in Guinea-Bissau following the coup d’état of 26 November, which unfolded just before the release of the results of the presidential runoff between incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and his main challenger, Fernando Dias, on 26 November. In a statement issued during the crisis, prior to Senegal’s confirmation that it had granted Embaló asylum, the military announced that the President and several senior officials were “under the control” of the High Military Command. In response to the coup, the AU convened a PSC session on 28 November, during which it condemned and rejected the unconstitutional change of government and decided to immediately suspend Guinea-Bissau from participation in all AU activities, organs, and institutions until constitutional order is restored. The Council further requested the AU Post-Conflict, Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Centre in Cairo, in collaboration with UN peacebuilding institutions, to engage relevant national stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau to support development activities aimed at preventing further relapses into political crisis. In addition, the PSC mandated the Chairperson of the Commission to establish an inclusive AU monitoring mechanism, in collaboration with ECOWAS and other relevant stakeholders, to closely follow developments on the ground, particularly the implementation of ECOWAS and PSC decisions. At the sub-regional level, the 68^th Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, held in Abuja on 14 December, rejected the transition programme announced by Guinea-Bissau’s military authorities and called for a swift return to constitutional order. The Authority warned of targeted sanctions against individuals obstructing the process and mandated the ECOWAS Chair to lead a high-level delegation to Guinea-Bissau to engage the junta.

On the other hand, the representative of Sudan is expected to update the PSC on the recent developments in the conflict in Sudan, including the fall of El-Fasher—the last major SAF stronghold— to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 26 October, and on reports of attacks on civilians and mass killings committed during and after the takeover. During the emergency meeting held in Sudan on 28 October, the PSC ‘strongly’ condemned the ‘criminal activities against Sudanese civilians and the grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, perpetrated by the paramilitary RSF’. The emergency session further requested the AU Commission to regularly monitor and report heinous crimes committed in Sudan, develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation, develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations to the PSC within three weeks. It also requested the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities to urgently undertake a fact-finding mission to Sudan and report back to the Council with recommendations within three weeks. While meeting these deadlines may prove challenging, tomorrow’s consultation could consider ways Sudan might facilitate the implementation of these tasks.

As with previous consultations, tomorrow’s engagement is not expected to result in an outcome document.

Tomorrow (13 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an informal consultation with countries in political transition—namely Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Sudan.

This will be the fourth such informal consultation since the PSC introduced this format into its working methods in April 2023, following its 14^th Retreat on Working Methods in November 2022. The informal consultation was established to enable direct engagement with representatives of countries suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government. It drew on Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol. Tomorrow’s consultation is expected to examine progress made and challenges encountered in ongoing transitions since the last consultation in March 2025.

One notable development since the previous consultation was the lifting of Gabon’s suspension from the AU despite the fact that the elections did not comply with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) on the ineligibility of perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government in elections organised to restore constitutional order. As noted in our April 2025 Monthly Digest, Nguema’s participation and victory, in clear violation of ACDEG, and the subsequent lifting of Gabon’s suspension without the PSC affirming its full commitment to Article 25(4), is not without consequences for AU’s purported policy of zero tolerance to coups. It signalled to coup makers and members of the military in other African countries that the PSC may be ‘willing not to insist on full compliance with AU norms if they opt for speeding up the ‘restoration’ of constitutional order as long as they hold elections.’

Not surprisingly, Guinea’s coup leader and interim president, Mamady Doumbouya, is poised to follow Gabon’s path as the country prepares for elections. The PSC is likely to discuss technical and financial support for credible elections and, echoing its 1284^th session, emphasise the importance of inclusivity in Guinea’s political process. In this respect, Guinea’s representative is expected to highlight progress toward the ‘restoration’ of constitutional order, particularly the September 2025 constitutional referendum and the general elections scheduled for 28 December 2025 and the electoral support the country needs. These elections are meant to conclude Guinea’s transition period. However, Doumbouya formally entered the presidential race in early November—reneging on his earlier pledge not to run. The PSC, during its field mission to Conakry in May and its 1284^th session, urged the transition authorities to honour their commitment to complete the transition by December 2025, but stopped short of reminding them of the prohibition under Article 25(4) of ACDEG against coup leaders contesting elections. With Doumbouya now a candidate—and his victory highly probable—the PSC may follow the exact approach it applied to Gabon, unless the regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), raises concern. Under the circumstances, whether or not the coup leaders in other countries will run for elections is now a matter of their choice and is not expected to face any opposition from the AU for non-compliance with Article 24(5) of ACDEG.

Similarly, Sudan’s representative may raise the issue of lifting the country’s suspension, citing the May 2025 appointment of Kamil al-Tayeb Idris as civilian Prime Minister by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chair of the Transitional Sovereign Council and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Following the appointment, it is to be recalled that the Chairperson of the AU Commission welcomed it as ‘a step towards inclusive governance.’ However, the appointment of the Prime Minister was not a result of national dialogue, nor did it involve the participation of Sudanese political and social forces. Indeed, discussions around the lifting of Sudan’s suspension remain premature under the prevailing circumstances, where the deteriorating security situation does not allow for an inclusive political process, there is no national dialogue and a clear pathway for the eventual convening of elections. In the light of recent developments including the fall of El Fasher, the last remaining major city in Darfur, into the hands of the para military Rapid Support Forces, marking the de facto partition of Sudan, the discussion may centre on deploying a mechanism for humanitarian and civilian protection in El Fasher and identifying credible pathways for accelerating efforts for peace as well as implementing the previous decisions of the PSC on the situation in Sudan.

Meanwhile, in the remaining countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—relations with the regional bloc ECOWAS remain strained, as the three states continue consolidating their alliance through the confederation established in 2024. It is becoming increasingly clear that the security situation gets in the way of and provides a pretext for the lack of focused progress in the transition process. In Mali, the National Transitional Council adopted a bill on 3 July 2025 revising the Transitional Charter, granting General Assimi Goïta a renewable five-year term as President of the Transition ‘until peace is restored.’ Similarly, in Burkina Faso, the transition period was extended for another five years, starting in July 2024—the year initially planned for its conclusion. The new charter, signed by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, also allows him to contest in the elections. Niger has taken a similar path. A national conference on rebuilding the country in February 2025 decided that the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (CNSP), which seized power in July 2023, would remain in power for five years without any clear timeline for elections.

The Council is therefore expected to reiterate the concerns expressed during its 1304^th ministerial session on 30 September 2025, which noted with ‘deep concern’ the ‘slow pace of political transition processes’ and urged the transitional authorities to accelerate inclusive transitions, engage all stakeholders, and facilitate genuine political dialogue. It may also again call on these authorities to adhere to their respective transitional roadmaps and operationalise joint transition monitoring committees.

While the issue of progress in the transition process may be the focus of the session, this cannot be separated from and is deeply tied to the possibility of arresting the deepening and widening threat facing these countries. A major issue for tomorrow’s session is the question of how AU and ECOWAS overhaul their approach by integrating the quest for restoration of constitutional order into a wider stabilisation and state authority expansion strategy backed by a security mechanism they develop and deploy together with the Sahel countries to address the existential threat facing these countries.

As such, tomorrow’s consultation needs to both situate the discussion on transition in these countries within the insecurity facing them and consider the kind of role the AU and ECOWAS bring to the counterterrorism efforts of these countries. Similar to Sudan and unlike Gabon and Guinea, the push for progress in the transitional process cannot be abstracted out of the pressing issue facing these countries, which is the terrorism menace that has grown to become an existential threat to these countries. A clear illustration of this involves the recent developments in Mali, with the capital Bamako under imminent threat and cut off from supply routes. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with al-Qaeda, has expanded operations from the north and centre into the western and southern regions of Mali. Its fuel blockade since September has caused severe shortages, power cuts, and economic paralysis in Bamako and other cities, triggering public unrest and fears of broader instability. Weekly fuel deliveries have reportedly fallen from 1,000 to 200 tankers. Facing mounting pressure, General Goïta has replaced several senior military officials, including the deputy chief of staff of the armed forces, the head of military security and the ground forces’ chief of staff, highlighting internal strains within the regime.

The PSC is also expected to discuss the AU’s recent intensified diplomatic engagement with these Sahelian countries and explore ways to enhance coordination. In May, the AU Commission Chairperson met representatives of the three countries in Addis Ababa to explore renewed engagement. This was followed by a visit from Angola’s Minister of External Relations—delivering a message from President João Lourenço, the current AU Chairperson—reaffirming the AU’s commitment to Sahel stability and counterterrorism efforts. In July, the AU Chairperson appointed President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi as Special Envoy for the Sahel. Angola also proposed hosting a summit on the Sahel in Luanda, welcomed by the PSC during its 1304^th session. Additionally, former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara was appointed as Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel, and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL). The PSC also decided to establish a Task Force to support counterterrorism in the region and called for a field visit by Special Envoy Ndayishimiye to engage directly with the transitional authorities. In this context, the informal consultation could provide an opportunity to discuss how to advance these initiatives and follow up on the decision of PSC and ECOWAS during their annual consultative meeting last May ‘to develop a security cooperation framework involving the AU and ECOWAS engagement with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, in order to more effectively address insecurity in the West Africa Region.’

On the other hand, the representative of Sudan is expected to update the PSC on the recent developments in the conflict in Sudan, including the fall of El-Fasher—the last major SAF stronghold— to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 26 October, and on reports of attacks on civilians and mass killings committed during and after the takeover. During the emergency meeting held in Sudan on 28 October, the PSC ‘strongly’ condemned the ‘criminal activities against Sudanese civilians and the grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, perpetrated by the paramilitary RSF’. The emergency session further requested the AU Commission to regularly monitor and report heinous crimes committed in Sudan, develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation, develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations to the PSC within three weeks. It also requested the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities to urgently undertake a fact-finding mission to Sudan and report back to the Council with recommendations within three weeks. While meeting these deadlines may prove challenging, tomorrow’s consultation could consider ways Sudan might facilitate the implementation of these tasks.

As with previous consultations, tomorrow’s engagement is not expected to result in an outcome document.

Tomorrow (18 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an informal consultations with Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan at the ambassadorial level.

Informal consultation with countries undergoing political transitions was incorporated into the PSC’s repertoire of working methods following its decision during the 14th Retreat on Working Methods, held in November 2022. The conclusions of the retreat introduced these consultations as a mechanism to facilitate direct engagement with representatives of countries suspended from participation in the AU due to unconstitutional changes of government, in line with Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol. Since then, two such consultations have been held in April and December 2023.

The last time the PSC held informal consultations with countries in political transition was in December 2023. Since then, the PSC convened its 1212th session on 20 May 2024 as a formal meeting to receive updated briefings on the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, and Niger. The PSC also conducted a field mission to Gabon in September 2024. Tomorrow’s session presents an opportunity for the PSC and countries in political transition to exchange views on the latest developments and provides a platform for candid discussions on concerning trends affecting the restoration of constitutional order in these countries.

Tomorrow (27 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold informal consultations with countries in political transition at the ambassadorial level.

Informal consultations with countries undergoing political transitions were incorporated into the PSC’s repertoire of working methods following its decision during the 14^th Retreat on working methods, held in November 2022. The conclusions of the retreat introduced these consultations as a mechanism to facilitate direct engagement with representatives of countries suspended from participation in the AU due to unconstitutional changes of government, in line with Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol. Since then, two such consultations have been held in April and December 2023.

The last time the PSC held informal consultations with countries in political transition was in December 2023. Since then, the PSC convened its 1212th session on 20 May 2024 as a formal meeting to receive updated briefings on the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, and Niger. The PSC also conducted a field mission to Gabon in September 2024. Tomorrow’s session presents an opportunity for the PSC and countries in political transition to exchange views on the latest developments and provides a platform for candid discussions on concerning trends affecting the restoration of constitutional order in these countries.

Tomorrow (15 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1227^th session to receive the report of the inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions.

The Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2024, Tebelelo A. Boang, is expected to deliver the opening remarks, followed by statements from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. Michael Wamai, an expert from Uganda to the AU and Chairperson of the Sub-Committee for the month of June 2024, is anticipated to present the report of the inaugural meeting of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions.

This session is convened in line with the decision made during the inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions (SCS) on 12 June 2024, in which the Sub-Committee agreed that the Chairperson for June, Michael Wamai, would present the Summary Record of the meeting to the PSC for consideration.

The PSC SCS was launched in June, fifteen years after the PSC first decided to establish it during its 178^th session in March 2009. This decision was made pursuant to Article 8(5) of the PSC Protocol, which empowers the Council to create subsidiary bodies to perform its functions. Despite the 2009 decision, momentum for operationalising the Sanctions Committee only accelerated in recent years, largely due to the resurgence of military coups across the continent since 2021. With six Member States currently suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), it appears that the AU’s anti-coup norms—once praised for reducing the occurrence of UCGs in Africa—are now facing significant challenges, raising doubts about their effectiveness.