SPECIAL REPORT

IMPACT OF COVID19 ON MULTILATERAL COOPERATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

AMANI AFRICA
Media and Research Services

18 JUNE 2020
IMPACT OF COVID19 ON MULTILATERAL COOPERATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

I INTRODUCTION

On 27 May, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) held a session on the impact of the novel coronavirus COVID19 on Living Together in Peace. The theme of the session offered useful lens for discussing the impact of COVID19 on multilateral cooperation and its implications for peace and security in Africa. In this special research report, we present an analysis of the impact of COVID19 on multilateralism and its implications for Africa based on the presentation that Amani Africa delivered to the PSC during its 928th session on 27 May.

The report highlights the emergence of two opposing trends that can be discerned from the COVID19 crisis in terms of multilateral cooperation. On the one side is the necessity arising from COVID19 for the international community to pull its efforts and resources together for achieving success to end the scourge of the pandemic. On the opposite side, COVID19 triggered or accelerated trends that undermine and impede the pursuit of Living Together in Peace, hence frustrating multilateral cooperation. Apart from highlighting the implications of these for peace and security in Africa, the report also identifies the various ways that COVID19 could affect peace and security in Africa and what the AU, particularly its PSC could do about these.

II COVID19 AND LIVING TOGETHER IN PEACE

COVID19 is a truly global pandemic affecting all parts of the world. In leaving no part of the world spared, the pandemic emphatically demonstrated, in a way no other event has done in recent memory, the entrenched interdependence of the world and the shared destiny of the human family. As such, it has made the values and ideals enunciated in the UN General Assembly Resolution 72/130 of 2017 on Living together in Peace more important than ever before. ‘Living together in Peace,’ according to the resolution, aims ‘to promote peace, tolerance, inclusion, understanding and solidarity, and to express its attachment to the desire to live and act together, united in differences and diversity, in order to build a sustainable world of peace, solidarity and harmony’.

The nature of the novel coronavirus pandemic is such that success in containing and defeating it depends on coordinated global action, hence the pursuit of the ideals of Living Together in Peace, namely solidarity, peace, inclusion and tolerance enunciated in UNGA Res 72/130. The efforts of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN Secretary-General in mobilizing concerted global action embody rare manifestations of deploying the ideals of Living Together in Peace to address the unprecedented challenge COVID19 posed to the health and life of people.
In the African context, illustrations of such concerted engagements include the solidarity flights of the UN for distributing support and the Jack Ma Foundation supply of testing kits and PPEs and the distribution of these medical supplies to AU member states via the Africa Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (Africa CDC) and Ethiopian Airlines.

Notwithstanding the imperative of the values of Living Together in Peace and some limited initiatives reflecting these values, COVID19 has also put these values to the test as the world has come to witness very concerning trends undermining multilateral cooperation and collective global action.

One such trend is the surge in misinformation – what the WHO Chief, Dr Tedros Adhanom called ‘infodemics’1 As the UN Under-Secretary for Global Communications pointed out in May while launching the new UN initiative called ‘Verified’, ‘[i]n many countries the misinformation surging across digital channels is impeding the public health response and stirring unrest. There are disturbing efforts to exploit the crisis to advance nativism or to target minority groups, which could worsen as the strain on societies grows and the economic and social fallout kicks in’. 2 The AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui, highlighted similar troubling trends including rise of xenophobia and stigma and the exploitation by terror groups of the pandemic to spread misinformation.3 One of the most disturbing consequences of the global infodemics is the rise in attacks against healthcare workers, the very people who have put themselves on the line to cater for the health of people.4

A further worrisome trend that gained momentum during this period has been the resort to inward looking approaches to the pandemic. The rise of unilateralist and nativist tendencies have led to the hoarding by states, notably developed countries, of critical medical supplies and the imposition of restrictions on the export of such supplies. For Africa, this has presented the challenge of market access to diagnostics and therapeutics that are key for scaling up the testing capacity of AU member states. Unless it is addressed urgently, this unilateralist approach can also impede Africa’s access to COVID19 medicine, when such medicine is finally discovered.

Additionally, this inward looking, exclusionary tendency has manifested itself in the lack of regard to the situation of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. Such exclusions enable COVID19 to find a hiding place, thereby allowing it to hit back. This is the experience of Singapore. Although Singapore’s effort in containing the virus was cited as a success story, the failure of its COVID19 response to protect migrant workers led to a major surge in COVID19 cases, making it one of the countries in Asia that recorded highest number of cases.

The third concerning trend is the rise in geopolitical rivalry between major powers of the world. This rivalry particularly between the US and China is having a crippling effect on the UN Security Council, preventing it from adopting a resolution supporting the UN Secretary General’s call for global ceasefire.

---

1 Speech by Dr Tedros Adhanom, Munich Security Conference, (15 February 2020) https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/munichsecurityconference
This rivalry is certainly a major impediment and the antithesis of Living Together in Peace. Unfortunately, at a time when the world needs global leadership and cooperation, such rivalry is not without its adverse impacts on Africa. It can affect not only the functioning of our cherished institution including its agencies such as Africa CDC but also peace and security on the African Continent. Even before COVID19, Africa has been viewed as a battleground of the US-China rivalry. With the destabilizing rivalry between them intensifying, there is huge risk of African hotspots and major peace and security issues being entangled in this rivalry, making the resolution of such conflicts beyond the reach of the conflict parties and internationally backed African peacemaking or mediation efforts.

The challenge for the AU and the PSC is how to monitor and approach this development and craft ways and means of shielding African situations from the worst manifestations of this rivalry.

The fourth trend relates to the politicization of the global response to the pandemic. The WHO, the only global body for mobilizing the required world scale technical and medical response support for members of the international community, has fallen a major victim of this politicization of the response to the pandemic. This would obviously affect the multilateral effort required for defeating the pandemic that only the WHO can coordinate and lead, thereby affecting WHO’s critical role in guiding and supporting national level response efforts. For Africa, this can affect the critical work of the WHO in other areas of public health and can thus be detrimental.

The fifth, particularly concerning, trend of how COVID19 affects Living Together in Peace is by its impact on peace and security on the continent. Amani Africa has produced a number of policy analyses targeting in particular previous sessions of the PSC on the impact of COVID19 on peace and security in Africa. Based on these analyses and Amani Africa’s continuing tracking of the peace and security impacts of COVID19, it is possible to identify some useful, albeit preliminary, observations on how COVID19 is affecting peace and security in Africa. This would take us to review the trends in the peace and security impact of COVID19 in Africa.

III SEVEN TRENDS OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY IMPACT OF COVID19 IN AFRICA

The first relates to the apt recognition in the second AU Assembly Bureau teleconference meeting held on 3 April of ‘the devastating socio-economic and political impact of the pandemic on African countries.’ African economies face the most severe shock in decades as a result of ‘falling demand for Africa’s commodities; capital flight from Africa; a virtual collapse of tourism and air transport associated with lockdowns and border closures; and depreciation of local currencies as a result of a deterioration in the current account balance.’

Additionally, the disruption that the COVID19 response measures caused to the livelihoods of the vast majority of people who depend on jobs in the informal sector have created severe socio-economic insecurity, including lack of access to basic necessities including food and cooking materials.

---

*UN COVID19 Policy Brief, Impact of COVID-19 in Africa*
More than the pandemic itself, these socio-economic fallouts from COVID19 response measures can have devastating impacts on peace and security. Our third observation is accordingly, the warning of the Director of Africa CDC, John Nkengasong, who is quoted for noting that the coronavirus could be a ‘national security crisis first, an economic crisis second and a health crisis third’ depending on how African countries respond to the pandemic.

While it remains difficult to make conclusive generalizations, early signs suggest that the socioeconomic fallouts from COVID19 will affect peace and security on the continent in various ways and significantly.

First, for countries in conflict including those on the agenda of the PSC namely Central African Republic, Libya, Mali and Sahel, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan and countries in the Lake Chad Basin, it would have the effect of worsening the security situation and the humanitarian impact of conflicts. Countries in the Sahel region, which are already facing the threat of terrorism and violent extremism, have to wage another battle against the spread of COVID-19 further stretching already limited state capacity. Reduced state capacity due to the economic impact of COVID19 also affects already stretched security sector’s ability to effectively undertake policing and security measures. In such context, overreaction or heavy-handed responses would have severe consequences on the security of civilians, who would end up being caught up in the crossfire.

This is already unfolding in the Sahel as the surge in displacement and refugee flows increase. The insecurity coupled with poor health care infrastructure and capacity also has the effect of limiting efforts for containing the spread of the virus with potentially devastating consequences for conflict affected populations and the most vulnerable among them.

Second, COVID19 and the response measures are sure to create new sources of fragilities and insecurities. Even countries that are not in conflict may not be spared from such adverse security consequences. Irrespective of how countries fare in dealing with the public health dimension of COVID19, it is unlikely that any country can escape the dire socio-economic consequences of the pandemic. With millions of jobs lost, the livelihood of so many others disrupted and economic opportunities for the youth severely undermined, the stability of countries stands to face formidable challenges.

The fear is that the serious, potentially prolonged, socioeconomic pressure is sure to fuel social tension and put citizens and governments on a collision course. Protests demanding greater government assistance have also been reported in some countries such as Tunisia, among others.

Whether these social and economic fallouts would indeed lead to instability depends on the capacity of the political system of the country to manage tensions and pressure. It is not thus inevitable that these fallouts on their own would lead to social conflicts.

---


There is strong reason to worry about social instability particularly in countries where economic factors converge with political factors to trigger crises. As the UN Policy Brief on Africa observed, ‘prolonged suspension of critical economic activity; continued emergency measures, in some cases associated human rights violations; delayed electoral processes and political transitions; as well as inequalities in access to food and basic services disproportionately affecting the poor and other vulnerable groups, including women and girls as well as children caught up in conflict; could coalesce, in some contexts, to spark unrest, (re) ignite conflicts or upset fragile peace processes.’

Second, peace and security will be affected adversely due to the disruptive impact of COVID19 on national, regional and international efforts for conflict management and resolution. The UN Secretary-General warned on 25 March that the pandemic threatened to divert international attention and resources from resolving ongoing conflicts and supporting peace processes.

Indeed, one of the consequences of the impact of COVID19 on conflict resolution efforts is that ongoing peace processes have come under increasing stress. Indeed, some peace processes have stalled, while others are facing delays. AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Amb Smail Chergui observed that, the pandemic ‘has delayed the implementation of critical peace agreements and hampered our mediation efforts at the local level.’

For instance, the PSC has learned from briefings it received for its session on the situation in South Sudan that COVID19 would affect the timelines and implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan. As Commissioner Chergui pointed out, ‘the armed group negotiation in Sudan, the implementation of the Central African Republic Peace Agreement as well as the ongoing discussions in Libya have taken a backseat.’

The other consequence of the impact of COVID19 on conflict resolution efforts is increasing risk of escalation of violence as conflict parties seek to use the situation for gaining military advantage. Examples in this respect include the spike in terrorist attacks observed in the Lake Chad Basin, in Mozambique, increase in incidents of fighting in Eastern DRC and the intensification of the destructive fighting in Libya. Similarly, Al Shabaab has intensified its daily attacks in Somalia, hampering humanitarian efforts to fight the spread of the virus. In Central African Republic, incidents of fighting have also been reported including by one of the armed groups, Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation (3R), that reportedly released a statement in April announcing ceasefire in response to the call for global ceasefire.

---

9 UN Policy Brief, note 5 above, 19.
10 Amani Africa - media and research services
BriefingsessiononthepeaceandsecurityimpactsofCOVID19inAfrica.pdf
12 Chergui, note 3 as above
13 Chergui, note 3 above.
A further impact of COVID-19 on conflict management and resolution efforts relates to peace support operations. COVID-19 and the social distancing measures required to contain it have impact on the troop rotation, timeline of planned drawdown in some cases and the actual operation of peace support missions including ‘support to peace processes, patrols and activities related to protection of civilians, convoy escorts and other forms of support to humanitarian assistance, force protection, protecting key infrastructure, and support to host state institutions and local authorities.’ This means that peace support operations are under pressure to ensure that their personnel are safe while at the same time make adjustments to contribute to the efforts of the host country for containing the virus without compromising their mandated responsibilities. COVID-19 cases have also been confirmed among AMISOM troops.

**Third**, COVID-19 could affect the African Peace and Security Architecture’s (APSA) approach to peace and security. COVID-19 has shown that a focus on hard peace and security issues is not adequate. There is a need for enhanced focus and investment in soft security matters involving social policy, including most notably those related to health and climate security issues. In this context, there is a need for bringing social policy and governance to the center of peace and security analysis and engagement of the AU. With respect to the APSA, this would entail that more attention is given to the portfolios of the Social Affairs Department and close synergy is established between the peace and security work of the PSC and the work of AU’s Social Affairs department. It should also be noted that COVID-19 and its socio-economic consequences could affect the contribution of member states to the AU Peace Fund.

**Fourth**, while the AU has declared the 2020 theme to be silencing the guns, various initiatives and planned activities around silencing the guns could not be implemented due to COVID-19. The extraordinary summit scheduled for May expected to mobilize the continent towards this objective of silencing the guns and facilitate the operationalization of African Free Trade Area could no longer be held. Expressing regret at how some of the escalating conflicts undermine this quest for silencing the guns, AU Commission Chairperson during his Africa Day message observed that ‘[t]he tragedy being played out in this country is of profound concern to us all. No-one is blameless in the failure, neither is any segment of the international community, which has a great responsibility in the persistence or even escalation of the conflict.’ What makes the situation in Libya troublesome with respect to the AU agenda for silencing the guns is also its very dire impact on and linkages with the security situation in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions.

**Fifth**, COVID-19 and its socio-economic fallouts will also affect peace and security by aggravating existing challenges in two other situations, namely countries in transition and those expected to have contested elections. In these countries, the pressure resulting from both the spread of COVID-19 and its socio-economic consequences is sure to deepen existing fault lines, thereby triggering simmering political tensions to boil over. Around 17 countries are scheduled to hold elections in 2020. In this context, as Commissioner Chergui noted, ‘the pandemic has raised crucial concerns over the organizations of the elections within stipulated time and in accordance with constitutional provisions.’ This issue is particularly concerning, in countries ‘with highly polarized political

---


16 Amani Africa, note 9 above.

17 Chergui, note 3 above.
landscapes or countries without constitutional provisions for interim governance.\textsuperscript{18} For some of the countries, such as Somalia, the planned election is a major milestone in the transitional process and any contestation around the elections due to COVID19 can have a very destabilizing effect.

**Sixth**, there is the issue of the rise in insecurity and vulnerability of IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. These are among the most vulnerable section of society. During times of national crisis, their situation becomes more insecure and precarious. In a pandemic such as COVID19, they are among the most at risk of contracting the virus on account of challenges relating to access to water, hygiene and congestion. As Amani Africa pointed out in its 13 April analysis, ‘[c]ountries hosting huge number of refugees and internally displaced persons will be bound to face an enormous burden posing serious protection challenges. In this respect, an issue of particular importance for members of the PSC is the steps that need to be taken not only to protect IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers and migrants from COVID19 but also from humanitarian disaster that may result from lack of supply of humanitarian assistance.’

\textsuperscript{19} Further aggravating the insecurity of IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers and migrants is their increased exposure to violence due to the fact that they are in areas affected by conflict and violence. An important aspect of the effort to protect IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers and migrants is therefore to ensure that some degree of cessation of hostilities is observed and health care facilities and humanitarian actors are protected from attacks.

The **seventh** trend on peace and security concerns the impact of the heavy securitization of the approach to enforcing COVID19 measures. In a number of countries, major incidents of excessive use of force, acts of torture and other forms of inhuman treatment, gender-based violence against women involving members of security forces have been reported. The constitutionally established national human rights institutions of some countries have reported that more people died as a result of undue use of force by security forces than by COVID19. There is also the related concern about ‘the abuse by some in government of the anti-COVID19 measures for clamping down on dissenting political voices, opposition political parties and civil society organizations.’ This has the effect of further undermining state-society relationship, fuel resentment towards the state and create the conditions for social instability, particularly when combined with the socio-economic impacts of the crisis including lack of access to food. While the anti-COVID19 measures have kept the lid on protests and other forms of opposition to these acts of human rights violations and abuses, the adverse security consequences of the human rights issues would become visible when the lockdown and emergency measures are lifted.

In this context, a major area of interest for the PSC is how to ensure that measures taken for containing COVID19 are done within the bounds of applicable AU human rights standards, as specified in the guidance that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) provided through its 24 March statement which is of interest to the PSC within the parameters of the communiqué of its 866th session of 8 August 2019.

\textsuperscript{18} UN Policy Brief, note 5 above, 20. \textsuperscript{19} Amani Africa, note 9 above.
**IV CONCLUSION**

The pandemic has highlighted two opposing trends vis-à-vis Living Together in Peace. It has shown that this is the time when the world needs to act on the ideals and values of Living Together in Peace. The pressing needs arising from the pandemic, as UN Secretary General Guterres underscored, make solidarity, one of the key principles of Living Together in Peace, an ‘urgent imperative.’

During this pandemic, multilateral cooperation has witnessed acceleration here on the continent within the framework of the AU. It is here in Africa that Living Together in Peace and multilateralism have found major source of application and support during this pandemic. This is not of course new. In one of his celebrated works, *Africa Must Unite*, Nkrumah presented one of the most cogent arguments on the imperative of multilateralism for Africa. He stated ‘[i]t is impossible to separate the affairs of Africa from the affairs of the world as a whole’. In asserting Africa’s relationship to a multilateral peace and security order, Nkrumah held that Africa’s interest ‘in the maintenance of peace and the elimination of the forces which daily threaten it, is very real indeed.’

Despite the various peace and security uncertainties arising on the continent and the delay the pandemic caused to the AfCFTA, the AU has put in place a continental strategy on COVID19 and a COVID19 Response Fund. The Africa CDC has become not only common source of scientific and technical support for member states but also the framework for coordinated action and mobilization of logistical resources for upscaling the capacity of member states to respond to the pandemic.

Other bodies of the AU including the PSC, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child have also initiated measures within their respective areas of responsibilities. Africa has also become a source of support for the global leadership of the WHO in the fight against the pandemic and the efforts of the UN Secretary General, including in pursuit of his initiative for a global ceasefire.

However, as our analysis also shows, this is also a time that has brought the values of Living Together in Peace under enormous pressure. The major sources of such pressure include:

- Infodemics
- Unilateralism and nativism
- Intensification of big power rivalry
- Politicization of the global response to the pandemic
- Impact of the pandemic and the anti-COVID19 response measures on peace and security

In the light of the foregoing,

1) With respect to the infodemics, the PSC could express support to UN’s new initiative, Verified, and encourage the Africa CDC to strengthen its work of countering misinformation, including by leveraging on this new initiative. The PSC could also urge the AU Commission to enhance its monitoring of efforts of terrorist groups to take advantage of the infodemics both to spread misinformation and to mobilize new recruits and support and the member states to enhance cyber security measures.

---

2) The PSC could call on the WHO to support the efforts of the continent, through Africa CDC, to limit the impacts of unilateralist measures on market access to medical supplies critical to the fight against COVID-19. The PSC could also welcome initiatives at the national level for producing some of the critical medical supplies and urge member states to support such efforts.

3) The intensification of geo-political rivalry carries adverse consequences for Africa both in terms of how African issues are dealt with in the UNSC and importantly by how it may directly play itself out on the continent. In this respect, the PSC could underscore the heightened importance of strengthening the commitment for Africa to speak with one voice and for countries on the continent to follow the principle of neutrality. The PSC could also reiterate the critical role of the Africa 3 non-permanent members of the UN Security Council in facilitating and supporting a common position of the AU on African issues on the agenda of the UNSC.

4) The PSC could reiterate its support for the work of the WHO and the importance of shielding the organization and the global response to the pandemic from politicization not only to ensure effectiveness of the global response against COVID-19 but also to safeguard the other lifesaving works of the global body including those on the African continent.

5) With respect to the peace and security impact of COVID-19 in Africa, it is worth considering a number of intervention measures.

a. On impact of COVID-19 on elections, the PSC could pronounce itself on three major issues. For countries that have opted to hold elections, to underline on how and under what conditions they will conduct elections and what kind of safety measures will be adopted to protect public health. Moreover, the current restriction on movements will hinder the participation of observers and countries need to provide alternative plans to fill this gap. Measures to ensure transparency of the process and outcome need to be put in place. For countries that opt to postpone, appropriate legal processes and political consensus needs to be reached, to prevent any form on unconstitutional change of government. The PSC needs to strongly urge for the respect of the constitutional order and that the delay should not be used for political purposes. Third, PSC needs to address specifically countries that are still in active conflict, most notably Somalia to ensure that issues relating to elections would not become further sources of insecurity. The PSC could encourage member states to provide regular information to the public to ensure that the public is informed and to prevent tension that may result from uncertainties and confusion on election processes.

b. On the socio-economic fallouts of COVID-19, the PSC could reiterate the decisions of the AU Assembly Bureau and the ongoing efforts of the AU Commission Chairperson and the UN Secretary General. The PSC could also welcome the call of the UN Secretary General for a $200 billion economic relief package and the joint statement of the UN High-Commissioner for Human Rights and the Chairperson of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights calling for global solidarity through fiscal and economic relief measures.
c. The PSC may also urge that particular attention is given to countries in conflict not only in terms of facilitating the provision of the required technical, medical and socio-economic support but also in supporting conflict resolution efforts in those countries. Welcoming the call for global ceasefire by the United Nations Secretary-General, the PSC may call on the AU Commission and Regional Economic Communities working alongside the UN to support efforts for cessation of all hostilities by conflict parties. In this regard, particular attention should be given to leverage on the announcement of cessation of hostilities in Cameroon, CAR and Sudan for initiating (or consolidating, where one exists) peacemaking.

d. Having regard to the implications of COVID-19 on the AU’s conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts including contributions to AU Peace Fund, the PSC may underscore the need to reinvigorate the AU peace and security architecture in light of this new and emerging challenge in order to help address the threat for increased social instability. The PSC may urge the AU Commission working with relevant RECs/RMs to initiate communication with member states for assessing peace and security risks and for helping them initiate mitigating measures. It could also request that AU regional and liaison offices, PSC authorized or mandated missions expand their focus to cover the peace and security impacts of COVID19, while ensuring the safety and security of their personnel.

e. With respect to human rights, reference can be made to the human rights dimension of the mandate of the PSC as provided for in Articles 3 and 19 of the PSC Protocol. In this context, a major area of interest for the PSC is how to ensure that measures taken for containing COVID19 are done within the bounds of applicable AU human rights standards and the guidance that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) provided through its 24 March statement in accordance with the communique of the 866th session of the PSC.

f. The PSC could invite the AU Commission to undertake joint assessment with the RECs about the impact of COVID19 measures on conflict resolution measures and submit report to it with proposals on measures that should be taken both to limit the negative impacts and seize the opportunities, such as in particular in terms of the use of new technologies and achieving ceasefires.

g. Although the surge in insecurity in Libya and Mozambique do not necessarily relate to COVID19, the gravity of the situation in these countries and the adverse regional ramifications call for specific attention. In this respect, the PSC could lend its support to the initiative of SADC with respect to Mozambique and urge the need for early collective action to avoid the risk of entrenchment of terrorist networks in Mozambique with all its consequences both to the country and the region. In respect to Libya, the PSC could request the AsU Commission to report on recent developments and the deteriorating situation in Libya for deciding how to make use of all instruments at its disposal for containing the situation and its impact on the region.
ABOUT AMANI AFRICA

Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research, training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Amani Africa wishes to express its gratitude to the Government of Switzerland, the Embassy of Germany the British Embassy and the Embassy of Finland in Addis Ababa

ADDRESS

Off Olympia roundabout Dem. Rep. Congo Street, Hailu Wolde Building, Kirkos subcity, Woreda 01 House no.263/unit 02 first floor
Tel: +251118678809
Mobile: +251944723204 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia