

# MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

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# MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL – JULY 2022

## THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In July, Djibouti chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). During the month, the PSC convened three sessions. All the sessions were dedicated to country/ region specific issues. Two sessions were held at ambassadorial level. There was one session at ministerial level. The outcome for all the three sessions were adopted as Communiqué. On average, it took about one week for the outcome documents of the sessions to be published.<sup>1</sup>

## SOUTH SUDAN URGED TO COMPLETE ALL OUTSTANDING TRANSITIONAL TASKS IN THE PEACE AGREEMENT

PSC's first session of the month, its 1092<sup>nd</sup> meeting, considered the situation in South Sudan with a focus on the implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

Council received briefings from Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for South Sudan and Head of AU Liaison Office in Juba, Joram Mukama Biswaro, Inter-Governmental Authority Special Envoy for South Sudan, Ismail Wais, the Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), Charles Gituai and the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Nicholas Haysom. Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Sudan to the AU, James Morgan also delivered a statement.

<sup>1</sup> Before its revision, the initial programme of work for the month of July envisaged a briefing on the situation in Horn of Africa to be held on 5<sup>th</sup> July 2022. The initial programme of work for the month also envisaged consideration of the report of the chairperson of the commission on Election in Africa, on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2022.

The session was held at a time when the end of the transitional period of the R-ARCSS was fast approaching while implementation of key transitional tasks are lagging behind. These include the unification of forces, the adoption of relevant laws on elections and the making of the new constitution and the establishment of the key institutions for constitution making and elections. This delay has not only further eroded public confidence in the Revitalized Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU)'s commitment to the peace process but also precipitated uncertainty and anxiety in South Sudan on how the country should proceed at the end of the transitional period in February 2023.

## The Reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU)

The RTGoNU was formed on 22 February 2020, which had long been provided for under Chapter 1 of the R-ARCSS, signed between the government and opposition political parties on 12 September 2018 in Addis Ababa. The RTGoNU, led by Salva Kiir Mayardit as the president, saw the swearing in of the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, as the first vice president.

In the light of this context, the PSC, in the [Communiqué](#) of the 1092<sup>nd</sup> session, 'encourage(d)' the South Sudanese parties to urgently complete all outstanding transitional tasks stipulated in the R-ARCSS, among them the acceleration of the graduation and deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF), the ratification of the Permanent Constitution-Making Bill and electoral laws, the reconstitution of the National Constitutional Review Commission and the National Elections Commission.' Considering that these remaining tasks would not be finalized before February 2023, the PSC further 'encourage(d)' the RTGoNU 'to expedite the development of the long-awaited roadmap, which will outline the outstanding transitional tasks in the R-ARCSS, and provide the necessary way forward.' This echoes the call of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)'s [39<sup>th</sup> Extraordinary Assembly](#) of IGAD Heads of State and Government, held on 5<sup>th</sup> July 2022, on the parties to draw up a roadmap with clear benchmarks and realistic timelines to complete the remaining tasks including the conduct of elections. These pronouncements signal the acceptance by the AU and IGAD of the inevitability of the extension of the

transitional period beyond February 2023.

It is worth noting that since then the 'Agreement on the Roadmap to a Peaceful and Democratic end to the Transitional Period of the R-ARCSS' was presented to the RJMEC. On 1 September 2022, the members of the RJMEC voted to extend the Transitional Period and term of the RTGoNU by two years from 23<sup>rd</sup> February 2023 until 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2025. This is subject to ratification by the Transitional National Legislative Assembly.

The Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) is constituted under Chapter VII of the R-ARCSS and is responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the Revitalised Peace Agreement and the mandate and tasks of the RTGoNU, including the adherence of the Parties to the agreed timelines and implementation schedule.

In terms of the role of the AU in assisting with the implementation of some of the transitional tasks, the PSC also expressed its appreciation to UNMISS and IGAD for supporting AU Commission to initiate a Trilateral Evaluation of the Electoral and Constitution-Making Needs of South Sudan in line with PSC's Communique of the 1060<sup>th</sup> meeting [[PSC/PR/COMM.2/1060 \(2022\)](#)]. It is to be recalled that at its 1060<sup>th</sup> session, the PSC requested the AU Commission to liaise with the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General and the IGAD Executive Secretary to coordinate a trilateral evaluation of the electoral and constitution-making needs of South Sudan. Haysom of UNMISS welcomed this call of the PSC in his [UNSC briefing](#). He stressed the platform will leverage comparative advantages, thus UNMISS intends to be an active partner in this effort.

On the intersecting challenges of peacebuilding and the growing humanitarian crisis induced by insecurity and flooding, the PSC found it necessary to encourage the RTGoNU, as the primary responsibility bearer for the wellbeing of South Sudanese, 'working in collaboration with the AU Commission and other critical institutions, including the African Development Bank, the AU Development Agency-NEPAD, on practical means and ways of mobilizing complementary humanitarian support to that currently being provided by the UN and other international partners.' The PSC also requested that the RTGoNU 'to expedite the establishment of the Board for Special Reconstruction Fund (BSRF), so

that the AU Commission, the UN and IGAD, working in collaboration with the Government, can expeditiously organize the South Sudan Pledging Conference as provided for in Chapter 3.2.8. of the Revitalized Peace Agreement.'

### Chapter 3.2.8. of R-ARCSS

Within nine (9) months of the establishment of the Special Reconstruction Fund (SRF), the BSRF in collaboration with the Chairperson of IGAD, Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary General of the United Nations shall convene a South Sudan Pledging Conference to raise money to resource this Fund, and to support the implementation of this Agreement. The Fund shall supplement core financing by the RTGoNU.

Regarding the role of the AU, particularly as it relates to the humanitarian situation, it is interesting to note that the PSC requested the AU Commission 'to explore the possibility of access to the Special Fund of the pledging project, so as to contribute to addressing the humanitarian needs in South Sudan.' This is made pursuant to the Decision of the Extraordinary AU Humanitarian Summit and Pledging Conference held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea on 27 May 2022. This prompt decision to use part of the pledged funds for supporting humanitarian action in South Sudan is welcome. Yet, the issue of whether the fund is operational and when the resources from the fund would be available was not made clear.

Beyond the impact of the delay in the implementation of the transitional tasks, tension between the main parties making up the R-TGoNU also reignited fears of relapse of the country back to conflict. The emergence and spread of localized conflicts compounds this situation further, highlighting the peacebuilding challenges facing South Sudan. In this regard, the PSC expressed 'deep appreciation to the "The Juba Quartet", namely, the heads of AU Mission in Juba, UN Mission in South Sudan, IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan, and the Interim Chairperson of RJMEC - for their good offices.' The PSC also commended Pope Francis for his engagement for peaceful South Sudan and the Sant'Egidio process for 'facilitating the resolution of the impasse between the South Sudanese holdout groups.'

## Sant'Egidio,

Sant'Egidio is a Catholic community based in Rome dedicated to the provision of social services and arbitrating conflicts. The community is widely recognized as a leader in Track 2 diplomacy by civil society actors and promotes discussion on the differing visions of the transition rather than violence as a means of reconciliation. In South Sudan, the community had played a key role in helping to move forward the peace process in South Sudan.

Underscoring the continued importance of peacemaking efforts, the PSC also tasked the AU Commission 'to utilize the AU Panel of the Wise and the Champion on Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) on the crucial issues that are stifling the smooth implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement.'

One of the important aspects of the R-ARCSS is the mechanisms that it put in place for facilitating the monitoring and supporting of implementation of the agreement. Of particular significance in this regard are RJMEC and Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM). Following the suspension of funds by the US to RJMEC and CTSAMVM on account of lack of progress in R-ARCSS implementation, the PSC expressed 'its concern over the USA decision to suspend financial support' to these bodies.' According to the PSC, this decision 'can seriously jeopardize the work of these two critical institutions and the current momentum, as well as the gains registered thus far' and accordingly appealed to the US Government to reconsider its position.

## Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC requested the AU Commission:

- To explore the possibility of access to the Special Fund of the pledging project, so as to contribute to addressing the humanitarian needs in South Sudan.
- To utilize the AU Panel of the Wise and the Champion on Peacebuilding and PCRD on the crucial issues that are stifling the smooth implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement.

- Through the Cairo-based PCRD Centre, to expedite the undertaking of a post-conflict needs assessment mission to South Sudan, in order to identify priority areas for PCRD support.
- Requested the AU Commission, UN and IGAD Secretariats to commence plans by the end of **August 2022** on a joint taskforce for putting together a strategy on mobilizing the needed support for the constitution-making and electoral institutions and processes in South Sudan.
- To capacitate the AU Mission in South Sudan so that it can effectively pursue the AU's mandate on promoting sustainable peace, security, stability and development in South Sudan.

## Relevant previous PSC decision:

- 1041<sup>st</sup> meeting held on 26 October 2021 on the Situation in Sudan ([PSC/PR/COMM.1041 \(2021\)](#)): Council requested the AU Commission to provide monthly updates on the evolution of the situation in Sudan.
- 1060<sup>th</sup> meeting held on 25 January 2022 on the situation in Sudan ([PSC/PR/COMM.1/1060 \(2022\)](#)): Council decided to undertake a solidarity visit to South Sudan on the second anniversary of the formation of the Transitional Government on 22 February 2022, considering that the end of the three-year transition period was approaching fast.

## Relevant other Executive decision:

- IGAD's [39th Extraordinary Assembly of IGAD](#) Heads of State and Government that was held on 5th July 2022, called up the RTGoNU and the parties to draw up a roadmap with clear benchmarks and realistic timelines to complete the remaining tasks including the conduct of elections.

## THE PSC CONSIDERS THE SITUATION IN THE CAR AS IT MULLS OVER THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE AU MISSION IN THE CAR

The second session of the month, which took place on 25 July, was on the 1093<sup>rd</sup> session dedicated to the situation in Central African Republic (CAR) and the AU Military Observers Mission to CAR (MOUACA).

The lead briefer at the session was Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) for the CAR and Head of AU Office in the CAR, Bertino Matias Matondo. Additionally, representatives of the Economic Community of East African States (ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the UN and the European Union (EU) also addressed the PSC. As the country concerned, the Permanent Representative of the CAR, E. Amb. Fernand Poukre-Kono also delivered a statement.

At the time of the session, one of the policy issues for the PSC was the challenges facing the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (PAPR-CAR). In the context of the disputed December 2020 election that was marred by violence, some of the signatories of the PAPR-CAR returned to fighting and new rebel group emerged. As a result, a major challenge for the CAR and the AU as guarantor of PAPR-CAR has been how to arrest the ensuing fighting affecting various parts of the country and save the PAPR-CAR from collapse. Apart from the military response that the CAR initiated, Angola and Rwanda also launched a diplomatic effort. The diplomatic track led to the adoption of the Luanda Road Map by the Heads of State and Government of the ICGLR on 16 September 2021. This sought the unilateral ceasefire declaration that President Faustin Archange Touadera announced on 15 October 2021 and engagement of ICGLR leaders towards the renunciation of violence by armed groups. However, the Luanda Roadmap did not make reference to nor built on the PAPR-CAR, thereby giving rise to questions about the relationship between the two.

In the [Communiqué](#) it adopted, the PSC expressed its 'deep concern over the security situation in the

country.' With respect to the PAPR-CAR, one major development that the PSC welcomed as a mark of progress 'towards the implementation' of the PAPR-CAR was the decision taken by the Government of the CAR to establish a commission for an integrated implementation of the PAPR-CAR and the Luanda Roadmap under the supervision of the Prime Minister and Head of Government.' On the relationship between the Luanda Roadmap and PAPR-CAR, the PSC further underscored the need 'for the Guarantors and Facilitators of the PAPR-CAR, including the experts of the ICGLR and members of the Commission to ensure an integrated implementation of the PAPR-CAR and the Luanda Roadmap' and 'to examine ways and means to address the situation of the leaders of the CPC present in Chad in order to find a rapid solution.' Missing from the PSC communiqué was the call for the signatories of the PAPR-CAR to return to the peace process and resume their part of the commitment for the implementation of the agreement.

With respect to the republican dialogue that the CAR government launched in pursuit of bolstering its standing with some sectors of society from 21 to 27 March 2022 in Bangui, the PSC commended 'the Government and all political and social stakeholders of the CAR for the holding of the Republican Dialogue and encouraged them to implement the adopted recommendations.' Missing from the PSC communiqué is any reference to the boycott of the dialogue by the main leaders of the political opposition. Yet, indicating the role of governance for facilitating secure environment, the PSC found itself highlighting to the CAR authorities the need for them to take 'the required measures to continue to promote good governance, strengthen national institutions and the rule of law.' This is to be undertaken, per the PSC, 'in order to create conducive conditions for ...lasting peace and stability in the country.'

The other policy issue for the PSC concerned the protection of civilians crisis that the renewed conflict induced. The majority of the violations that arose from the military operation and the attacks by armed rebel groups affected civilians, further exacerbating the already dire protection of civilians crisis in the country. In this regard, the most that the PSC had to say was to condemn 'the attacks perpetrated by the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) against the civilian population.' The PSC missed the opportunity to call on all actors engaged in military operations in the CAR



to abide by AU and UN civilian protection measures and respect international humanitarian law and call for the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring and reporting on protection of civilians from attacks by all those engaged in military operations and armed fighting.

On the humanitarian challenge exacerbated by increased fighting and insecurity, apart from appealing to the international community and emphasizing the need for full implementation of the Yaoundé declaration of April 2022 on addressing the humanitarian situation in the CAR, the PSC requested 'the AU Commission to provide humanitarian assistance to CAR, including the possible use of resources mobilized from the Extraordinary Humanitarian Pledging Conference held in Malabo in May 2022.'

The issue of the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on the CAR by the UN Security Council (UNSC) also featured in this session. The embargo has since 2013 been extended regularly. On 29 July 2021, the Security Council adopted [resolution 2588 \(2021\)](#), by which it extended until 31 July 2022 the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze in the CAR. CAR has been calling for the lifting of the sanction for the past few years and was seeking to achieve the lifting of the sanction before its further renewal upon the imminent expiry of its current term. Despite reiterating its earlier call for the lifting of the sanction, the PSC, in apparent acknowledgement of gaps that should be addressed by the CAR, called on the authorities 'to take the necessary measures for the implementation of the benchmarks set out by the Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council to facilitate the lifting of the embargo.' This is indicative that the issue of the lifting of the embargo is not an all or nothing matter. As such, a more practical approach would be to work towards progressive lifting of the embargo.

The other key aspect of this session's agenda was the status of operationalization of MOUACA. The AU, as the main guarantor of the PAPR-CAR, deployed MOUACA, by virtue of the decision of the 936<sup>th</sup> session of the PSC that authorized its deployment for the period from 1 September 2020 to 31 October 2022, to support and monitor the implementation of the PAPR-CAR. Yet, various administrative, logistical and organizational factors led to the lack of operationalization of the mission despite the fact that the number of personnel of MOUACA was reduced from 49 to 34. While the PSC

held the session as the end of the funding timeline was days away (31 July), the mission was able to absorb only a small fraction of the funds allocated to it by the EU from its European Peace Facility (EPF), which replaced the African Peace Facility (APF). The most immediate concern of the PSC was accordingly the possibility of the extension of the funding timeline for the mission. In this respect and having regard to the due date for the renewal of the mandate of the mission, the PSC tasked 'the AU Commission to continue engaging the EU with regard to the financial support and continuation of the activities of MOUACA and report back to Council with recommendations before 31 October 2022.'

## Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up

The PSC called on:

- The CAR Government and all political and social stakeholders of CAR to take all necessary measures for the holding, on the agreed dates, of the local elections scheduled for 2023.
- The AU Commission:
  - to continue to provide the necessary support for the success of this electoral process, including the possibility of providing resources from the Peace Fund.
  - to continue engaging the EU with regard to the financial support and continuation of the activities of MOUACA and report back to Council with recommendations **before 31 October 2022**.
  - to provide humanitarian assistance to CAR, including the possible use of resources mobilized from the Extraordinary Humanitarian Pledging Conference held in Malabo in May 2022.
  - to take the necessary measures to ensure that the AU Mission in the Central African Republic and Central Africa (MISAC) is equipped with the necessary capacity to enable it to discharge its mandate effectively, including support for the implementation of the PAPR-CAR and taking into account the role of the AU as a main guarantor of the Agreement.

## THE PSC APPEALS TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO IMPOSED ON SOMALIA

The PSC's 1094<sup>th</sup> meeting, held on 27 July, was a Ministerial meeting on the Situation in Somalia and the Operations of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

The PSC received briefing from Ms. Fiona Lortan, Interim Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Somalia and Interim Head of ATMIS. It also heard interventions from the representatives of the Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCC), UN, EU and the United Kingdom (UK).

The aim of the session was to discuss the recent developments in Somalia and the progress made in the implementation of the mandates of ATMIS as envisaged in PSC communique [1068<sup>th</sup> \(2022\)](#) and UN Security Council Resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#), which authorized the new mission.

The conclusion of the protracted parliamentary and presidential elections is one of the political developments that received Council's attention. Considering the importance of this for stability in Somalia, the PSC in the [Communiqué](#) of the 1094<sup>th</sup> session welcomed the completion of the electoral process, the swearing in of the new Parliament, the inauguration of the new President and the appointment of a new Prime Minister; the appointment of the National Security Adviser, Director of National Intelligence, and Special Envoy for the Drought Response, among other appointments.

In Somalia, political leadership in the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has been a major factor in AMISOM's effective delivery on its mandate and political and security dynamics in the country. The end of Formajo's tenure and the election of a new president with the kind of leadership qualities that the situation in Somalia requires is received in some quarters with a sigh of relief. In his inaugural speech on 9 June, the priorities that President Mohamud outlined for his administration were national reconciliation, improving relations between the central Government and federal member states, addressing the security threat from Al-

Shabaab, and attending the dire drought conditions facing the country.



"An important instrument that will boost reconciliation is to complete the review and implementation of the provisional constitution."

"We shall boost our amicability with our neighbors and Somalia's partners across the world."

"We cannot continue surviving months of delivering water to drought affected people, then following by rescuing people affected by floods."

**President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud**  
**Excerpts from Speech delivered**  
**at Inauguration Ceremony**

Not surprisingly, the PSC welcomed the President's Agenda of prioritizing national reconciliation; strengthening federalism and improving relations between the Federal Government and Federal Member States; addressing the security threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed groups; finalization of the constitutional review process and judicial reform; and addressing the prevailing humanitarian situation.

Apart from welcoming the agenda of the new Somalia administration to focus on addressing the security threat posed by Al-Shabaab, the PSC stressed that 'military means on their own are not enough to address the many challenges facing Somalia and, in this regard, **requested** the Commission to provide the necessary support to enable the Police and Civilian components to provide support to the FGS in its efforts to enhance governance and the provision of public goods and services to local communities.' It further highlighted 'the critical need for socio-economic activities, quick impact and peace strengthening projects and other types of peace dividends in Somalia, particularly in liberated areas, in order to ensure development and preservation of the gains made thus far.'

Another discussion point at the session was concerning finance. ATMIS is faced with a funding shortfall amounting to tens of millions. While it continues to receive funding from the EU, the UK and

logistical support from the UN, these fall far short of the funding needs of the mission. The PSC noted with concern the funding challenges facing ATMIS and the urgent need to provide the necessary financial support for ATMIS, including through the use of UN assessed contributions and the AU Peace Fund, and in this regard, calls for urgent engagement among the AU, the EU, the UN and other existing and potential new donors, on practical ways to address the financial challenges facing ATMIS, with a view to ensuring that the Mission more effectively and successfully discharges its mandate within the timelines stipulated in PSC Communique [\[PSC/PR/COMM.1068 \(2022\)\]](#) of 8 March 2022 and [UNSC Resolution 2628 \(2022\)](#), in support of the Somalia Transitional Plan (STP) and the National Security Architecture.

Concerning the severe humanitarian crisis which is compounded by climate change and insecurity, the PSC noted with alarm the prevailing humanitarian situation in Somalia, and in this respect, requested the PRC, through its Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees and IDPs and the PRC Sub-Committee on Drought and Famine, urgently to engage the FGS through the Special Envoy on Drought Response, in order to identify the needs of the FGS, with a view to mobilizing the required support, including on the possible use of resources mobilized from the Extraordinary Humanitarian Pledging Conference held in Malabo in May 2022.

### Extraordinary Humanitarian Pledging Conference held in Malabo

The summit that was held on 27 May 2022 deliberated on ways to address the humanitarian challenges facing the continent - such as those being experienced in various regions in the continent. During the summit, the AU with other concerned stakeholders reviewed the state of humanitarian action and response, looking at early warning and prevention, peace building and addressing root causes, and identifying durable solutions and post conflict recovery for peace and development. During the summit, pledges were made for responding to the humanitarian crises on the continent and the AU Commission was tasked 'to follow up on the pledges made' during the summit. [\[Ext/Assembly/AU/Decl.\(XV\)\]](#)

It is interesting to note that the session also addressed itself the issue of lifting of the arms embargo imposed on Somalia. The UNSC imposed an arms embargo on Somalia in 1992 that was partially lifted in 2013 to help Somalia's security forces develop and fight the Al-Shabaab. The remaining sanctions, which require requests for certain weapons to be approved, are renewed annually. The new government of Somalia has been campaigning since May for the support of neighbours and the AU. In this regard, Council appealed to the UN to urgently reconsider the request from the FGS for the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on the country, in order to ensure that the country is sufficiently equipped to effectively address the security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab terrorist group and other armed groups active in Somalia, as it prepares to take over security responsibilities from ATMIS at the end of the transition. The UNSC is expected to consider renewal of the arms embargo in November 2022.

With respect to the drawdown of 2000 ATMIS troops, it reiterated the need for the FGS, with the support of its bilateral partners, to ensure effective force generation and integration, which is crucial for the successful transition, including preparations for the drawdown of 2000 ATMIS troops by 31 December 2022, in line with the ATMIS Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and [UNSC Resolution 2628 \(2022\)](#), taking into account the need to ensure ATMIS force protection and reconfigure Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in a manner that does not lead to a security vacuum that can be exploited by Al-Shabaab. While the ambition of a drawdown and set timeline for exit is commendable, it remains to be seen how realistic the process of drawdown and the planned exit of ATMIS on the set time.

### Relevant previous PSC decisions:

- 1068<sup>th</sup> meeting held on 8<sup>th</sup> March 2022 on the reconfiguration of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) [PSC/PR/COMM.1068\(2022\)](#): the PSC underscored the 'critical importance of sustainable and predictable financing, at adequate levels and for the full duration of the mission from 1 April 2022 up to 31 December 2024.' It further appealed to the UN, EU and other partners to 'establish a financial support package, including through UN assessed contribution'.



## Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC requested

- The AU Commission:
  - to provide the necessary support to enable the Police and Civilian components to provide support to the FGS in its efforts to enhance governance and the provision of public goods and services to local communities, as outlined in the revised Somali Transition Plan (STP).
  - in close consultation with the FGS, the UN and other international partners, to finalize the benchmarks for the transition indicating the milestones each of the institution needs to achieve within the timelines with an initial focus on benchmarks and indicators for Phase 1 of the transition, culminating in the draw-down of 2,000 troops by 31 December 2022.
  
- The AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Centre in Cairo
  - to support the post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts of the FGS.
  
- The PRC, through its Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees and IDPs and the PRC Sub-Committee on Drought and Famine,
  - urgently to engage the FGS through the Special Envoy on Drought Response, in order to identify the needs of the FGS, with a view to mobilizing the required support.
  
- The UN
  - to consider holding a special session on financing for ATMIS and Somalia Security Forces.

## Other PSC activities during the month

During the month of July, apart from its sessions, the PSC also undertook a field mission. The mission took the PSC to Somalia from 19 to 22 July 2022. The purpose of the field mission was to assess progress made and outstanding challenges, as well as to support the next steps in implementing the decisions of PSC Communique 1068th (2022) and UN Security Council Resolution 2628 (2022). This mission also served to engage the leadership and personnel of ATMIS and the various Somalia actors including the leaders of the FGS and facilitate understanding about the situation on the ground and close collaboration with the new administration.



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
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We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

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