Update on the situation in the Sahel
Update on the situation in the SahelDate | 6 August 2026
Tomorrow (7 August 2026), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will receive an update on the situation in the Sahel region.
The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for July, followed by a statement by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The Special Representative of the AU Commission for Mali and the Sahel and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), Mamadou Tangara, is expected to brief the Council.
While the PSC addressed the political transitions in Burkina Faso and Niger during its most recent 1356th session, the last time it held a session on the Sahel as such was on 30 September 2025, during its 1304th session, which addressed the Sahel region as a whole. Convened at ministerial level and attended by AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, that session tasked the Chairperson of the Commission to establish a Task Force to support the countries of the Sahel in fighting terrorism.
The security situation in the region appears to have worsened further since the 1304th session. In Mali, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Tuareg separatists belonging to the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) ratcheted up the pressure against the Malian armed forces and their Russian allies by launching coordinated attacks across several locations in the country. These attacks targeted military installations, imposed blockades on key transport routes, and increased pressure on government-controlled areas. Several senior military officials, including Defence Minister General Sadio Camara, were also reportedly killed in these latest rounds of attacks.
Similarly, Burkina Faso continues to experience a surge of attacks by JNIM and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). These groups launched coordinated attacks in the north and east part of the country in February, overrunning military detachments and killing troops and civilians. Reports indicate that a large part of Burkina Faso remains outside the government’s effective control.
In Niger, JNIM attacked Niamey’s international airport in June, killing more than 30 troops and civilians. This attack took place five months after a similar attack on the airport in January, which was claimed by the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). The statement, the Chairperson of the AU Commission issued after the 17 July ambush of a Nigerien detachment on the Bankilaré–Téra axis in Tillabéri, described a resurgence of terrorist attacks across the Sahel exacting a heavy toll on both security forces and civilians.
The humanitarian toll behind these trend lines is severe. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) figures for the first quarter of 2026 record 2,640 conflict-related deaths and 1,179 security incidents across the Central Sahel. The region hosts 2.8 million internally displaced persons, 2.1 million of them in Burkina Faso and 283,000 in Niger, alongside 444,400 refugees. An estimated 11.4 million people require food assistance, including 2.7 million facing IPC Phase 3-or-worse acute food insecurity, and 401,000 children are suffering from severe acute malnutrition. These figures give texture to what the Council is likely to describe, once again, as a humanitarian emergency inseparable from the security crisis.
On the diplomatic front, there have been some notable developments. The US appears to be actively trying to re-engage with the three Sahelian states through diplomatic visits and offers of pragmatic security cooperation. During his first official trip to Africa since assuming office, the new US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Frank Garcia, visited several West African countries, including Mali, to strengthen economic and security partnerships, particularly focusing on critical minerals and counterterrorism cooperation.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited the region in July and met with his counterparts from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in Niamey, in an apparent attempt to reassure them of his country’s continued support to strengthen their operational capacities. While the three countries reaffirmed their security partnership with Russia, they appear to be increasingly trying to diversify their security cooperation to counter the growing threat they face.
Niger’s military leader, General Abdourahamane Tiani, visited Turkey in June to explore opportunities for enhanced cooperation, including on defence.
Meanwhile, the three Sahelian states have also sought to repair relations with Algeria, a key regional actor with longstanding influence on Sahelian security and diplomacy. In February, Niger’s transitional President, Abdourahamane Tiani, visited Algeria to restore bilateral ties, while Burkina Faso dispatched a high-level delegation led by its Minister of Energy, Mines and Quarries. Both Niger and Burkina Faso had previously recalled their ambassadors from Algiers in solidarity with Mali, which severed diplomatic relations with Algeria in 2025 after accusing it of downing a Malian surveillance drone. Mali subsequently restored diplomatic ties with Algeria in July, apparently with the help of Russia’s facilitation behind the scenes. These developments reflect a growing recognition among the Sahelian states that cooperation with Algeria is indispensable for their counterterrorism efforts.
In terms of AU’s engagement, a major development, which follows the PSC’s call in its 1304th session for the ‘intensification of diplomatic engagements with the countries of the Sahel’, was the AU Commission Chairperson Youssouf’s first visit to Ouagadougou, on 15-16 July, meeting Foreign Minister Karamoko Jean-Marie Traoré and Prime Minister Rimtalba Jean Emmanuel Ouédraogo. In view of the existential threat facing the countries of the Sahel, this is a long overdue mission. Youssouf stated that his visit was ‘intended to convey the Union’s solidarity with the Government & people of Burkina Faso in their efforts to restore peace, combat terrorism & promote stability.’ He went on to reaffirm ‘the Commission’s commitment to accompanying Burkina Faso, through the relevant organs & institutions of the AU, in support of humanitarian response, public health & sustainable development.’ Youssouf also visited Bamako, where he held meetings with several senior Malian officials, including General Assimi Goïta.
Youssouf underscored the importance of strengthening regional cooperation to address shared peace, security & development challenges. He also called for revitalising the Nouakchott Process on security cooperation and for closer AES-ECOWAS harmony, while committing the Commission to a three-pillar Sahel strategy of governance, security and development. In what signals the recognition of the need for a multidimensional approach inclusive of addressing governance issues, the Chairperson noted that the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance ‘remains an important continental framework for promoting good governance & responsive institutions.’
The AU has faced criticism over its lacklustre engagement in the Sahel crisis. Coming after increasing diplomatic steps including the 2025 appointment of Évariste Ndayishimiye as Special Envoy for the Sahel and Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara as his Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), based in Bamako, the visits to the Sahel, if accompanied by meaningful measures for wider AU support for Sahel countries including through following up on the decision of the PSC for the establishment of a Task Force, this has the potential of elevating AU’s role in the Sahel.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) remains engaged with the three Sahelian states that announced their withdrawal from the bloc. In March, former Guinean Prime Minister Lansana Kouyaté was appointed as ECOWAS Chief Negotiator to lead efforts to maintain dialogue and explore avenues for engagement with these countries. The security situation in the Sahel was also discussed during ECOWAS’ 69th Authority of Heads of State and Government summit, held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in July. The Authority directed the President of the Commission to intensify engagement with the Sahelian states with a view to establishing a pragmatic security cooperation framework centred on the shared objective of containing the spread of terrorism and addressing broader regional security challenges.
In August 2025, the Authority decided to activate the ECOWAS counterterrorism brigade, marking a renewed effort to strengthen the region’s collective response to growing security threats. Since then, military chiefs and defence officials have been working to establish the necessary structures and operational framework for the force. At its most recent summit, the Authority endorsed a Revised Roadmap outlining phased implementation timelines aimed at achieving the brigade’s full operational capability by July 2027. It also tasked the ECOWAS Commission with facilitating consultations among Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria to reach an agreement on the location of the force’s headquarters.
The UN Security Council discussed the situation in West Africa and the Sahel in July. Briefing the Council, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for West Africa and the Sahel, Leonardo Santos Simão, highlighted the increasing use of drones, sophisticated communications technologies, and cryptocurrencies by armed groups and terrorists to coordinate their cross-border operations, underscoring the growing complexity of the regional threat. The UN is undertaking an independent strategic review of its regional office, led by former Ethiopian President Sahle-Work Zewde. The review is expected to inform the Security Council’s consideration of how to adapt the UN’s engagement and presence in West Africa and the Sahel to the region’s rapidly evolving political and security landscape.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC could express deep concern over the deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso and Niger, particularly the persisting terrorist activities by groups affiliated with JNIM, ISGS and ISSP, and underscore the urgent need for strengthened regional and continental coordination to address the evolving threat landscape. The Council may condemn continued terrorist attacks targeting civilians, national defence forces and security institutions, while expressing solidarity with the people of Burkina Faso and Niger and emphasising the importance of responses that address not only immediate security threats but also the governance, development and humanitarian dimensions of the crisis. The PSC may express concern about and call for enhanced effort for ameliorating the severe humanitarian consequences of the crisis, and may encourage the AU Commission, in coordination with humanitarian actors and regional organisations, to reinforce interventions anchored on a peace-security-development nexus approach that recognises the interconnected nature of the sources of vulnerabilities and humanitarian needs in the Sahel. The PSC may call for enhanced coordination among the AU, ECOWAS, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), and other regional and international actors, to ensure that the limited resources available are organised around addressing the growing threat endangering the collective existence of affected countries. The PSC may welcome the visit that the AU Commission undertook to the Sahel countries and encourage the AU Commission to sustain its engagement with Burkina Faso and Niger through high-level diplomatic channels. The PSC may request that the Chairperson develop a strategy to deliver on the commitment he expressed during his visit for AU’s accompaniment of the Sahel countries in their quest for restoring peace, addressing humanitarian challenges and advancing regional cooperation. The PSC may also reiterate its decision on the establishment of the AU Task Force to support the Sahel countries in the fight against terrorism and efforts to restore peace and security.