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**REPORT OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA AND
THE OPERATIONS OF THE AFRICAN UNION SUPPORT AND STABILIZATION MISSION IN
SOMALIA (AUSSOM)**

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(AUSSOM)**

I. BACKGROUND

1. This report is submitted to the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) pursuant to Communiqués PSC/PR/COMM.1253 (2024), PSC/PR/COMM.1276 (2025), PSC/MIN/COMM.1287 (2025) adopted during its 1253rd, 1276th, and 1287th sessions, respectively, as well as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2767 (2024). The report presents key developments in Somalia and progress achieved in the implementation of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) mandate covering the period July to December 2025. It includes observations and recommendations on the way forward.

II. MAIN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. During the reporting period, Somalia continued to advance its national priorities under the leadership of H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, including strengthening inclusive political national dialogue. Between June and August 2025, the President held extensive consultations with the National Salvation Forum (NSF), focused on constitutional amendments and the electoral model. These engagements culminated in an agreement on a Revised Electoral Framework, marking progress toward universal suffrage. Despite some opposition boycotts and persisting divergences, the agreement underscored Somalia's commitment to unity, political stability, and inclusive governance.

3. Pursuant to the Revised Electoral Framework, the National Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC) reopened voters' registration in Mogadishu from 9 to 30 September 2025, enabling newly registered political organizations to enlist supporters. On 29 November 2025, NIEBC announced that Banadir district council elections will be held on 25 December 2025 across 16 districts, with 61 political organizations participating. The announcement followed the launch of voter identity documents (ID) distribution in Hodan District, after successful completion of similar exercises in seven Mogadishu districts, Xamar Weyne, Shangani, Boondheere, Xamar Jajab, Waaberi, Shibis, and Abdiiaziz.

4. Despite these electoral gains, relations between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), Puntland and Jubaland authorities remain strained.

III. SECURITY SITUATION

5. The security situation improved notably following the successful launching of Operation Silent Storm in response to al-Shabaab's 30-day offensive in March/April 2025. As a result, the number of incidents in Mogadishu significantly declined, and overall security conditions improved.

6. However, Al-Shabaab still retains the capacity to infiltrate and conduct opportunistic attacks, illustrated by the assault on Godka Jilow prison, which occurred shortly after the government reopened key roads in Mogadishu for the first time in more than a decade.

7. Localized clan disputes persisted in Hirshabelle and Lower Shabelle. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) responded by engaging traditional and political leaders to support reconciliation processes and address the root causes of conflicts. These initiatives remain essential to sustainable peace and social cohesion.

IV. PROGRESS ON JOINT OPERATIONS AND COORDINATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA (FGS)

8. In implementing its mandate, AUSSOM continued to maintain its presence across all sectors, securing key population centres and supporting Somali Security Forces (SSF) with logistics, joint planning, and operations. AUSSOM and SSF jointly recaptured Awdheegle town in Lower Shabelle during the third phase of Operation Silent Storm, which culminated on 5 October 2025. The surrender of the Al-Shabaab district commissioner and his fighters contributed to a decisive victory. This followed earlier gains in Bariire, Sabiid, and Anole, consolidating significant territorial recovery.

9. Furthermore, AUSSOM continued to support the Somali Police Force (SPF) with escorts, guard duties, joint patrols and additional patrols across Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, and Beletweyne. Additional joint operations supported by AUSSOM, local defence forces, and international partners continued across the Area of Responsibility (AOR), including air and ground strikes targeting Al-Shabaab leadership. In Middle Shabelle, local defence forces eliminated several militants and senior commanders.

10. In Bay and Bakool, SSF dismantled hostile camps, seized weapons, and neutralised senior militants. Operations in Jamaame (Lower Juba) and Afgooye (Lower Shabelle) yielded further success, including the destruction of illegal detention sites and rescue of over 30 civilians. These gains illustrate the growing capability of SSF to undertake major offensive operations. However, parallel efforts to extend governance, restore state authority, and address urgent humanitarian needs remain essential to consolidate gains and sustain public confidence.

V. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

11. Somalia continues to face a severe humanitarian emergency driven by conflict, displacement, and worsening drought. On 10 November 2025, the FGS declared a state of emergency, warning of risks associated with climate change. Approximately 4.4 million people are projected to face food insecurity between October and December 2025.

12. In addition, funding shortfalls are acute. By November, the 2025 Somalia Humanitarian Plan was only 23.7% funded, with USD 337.3 million received of the USD 1.42 billion required. Without urgent support, livelihoods may collapse, and widespread food and water shortages could result in further loss of lives.

13. While lacking an explicit humanitarian mandate, AUSSOM has continued to facilitate humanitarian access, deliver relief supplies, and provide water, food, and medical assistance, particularly in hard-to-reach areas.

VI. OPERATIONALISATION OF THE MISSION

14. In line with Council directives, operationalization of AUSSOM progressed, with maintained personnel levels and reconfiguration under Phase 2. A technical team from Egypt conducted assessments in August 2025 ahead of deployment planning. Additionally, coordination meetings among AUSSOM, FGS, and the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) continued throughout October and December, including a joint reconnaissance mission to Baledogle.

15. The AU, UN, and FGS consultations from 26 August 2025 to 8 September 2025 advanced preparations for the Joint Technical Assessment pursuant to UNSCR 2767 (2024). Findings will inform authorization of subsequent AUSSOM phases and an updated exit strategy. Funding shortfalls persist,

despite major efforts, including the September donor conference. Reduced financial resources risk undermining operational effectiveness as UNSOS experiences a 25% expenditure cut. The Council may wish to urge partners to ensure adequate, predictable and sustainable financing to support AUSSOM and Somali Security Forces (SSF).

VII. MISSION SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS AND FINANCIAL CHALLENGES

A. Background

16. AUSSOM, supported by UNSOS, is operating in an increasingly constrained financial and operational environment. UNSOS, funded through the United Nations peacekeeping assessed budget, has been directed to identify USD 130 million reductions in expenditure during the current fiscal year (spanning June 2025 to July 26), representing 25% of its approved USD 520 million budget. These constraints have significant implications for AUSSOM's core capabilities, particularly aviation support, contingent-owned equipment (COE) management, force sustainment, and logistical support.

17. Against this backdrop, the AU and UN convened Director-level consultations from 13–14 November 2025, to advance UNSOS contingency planning and preserve essential support functions for the Mission. Additionally, the AU is coordinating closely with the UN on force generation for Battle Groups, Formed Police Units, and Aviation Units, including ongoing MOU/LOA tripartite negotiations and budgetary preparations required for new deployments such as the incoming Egyptian contingent.

18. According to the AUSSOM Concept of Operations (CONOPS), the authorized strength of the Mission is 11,911 personnel, comprising 11,826 uniformed personnel (11,146 military and 680 police personnel) and 85 civilians. The estimate budget for AUSSOM from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 is USD 190.2 million and includes the following:

- a. Military, inclusive of contingents, Mission and Force Headquarters staff (USD 152.9 million);
- b. Police, inclusive of police leadership, formed police units and individual police officers (USD 14.6 million);
- c. International civilian personnel (USD 14.0 million);
- d. Operational costs covering official travel; facilities and infrastructure; ground transportation; information technology; medical; other services and supplies (USD 3.9 million);
- e. Other support, including quick impact projects (USD 0.8 million); and
- f. Thematic programmatic activities (\$4.0 million).

19. Additional challenges relate to the persistent delays in the payment of stipends for military and police personnel, which continues to affect all AUSSOM Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs). These delays have been compounded by outstanding financial obligations inherited from the previous African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), including unpaid troop allowances, reimbursements for contingent-owned equipment (COE), and other mission-related liabilities.

20. The accumulation of these arrears has negatively impacted on the confidence of TCCs/PCCs, complicated national budget planning, and risks undermining morale and operational readiness. Failure to address these legacy debts in parallel with the new UNSOS contingency measures may

further erode the credibility of the AU–UN partnership and jeopardize sustained political and operational commitment from contributing countries.

21. The evolving UN liquidity crisis and the mandated budget reductions risk undermining AUSSOM operations if joint contingency measures are not implemented. Without aligned AU-UN planning, predictable timelines, and synchronized budgetary decisions, mission continuity, force generation, and AUSSOM’s reconfiguration under the approved CONOPS could be adversely affected.

B. Key Developments from AU–UN Consultations

22. **Agreement on USD 130 million Expenditure Reduction.** Both sides acknowledged the need to implement the 25% budget cut within the current UN financial year. Any further adjustments driven by urgent operational needs must be absorbed within the existing envelope. An additional USD 17 million was identified as necessary for AUSSOM reconfiguration. The AU Commission stressed the need for this provision to be secured in order to ensure capabilities generation for the incoming TCC.

23. **Aviation and AUSSOM Reconfiguration.** The AU and UN have developed a consolidated and sequenced implementation timeline for the AUSSOM CONOPS, including aviation support requirements and additional expenditure adjustments if needed.

24. **Comprehensive Financial Review.** Both sides are committed to a more exhaustive financial review to optimize resource use, including analysis of non-issued aviation reimbursements and air assets unavailable or not yet operational.

25. **Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) Inspection and Right-Sizing Exercise.** A joint COE review will be conducted in the first Quarter of 2026 to align holdings with the Mission’s evolving force posture, with efficiencies to be integrated into the 2026/27 budget. The AU will encourage TCCs and PCCs to dispose of non-serviceable COEs in the Mission to reduce repatriation costs.

26. **Ongoing AU–UN Operational Coordination.** In parallel with contingency planning, the AU and UN are advancing preparations for the deployment of the new Egyptian contingent under AUSSOM. Key elements include:

- a. Force generation sequencing;
- b. Finalization of Memoranda of Understanding/Letters of Assist;
- c. Coordination of budgetary requirements; and
- d. Agreement for a 20-week deployment timeline, starting after the conclusion of Memorandum of Understanding and Letter of Assist (MOU/LOA) negotiations.

27. **Key Challenges.** The following are key challenges currently facing AUSSOM Operations:

- a. **UN liquidity Crisis.** Immediate and sustained financial pressures will continue shaping UNSOS operational capacity.
- b. **Tight Timelines linked to UN budget cycle.** UNSOS’s financial year ends on 30 June 2026; deployments must occur within this window.

- c. **Need for Synchronized AU–UN Planning.** Without an integrated framework, reductions may disproportionately affect mission-critical support.
- d. **Aviation Vulnerabilities.** Aviation is among the most resource-intensive areas and may face reductions that affect mobility and casualty evacuation. In this regard, AU and UN works on maintaining the strength of thirteen (13) helicopters deployed in support of AUSSOM, as an interim option, pending the upcoming UN budget resources for 2026-2027.
- e. **Other Financial Contributions.** In the meantime, the AU has made USD 20 million available to the Peace Fund in addition to the contribution of other partners such as China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The European Union, through its European Peace Facility (EPF) is expected to provide hybrid support, including in kind (15% in the form of non-lethal equipment), and 85% to cover stipends.
- f. The Commission has also been actively involved in discussions with non-traditional partners as predictable, sustainable and multi-year funding still remains one of the greatest challenges of AUSSOM.

C. Bridging Identified Challenges and Required Action

28. The cumulative effect of the financial constraints, capability gaps, and compressed timelines highlights a critical inflection point for AUSSOM. While recent AU–UN engagements have produced important convergence on budgetary measures and sequencing, several structural risks remain that could impede mission continuity if not addressed through decisive, collective action.

29. Given the challenges outlined above, sustaining AUSSOM’s operational effectiveness amid tightening fiscal conditions will require timely political direction and coordinated decision-making. The developments emerging from recent AU–UN consultations underscore both the urgency of adopting a unified planning framework and the need for clear, actionable guidance to safeguard mandate delivery during this period of financial and operational adjustment.

30. As the AU Commission continues to engage the UN and partners on contingency planning and resource optimization, strategic guidance from the Peace and Security Council Council will be essential to orient the next phase of decision-making. In this context, the following recommendations aim to provide a clear pathway to stabilize operations and safeguard priority capabilities.

D. Possible Political and Strategic Options

31. In light of the financial, operational, and political considerations outlined above, the Peace and Security Council may wish to provide strategic guidance on the preferred option to ensure a coherent and conditions-based transition in Somalia. The following proposals are outlined for consideration:

- a. **Option 1. Maintaining the status quo on AUSSOM and UN Support Structures.** Under this option, the AU and UN would continue implementing the UNSOS contingency plan within the existing budget framework, absorbing the mandated USD 130 million reduction while sustaining core operational support to AUSSOM. This option implies a Mission cumulating more deficit with no certainty on predictability on the availability of resources to cover the USD 190 million of the Mission budget. Moreover, it is unclear what decision the UN budgetary entities would make on UNSOS for the upcoming fiscal year.

- b. **Option 2. Transformation of the AU Mission into a Regional Cooperation Initiative based on Bilateral Deployments.** Under this option, some military or police components currently deployed under AUSSOM would be replaced or supplemented by regional or bilateral deployments between the FGS and its partners (African States and international bilateral partners). These could include direct troop deployments, specialized units, or enablers mobilized through bilateral security cooperation agreements, outside the UNSOS-funded structure.
- c. **Option 3. Organized Mission Withdrawal and support to Somalia's full ownership.** Under this option, the AU and the UN would jointly plan and implement a full and orderly withdrawal of AUSSOM from Somalia at the end of the lifespan of the CONOPS. The mission would move toward an orderly withdrawal, transferring full security responsibility to the FGS, supported by regional security partners and bilateral arrangements. This option would require a detailed exit framework, clear timelines, and coordination with the current TCCs/PCCs.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

32. In light of the foregoing, the Council may wish to consider the following recommendations:
- a. **Welcome** and acknowledge the positive political developments in Somalia, as illustrated by the President's visit to Kismayo, on 5 October 2025, which demonstrated a continued commitment to stakeholder engagement, trust-building, and reconciliation;
 - b. **Commend** Somalia's progress towards one-person-one-vote elections and encourage continued inclusive political engagements in the country;
 - c. **Welcome** FGS progress in renewed operations against Al-Shabaab and call on international partners to reinforce the Somali-owned security effort; and **request** the Commission to temporarily suspend the repatriation of Burundi troops and the Ghana Formed Police Unit (FPU), as well as the transfer of Sierra Leone FPU, to prevent security gaps.
 - d. **Acknowledge the** ongoing initiatives of addressing clan conflicts, and **underline** their importance for state-building and countering violent extremism;
 - e. **Express concern over** deteriorating humanitarian conditions and appeal for increased donor support to the underfunded 2025 Humanitarian Plan. Encourage resilience-building initiatives to complement emergency relief;
 - f. **Commend** the AUSSOM Troop/Police-contributing countries, and Somali Security Forces for their enduring commitment and sacrifices in pursue of lasting peace in Somalia; **express condolences** to the families of the AUSSOM personnel who have paid the ultimate sacrifice in the cause of peace and stability in Somalia and **wish** speedy recovery to those injured during AUSSOM Operations.
 - g. **Commend** regional and international partners for their financial and technical support to the AUSSOM in enhancing the implementation of their mandate;
 - h. **Reiterate** the Council's commitment to full operationalization of AUSSOM, **encourage** the Arab Republic of Egypt to expedited the deployment its Peace Keeping Forces in Somalia, and

commend the Republic of Burundi and Ghana for deployment of its personnel in Somalia beyond 31 December 2025;

- i. **Emphasize the importance** of ensuring that any decision concerning AUSSOM operations, must be based on the security situation, not on a budget-driven approach; and
- j. **Welcome** the ongoing advocacy on AUSSOM funding shortfalls and **urge** the international community to continue supporting efforts for ensuring adequate, predictable, and sustainable resources for AUSSOM and SSF, including through the UN-administered Trust Fund.