AU Commission Chairperson's Report on the Study on Climate Change, Peace and Security Nexus

SUMMARY

Introduction & Background

Africa is strongly mobilized for Climate Action at all levels as evidenced by the framework of the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032). It is equally reflected in the progress of continental and regional initiatives such as the African Renewable Energy Initiative, the Africa Just and Affordable Energy Transition Initiative, the African Adaptation Initiative, the Adaptation of African Agriculture Initiative and the African Women's Climate Adaptive Priorities. Other relevant initiatives also include the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa, the Great Green Wall, as well as the Climate Commissions of the Congo Basin, the Sahel and the African Island States.

The diversity and scale of the negative current and anticipated impacts of climate change in Africa, and its concurrent security challenges, highlight the need for mainstreaming the climate change, peace & security nexus in Africa. The African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) indicated the importance of this mainstreaming endeavour in 2016. The PSC, once again, underscored in 2018 the importance of the AU Commission (AUC) to mainstream climate change in all its activities, particularly in early warning and prevention of climate change-related violent conflicts. In addition, a study was requested on the nexus between climate change, peace and security in the continent stressing, among other things, that the envisaged study should pay particular attention on the plight of island Member States. This issue remains of interest to the Peace and Security Council as reiterated in April 2022.

Moreover, in February 2022, the Assembly, in its 35th Ordinary Session, requested the Commission to "expedite the finalization of a climate-related security risk assessment study, in consultation with Member States". The Tangier Declaration of October 2022 also emphasized the need for the AU, the UN and their strategic partners to support "the African initiatives and strategies in order to eradicate the negative impact of climate change on peace and security in Africa". The July 2023 Nairobi Statement on Climate Change, Peace, Security and Stability in Africa equally acknowledged that "the ever-growing adverse impacts of climate change have deleterious consequences on the sustainability of peace, security and stability across the African continent especially on fragile communities".

The present document is an Executive Summary of the Chairperson's Report that draws on the climate-related security risk assessment study mandated above. After presenting the conceptual framework, the report presents an overview of the key climate-security risks and the key emerging responses to address them from both a continental and a regional perspective as identified in the study. Lastly, the report includes several recommendations on how to better address climate-related security risks across the continent, concluding on a recommendation to develop and adopt a Common African Position on the Climate Change, Peace and Security nexus, based on the guidance from Member States, the previously developed15 Key Messages, and the key aspects of this present report.

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Conceptual Framework

Human security is people-centred and includes economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. Political instability, (organised) crime, urban violence, terrorism and violent conflict are different ways in which insecurity manifests itself. Climate-related risks, including climate-related security risks, are driven by a range of climatic hazards including slow onset changes such as temperature rise, ocean acidification and changes in precipitation patterns, as well as fast onset events such as storms and floods. These hazards are also referred to as climatic stressors or shocks. The impact of these climate stressors, including on peace and security, is dependent on:

- The exposure of a certain community, economic sector, or geographic area to these hazards; and
- Its vulnerability, i.e. the degree to which geophysical, biological, and socio-economic systems are susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse impacts of climate change.

Climate-related security risks are thus driven by one or more climatic stressors that have certain direct and/or indirect impacts on human security and challenge the peace and stability of states and societies. They are systemic risks that emerge through complex interactions between climate change and different social, economic, environmental, demographic and political factors. These interactions can be clustered around specific impact pathways. The concept of climate-security risk pathways used in this framework is based on the best available knowledge and science in the field. Pathways are used to understand how climate change and insecurity are interlinked in specific contexts.

Solutions focused

The focus of this report is solutions-oriented, based on existing climate-related security risks. It includes an assessment of good practices and lessons learned that can help policymakers and practitioners to link climate change adaptation to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. These good practices inform a series of actionable recommendations for policymakers on a regional and continental level.

Data collection

The analysis of climate-related security risks is based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative data and approaches. When exploring the knock-on effects of climate impacts, such as how increased extreme weather events or sea-level rise impact livelihoods and the economy, social cohesion, conflict, political instability, trust in governments, and gender-based violence, qualitative data is often not exhaustive enough and quantitative models are not yet able to capture the complex feedback loops and interactions that link climate impacts and security. This means that an analysis of the available quantitative data should be combined with qualitative approaches, backed by thorough literature reviews and interview.

In addition, for each region, consultations with key stakeholders were held to provide inputs for the risk analysis and to identify good practices and responses. A gender-sensitive and intersectional research approach ensured that the findings are disaggregated as much as possible by gender, age and identity groups to better understand the heterogeneity of risks and dimensions of resilience across contexts and actor groups. To provide solid quantitative climate change impact data for the analysis of climate-related security risks, the African Continental Climate Security Risk assessment drew on data and modelling work. Future climate impact projections are made for two future greenhouse gas emissions scenarios (Representative Concentration Pathways, RCPs) under the SSP2 socio-economic pathway. RCP2.6

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represents the low emissions scenario in line with the Paris Agreement, whilst RCP6.0 represents a medium to high emissions scenario.

Emerging Issues on the Climate Change, Peace and Security Nexus

Climate impacts are compounding other pressures and are changing the access and availability of natural resources. The impacts of climate change on natural resources such as land, water, and forests are manifold across the African continent. Where small arms are readily available, histories of conflict or social and ethnic cleavages exist, groups are marginalised, and natural resource management and conflict management institutions are challenged, this competition can turn into violent conflict.

Food, water and energy insecurity, exacerbated by climate change, can drive a number of security relevant challenges, in particular for already vulnerable population groups. For example, the interruption in the provision of food, water and energy or their fast increases in price can feed into pre-existing grievances and act as triggers for political instability.

Climate impacts are accelerating several mobility trends. By far the largest migration trend that is impacted by climate risks is migration within countries, in particular from rural areas to cities. By putting rural livelihoods under pressure, climate impacts are accelerating rural-urban migration. Climate change is also increasing the frequency and severity of weather-induced disasters, and with it, the risks of displacement. At the same time, conflict is also a major driver of displacement and displacement often goes hand in hand with several risks, in particular when it comes to the vulnerability of certain groups (women, youth, people living with disability, the elderly).

Climate-related security risks are providing a fertile breeding ground for non-state armed groups such as militias, terrorist and criminal groups in Africa as they increase the pressure on state institutions. Non-state armed groups often use governance gaps to further undermine state institutions and build their own legitimacy and strength by providing cash and humanitarian aid in the aftermath of droughts, conflict resolution mechanisms and access to justice for disputes over natural resources and even building their own schools and providing education opportunities to the local population. For example, climate impacts such as droughts can drive recruitment towards illegal fishing, trafficking activities, and piracy. Furthermore, armed groups also often deepen environmental challenges: illegal resource extraction and environmental crimes such as poaching, and illegal logging and mining are often an important source of revenue for these groups.

The way climate-related security risks play out on the African continent is highly dependent and influenced by several external risks and pressures. Many African countries are highly dependent on food imports and thus on the policies in food producing countries and on global markets. Food price shocks strongly affect local food security and provision which when disturbed can increase grievances and political instability. Energy price shocks have also negatively impacted many African governments that have lacked fiscal leeway to put in place wide-scale measures to counter rising energy prices. In addition, the projected emergence of climate-related border tariffs designed by some of Africa’s trade partners may have deeply negative impacts on African economies and livelihood. Indeed, Africa holds a substantive amount of the world's mineral reserves. These minerals are crucial for the green transition

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and include cobalt, manganese and lithium. As the demand for critical materials essential to clean energy technologies is rising, it brings risks and opportunities for Africa as Africa needs to avoid mirroring the export of other raw materials from the continent without leaving much value added and instead maximize the benefits of its rich mineral reserve for its people.

While there have been significant improvements in terms of capacities to assess and address climate-related security risks, there are still significant gaps: African research capacities are still lagging behind. From 1990–2019, climate-related research on Africa received less than 5% of global funding and more than three quarters of this funding went to EU and north American institutions and less than 15% to African institutions. This trend is also mirrored for research on climate-related security risks with most of the capacities to conduct such research being concentrated outside of the African continent.

While there are regional strategies addressing climate-related security risks, similar strategies on the national level often do not exist, creating implementation gaps. A significant barrier to implementing climate security strategies is the lack of clarity regarding ownership and coordination of these topics on different levels. Some regional organisations such as IGAD and ECOWAS have dedicated structures and mechanisms, while others still have not created such institutional arrangements. This is largely mirrored on the national level where responsibilities are spread across different sectors and ministries. This fragmentation inhibits the development and execution of coherent and effective climate security policies. Governments often also lack mechanisms for effective coordination and collaboration between national and local stakeholders to ensure the integration of climate-related security risks.

The financing gap for both climate action and peacebuilding and conflict prevention remains enormous. The latest IPCC report states that annual climate financing flows to the African continent are billions behind the lowest adaptation cost estimates. And of the existing commitments not enough are being dispersed: between 2014-2018 less than half of commitments were disbursed. And more than half of all the climate-related investments are concentrated in only 10 African countries. The current flow of funds for adaptation in Africa is insufficient and falls billions of dollars short of the estimated minimum cost. Meeting the targets set out for adaptation in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in Africa would require an additional funding of 41.3 billion USD annually.

The African Development Bank has stated that Africa will require $2.7 trillion by 2030 to address its climate change needs. Existing Financing is not going to those contexts and countries that are the most vulnerable to climate impacts and security risks. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) acknowledges that co-financing for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and African states that are affected by fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) experiencing medium-intensity conflict and high institutional and social fragility is comparatively lower than the co-financing leveraged in other African states. An analysis of almost 1000 projects, representing US$14.4 billion, conducted in 146 countries, including 56 fragile states, revealed that conflict and fragility might hinder access to and implementation of climate finance. Projects supported by vertical funds in extremely fragile states are much smaller than those in fragile or non-fragile states. From January 2014 to June 2021, only one extremely fragile state from Africa had access to vertical fund climate financing. A similar study on climate funding in conflict and fragile states found that as of 2020, less than a third of all GEF-funded projects were implemented in conflict-affected

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contexts. Furthermore, some projects in conflict-affected African countries were cancelled, dropped or increased the duration of delays because of security issues.

Findings on the Study of the Nexus between Climate Change, Peace and Security

Africa is leading in institutional innovations and cross-sectoral cooperation to address climate-related security risks

Recent years have seen a strong increase in the creation of dedicated institutions and cross-sectoral cooperation mechanisms to address climate-related security risks. Globally, Africa is an innovative leader in this area. The are major ongoing collaborative efforts between African regional organisations and the AU, the UN system, government agencies, and civil society organizations, to address the impact of climate change on peace and security in their region. Different organisations have also started to create dedicated climate-security positions and capacities: the UN Regional Working Group on Climate Change, Environment, Security and Development (UN-CCESD), the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa have their own dedicated environmental and climate-security advisers.

The 'Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace' initiative launched by the Egyptian COP27 presidency is a continental effort to facilitate African knowledge sharing and capacity building focussing on climate adaptation and peacebuilding. The African Development Bank Group's strategy for addressing fragility and building resilience 2022-2026 focuses on building resilience to various vulnerabilities, including climate change and it aims to address the root causes of conflict and fragility and emphasizes investment in crisis prevention across different fragile countries. Another interesting initiative is the Africa Climate Mobility Initiative (ACMI), a collaboration between the African Union Commission, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the World Bank created in 2021 to generate political momentum and a common policy agenda on climate mobility in Africa, and to support implementation capacity and partnerships on the continent.

In addition, the request at the 1163rd meeting of the PSC held at Ministerial level on 21 July 2023 to the AU Office of the Special Envoy on Women Peace and Security to integrate issues relating to Women in Development and Climate Change, in its future forums, taking into consideration the outcomes of the meeting on "the overarching challenges of climate change and the women's agenda" organized on 16 February 2023 on the margins of the 36th Summit of the African Union, is yet another positive development. Finally, CGIAR, a consortium of international research organisations, has started to create dedicated climate security initiatives across the continent.

Early Warning and early action systems are improving, but key challenges remain to integrate the climate change, peace and security Nexus

Early warning analysis to inform planning and action is a major component of addressing climate-related security risks. They are also at the heart of prevention strategies, both in terms of preparing for natural hazards but also addressing violent conflict or other threats to human security. Collection and analysis of disaggregated data on the Climate Change, Peace and Security nexus are important to address multi-

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dimensional vulnerabilities, but unfortunately large parts of the African continent suffer from severe shortcomings in hydro-meteorological infrastructure and services as well as multi-hazard monitoring capacities. Less than half of African countries have Early Warning and Early Action (EWEA) systems, largely due to poor access to and availability of reliable data. Those systems that exist often suffer from quality issues. Despite these challenges, several organisations and African governments have undertaken efforts to develop EWEA systems that integrate both climate and security risks across the continent. These systems focus either the local, national, regional, or continental level.

The AU has two major EWEA systems that look at the climate-conflict nexus. Firstly, the Africa Multi-Hazard Early Warning and Early Action System (AMHEWAS) programme, which is embedded in the Department for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment department (DARBE). It aims to integrate four elements of early warning, namely risk knowledge, monitoring and warning services, risk communication and response capacity. Outputs from AMHEWAS, such as the weekly Continental Watch, focus almost exclusively on the forecast of natural hazards, such as extreme precipitation, flooding, and storms, but without drawing linkages with existing vulnerabilities regarding peace and security. Secondly, the AU Commission for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AUC-PAPS) department has the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), which was created as a tool for the anticipation and prevention of conflict within the broader framework of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by focusing on conflict drivers such as poor governance, poverty, transnational organized crimes, inequality and exclusive practices and tendencies. CEWS does not draw interlinkages between climate change, environmental issues, and conflict and insecurity trends.

There have been efforts to strengthen collaboration across those two pillars by developing for instance joint outputs focusing on both climate and environmental indicators as well as peace and security data, but such initiatives have not been operationalised. Apart from these AU early warning systems, there are some other regional initiatives, most notably the African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development (ACMAD) African Multi-Hazard Advisory Centre (AMHAC), established in late 2022 in Niger, which aims to further enhance the continental capacity to generate regular continental hazards and disaster situation reports, continental climate trends and impacts as well as impact-based advisories and watches. Similar as to AMHEWAS, its role is to support national meteorological services and other stakeholders during hazard seasons, but it does not comprehensively integrate non-climatic indicators.

At the national level, concrete examples for countries that have strengthened their Early Warning and Early Action Systems have shown, for example, that the early warning strategy and relocation of communities confronted to disasters prevented a significant death toll, especially when comparing to casualties in previous disasters or with some other regional countries with less developed EWEA systems.

At the local level, EWEA systems are known to be most effective when integrated into community and informal networks.

Regional Risks Analysis and Currently Implemented Responses in Africa

<u>Northern Africa:</u>

- Key Climate-Risk Pathways:

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- *Rising water insecurity:* North Africa is already experiencing the impacts of water insecurity. The region is one of the driest in the world and has restricted water resources. A combination of receding supply, driven by climate change impacts, and rising demand has several important security implications: as water resources are getting scarcer and agricultural livelihoods are increasingly under pressure, this pressure can contribute to grievances and political instability.
- *Food Security challenges:* Changing climatic condition and rising water scarcity endanger domestic agriculture and deepen the region's reliance on imports. Food price shocks occurred despite high food subsidy regimes across the region. In the next years, climate change will likely lead to further market shocks and the cost of food imports compared to GDP is to increase further.
- *Fossil fuel dependency and the green transition*: Northern Africa remains largely invested in the extraction and use of fossil fuels. Despite policy reforms, the region still subsidises fossil fuels for consumers, which further lock in a fossil economy and as long as fossil fuel prices remain high. The countries most exposed to transition risk have the least incentive to diversify their economies and so are the least prepared to deal with its effects; and
- *Human mobility, migration and displacement:* Both internal and regional migration are set to rise as consequence of climate change, through environmental challenges causing displacement, and its follow-on effects, such as loss of livelihood and conflict. While migration is an important adaptation measure, it can also become a driver for tensions and conflict.

- Key Regional Responses:
  - *Managing fossil water reserves:* As the fossil aquifers are largely transnational, they require monitoring on a regional level. Regional data on fossil aquifers can be the base to avoid unsustainable depletion and contamination.
  - *Climate Security Networks:* Regional organisations partly or completely encompassing the Northern African region have initiated debate on climate security issues.
  - *Infrastructure and restoration projects:* Northern African states have demonstrated successful leadership with ambitious projects to restore and protect the natural and man-made environment against climate change.
  - *Subsidy reform:* Northern African states have begun tackling subsidy policy reform. If conducted correctly, subsidy reform can reduce certain climate security risks and increase the resilience of Northern African populations.
  - *Green transition:* Several Northern African states have successfully attracted international investments to boost their renewable capacity; and
  - *Adopting sustainability:* Northern African states have begun adopting numerous projects at different scales dedicated to improving sustainability which will also address climate security risks.

<u>Western Africa:</u>

- Key Climate-Risk Pathways:
  - F*ood and livelihood insecurity:* The impacts of climate change on food systems are likely to have negative impacts on food security. As West Africa provides around 1/3 of the food needs of the continent, disruptions to the region's food system may have important food security implications beyond its borders.

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- *Natural resource competition and conflicts:* Modified natural resource availability throughout the region due to climate impacts, with water and fodder reserves declining because of droughts and flooding, and land degradation accelerating, aggravates conflicts such as agro-pastoral incidents, disputes over dwindling fish stocks, and tensions over land and forest sharing and tenure. Armed groups can leverage this context by settling disputes and recruiting disgruntled communities, particularly youth.
- *Changing migration patterns:* Climate change contributes to sudden changes to displacement, transhumance and forced immobility, impacting the security of populations, be they on the move, hosting or involuntarily immobile. The loss of traditional mediation mechanisms deepens risks that disputes grow into violent conflict.
- *West African cities as hotspots of climate security dynamics:* Almost half of the West Africans live in cities, and the urban population is still growing rapidly. Rural exodus is an adaptation strategy that will likely intensify as climate change impacts increase, deepening sub-urban poverty and leading to insecurity.

- Key Regional Responses:
  - *Transboundary cooperation in resource management*: Transboundary resource management cooperation has been one of the major axes of regional policy on climate security. Apart from transboundary water management, collaboration exist in numerous other domains to strengthen climate resilience, such as the Great Green Wall initiative.
  - *Risk planning and early warning systems*: Relevant regional initiatives include the ECOWAS' Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) along with its regional centre Aghrymet and WANEP's regional early warning system, which is focused on conflict, integrating aspects of the climate security nexus.
  - *Conflict-sensitive climate adaptation and climate-informed peacebuilding*: Existing climate action in the region is focused on adaptation to bolster livelihoods, tackle armed opposition, ensure sustainable access to natural resources, develop and implement conflict-sensitive climate adaptation plans and link the Women, Peace and Security agenda with climate and environmental issues. Conversely, several peacebuilding efforts in West Africa have a clear environmental or climate focus; and
  - *Integrated interventions*: Various efforts in West Africa consider climate security as a way to address a multitude of issues in the region, holistically across natural resource governance, resilience and adaptation, sustainable resource use, disaster risk reduction and preparedness. The region has thus witnessed the creation of an ECOWAS-UNOWAS Working Group on Climate Change and Security, and the establishment of a UN Regional Working Group on Climate Change, Security, Environment and Development (UN-CCESD).

<u>Central Africa:</u>

- Key Climate-Risk Pathways:
  - *Livelihood and food insecurity intensify competition over natural resources, contributing to violent conflict and insecurity:* In Central Africa, the agricultural sector and pastoralism are the main sources of income. Livelihood losses can quickly result in food insecurity, which is known to be both a consequence and a cause of conflict. While tensions within and between groups, because of the effects of climate change on the availability of and

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access to natural resources, typically plays out in a very localised manner, they can quickly escalate. Mining is also a regional livelihood that is linked with climate and that can involve illicit networks, including armed groups for which the mining and/or taxation of mining activities is an important financing source.

- *Climate impacts exacerbate the proliferation of armed and criminal groups:* Climate change has compounded core drivers of conflict and strengthened the ability of armed groups' efforts to recruit, retain and re-recruit people, especially youth. Herders may either protect themselves or seek protection from armed groups, and the latter gain economic profits from the cattle trade. The spread of firearms amongst transhumant pastoralist and their alleged involvement in arms trafficking is further driving intercommunal hostility. Environmental degradation is one of the main drivers of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, as well as overfishing and maritime crime such as arms and drugs trafficking, human trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea.
- *Climate impacts exacerbate challenges around human mobility, contributing to increased conflict and security risks:* When climate and environmental pressures increase, refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities suffer from the consequences, especially when natural resources are scarce. Competition can then escalate into conflicts around access to livelihoods, natural resources, aid and development resources. With increased climatic pressures, fertile land has become extremely scarce, resulting into conflicts between local farmers, sedentary agro-pastoralists and transhumant pastoralists.
- *Conflict intensifies environmental degradation:* Conflict causes environmental degradation in different ways: pollution of air, water and soil, as well as deliberate environmental destruction and the use of resources as weapons of conflict. These dynamics threaten ecosystems like the Lake Chad Basin and the Congo Basin, which are both of critical importance for livelihoods. The latter is one of the last remaining net carbon sinks in the world, but the impact of climate change combined with direct, human-made environmental pressures damage its ability to absorb CO2. Another growing climate security challenge is human-wildlife conflicts in both savanna and forest ecosystems because of climate change and human-made environmental stressors.

- Key Regional Responses:
  - *Cross-border agreements:* Regional organisation such as the ECCAS and the Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC) or the Network of Central African Protected Areas (RAPAC) facilitate promising developments.
  - *Strengthening social cohesion between pastoralists and farmers, and between pastoral communities*: Local and traditional committees benefit from support to prevent conflicts and promote peace by mediating natural resource management, facilitate local justice mechanisms to address grievances and manage conflicts, and foster intercommunal dialogue, with the objective to improve perceptions and change attitudes and behaviours between farmers and herders.
  - *Blended finance to support joint peacebuilding and conservation interventions that target drivers of conflict and instability:* Support provided to deploy a new force of rangers and ecoguards and a REDD+ strategy aimed at reducing drivers of deforestation, accessing

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carbon market, providing alternative livelihood models that bring co-benefits to the communities, and fostering durable conservation and peace.

- *Conservation efforts can integrate climate adaptation and peacebuilding objectives at the local level*: Various initiatives foster alternative income opportunities (agroforestry and beekeeping) for local and indigenous communities, support community welfare and livelihoods, implement inclusive management principles, provide job opportunities, regulate multi-use areas in protected areas, and empower local communities to engage in Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of conservation efforts.

<u>Eastern Africa:</u>

Key Climate-Risk Pathways:

- *Competition over natural resources:* Competition over natural resources, particularly over water, land, and forests, can arise from both resource scarcity and abundance, and is driven by various factors, along with climate-related impacts. Pastoralism is a major factor behind many communal resource-related conflicts. The most prevalent form of these conflicts is not conflicts between farmers and pastoralists but cattle rustling which has turned violent due to the proliferation of small arms and weapons and can be tied to transnational organised criminal networks, particularly in border areas.
- *Livelihood and food insecurity*: Agriculture, pastoralism, and fisheries play a central role in the livelihoods and food security. They are dependent on climate-sensitive resources such as water. For example, excessive rainfall has led to a spike in incidence of livestock diseases. For lake fisheries, reduced precipitation can have negative consequences on the habitat of freshwater species. There are also gender implications as women are more dependent on small-scale agriculture and livestock production. Conversely, the infrastructural damages and livelihood disruptions caused by protracted conflicts also impede access of vulnerable groups to essential services and markets, hereby weakening agricultural and livestock-dependent livelihoods.
- *Maritime fisheries and security:* Coastal and island communities are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change: slow and rapid onset events such as sea level rise and cyclone sand storm surges can cause loss of life and widespread damage to infrastructure, thereby affecting livelihood and food security, and causing significant economic losses, coastal flooding and erosion threaten the region's rich diversity of sea grasses, weakening the natural protection of coastal areas, leading to higher flood risks, warmer sea surface temperatures and ocean acidification affect the health of the coral reefs, challenging the livelihoods and food security of coastal and island communities.
- *Changing mobility patterns:* Climate change can make the availability of water and grazing resources less reliable and predictable, causing pastoralists to change grazing routes which could amplify clashes with other pastoralists and farmers. Climate-induced migration of inland communities to coastal areas could increase competition over limited fish stocks. Droughts can also drive populations to areas with more favourable conditions for agriculture, leading to competition over cultivable land between migrant and resident populations. Climate change impacts will likely feed into the trend of rural-urban migration, which could create additional insecurity in urban areas. Increasingly difficult conditions at home may even push more people to pursue irregular forms of migration.

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Conversely, the securitisation of borders hinders mobility and thus threatens the livelihoods of borderland communities that are dependent on pastoralism and cross-border trade. Such trends disproportionately expose youths to the risks that may occur on route or at the destination, while leaving a disproportionate number of dependents to face livelihood risks at home.

- *Exploitation by armed groups:* Prevailing climatic and environmental conditions can hinder or ease the operations of Armed Groups, as well as on the existence and lucrativeness of economic activities that provide them with financial support. While recruitment into armed groups is a complex phenomenon that is driven by a range of factors including identity, religion, social and political marginalisation, it is also happening against the backdrop of the impacts of climate change in worsening livelihood conditions and reducing income. This is especially the case for young pastoralists and in refugee camps, particularly those located in border areas.

- Key Regional Responses
  - *Strong international cooperation on matters related to climate change and security:* The UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) stands out as one of the world's first climate-sensitive political missions and has included in 2020 an environmental and climate security adviser. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa also have climate and security advisers. The UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has several projects on the climate-conflict nexus. Finally, the World Food Programme's R4 Rural Resilience Initiative uses risk management strategies to promote sustainable farming practices and resilience among the poorest farmers.
  - *Proactive regional cooperation to address the Climate Change, Peace and Security Nexus:* Several institutions, strategies and mechanisms, such as IGAD's 3 specialized institutions, its Climate Security Coordination Mechanism and its Regional Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan for 2023-2030 clearly demonstrate a drive to assess climate, peace and security-related risks. The 'Kampala Ministerial Declaration on Migration, Environment and Climate Change' calls for countries to work together to address the risks associated with climate-induced migration. EAC has two semi-autonomous institutions that have made headways in fostering cooperation on resource management. The Horn of Africa's initiative partly focuses on building resilience to climate change impacts in the region's borderland areas. CGIAR has projects and tools focusing on the links between climate and security, including the Climate Security Observatory and a Climate Security Sensitiveness Scoring Tool (CSST).
  - *Gender inclusivity:* Efforts have been made in the region for the inclusion of women in peacebuilding and decision-making, recognising the security issues faced by women, including those related to climate change, gender-based violence, and access to justice.
  - *Climate-sensitive livelihoods*: There is a strong degree of integration of climate resilience-building strategies in policies pertaining to the blue economy for small island states where marine and coastal resources are the backbone of their livelihoods.
  - *Climate-conflict sensitivity*: Efforts have been made to embed aspects of livelihood resilience and grassroots engagement in responses to conflict and security issues

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including through a number of policies on climate, environment, and food security that understand climate-related security risks and conditions under which such risks emerge.
- *Human health:* National level climate policies in East Africa are increasingly recognising the importance of human health considerations in addressing climate-related impacts.
- *The important contributions of Civil Society Organisations*: Formal and informal networks of CSOs are supporting early warning and early response systems. In some cases, CSOs are an integral part of conflict early warning and response strategies. They also play important roles in natural resource management in East Africa.
- *The key influence of traditional authorities and local cultural norms in how potential conflicts are mitigated or addressed*: Local conflict resolution mechanisms have reduced the risk of inter-group violence as local cultural norms influence how potential conflicts are mitigated or addressed. They have been incorporated with tangible results in several peacebuilding initiatives in the region. Furthermore, indigenous customs are instrumental in conserving natural resources such as forests.
- *The private sector has been a major strength in terms of climate adaptation*: The Private Sector is providing adaptive climate services such as agricultural extension services and livestock insurances reaching, in some cases, more farmers than formal providers.

Southern Africa:

- Key Climate-Risk Pathways:
  - *More frequent weather induced disasters compound root causes of instability*: Extreme-weather events, whose frequency is increasing due to climate change, together with other factors such as high international fuel prices, and macroeconomic instability, are affecting food security in the region and can drive instability and social unrest, particularly in communities highly dependent on agricultural livelihoods. Furthermore, disasters strain state services, hinder development, and worsen health conditions.
  - *Climate risks and conflict impact human mobility*: Mobility, particularly from rural to urban areas, is increasingly serving as a climate adaptation strategy. Extreme-weather events and violence are displacing populations temporary and permanently, increasing competition over livelihoods and natural resources. In addition, when people leave rural areas, there is a decrease in agricultural labour and knowledge, resulting in negative impacts on food security.
  - *Land and water access and use conflicts*: Climate impacts put pressure on land, leading to encroachment, displacement, and unsustainable practices. Furthermore, water disputes are rising, including between upstream and downstream farmers, due in part to the increasing frequency and severity of droughts. There is also a surge in conflicts between humans and wildlife as animals have been forced to migrate closer to human settlements due to the lack of grazing land and water sources.
  - *Weak governance of high-value natural resources*: While the green transition offers a lot of opportunities, there are also risks. First, a more significant demand for critical minerals can increase conflicts around mining, and second, the transition can bring loss of revenue to countries dependent on extractive industries and in particular those that rely on fossil fuels, resulting in job losses, social tensions, and stranded assets.

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Key Regional Responses:

- *Strengthened Early Warning Systems*: The SADC Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) for conflict prevention, management and resolution focuses mainly on conflict-related data but is beginning to incorporate information on climate-related factors and collaborating with units focused on reducing disaster risks.
- *Leveraging Resilience and DRR Regional Policies*: The SADC Regional Resilience Framework 2020-2030 takes an integrated approach to sustainable development, disaster risk reduction, and climate change adaptation. Promising examples of early warning systems include the Southern African Regional Climate Outlook Forum (SARCOF), the SADC Regional Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis (RVAA) Programme and the SADC Disaster Risk Management and Information System (DRM IMS).
- *Well-developed Regional Water Management*: The Regional Strategic Action Plan for Integrated Water Resources Development and Management (RSAP-IWRM) showcase awareness of the potential dangers of water issues and have therefore initiated. Several bilateral and multilateral institutions, including river basin organizations (RBOs) have also been established to foster cooperation among shared river courses.
- *Renewable Energy Transition*: There are positive examples of mobilisation of international finance to support decarbonization efforts while creating opportunities for workers and communities and providing a blueprint for a just energy transition.
- *Addressing Internal Displacement Caused by Climate Hazards and Conflict*: Efforts have been made to identify and implement policies and strategies aiming to reduce the impact of disasters and conflict on the population and the number of displaced people by improving aid support and coordination. Tangible experiences have shown that the early warning strategy and relocation of communities prevented a significant death toll.
- *Integrated Water Management and Nature-Based Solutions*: Efforts have been made in the region to restore degraded watersheds through emergency rehabilitation measures, nature-based solutions and implementing catchment management plans and thus talking unsustainable land use patterns and water conflicts, promoting climate resilience, and offering livelihood opportunities for local communities.
- *Localised climate security assessments:* There have been cases in the region of local stakeholders co-designing an approach and mapping stakeholders, hazards, climate security risks and solutions for local climate security assessments. This inclusive approach facilitates the collection of relevant information from various sources.
- *Community-Based Natural Resource Management*: Some approaches have been piloted in the region to combine traditional and scientific methods as well as reintroduce traditional governance and management systems for pastoral resources and have gained support from traditional leaders.

Key recommendations

Recommendations on the Chairperson's Report on the Study on the nexus between Climate Change, Peace and Security are as follows:

- <u>Recommendation Package 1: Acknowledge leading stakeholders in Africa, in particular:</u>

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- The African Union Assembly and the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC)
- The Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee of the African Union Development Agency-NEPAD
- The African Union Peace and Security Council as well as the AGA and APSA Platform
- The Regional Economic Communities and the Regional Mechanisms
- All Departments of the AU Commission
- The African Union Network of Think Tanks for Climate and Peace

- Recommandation Package 2 : Enhance Governance :
  - *Develop and strengthen climate-security capacities and institutions*: Facilitate exchanges of experiences, training and capacity building at the regional, national and local level to strengthen and extend dedicated climate-security capacities and structures.
  - *Ensure broad inclusivity*: Involve the most marginalised in decision-making process from policies to projects through programs to empower and enable effective participation and developing leadership skills.
  - *Focus on the most marginalised and vulnerable*: Actions should be targeted towards women, children, youth, people living with disabilities, the elderly, internally displaced persons and refugees and other minority groups that are marginalised.
  - *Support Human Rights, including environmental rights*: Facilitate engagement and protection mechanisms for environmental defenders and human rights activists.
  - *Address gender-based violence*: Integrate and upscale action on Gender-based violence across climate-security programming.
  - *Continue to strengthen the climate-conflict nexus in early warning and early action*: Incorporate a clear set of climate security indicators and draw clear linkages in early warning and early action to indirect, cascading risks related to climate change
  - *Foster cross-sectoral cooperation*: Responses to climate-related security risks must address the different dimensions of risks, including humanitarian, development, peace and conflict, and adaptation and environment sectors.
- Recommendation Package 3: Develop Knowledge:
  - *Build capacities and awareness of civil society*: More climate-security capacities for civil society will be pivotal to fill the action gap and address Climate Risks.
  - *Use local and traditional knowledge and institutions*: Using local, traditional and indigenous knowledge and institutions for conflict resolution are important success factors for climate-security interventions and should be integrated from the beginning.
  - *Understand differences*: Data collection must be disaggregated by gender, age and other identity factors that shape risk and resilience. Climate-security assessments need to critically reflect these factors and use an intersectional research lens and climate-security action needs to be tailored to those most vulnerable.
- Recommendation Package 4: Foster Partnerships:
  - *Harness Civil Society Organizations*: Civil society organisations often have experience in implementing projects in challenging environments and access to networks, local context knowledge and analytical capacities. Partnerships for implementation on climate-security risks should therefore be upscaled to ensure delivery on the ground.

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- *Engage with the private sector*: The private sector can be a risk multiplier, but also a powerful lever to build more resilient states and societies and therefore play a positive role in addressing climate-related security risks. It is important to not approach the private sector as a monolith but in a contextual manner instead.
- *Ensure a just transition*: There needs to be sufficient investment into the green transition in Africa and enabling equal opportunities for growth and development. This includes developing local value chains for green technologies to better position Africa in the global transition both in terms of innovation and value chains.
- *Reduce external risks:* The global north has a responsibility to ensure that key policies on food, energy, trade, migration, corruption, minerals and development cooperation are climate-security sensitive and don't exacerbate risks on the African continent.

- Recommendation Package 5: Mobilize Finance for Africa's special needs and circumstances:
  - *Close the adaptation financing gap:* There must be a significant overall increase in climate finance for Africa, in particular for adaptation. Non-conditional grants must be increased and it is also imperative to use context-and conflict-sensitive approaches to ensure that adaptation action is not leading to new conflict risks, and to identify peacebuilding and conflict-prevention co-benefits.
  - *Finance Loss and Damage:* Invest in risk prevention and resilience building, including through better and easier access to finance, investments in absorption capacities and the rapid operationalisation of the loss and damage fund. Multilateral financial institutions must implement reforms that enable debt relief for conflict-affected and the most fragile countries and facilitate increased financing to cope with extreme weather.
  - *Reach the most vulnerable, conflict affected and fragile contexts:* Financing for conflict-affected and fragile countries must be ramped up and more easily accessible, while capacities to manage these funds need to be strengthened.
  - *Strengthen African financing facilities:* Strengthen the African risk facility by improving access for countries that face funding problems, and the understanding of how the risk facility works at the national level. The African Peace Fund needs to be urgently operationalized and scaled up.
  - *Provide financing to upscale climate-security actions*: It is imperative to invest now in projects that build resilience against climate-related security risks. In addition, finance organisations should integrate climate-related security risks across their portfolios.
- Recommendation Package 6: Define African Solutions for African Challenges:
  - *Seize the strength of the young generation*: A strong focus on primary, secondary and tertiary education and employment opportunities for youth, including through climate literacy and focus on green skills and sectors is a key prevention and resilience strategy. *Strengthen African analysis, research and data collection*: African analysis, research and data collection capacities have to be improved to provide more contextualised analysis of climate-related security. The African Migration Observatory need be bolstered to provide relevant and timely data in that regard.
  - *Develop and Adopt a Common African Position on the Climate Change, Peace and Security Nexus:* Unify Africa's voices and actions to address the nexus through such a position based on the guidance of the Member States, the 15 Key Messages presented to the AU PSC in November 2022, and this Report.

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