

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

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THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In September, Ghana was the monthly Chairperson of the Africa Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). From the items making up the agenda of the [Provisional Program of Work](#) at the beginning of the month, the PSC did not consider one agenda item¹ and another item that did not initially feature in the program of work was added during the month.² In total, the PSC convened six sessions. Four of these sessions were committed to thematic agenda, while two addressed country/region specific issues.

With the exception of one session convened at ministerial level, all of the session took place at ambassadorial level. The outcomes of all of the sessions were adopted as Communiqués while no outcome document was released for two sessions.³ On average, it took about two weeks for the release of the outcome documents.

PSC AGREED TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE CONSULTATIVE MEETING WITH CSOS

The first substantive session of the PSC, held on 14 September, involved the first annual consultative meeting between the PSC and the CSOs. As noted in [our analysis](#), apart from discussing the implementation of the Livingstone Formula and the Maseru Conclusions, the consultation also had a focus on engagement on the implementation of Accra

Declaration and Malabo Decisions, particularly as they relate to unconstitutional changes of government. It thus identified and clarified the role of African civil society in the implementation and monitoring of the outcomes of various continental dialogues that have taken place on the subject, including the Reflection Forum on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, that was held in Accra in March 2022; the AU Extraordinary Summit on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government, held in Malabo in May 2022, and the ECOSOCC Citizens' Forum on Democracy and Unconstitutional Changes of Government, held in Lusaka in July 2022.

ECOSOCC's Head of Programmes, Kyeretwie Osei, gave an overview of how ECOSOCC is working to engage CSOs through various interventions. These various areas highlighted in his presentation include: the establishment of a CSO continental database to interface with the PSC and the AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS); scaling up advocacy on PSC programs and initiatives; mobilizing CSOs to support continental initiatives, particularly on UCGs in Africa; working with CSOs in the development of a policy booklet on 2021 AU Theme of the Year to achieve peace and security on the continent and integrating youth and women throughout Africa's peace and security architecture.

The session featured five CSOs, representing the five regions of Africa, and working in the field of governance, democracy peace and security, namely: the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), representing Eastern Africa; West African Civil Society Institute (WASCI), representing Western Africa; Cameroon Youths and Students Forum for Peace, representing Central Africa; Southern Africa Partnerships for Prevention of Conflicts (SAPPC), representing Southern Africa; and the Association International Cle de la Paix Pour le Developpement et la Solidarite, representing Northern Africa. They highlighted the governance and peace and security challenges facing the different regions including the democratic backsliding including tenure elongation and the threat of expansion of terrorism in West Africa, failing governance system, increased cases of violent political transitions and state fragility in Southern Africa and the spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the Central Africa region. While welcoming the consultative meeting, they also emphasized the

¹ This was the agenda on the implementation of the Continental Structural Prevention Framework (CSPF).

² The agenda item added during the month was the joint briefing on the AU Peace Fund.

³ No outcome was adopted for the Inaugural annual consultative meeting between the PSC and the CSOs held on 14 September and Joint Briefing on AU Peace Fund held on 16 September.

need for enhancing the engagement with CSOs and creation of avenues for participation of CSOs in the various workstreams of the AU on governance and peace and security including early warning and early response, mediation and PSC field missions.

Apart from the foregoing, representatives of the Institute for Security Studies and Amani Africa Media and Research Services made presentations sharing their experiences of working with the PSC. The interventions highlighted how the PSC can institutionalize engagement with CSOs in order for it to tap into and adequately harness their expertise and resources in developing various policy interventions for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. It was appropriately suggested that for this it would be wise to build on existing best practices to facilitate engagement of CSOs including through the submission of early warning reports, the provision of information and analysis on conflict prevention and conflict management and resolution measures that the AU may need to adopt or on the revision of such measures and in participating in some of the activities of the AU such as in election monitoring and awareness creation activities for the promotion of AU norms on democratic governance and constitutional rule and countering terrorism in Africa.

The Chairperson of the PSC for the month Ghana's Permanent Representative to the AU, Amma Twum-Amoah, underscored the significant role that civil society plays in promoting good governance in Africa. She urged the CSOs to engage robustly with the PSC in order to enhance efforts aimed at promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa. The AU Commissioner for PAPS, Bankole Adeoye, also stressed the importance of an active civil society to the implementation of AU programs.



'The Livingstone Formula and the Maseru Conclusions reinforce the necessity of periodic structured engagements between the PSC and CSOs.'

H.E Bankole Adeoye

Members of the PSC noted that CSOs serve as bridge between policy makers and the wider constituency of the African public for the implementation of conflict prevention mechanisms, including early warning and early response to conflicts, with some member states emphasizing that the role of CSOs is complementary and needs to be facilitated through ECOSOC. The need for enhancing the participation of women and youth networks in peace processes and in peacebuilding and governance initiatives was also underscored. In terms of their role in democratic governance, the PSC commended the role of CSOs in election processes. The PSC agreed to institutionalize the annual consultative meeting with CSOs as part of the Accra Forum on democratic governance and peace and security, which is envisaged to be held in September annually.

PSC REQUESTED THE AU COMMISSION TO CONSIDER THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENT ON (SALW) IN AFRICA

During the first week of September from 4 – 7, the PSC undertook a field mission to Lomé, Togo to commemorate the 2022 Africa Amnesty Month (AAM). Subsequently, it undertook a mission to Niger. As a follow up to its field mission, the PSC held a session on 15 September to reflect on the field mission.

Unlike previous sessions on the AAM held in Addis Ababa, the PSC undertook a field mission to give regional visibility to the issue of the collection of SALW as part of the annual engagement on the AAM. As part of the mission whose details are contained in the [field mission report](#), the PSC held an interactive session in Lomé, Togo with briefings from Adedeji EBO, Chief Conventional Arms Branch at United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Badreldin Elamin Abdelgadir, incoming Deputy to the UN High Representative for Disarmament, Mazah Paka, the Executive Secretary of RECSA and the President of the Togolese SALW Commission.

In terms of the state of affairs regarding SALW, the PSC in the [Communique](#) issued on the session expressed its deep concern over the continued proliferation

of illicit SALW leading to an increase in criminal activities, terrorism and violent extremism. Certainly, the proliferation of illegal arms in Africa has been a problem for years. What is even more worrying is that over the past decade there has been a strong upward trend in terrorist attacks involving SALW as well as in the number of fatalities resulting from such attacks across the continent. The PSC additionally expressed concern over 'the recurring armed conflicts and other forms of insecurity' which make the illicit proliferation and circulation of such arms and weapons. Recognizing that SALW end up in the hands of civilians and armed groups partly on account of poor safekeeping of arms, the PSC stressed 'the need for Member States to mark, keep records and trace weapons' and requested the AU Commission 'to provide technical support to Member States on the management of stockpiles and destruction of surrendered SALW.'

Concerning the increasing link between terrorism and SALW, PSC emphasized the need to link the Silencing the Guns in Africa goal with the implementation of the Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government [[Ext/Assembly/AU/Decl.\(XVI\)](#)], which instituted 31 January of each year as 'Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation'.

The critical role of the RECs/RMs in fighting the proliferation of illicit weapons in their regions was stressed by the Council. PSC also emphasized the need to harmonize and coordinate the strategies and actions of the AU, the RECs/RMs, the UN and the international community to ensure the control of the illicit circulation of weapons on the continent.

In order to advance the agenda, the PSC decided to continue launching AAM on the ground with the participation of the youth and women, as well as the media and faith-based organizations.

In a welcome development that took up the proposal that Amani Africa advanced for the past few years, the PSC tasked the AU Commission to consider the development of continent wide legal instrument on the regulation of SALW in Africa. While there are regional instruments and the AU supports the international Arms Trade Treaty, Africa lacks a continent wide legal regime that is geared towards addressing the specificities of the challenges of the trade in and circulation of illicit SALW in Africa. The development of such African wide legal instrument

would go long way in strengthening the effort to stem the tide of illicit SALW fuelling conflicts and insecurity in various parts of the continent.

Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC requested AU Commission:

- To develop a reporting and monitoring template for Member States to provide information on AAM activities and to continue providing technical support to Member States on the management of stockpiles and destruction of surrendered SALW;
- In close coordination with Member States and RECs/RMs, to conduct surveys on the collection of illicit weapons at five-year intervals in order to provide reliable data on the progress made by the Member States;
- To convening a meeting of experts from Member States, to elaborate a common African position which will provide guidance to AU Member States during the 4th Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms;
- To explore the possibility of developing legally binding instruments on the management of SALW and to update the Council on the same.

Relevant AU Assembly decision

- AU Assembly Decision [[Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1\(XIV\)](#)] adopted during the 14th Extra-Ordinary Session on Silencing the Guns held on 6 December 2020, in Johannesburg, South Africa, extended the implementation of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa for a period of ten (10) years (2021-2030) and accordingly, extended the commemoration and conduct of the AAM during September of each year for a period of ten (10) years (2021-2030).

Joint Briefing on AU Peace Fund

On 16 September, PSC convened a joint-meeting with the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) Sub-Committee on Budget Matters along with the Board of Trustees of the AU Peace Fund. The session that was not initially in the monthly program of

work was dedicated to considering the status of the AU Peace Fund operationalisation as detailed in our analysis [here](#).

The PSC held a number of sessions on the Peace Fund previously. The last time it convened a session to discuss the AU Peace Fund was in October 2021, at its 1036th meeting. At that session, Council deliberated on the utilization of the Peace Fund on priority areas including support to peace processes in specific conflict and crisis affected member states including Libya, Mali, Somalia and Sudan.

Unlike such previous sessions this was the first time for the PSC to hold a joint meeting involving the relevant subcommittee of the PRC. It thus had the advantage of bringing these key actors on the same page as far as information on the operationalization of the Peace Fund is concerned and in forging consensus and shared understanding on the processes for the operationalization of the Fund and the planned pilot utilization of specified component of the Fund. Apart from the briefing from the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission, who is a member of the Executive Committee of the Peace Fund, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security made a presentation on 'Evolving consensus on financing AU Peace Support Operations and priority utilization of the Fund'.

During the consideration of the report on the Crisis Reserve Fund that forms part of the Peace Fund during the Executive Council session in Lusaka, one of the issues raised centered around the extent to which the relevant bodies were consulted and whether due process has been followed as stipulated in the Financial Rules and Regulations (FRR). The concept of implementing a pilot project under the three windows of the Peace Fund has been largely welcomed but the Executive Council could not consider the proposed project for approval. Hence this Joint Briefing session is meant to provide firm clarity on compliance with the FRR and ensure that the relevant AU bodies achieve common understanding. It also serves to pave the way for proposed \$8.4 million for the pilot projects that is yet to be approved by the PRC for adoption by AU policy organs.

While no outcome document was issued on the session, the meeting called on the AU Commission to continue engaging member states to resolve the

challenges facing the Fund's operationalization and mobilization of resources for the Fund. Commending the Government of Senegal for its voluntary contribution to the Fund, the meeting encouraged other member states to do the same. During the session, emphasis was also put on the need to focus on conflict prevention and mediation in line with Window 1 of the Peace Fund.

PSC 'UNEQUIVOCALLY REITERATES ALL MEMBERS OF THE TRANSITION MILITARY COUNCIL (TMC) SHALL BE INELIGIBLE TO PARTICIPATE AS CANDIDATES FOR THE ELECTIONS AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION'

On 19 September the PSC held its 1106th meeting during which it received an update on the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Mali. The session was meant to review the developments in the transitions in each of these countries since its last meeting in April 2022 at its [1076th](#) session.

PSC received briefings from Basile Ikouebe, High Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Office in Chad and received updates from representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Burkina Faso

The notable steps in Burkina Faso that were noted by Council includes the agreed transition time period set for 24 months starting from 1 July 2022, thus reducing the initial 36 months' timetable proposed by the transition authorities. In the [Communique](#) adopted on the session, the PSC expressed its deep concern over the deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso marked by heightened terrorist attacks targeting military outposts, the civilian population and essential infrastructure facilities.

The specificities of the challenges facing Burkina Faso including the fragilities and divisions in the army that precipitated the second coup and the fast-deteriorating security and humanitarian situation necessitate that the AU deploys targeted support for the transitional process both to avoid repeat of further coups and to help the initiation and implementation of the requisite reforms. In this respect although not specific to Burkina Faso, the PSC requested the AU Commission develop a support program for the countries in transition to address issues relating to National Reconciliation, Governance, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)/Security Sector Reform (SSR), Institutional Reforms – Rule of Law, Security and Capacity development, premised on national ownership and leadership.'

At the session, Council also welcomed the efforts of ECOWAS, including the appointment of the mediator for Burkina Faso, Mahamadou Issoufou, former President of the Republic of Niger. Issoufou was appointed at the [Extraordinary Summit](#) of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government held on 4th June 2022, as ECOWAS Mediator for Burkina Faso, to facilitate dialogue among all stakeholders.

Relevant previous PSC decisions:

- 1062nd PSC session on the situation in Burkina Faso [[PSC/PR/COMM.1/1062\(2022\)](#)]: held on 31 January 2022 suspended Burkina Faso in all AU activities until the effective restoration of normal constitutional order in the country.

Chad

On the situation in Chad, there were two significant developments that attracted the attention of the PSC. The first key development was the signing of peace agreement between Chad's transition government and about 40 politico-military groups on 8 August in Doha, Qatar, after more than five months of peace talks. The second key development is the launch of the 21-day 'Inclusive National Dialogue' (NID) on 20 August following the signing of the Doha agreement that gathered some 1,400 delegates from various stakeholders.

While welcoming these developments, the PSC called for equitable and inclusive participation in the dialogue representing the strata of a society fully, including women and youth. This call speaks to the charge by some opposition parties and civil society actors of the lack of inclusivity of the NID, leading to the boycott of the process by some key opposition parties. Parallel to this call for making the NID equitable and inclusive, the PSC 'urged all the armed groups yet to sign the Doha Agreement and parties which withdrew from the NID to reconsider and participate in the process in pursuance of sustainable peace.'

In a clear indication of the PSC's admission, despite not suspending Chad, that the transition authorities came to power unconstitutionally, it reaffirmed its 'call for the transition authorities to respect the 18 months period for the completion of the transition'. This reiteration of the 18 months period was very unrealistic and does not add up with PSC's endorsement of the NID. As we have pointed out in [our analysis](#) produced ahead of the session, the 18-months deadline for concluding the transition was lapsing in October 2022 and was thus unlikely to be met. Rather than reiterating the 18-months deadline, the realistic position to take for the PSC was to assign a high-level envoy who, among others, would engage the transitional authorities for making sure that agreement is reached on a reasonable timeline for the transition.

We pointed out that the 'PSC is seen as having dealt with the military seizure of power & the suspension of constitution leniently. For it to be seen to be applying AU norms fairly, at a minimum it needs to uphold its own decisions on Chad by reaffirming the... conditions of the transition as set out in the communique of its 996th session.' It was thus commendable that the PSC used strong expression that it 'unequivocally reiterates that all members of the Transition Military Council (TMC) shall be ineligible to participate as candidates for the elections at the end of the transition.' The expectation that arises from this emphatic restatement is that failing to comply with this condition would erase the rationale for the PSC not to suspend Chad and would accordingly trigger the suspension of the country.

What is missing from the PSC communiqué on Chad is the lack of reference to the repression against members of the opposition and civil society organizations. What makes this omission stark is in the same communiqué the PSC condemned 'the use of coercive measures

that jeopardize fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the right to protest and assembly' in the context of Guinea.

Finally, the PSC also decided to convene a session dedicated to the situation in Chad.

Relevant previous PSC decisions:

- 993rd Council's emergency session on the situation in Chad [[PSC/BR/COMM.2\(CMXCIII\)](#)]: held on 22 April 2021, Council convened an emergency session in response to the power assumption by Chad's military in contravention of the country's constitution.

Guinea

Resembling the Burkina government, the National Transition Council of Guinea also set a 36-month transition to civilian rule on 11 May. However, ECOWAS rejected the proposal by the military leaders of Guinea for a 36-month-long transitional period. In order to resolve the disagreement over the duration of the transition between the military leaders of Guinea and ECOWAS, and to strengthen dialogue, ECOWAS appointed mediator for Guinea. In this regard, Council welcomed the appointment of Yayi Boni, former President of the Republic of Benin, as the ECOWAS mediator for Guinea. Boni replaced the Ghanaian diplomat Mohamed Ibn Chambas, who stepped down as the ECOWAS mediator on 3 July 2022.

Even though, the transitional authorities continue to insist that there is no political crisis in Guinea, the country is still witnessing a deteriorating political situation and gross human right violation. Pertaining this, the PSC, apart from condemned repressive measures, called on 'the transition authorities to conduct transparent and impartial investigations as well as litigations, especially on political leaders and to ensure respect for the individual and collective freedoms of Guinean citizens.'

On the measures required for making progress in the transition, the PSC noted with satisfaction 'the call for the holding of the national dialogue by the Prime Minister of the transition and the undertaking to set up a formal dialogue framework aimed at building trust and confidence amongst all parties and reaching consensus on the transition process.' Importantly, it went on to underline 'the need for an inclusive

approach which caters for the participation of women and the youth'.

On the critical issue of providing targeted support through effectively accompanying the transitional process, more than one year after its decision for the establishment of the transition support mechanism the PSC still reiterates its call for the operationalization of this mechanism. This long delay in the operationalization of this mechanism meant that the AU did not have the level of presence and visibility in the effort to support the initiation and implementation the requisite reforms as part of the transition in Guinea. A key step towards the operationalization of the AU Support Framework for the Transition in Guinea and the Transition Support Mechanism was taken with a convening of a meeting in Guinea involving the AU Director of Conflict Management and the AU High-Representative for Mali and Sahel.

Relevant previous PSC decisions:

- 1036th session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1036\(2021\)](#)]: Council endorsed ECOWAS's Communiqué of its 8 September 2021 Extraordinary Summit where the regional organ decided to suspend Guinea from all of its governing bodies and suspended Guinea from activities of the AU until restoration of constitutional order in the country.
- 1064th session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1064\(2022\)](#)]: Council endorsed ECOWAS's Communiqué of its 3 February 2022 Extraordinary Summit where the regional organ upheld the suspension of Guinea and requested Guinean authorities to provide an acceptable timeline for the restoration of constitutional order.

Key actionable decision requiring follow-up:

- Council reiterated its call for the operationalization of the Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea (MMTG), comprising the AU, ECOWAS, UN, and all other relevant stakeholders, pursuant to Communiqué [[PSC/PR/COMM.1030\(2021\)](#)] adopted on 10 September 2021, as a comprehensive framework for coordinated support and follow-up of the transition in Guinea.

Mali

ECOWAS authority at the 61st Ordinary session held on 3 June 2022, decided to lift the economic and financial sanctions it imposed on Mali while maintaining the suspension and targeted sanctions against individuals and groups. This is a result of a noble diplomatic engagements between ECOWAS and the transition authorities in Mali during the past month. ECOWAS also accepted the transition timeline of 24 months from 29 March 2022 and commended other positive steps notably the promulgation of a new electoral law on 24 June and establishment of the single election management body, Agence Indépendante de Gestion des Elections (AIGE).

At the session, Council discussed the progress attained in the implementation of the Transition Roadmap in Mali and the progress made in the conduct of the transition, including the adoption of a AIGE, the enlargement of the composition of the National Transitional Council (NTC), the legislative body of the transition, to strengthen inclusivity, the adoption of a timetable for political, institutional and electoral reforms as well as the appointment of the members of the Committee responsible for drafting the preliminary version of the new Constitution.

Another key development taken after Council's last session was the 3rd Meeting of the Transition Support Group (TSG) on Mali. Co-convened by the AU, ECOWAS, and UN under the auspices of the Togolese government, the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali presented an opportunity for Malian authorities to present steps being taken for implementing the transitional roadmap and mobilize support from regional and international actors for the reform process. The Transitional Authority of Mali, during the 3rd meeting also requested the lifting of remaining sanctions. However, Council at the session only welcomed the conclusions of the 3rd Meeting of the TSG on Mali and urged the fulfilment of pledges of support for the Malian transition.

The Authority of Heads of State and Government of the ECOWAS convened an Extraordinary Session in New York, US on the margins of the UN General Assembly, on 22nd September 2022, under the chairmanship of H.E. Umaro Sissoco Embalo, President of the Republic of Guinea Bissau and Chair of the ECOWAS Authority. The Extraordinary Summit was convened to review

the report of the ECOWAS Mediator for Guinea, and the situation of the 46 Ivorian soldiers detained in Mali.

Relevant previous PSC decisions:

- 1001st Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1/1001\(2021\)](#)]: the PSC endorsed ECOWAS decision to suspend Mali and suspended the country from all AU activities until the restoration of constitutional order. At that session, Council further decided to constitute an evaluation mission to engage with relevant Malian and regional actors on the ground. No such mission was constituted.
- 1057th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1/1057\(2022\)](#)]: Council convened a session following ECOWAS's imposition of political and financial sanctions against Mali at its Extraordinary Summit held on 9 January 2022, following Mali's submission of a five-year long transition calendar. While Council reached consensus to endorse ECOWAS's decision to impose sanctions additional to suspending Mali, some Council members were wary of the economic implications of the additional sanctions as well as the potential negative consequences to diplomatic efforts. (See [Amani Africa's Monthly Digest -January 2022](#) for details)

Key actionable decisions applicable to all situations

In addition to Council's decisions adopted with regards to each member State considered at the session, the AU Commission was also requested to:

- Consideration of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in all the countries in political transition, immediately initiate a Commission-wide humanitarian support package, including the possible usage of materials from the AU Continental Logistics Base in Douala, in order to swiftly address the critical humanitarian situation therein and as a significant enabler to ensure a swift return to constitutional order;
- Within the broader framework of comprehensive support to the African countries in transition; develop a support program for the countries in transition to address issues relating to National Reconciliation, Governance, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegra-

tion (DDR)/Security Sector Reform (SSR), Institutional Reforms – Rule of Law, Security and Capacity development, premised on national ownership and leadership;

- Take a lead role and facilitate collaboration amongst all stakeholders – the AU Member States, ECCAS, ECOWAS, CENSAD, and UN as well as relevant partners – in the operationalization of support mechanisms for all Countries in transition to mobilize necessary resources to ensure seamless transition processes;
- Provision of a comprehensive briefing to the Council on the status of the deployment of 3000 troops to the Sahel, with the participation of all stakeholders involved, for Council's consideration.

PSC SHIFTED GEAR IN ITS POLICY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM WITH MORE FOCUS ON THE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EMERGENCE AND EXPANSION OF TERRORISM

The only ministerial level meeting of the PSC for the month making up its 1107th session was held on 23 September 2022 on the margins of the 77th UN General Assembly in New York, USA. The theme of the session was 'Strengthening Regional Organizations for the Maintenance of Peace and Security in Africa: Preventing and Fighting Terrorism and Violent Extremism in the Continent'.

As a session aimed to provide a platform for consultation and debate on how to strengthen the role of Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) in the collective efforts for maintenance of Peace and Security in Africa, particularly in terms of preventing and combatting of terrorism, violent extremism, and radicalization, the PSC received statements from Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission, Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism and from representatives of the RECs/RMs.

As pointed out in Amani Africa's [special report](#), the trend in the growing threat of terrorism witnessed in recent years and the data from the 2022 Global Terrorism Index indicate that Africa has become the epicentre of global terrorism. The region accounts for about 50% of global deaths due to terrorism while four of the ten countries globally to have experienced increase in deaths from terrorism in 2021 are also in Africa. In this regard, in the [Communique](#) issued on the session, the PSC expressed grave concern over the expanding and worsening scourge of terrorism and violent extremism on the Continent, exacerbated by the influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), mercenaries and private military enterprises.

To address the growing scourge of terrorism, the need to prioritize political solutions alongside military and security interventions was perhaps one of the most essential points emphasised at the session. Thus, PSC recognized that terrorism, radicalization and recruitment have been attributed to many causal factors such as democratic governance deficits, porous borders, ungoverned spaces, economic deprivation and marginalization, and lack of effective and legitimate governance structures for the provision of sustainable political and socio-economic infrastructure. In this regard, Council requested the Commission to explore options to further improve the implementation of policy interventions aimed at addressing the root causes and drivers of terrorism and violent extremism, especially the democratic governance deficit and the absence or weakness of governance structures in peripheral and remote territories, as well as political, social and economic marginalization.



'Prevention remains one of the most important tools against terrorism. Addressing its deep and multi-faceted drivers yield more impactful and long-lasting results. Military operations or security-centred responses alone are insufficient in the fight against terrorism.'

*Vladimir Voronkov,
Under Secretary General,
United Nations Office Counter-terrorism*

The ministerial communiqué also registers a marked departure from previous PSC sessions in terms of the emphasis it has put on the non-security focused political, governance and socio-economic measures critical to countering the nature of the threat of terrorism in Africa. Thus the PSC highlighted the following to halt the growing scourge of terrorism:

- The need for context-specific interventions tailored to address the security, governance, development and humanitarian needs of the affected countries and regions with the participation of local community leaders, faith-based leaders, youth, women and the representatives of children;
- The need to leverage the pivotal role of the Traditional, Cultural, Religious and Community Leaders in an effort to de-radicalize the youth.

Going further in the specific tasks assigned to the AU Commission for follow up, the PSC, among others, requested the Commission to support RECs/RMs to

- Explore options to further improve the implementation of policy interventions aimed at addressing the root causes and drivers of terrorism and violent extremism, especially the democratic governance deficit and the absence or weakness of governance structures in peripheral and remote territories, as well as political, social and economic marginalization
- Support Member States affected by the scourge of terrorism in strengthening institutions for delivery of social services, such as education, justice, health care and entrenching democracy, good governance and the rule of law;
- Put in place mechanisms for supporting initiatives of local communities both for deradicalization, reconciliation, inter-communal dialogue and for implementing measures for addressing the humanitarian and socio-economic needs of affected populations; and
- Harness the comparative technical advantages of Africa's governance and development institutions, including the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), African

Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD), the African Development Bank (ADB), and the relevant AU Commission Departments, in developing and implementing peace

In terms of enhancing the role of RECs/RMs, the PSC additionally tasked the AU Commission to support RECs/RMs to

- Strengthen existing mechanisms at the level of RECs/RMs in terms of their capacity to tracking, monitoring, reporting on, and proposing policy responses to prevent the expansion of the threats of terrorism and violent extremism with the support of the AFRIPOL, CISSA and ACSRT;
- Establish regional counter-terrorism centres to support national efforts in preventing and combating terrorism; and
- Convene inter-RECs/RMs policy coordination meetings horizontally among RECs/RMs, including at ministerial and Heads of State and Government levels taking note of the best practices of the Joint Summit of ECOWAS and ECCAS on peace, security and stability and the fight against terrorism and violent extremism held in Lomé, Togo in July 2018.

Relevant previous PSC decision

- 957th session [[PSC/PR/COMM.\(CMLVII\)](#)]: Council decided to dedicate an annual session to assess progress in the Continental efforts in combating the scourge of terrorism, radicalization and violent extremism, as well as foreign terrorist fighters.

Relevant AU Assembly decision

- During 16th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa held on 28 May 2022, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, [[Ext/Assembly/AU/Decl.\(XVI\)](#)], Assembly decided, to establish an AU Ministerial Committee on Counter Terrorism to serve as a high level coordination, monitoring, evaluation and follow up mechanism of the implementation of the commitments made at the session. Further Assembly stressed the need to promote experience sharing and lesson learning among Member States and RECs/

RMs to better coordinate and enhance regional and continental efforts in combating terrorism.

PSC DECIDED TO UNDERTAKE A SOLIDARITY FIELD MISSION TO THE ABYEI AREA

Council's last session of the month convened on 29 September considered the political and security situation in the Abyei region.

PSC received briefings from Thabo Mbeki, former President of the Republic of South Africa and the Chairperson of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), and Hanna Tetteh, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa. PSC also received briefings from H.E Ambassador Mohamed Belaiche, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission to the Sudan and H.E Ambassador Prof. Joram Biswaro, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of the AU Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS). As country of concern, the PSC also received statement from Ambassador James Pitia Morgan, Permanent Representative of South Sudan. From a working methods and AU rules perspective, it is interesting to note that Sudan, as country suspended from AU activities, did not participate in this session despite being a country of concern.

Abyei is an area on the border between South Sudan and the Sudan that has been accorded special administrative status by the 2004 Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended Sudan's civil war. Under the terms of the Abyei Protocol, which was part of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), residents of Abyei have been declared, on an interim basis, to be simultaneously citizens of Sudan's West Kordofan State and South Sudan's Northern Bahr el Ghazal State until Abyei's permanent status is determined through a referendum.

Despite enduring political and security challenges affecting the Abyei region, it has not received adequate level of attention. Among many reasons, internal challenges in Sudan and South Sudan has diverted

attention to resolve the final status of Abyei Area. The lack of progress seems to have increased frustration among the residents of the area who recently staged a public demonstration to demand autonomy.

Although the security situation in the Abyei area remains mostly calm, a new conflict is emerging between the Dinka Ngoc and Twic communities in southern Abyei who overlap on Abyei's southern border in South Sudan's Warrap State. In February and April 2022, there has been intense clashes between the Ngok Dinka of Abyei and the Twic Dinka that led to the loss of lives and displacement of thousands of people. Pertaining this, the PSC, in [Communique](#) adopted on the session, condemned 'the violent confrontation in the Abyei Area Administration, destruction of property and the loss of life of civilians and urged the parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, exercise restraint and pursue an amicable resolution of contentious issues.'

Recognizing the importance of improved relationship between Sudan and South Sudan for the resolution of the Abyei conflict, the PSC welcomed what it called renewed relationship between the Governments of South Sudan and the Sudan and their commitment towards good neighborliness and commended 'their dedicated efforts aimed at a peaceful resolution of the political and security issues relating to the Abyei Administrative Area.' Indeed, there have been concrete engagements between the senior leaders of the two countries including on the issue of Abyei. For instance, on 24 May Sudan Minister of Defence, Yassin Ibrahim Yassin and his South Sudan counterpart, Angelina Teny, met and among other actions agreed to re-establish the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, activate river transport, and immediately open border crossings while controlling and monitoring the movements of citizens at the borders. On 27 September, President Kiir reiterated the decision of both countries to use the cooperation framework to resolve bilateral disputes, including Abyei. And on 4 October, following this particular session President Kiir reconstituted the committee by creating a subcommittee on development and natural resources within it.

Notwithstanding these positive developments in the relationship between the two countries, key actions required for implementing existing agreements on Abyei remain outstanding. In this respect, the PSC reiterated its 'appeal to the Parties to accelerate the

implementation of the Agreement on Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements for the Abyei Administrative Area, signed on 20 June 2011, particularly the finalization of the establishment of the Abyei Area Administration, the Abyei Area Council, and the Abyei Police Service, in order to facilitate the provision of essential services to the Abyei population.'

On 20 June 2011, the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed an agreement on a temporary administrative arrangement for Abyei, which was to be in place until the resolution of the territory's long term political future. It mandated for the demilitarization of Abyei and the establishment of a joint administration.

Additionally, it called on the parties to implement the September 2012 Cooperation Agreement, especially the demarcation of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ), to allow the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) to discharge its mandate effectively.' Considering the adverse impact recent events notably the call for autonomy of the region on the cohesion and stability of people in Abyei highlighted in [our analysis](#) produced ahead of the session, the PSC urged 'all stakeholders to maintain the objective of organizing the referendum, in accordance with the 2011 Protocol, as a part of the overall objective of the stabilization process of the Abyei Area.'

On the role of AUHIP, expressing its 'profound gratitude' to its sustained efforts that contributed to the stabilization of the Abyei area, the PSC requested the AU Commission 'to scale up the mobilization of the requisite resources to ensure the success of this undertaking aimed at negotiating solutions to the challenges in Abyei. The PSC also expressed its expectation 'to receiving the comprehensive report of the activities of the AUHIP.' Notwithstanding this and considering that the AUHIP has been the lead mechanism for the AU's engagement on the situation in Abyei, the PSC, among others, requested the AU Commission to a) nominate a facilitator for the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC) and assist AJOC in carrying out its functions' and b) 'Conduct, in cooperation with the two parties, a thorough analytical study of the recurring root causes and the triggers leading to protractible instability in the Abyei region, including developing an implementation matrix of the PSC decisions on Abyei, and brief the Council to guide further interventions.' Considering the extensive work

that the AUHIP undertook on the issue for long time and its institutional memory on the background and context as well as major issues relating to the Abyei situation, it is logical to expect that these requests directed to the AU Commission would be undertaken through the AUHIP.

The other issue that the PSC considered relate to the role of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei. In this respect, the PSC commended the UN mission for its 'support to the JBVMM in its monitoring and verification activities along the border between Sudan and South Sudan' and encouraged 'he newly constituted multi-national contingents in UNISFA to relentlessly continue discharging its mandate to ensure the stability of the region'. Most importantly, it reiterated 'the need to maintain the presence of UNISFA in order to continue maintaining peace and stability in the Abyei region, particularly along the border between Sudan and South Sudan' and urged the UN Security Council 'to continue supporting the peacekeeping force pending the resolution of Abyei's status'.

Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up

The PSC in particular requested the AU Commission to

- Nominate a facilitator for the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC) and assist AJOC in carrying out its functions in accordance with the Agreement on the Temporary Arrangements on Security and Administration;
- Conduct, in cooperation with the two parties, a thorough analytical study of the recurring root causes and the triggers leading to protractible instability in the Abyei region, including developing an implementation matrix of the PSC decisions on Abyei, and brief the Council to guide further interventions; and
- Spearhead the support for the socio-economic development of the Abyei Area through existing mechanisms, including the PCRD; and in the same vein, coordinate AU's engagements with the AU international development institutions to jointly explore a common humanitarian and socio-economic scheme to support the Abyei Area, while the two Governments search for durable peace.

The PSC then decided to undertake a solidarity field mission to the Abyei Area, in cooperation of the two Governments, with a view to engaging all stakeholders and obtaining first-hand information on the ground in order to inform the decisions of the Council on resolving the contentious issues and further enhancing the implementation of the agreements.

Other Activates of the PSC

During September, in addition to its statutory sessions, the PSC also undertook other activities.

Most notably, the PSC undertook a field mission from 4 to 7 September 2022 to Lomé, Togo to commemorate the 2022 AAM. This commemoration held for the first time outside of the AU's headquarters in Addis Ababa. During the field mission, Council held an interactive session on the implementation of the AAM initiative, in the context of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2030 and AU Agenda 2063. The programme of activities also included a ceremony where the symbolic destruction of illicit weapons collected by the Togolese government was performed. The PSC also paid a visit to the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) on 6 September 2022. Then, on 15 September, Council considered the field mission and released a [report](#).



Pictures taken from AU PAPS

2022 Commemoration of AAM by PSC, in Lomé, Togo

The PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) also held a preparatory meeting on 12 September for the 7th Informal Joint Meeting and 16th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and the UNSC. CoE also considered the Draft Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the month. Most notably, the CoE, as a follow up to the PSC session on sanctions on unconstitutional changes of government held in August, convened a workshop on the operationalization of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions during which

it held a training workshop on sanctions, terrorism and violent extremism. The workshop also served as an occasion for drafting of the terms of reference of the PSC Sub-committee on sanctions.



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
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Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research; training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African Union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

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