THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

Chad assumed chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in September. In total, eight sessions were convened throughout the month. Although Council planned to convene a session to consider strategic priorities for the utilisation of the AU Peace Fund and the zero draft African consensus paper on financing AU-led peace support operations (PSOs) through UN assessed contributions, that session was postponed to October.\(^1\) On the other hand, two of Council’s sessions took place outside of the programme of work to address the emergency situation in Guinea, following the coup of 5 September 2021.

Of the eight substantive sessions, three covered country specific situations whereas the remaining five addressed thematic peace and security concerns. All of the country-specific situations addressed during the month covered situations in the west African region.

1. Although no publicly available outcome document has been issued on the subject, the consideration of strategic priorities for utilisation of the AU Peace Fund and the zero draft African consensus paper on financing AU-led PSOs through UN assessed contributions was one of the agenda items of PSC’s 1011th session convened on 21 July.
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Monthly Digest on the AUPSC

Despite the Prime Minister’s emphasis to this point, there was no consensus among Malian transitional authorities regarding the establishment of such independent election management body at the time of PSC’s evaluation mission. As highlighted in the evaluation mission report, some Malian stakeholders also preferred to stick to the current system of having the elections managed by three institutions (the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MADT), the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and the General Office of Elections (DGE)), mainly due to their concern that establishing a single independent election management body would entail a lengthy legal process that may risk extending the transition period.\(^2\)

ECOWAS’s Communiqué adopted following the Community’s mediator, Goodluck Jonathan’s mission to Mali conducted from 5 to 7 September also stressed this point, urging the government to “develop a chronogram detailing the reforms and priority actions that need to be undertaken in order to hold the presidential and legislative elections”, including the establishment of voters’ register and identification of electoral body. At its 1027th session, Council took note of this issue and made a call for the transitional authorities to “establish a clear, precise and realistic chronogram, delineating the period and implementation of reforms, as well as the elections, within the collectively agreed 18 months transition period”. Acting on these calls, Mali finally managed to conduct a national dialogue\(^3\) which led to the adoption of a new transition calendar planning the elections for 2026. This entails the extension of the transition for four additional years, bringing the total transition period to over six years. The new calendar did not obtain ECOWAS’s acceptance.\(^4\)

With regards to the security situation, France’s decision to scale down its military presence in the region, added to Chad’s decision to withdraw half of its troops from the G5-Sahel Joint Force deployed in the three-border area along central Mali has been cause for concern regarding further destabilisation in the region including Mali.\(^5\) In light of that, Council urged the transitional authorities to accelerate the deployment of the Reconstituted Army Battalions (BATFAR), which is made of reconstituted Malian armed and security forces as envisaged in the Algiers Accord but is yet to be completely operationalised.

Another important step which could contribute highly for stabilising Mali and the Sahel region is the finalisation and implementation of the AU Stabilization Strategy for the Sahel. Despite the process of developing this strategy having commenced years ago and it is to be recalled that at its 1001st session, the PSC urged Mali’s transition authorities to conduct an inclusive national dialogue. Following two postponements, the national dialogue or ‘National Refoundation Conference’ was conducted from 11 to 30 December 2021 throughout various regions of the country, with the exception of two key regions – Kidal and Menaka. The Cadre d’échange also notably did not take part in the dialogue, claiming lack of trust between the transition government and political parties. The political coalition has also voiced its opposition against the new electoral calendar and the extension of the transition period which came about as recommendation of the national dialogue.\(^6\)

\(^{2}\) On 24 November 2021, Mali’s Council of Ministers adopted a draft electoral law which among others, provides for the establishment of a single election management body. While this may be regarded as a resolution to one of the pending issues in the country’s transition process, question may be raised regarding the inclusivity of the process which led to the adoption of the draft electoral law and whether consensus has been reached among all stakeholders on the establishment of a single electoral management body. For instance, in reaction to the draft law, the Cadre d’échange (‘Exchange Framework’) – a political coalition involving allies of the former presidential majority – has called on the transition authorities to comply with the recommendation of the MADT to retain the existing design of the election management with some improvement.

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\(^{4}\) Mali’s transition authorities submitted the new transition calendar to ECOWAS on 31st December 2021. ECOWAS Mediator visited the authorities on 5 January 2022 to discuss the implication of the new calendar on the 2020 Transitional Charter, after which the authorities revised the calendar, scheduling the elections for December 2025, a concession ECOWAS did not find convincing. On 9 January 2022, ECOWAS convened its 4th Extraordinary Summit where it expressed the unacceptability of the extension of the transition period until 2025 and in addition to maintaining the sanctions it imposed against Mali, announced additional sanctions, including closure of borders between Mali and other ECOWAS member States. The PSC, at its 1057th session convened on 14 January 2022 endorsed ECOWAS’s decision to impose additional sanctions and called on Malian transition authorities to ensure return to constitutional order within a period not exceeding 16 months. Since then, Mali’s authorities have shown little flexibility leading to the deterioration of relations between the country and its regional and international partners. On the other hand, a joint technical team of the AU, UN and ECOWAS has agreed to an additional 12 to 16 months of transition period starting from 15 March 2022, showing ECOWAS’s flexibility.

\(^{5}\) France’s relationship with Mali’s transitional government seems to have deteriorated further following Mali’s latest decision to extend the transition period. A P5 and P3 member of the UNSC, France drafted a Statement endorsing ECOWAS’s additional sanctions against Mali which was considered by the UNSC on 11 January 2022. China and Russia blocked adoption of the Statement.
back, the delay experienced in its finalisation and actualisation have made much needed coordination among relevant regional and international actors difficult. Hence, Council’s call for the AU Commission to finalise the strategy in collaboration with ECOWAS and ECCAS as the concerned regional economic communities (RECs) was important in that regards.

The AU Commission was also tasked with two main deliverables. The first one is to undertake a threat assessment in Mali, through engagement with relevant stakeholders including ECOWAS and submit its findings and recommendations to Council. Although Council did not specify a deadline for the conduct of the assessment and submission of findings, it did indicate that the assessment shall take effect immediately. Also, there was no indication regarding the nature of the assessment but it can be understood from the prevailing situation in the country and the region, the political challenges (particularly those relating to the conduct of elections) as well as the widespread insecurity and related humanitarian issues are likely to be the areas of focus. The assessment can also serve the AU Commission to identify the areas where Mali’s transitional authorities require support.6

The other task Council assigned to the AU Commission is the convening of the third meeting of the Mali Transition Support Group (GST-M). The GST-M which was formed following Mali’s coup of August 2020 had its first meeting in November 2020 and its second meeting in March 2021 where various issues surrounding the transition were discussed. Challenges such as the risk imposed to peaceful transition by growing social movements from various sectors of socioeconomic life and the need to breach the gap between social actors and government are among the rarely mentioned but crucial concerns discussed at the recent GST-M meeting. The GST-M could therefore contribute greatly to Mali’s transition by identifying and tackling similar underlying issues. Although the second GST-M meeting was concluded with the decision to convene the next meeting in June 2021, the third meeting is yet to be convened.

COMMEMORATION OF AMNESTY MONTH

On 8 September, Council convened its yearly session to commemorate African amnesty month. The session marked its 1029th meeting and was an open session attended by relevant stakeholders including representatives of respective RECs/RMs and the representative of the United Nations (UN) Office to the AU (UNOAU) as well as the representative of the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA). The outcome of the session was adopted as a Press Statement.

The proliferation of illegal arms in Africa has been a problem for years. The growing trend of acquisition of weapons by civilians for the purposes of protection in the context of conflict affected countries, the sponsorship and promotion of arms influx into Africa by non-African States, week cross-border collaboration and coordination of efforts to control illicit arms flows were among the main concerns which featured at this year’s commemoration of African amnesty month. Council also welcomed some of the gains obtained since the initiation of African amnesty month in 2017 and called on member States to work in close collaboration with RECs/RMs towards consolidation of these gains.

In addition, the importance of addressing underlying root-causes of arms proliferation was stressed by Council. As studies imply, some of the prime reasons for illicit arms flow and civilian possession of weapon in Africa include widespread and extreme poverty, exclusion and marginalisation, ethnic and religious factionalism, use of excessive force to respond to dissent, elite based patrimonial governance and high dependence on extraction of natural resources. It is therefore important for member States as well as all relevant stakeholder to focus on addressing these underlying issues.

In concluding the session, Council requested the AU Commission to revitalise the Security Sector Reform (SSR) Steering Committee. The Steering Committee last had its meeting in November 2020, in the presence of delegates from AU member States, representatives of various AU organs and civil society. At the meeting, the AU Commission presented the
Draft AU Three-Year SSR Strategy 2021-2023, which is aimed at strengthening regional and national capacities for the effective implementation of the AU SSR Policy Framework. It is therefore important for the AU Commission to update Council on the status of the draft strategy. Another point emphasised at the Steering Committee’s meeting was the challenge imposed to the effective implementation of SSR activities due to limited human and financial resources. Hence, member States need to explore various options for financing SSR activities, including through various partnerships, however ensuring that national ownership of the process is not compromised.

THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

After its 1028th emergency meeting convened on the day after the 5 September coup in Guinea, Council convened its 1030th session on the situation in the country, on 10 September. The outcome of the session which was adopted as a Communiqué.

At the session, Council endorsed ECOWAS’s Communiqué of its 8 September 2021 Extraordinary Summit – where the regional organ decided to suspend Guinea from all of its governing bodies – and suspended Guinea from activities of the AU until restoration of constitutional order in the country.

In addition to suspending Guinea, some of the other concrete conditions set by Council include its demand for the immediate and unconditional release of the former President and other arrested officials, the immediate return of the military to the barracks and the return to constitutional order. Similar to previous examples of coups in countries like Chad and Mali, Guinea’s military has taken over the transition process, appointing the leader of the coup, Col. Mamady Doumbouya as the President of the transition. Moreover, the transitional charter which has been drafted by the military has no indication regarding the intended length of the transition period, despite ECOWAS’s demand that Guinea conducts an election in six months.7 Such facts are concerning and unveil the growing interfere of the military in politics and controlling transitional processes. Hence, both the PSC and relevant RECs/RMs need to employ all tools available to respond to occurrences of UCG, in a manner that can deter future incidences.

In terms of tasks assigned which will require follow up, the Chairperson of the AU Commission was requested to provide quarterly briefings to Council on developments in the country and also, to establish an inclusive monitoring mechanism to follow up on the implementation of decisions of ECOWAS and PSC regarding the situation in Guinea.

Taking account of the resurgence of coups in the continent during the year, the PSC also tasked the AU Commission to undertake a “comprehensive and objective analysis focusing on the root causes and impact of the UCG arising from non-consensual and/ or politically manipulated democratic processes” at the 1030th session.8

CONTINENTAL AND REGIONAL ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA OF MINE ACTION

On 16 September, Council convened its 1032th session which was focused on continental and regional activities on mine action in Africa. The outcome of the session was adopted as a Communiqué.

The session mainly served to recall the continued use of and civilian suffering from unconventional weapons such as antipersonnel landmines, cluster munitions, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well as explosive remnants of war (ERW). Accordingly, Council emphasised the continuous relevance of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and called on member States to ensure proper implementation of obligations stipulated in these instruments.

The Declaration of States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production

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7 Having noted Guinea’s failure to respect the stipulated timeline of 6 months for the conduct of elections, ECOWAS has at its recent Extraordinary Summit of 25 March 2022 resolved to impose financial and economic sanctions against Guinea upon the latter’s failure to submit an acceptable transition timetable by 25 April 2022.

8 See more on the trends and underlying root causes of UCG in Africa in Amani Africa’s Special Research Report on the subject, which also aims to contribute to PSC’s request of the 1030th session. It is also worth noting that adding to the AU’s efforts to address the spike in UCG, the PSC conducted a reflection forum in Accra, Ghana, from 15 to 17 March 2022, in line with the decision of the AU Assembly’s 35th Ordinary Session, a Summit is also planned to take place at the end of May 2022, to address the rise in the trend of UCG and Terrorism in Africa.
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Maputo Declaration) is also another important instrument which sets the year 2025 as a deadline by which member States shall ensure that there are no new mine victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control, and that survivors are fully assisted and included in societies on equal basis with others.

One of the key Council decisions of the 1032nd session was the mandating of the AU Commission to organise a session for sharing information and exchanging lessons in the area of mine action, as to enable member States meet the 2025 deadline on clearing mines in their territories or jurisdictions under their control. The Commission was also requested to integrate mine action within the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030 and also to conclude the Draft AU IED Mitigation Strategy and submit it to Council for consideration.

COMMEMORATING THE INTERNATIONAL DAY OF PEACE AND BRIEFING ON THE SECOND EDITION OF THE LUANDA BIENNIAL “PAN AFRICAN FORUM FOR THE CULTURE OF PEACE”

The session committed to the commemoration of international peace day formed Council’s 1033rd meeting and was convened on 21 September. The outcome of the session was adopted as a Press Statement.

The session was convened in the context of the decision of the AU Assembly of its 24th Ordinary Session (Assembly/AU/Dec. 546-568(XXIV)) for the AU Commission to co-organize a biannual Pan-African Forum for a Culture of Peace in Africa, with the Government of Angola and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). The Pan-African Biennale was held for the first time in September 2019 and the second edition was held on 4 October, under the theme “Strengthening the Pan-African Movement for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence: Towards a Global Partnership”.

An open session attended by various participants including representatives from RECs/RMs, UNESCO as well as Amani Africa, the 1033rd PSC session had the central purpose of highlighting the instrumentality of Africa’s rich cultural heritage for cultivating the culture of peace on the continent.

Some of the main points emphasised at the session include the need to prevent and mitigate conflicts in the continent through promoting the culture of peace, utilising cultural heritage, arts and education; the value of exploring indigenous approaches to conflict prevention, management and resolution; the importance of multi-actor partnerships between the government and various entities such as civil society, private sector, media and artistic and scientific community and faith based organisations.

REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE AU COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IN AFRICA HELD DURING THE PERIOD FROM JANUARY TO JUNE 2021

Council’s 1034th session held on 23 September was a consideration of the AU Commission Chairperson’s report on elections held from January to June 2021. The outcome of the session was adopted as a Communiqué.

In addition to welcoming the conduct of elections for the reporting period in 11 AU member States, Council highlighted the need for member States to fund their own elections in order to avoid external interference. The upsurge of UCG in the continent was also stressed by Council as a concerning trend which endangers democracy and accordingly, Council called for the enhancement of early warning mechanisms, particularly with regards to member States which are undergoing political transition and in those carrying out elections.

Having regard to the increase in UCG in the continent, Council’s decision to mandate the AU Commission to organise an appraisal symposium to consider measures relevant for addressing underlying political challenges which result in coups was a new and timely component of the session. There was however
no timeline indicated regarding when the symposium shall be convened so this will require close follow up.

Another important outcome of the 1034th session was PSC’s request for the AU Commission to expedite the development of “guidelines for elections during Covid-19 and other public health emergencies and humanitarian disasters”. It is to be recalled that the Council considered the AU Guidelines on Elections in Africa in the Context of the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic and Other Public Health Emergencies, at its 976th session, where it decided that member States should provide their inputs on the Guideline before its submission to the Permanent Representatives’ Committee (PRC). At its 982nd session, Council also urged member States to expedite adoption and implementation of the AU Elections Guideline considered at its 976th meeting. Notably, the Guideline referred at the 1034th session extends to ‘humanitarian disasters’, an issue not covered in the Guideline considered at the 976th session.

PROJECTED IMPACT OF WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES AND MERCENARIES FROM LIBYA ON THE SAHEL AND THE REST OF AFRICA

The last session of the month was convened on 30 September and formed the 1035th meeting of the PSC. The session, convened at ministerial level, addressed the growing concern over the possible impacts that the withdrawal of foreign fighters from Libya would have on the rest of Africa, particularly the Sahel region. The outcome of the session was adopted as a Communiqué one day after the meeting.

As noted by Council, the withdrawal of foreign forces from Libya is not only one of the objectives underscored in the Ceasefire Agreement of 23 October 2020, but also a necessary precondition for the success of Libya’s national peacebuilding process. However, without the proper management of the withdrawal of these forces, there is risk of further destabilisation to the overall Sahel region and the rest of Africa. As captured by Council, the prevalence of foreign fighters and mercenaries is already exacerbating the insecurity not only in the Sahel region, but also in the Horn of Africa, the Lake Chad Basin Region and Central Africa. Accordingly, Council stressed that the withdrawal of foreign forces from Libya should be conducted in an “orderly, coordinated and incremental manner”. Council also emphasised the importance of a coordinated approach, particularly between the AU and the UN in formulating and implementing the withdrawal process. The Policy Paper drafted by the ACSRT on the impacts of withdrawal of foreign forces from Libya, which Council welcomed at its session and encouraged its finalisation and dissemination to member States, is also expected to provide guidance.

Pining one of the main underlying reasons for the presence of foreign forces, Council also urged external actors to immediately cease their interference in the internal affairs of Libya, warning to name and shame such actors if they refuse to heed Council’s call. This is not the first time for the PSC to extend such warning as it has made the same remarks at previous sessions such as its 957th session. External actors who continue to fuel the Libyan conflict, particularly through provision of weapons in clear violation of UN arms embargo need to be made accountable and naming and shaming can be among the instrumental methods of doing so.

With regards to regional security and collaborations among regional States, Council took appreciative note of the Ministerial meeting of Libya’s neighbouring countries, held on 30 and 31 August 2021, in Algeria. The meeting served as a means for neighbouring States of Libya to recommit their efforts for the resolution of the conflict in Libya. In addition to addressing the need to work towards unifying State institutions in Libya and achieving reconciliation, the urgent withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign forces from Libya was also a main topic of discussion. Having regard to the value of collaborations among States in the region, Council also made an appeal for the reactivation and operationalisation of the Quadripartite Agreement between Libya, Niger, Sudan and Chad on Border Protection.

* On 8 October 2021, an action plan was developed for the management of the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya. The action plan was a result of a three days consultation among the military representatives from the Government and opposition military forces, also known as the 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission (JMC). The action plan provides the structure for a “gradual, balanced, and sequenced” withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya.

* The Policy Paper was drafted in line with PSC’s request at its 1016th session on the situation in Chad. PSC made the request taking note of the projected impact of withdrawal of foreign forces from Libya on Central Africa and the Sahel region.
The agreement which was signed in 2018 had the main purpose of coordinating the actions of the armed forces of the four States in responding to transboundary security threats including illegal migration, human trafficking and most importantly, the growing prevalence of terrorism. Accordingly, it was agreed among the concerned countries to establish a cooperation mechanism for border security and to fight against transnational organized crime across their shared borders. As emphasised by Libya’s Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry for Political Affairs, Mohammed Khalil Issa, in a speech delivered at PSC’s 1024th session following up on the implementation of AU’s strategy on border governance, Libya aspires to reactivate the terms of the quadripartite agreement with its neighbours in order to combat various cross-border crimes and to consolidate peace, security and development in the common border areas.

Having regard to the growing threat of terrorism in the region, Council also urged for the operationalisation of the AU Special Fund on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism. The Special Fund was established pursuant to Assembly decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.614 (XXVIII)] adopted at the 27th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly. As indicated in the Assembly decision, the Special Fund is to be financed through voluntary contributions. Hence, much lobbying is needed in terms of convincing and encouraging member States and relevant stakeholders to make contributions which will enable the Special Fund to be operational.

In terms of key decisions adopted at the 1035th session, first would be Council’s decision to reactivate the PSC Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism. It is to be recalled that at previous sessions such as its 812th meeting, Council reiterated the urgent need to reactivate the sub-committee. Another key decision was Council’s note to expedite the implementation of its previous decisions relevant to combating terrorism in the continent. One of these decision is the development of an “African list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts, including foreign terrorist fighters”. The request to develop a database of persons or organisations involved in or supporting terrorism in Africa was made by Council at its 812th session, assigned to the AU Commission, working through the ACSRT, CISSA and AFRIPOL. In this regard, some of the progress made by CISSA and AFRIPOL in establishing a database of active foreign fighters and militant groups in the continent was welcomed by Council.

In addition to discussing security threats in the region and the growing concern over the presence of foreign forces in Libya and the projected impact of their withdrawal, Council also addressed some key aspects of the Libyan peace process, including the approaching timeline for the conduct of national elections (which could not be conducted at the expected deadline of 24 December 2021) and the need for preparations to organise the election. In that regard, the AU Commission was requested to assist Libyan authorities and provide the required support for the successful conduct of the elections.7 The Commission was also requested to mobilise resources to support efforts in the areas of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) as well as efforts in mitigating resurgence of non-State armed groups and curbing illicit arms flow.

Another key request emanating from the 1035th session was for the AU Commission to scale up consultations on the deployment of the 3000 troops to Sahel and report back to the PSC ahead of the AU Summit in January/February 2022. The deployment of the 3000 troops is part of AU’s strategy to strengthen its response to the continuing insecurity in the Sahel region.

The AU Commission was also tasked with taking the lead in developing a “comprehensive and integrated strategy” for the Sahel region and report back to the PSC on the process during the first quarter of 2022. As captured above, the same request was also made at the 1027th session on Mali, for the finalisation of the AU Stabilization Strategy for the Sahel, demonstrating the importance Council is placing on the issue.

7 The Libyan elections which were planned to take place on 24 December 2021 could not be conducted and were postponed, entailing a regress in the Libyan peace process. One of the central issues which led to the postponement of the elections is the lack of agreement within the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) on the constitutional basis for elections. While a law on presidential elections was issued through decree by the Speaker of the House of Representatives (HoR) on 8 September 2021, the law is marred with procedural controversy. In addition to the absence of an agreed constitutional basis, the candidate list for the presidential election was also another major contributing factor for the elections to be postponed. Particularly, the registration of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son of former leader Muammar Gaddafi, who has been convicted in absentia for war crimes has been a major point of contention.
Taking into consideration that the OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa does not address the new realities of involvement of foreign forces and terrorism in the continent, the PSC also highlighted the need to expeditiously revise the Convention – although no deadline was provided.

Regarding the prevailing humanitarian situation in Libya, the growing trends of migrant smuggling and human trafficking were stressed by Council.

**OTHER PSC ACTIVITIES DURING THE MONTH**

In addition to its substantive sessions, Council also convened a meeting in September to prepare for the 15th and 13th annual joint consultative meetings with the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC), respectively. While the consultative meeting with the EUPSC did not take place in 2021 due to time constraints, the PSC and UNSC had their 15th annual consultative meeting on 17 December, which was preceded by the informal joint seminar of the two Councils convened on 16 December.
ABOUT AMANI AFRICA

Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research, training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African Union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

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