

**BRIEFING NOTE ON THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION OF THE CAR FOR THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING OF 25 JULY 2022**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. This Briefing Note has been produced as part of the regular examination of the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) for the Peace and Security Council (PSC). It gives an account of the main developments which have occurred in the country since the 1011<sup>st</sup> Meeting of the PSC held on 21 July 2022. It highlights the major challenges to be addressed in the CAR, particularly the political, security, humanitarian and economic development issues which are the crucial priorities, efforts by the national authorities as well as international assistance for peacebuilding and the reconstruction of the country.

**II. MAIN DEVELOPMENTS**

**a. Political Process:**

2. The changing situation in the CAR brings to the fore the challenges to be addressed by the authorities in the Central African Republic. In his inauguration speech of 30 March 2021, President Touadera spelt out his vision for the restoration of security and stability and demonstrated a political situation which is still dependent on the volatile security situation in his country.

3. Following the violence that marred the December 2020 presidential and parliamentary elections, the Central African authorities urged stakeholders to go beyond positions of principle and rather engage in a substantive discussion on inter-Central African talks. It is in this spirit that, on 21 March 2022, Professor Faustin Archange Touadera launched the deliberations of the republican dialogue in the CAR which took place from 21 to 27 March 2022.

**b. Republican Dialogue:**

4. Participating in this major event were the Speaker of the National Assembly, Prime Minister, former heads of state, heads of state institutions, former Vice Presidents, former Prime Ministers, members of government, heads of diplomatic and consular missions, representatives of international organizations and invited observers (including the UN, AU, EU and ECCAS), members of the bureau of the National Assembly, members of the Office of the Prime Minister and Office of the President of the Republic, the mayor of Bangui, military and police officers as well as other participants including leaders of several civil society organizations.

5. Four hundred and fifty (450) participants representing the key stakeholder sectors worked in committees on five (5) main issues, namely: Peace and Security, Political Governance, Rule of Law and Institutional Reforms, Economic and Social Development, and Diplomacy and International Cooperation; they made not less than six hundred (600) recommendations mainly based on the resolutions of the Bangui Forum held in 2015. During the plenary meeting held on 27 March 2022, the various entities present were hopeful that the relevant recommendations of this conclave will be appropriately applied in order to foster rapid national reconciliation, peace and economic recovery.

6. However, in spite of the efforts and commitment of the Central African authorities to arrive at a renewed and consensual framework for dialogue and reconciliation, the COD-2020 democratic opposition coalition announced its withdrawal from the national dialogue; on the other hand, there were suspicions over the desire of the ruling party to use the dialogue to amend the Constitution in order for President Touadera to have another term in office. Others also held that peace cannot be attained without the inclusion of the CPC rebel groups. The government stuck to its position which was that those who took up arms excluded themselves from the national reconciliation process. This position has never been accepted by the opposition which hoped for an inclusive dialogue process to accommodate armed groups considered as the main protagonists of the crisis. Consequently, the situation remains fragile and characterized by **heightened tension** among the actors in the crisis: **the government, opposition and armed groups**.

7. A presidential decree on the establishment of the Committee for the implementation and monitoring of the recommendations of the Republican Dialogue has been published. What is now left is for the members of this implementation and monitoring committee to be made known and the necessary resources put at their disposal for them to commence work.

### **c. Peace Process/PAPR and Luanda Roadmap:**

8. The Central African government has always reaffirmed its political will and determination to marshal all efforts to revitalize the PAPR. The 11<sup>th</sup> session of the PAPCAR Executive Monitoring Committee (CES) held on 2 August 2021 was attended by the statutory members of the CES and the armed groups which have remained committed to the PAPR-CAR. The objective of the 11<sup>th</sup> session was to (i) update all members of the CES on the main recommendations of the PAPR assessment at the end of the 10<sup>th</sup> session of the CES held on 16 April 2021, (ii) transfer the co-chairship of the CES<sup>1</sup> from the Prime Minister to the Minister of State in charge of Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Repatriation and Monitoring of the PAPR-CAR, (iii) set up a Coordination Unit of the PAPR-CAR, and (iv) hold sessions of the Executive Monitoring Committee (CES) every three (3) months.

9. At the end of the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the CES, a lot was expected from the conclusions of the Luanda Summit (Angola) held in September 2021, hence the need to stress in this regard the essence of greater complementarity between the main frameworks for the promotion of peace

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1 The change in chairship of the CES was one of the recommendations of the PAPR-CAR assessment which was requested by most of the CAR's strategic partners, including the AU, ECCAS, European Union, MINUSCA as well as the Armed Groups which signed the PAPR-CAR to ensure its revitalization.

in the CAR<sup>2</sup> as the basic mechanisms for the relaunch of the PAPR-CAR and the attainment of lasting peace in the Central African Republic. After the 12<sup>th</sup> session of the CES convened on 14 February 2022, the 13<sup>th</sup> session held on 25 May 2022 provided an update on (i) progress made towards the implementation of the commitments of the parties to the Agreement, (ii) implementation of DDDR activities, (iii) issue of the dissolution of Armed Groups (iv) revitalization of the structures of the CES, and (v) need to establish a consultation mechanism for the implementation of the Luanda Roadmap and the PAPR-CAR.

#### **d. New Strategic Review Initiative**

10. On 4 June 2022, the government organized a strategic review meeting with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Angola and Rwanda, H.E. Ambassador Tête Antonio and H.E. Mr Vincent Biruta, in their respective capacities as representatives of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, members of the CAR government, Guarantors of the PAPR, Facilitators of the Agreement, including the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and all the other technical and financial partners of the CAR, including France, USA, Russia, European Union, World Bank and AfDB.

11. This strategic initiative to review the political process in the CAR which was launched by President FA Touadera aims at combining the implementation of the PAPR-CAR with the Luanda Roadmap. It was overwhelmingly welcomed by all the partners of the CAR – including the Guarantors and the Facilitators – who have been calling for it for sometime now due to the obvious lack of coordination between the PAPR-CAR implementation and monitoring mechanisms led by the AU representative and the Minister of State for DDDR and PAPR-CAR, both of whom are co-Chairpersons of the Executive Monitoring Committee (CES), on the one hand, and the mechanisms of the Roadmap led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his Angolan and Rwandan counterparts, on the other. The most contentious issue has to do with internal coordination among the Central African officials.

12. The initiative to launch this strategic review also underscores the will of the government of the Central African Republic to re-own the political process in a more coordinated manner which, among others, makes provision for a quarterly political and technical assessment of progress which would in turn help to identify challenges in order to take the necessary corrective measures and to synergize the necessary or available resources with a very specific joint PAPR-CAR-Luanda Roadmap implementation timetable.

13. It should be emphasized that in order to respond to the insistence of the AU in its capacity as a main Guarantor of the PAPR-CAR and co-chair of the CES, and given the persistent dichotomy between the mechanisms for the implementation of the PAPR-CAR and Luanda Roadmap, **the 8<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Strategic Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation/Security Sector Reform and National Reconciliation (Comstrat DDDR/RSS/RN) which was held on 15 July 2022 finally decided to establish a coordination mechanism to be**

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<sup>2</sup> This measure aims at (i) strengthening cooperation links between the two main frameworks for the promotion of peace in the CAR, particularly the Luanda Roadmap and the PAPR, (ii) pooling initiatives by relying on the previous efforts of the PAPR, and (iii) setting up joint working teams to deepen coordination for the attainment of the objectives spelt out in the Luanda Roadmap.

**chaired by the Prime Minister and Head of Government.** The Comstrat/DDRR/RSS/RN is the strategic coordination and decision-making body for these three important areas. The President of the Republic and the Prime Minister are the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Comstrat/DDRR/RSS/RN respectively.

14. It goes without saying that this important decision will reset the general momentum and move all the facets of the peace process in the CAR forward with the direct involvement and coordination of the Guarantors, Facilitators and ICGLR experts who are working towards the implementation of the Luanda Roadmap. One of the priorities of this new coordination mechanism will certainly be the quest for a solution to the issue of the presence in Ndjamena of the leaders of the CPC, including ex-president **François Bozizé**.

#### **e. Municipal and Regional Electoral Process**

15. For over thirty (30) years now, the CAR has not organized municipal elections to allow citizens of the Central African Republic to choose their mayors themselves. With regional and municipal elections due to be held on 15 September 2022, the National Electoral Authority (ANE) invited the political parties and civil society stakeholders to assess preparations towards same. The ANE announced that even though several obstacles remain, the elections will take place as scheduled by the electoral timetable. Mobilizing an amount of 10 million US dollars for the holding of these elections at the **beginning of 2023** remains a challenge for the CAR which has barely finished organizing expensive presidential and parliamentary elections.

16. The priority activities of the National Electoral Authority (ANE) to move the municipal and regional election process forward focus on electoral mapping operations to take into account the new law on administrative districts which raised the number of prefectures in the CAR from sixteen (16) to twenty (20). Similarly, the number of new municipalities is expected to rise. The Central African State has made a commitment to finance the first phase of the mapping project at a cost of FCFA 385 million, i.e. USD 764,000. The cleaning of the electoral register will take into account internally displaced persons who have come back to their towns, returnee refugees, youth who have attained the voting age, the deceased and new registration of unregistered people. The APE is considering measures to ensure transparency by its members in its branches, particularly through voting in the presence of political party and civil society representatives to avoid disputes. The partners have made recommendations for deepened sensitization on the upcoming elections and specifically insisted on the need for intensive communication for women by taking the parity principle into account. Technical or financial assistance from the AU for issues of decentralization and grassroots governance could help the CAR to address this new important challenge of the country's democratization phase.

#### **f. Security Situation:**

17. In the area of security, the aborted coup attempt by fighters of the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) on 13 January 2021 pushed the government of the Central African Republic to launch an offensive against the CPC with the help of Russian and Rwandan forces who are supporting the Central African Armed Forces. Thus far, this offensive has been waged throughout the country, with the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) and their Russian and Rwandan allies liberating 80% of the territory under the control of the armed groups.

18. The porous nature of the borders is another reason why the CAR would want to join the call for the lifting of the embargo and to spare no effort to ensure the deployment of the FACA. However, **allegations and, indeed, largely proven cases of (i) human rights violations, (ii) attacks on civilians and (iii) perpetration of atrocities** levelled against both the CPC and FACA and Russian forces in the course of their military operations have necessitated the establishment of a commission of enquiry to throw light on the reported acts of violence. The year 2021 was particularly characterized by a deterioration in the security situation, respect for human rights in the CAR and intensified attacks and alleged atrocities perpetrated by both the armed groups and the regular security forces.

19. On 15 October 2021, the President of the Republic declared a **unilateral cease-fire** as part of the implementation of the roadmap adopted at the ICGLR mini extraordinary summit held on 16 September 2021 in Luanda (Angola). This declaration was seen as a positive signal for the easing of political tensions and the creation of a peaceful climate for dialogue. However, it did not take long for the cease-fire to be systematically violated, with incidents reported in the hinterland leading the parties to the conflict, particularly the armed groups of the CPC and the government, to trade accusations.

20. Tension also built up on the operational front between the Russian Forces and the MINUSCA Peacekeeping Forces, leading to an escalation and a risk of compromising their operational collaboration on the field as well as the stabilization efforts in the CAR. Geostrategic conflicts led to a campaign against the Russian presence in the CAR, the indirect consequences of which the country actually suffered through the suspension of certain types of aid or the delay in their release.

21. It should be stated that the security situation in the CAR remains very fragile and requires assistance on a permanent basis. After about a year and a half of FACA counter-offensive supported by Russian Instructors and bilateral Rwandan forces, **the situation over the last few months shows a certain decline** insofar as the CPC rebel forces and **Ali Darassa's** Unit for Peace in Central Africa (UPC) in particular intensified their military operations in the Central, Northern and Eastern regions of the CAR. For example, on 14 July 2022, the **heavily armed** UPC rebels occupied several towns in central CAR, including Dimbi and Kembe in the Basse Kotto prefecture after violent clashes with the FACA and its allies, thereby leading to the flight of the people and administrative authorities who sought refuge in the Catholic church. The people began to come back to their homes after the arrival of the MINUSCA Portuguese blue helmets.

22. According to the local authorities, the CPC rebels are still in the vicinity waiting for the departure of the MINUSCA contingent for them to take over this area.

23. It is important to stress that the **arms embargo** imposed on the CAR by the UNSC in 2013 continues to affect the government very negatively because its armed forces, the FACA, have already been weakened by several years of conflict, lack organization and resources and **have been deprived of their right to procure the necessary weapons to carry out their sovereign mission of defending their country successfully**, while the **Armed Groups simply continue to procure modern weapons and communications systems** through countries in the sub-region

and, therefore, enjoy the advantage of better firepower than the FACA. In addition to this is the introduction of anti-personnel **land mines**.

24. Had MINUSCA, the Rwandan bilateral contingent and Russian instructors not been present, the security situation in the CAR would have been more uncertain and unpredictable.

**g. Economic Situation:**

25. On the economic front, the situation reflects the complex discussions entered into with the technical and financial partners, including the World Bank, IMF, European Union and many other regional and sub-regional financial institutions. Prior reforms and actions were required of the Government before any disbursements could be made. The Government presented the status of the implementation of measures which included the passage of the amending finance act, abolition of some revenue management agencies and redundant state institutions considered to be a drain on the budget, auditing of the Covid-19 pandemic resources and indeed the activities of experts from the Russian Federation in the customs sector and the financing of the military activities of the Russian instructors.

26. New issues came up with the **CAR's adoption of the Bitcoin currency**, a new digital currency system which will come into force on 3 July 2022. The legalization of the Bitcoin by the Central African authorities on 22 April 2022 for it to be used as legal tender throughout the country alongside the CFA Franc was received with some scepticism by CEMAC. In view of this decision by the Central African authorities, the Central African Banking Commission (COBAC) issued a communiqué on 6 May 2022 forbidding all establishments associated with it to engage in crypto currency transactions particularly due to the non-convertibility of crypto currencies vis-à-vis the CFA Franc. More pressure is being brought to bear on the Central African authorities by both the Bretton Woods Institutions and COBAC to force them to amend Article 1 of the law of the Central African Republic on crypto currencies which is introducing the Bitcoin as legal tender in the country.

27. It should be clarified that the Central African authorities are of the view that the choice to adopt the Bitcoin is part of the efforts of the government to get around the pressure and conditions imposed by their technical and financial partners – under the influence of France – based on **geopolitical considerations** which are detrimental to their economic and financial parameters per se. The government's financial experts and CAR's technical and financial partners are concerned that the country's public treasury runs the risk of no longer being able to **meet the Civil Service wage bill as from October 2022**, with the attendant consequences and unpredictable reactions.

28. The current situation of the global crisis has worsened the shortage of Jet A-1 fuel announced by the National Civil Aviation Directorate as from 2 July 2022. The Central African Republic has not been spared the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis. As a landlocked country which depends on the sole corridor from Bangui to Douala (Cameroon), the CAR is experiencing severe import restrictions. **There has been a widespread increase in the prices of consumer products**. The situation has deteriorated with the fuel crisis that the Central African Republic has been experiencing for more than two months now and has dealt a big blow to all activities, be they economic or social.

## **h. Humanitarian and Human Rights Issues:**

29. The persist insecurity both in Bangui and in the hinterland is a major concern as far as human rights and humanitarian law are concerned. Indeed, continued clashes between loyal forces and the armed groups do not encourage access by humanitarian organizations to the areas accommodating displaced persons. In addition, all the attacks and clashes lead to movements of people who take refuge in the forests, more peaceful towns or in neighbouring countries. At the same time, with the support of UNHCR, many Central Africans who were refugees in neighbouring countries are gradually returning to the CAR from Cameroon, DRC and the Republic of Congo.

30. In the light of the severe food insecurity facing the CAR, the Board of Directors of the African Development Bank (AfDB) approved a grant of **5.39 million United States dollars** for the CAR on 14 July 2022 to help with the production of an additional 32,000 tonnes of food and to strengthen the food security of 100,000 people. The grant will also help to implement a food emergency programme to deal with the soaring food prices exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. Although it is important, this grant cannot contain the food crisis in the CAR which has affected more than 2 million people, most of whom have become internally displaced as a result of military activities.

31. From 29 August to 3 September 2021, a mission of the Sub-Committee of Refugees and IDPs of the African Union PSC visited the CAR to assess the humanitarian situation. The delegation led by **Ambassador Yahaoui Lamine** of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) held meetings with the Central African authorities and institutions dealing with humanitarian issues. The mission of the Sub-Committee also pledged an amount of **USD 150,000** to the Government to support its efforts to contain the humanitarian crisis. **Up to now, this pledge has not been provided, a situation which exposes our mission, MISAC, to constant criticisms and reminders.**

32. In May 2022, the Special Criminal Court commenced sitting. Since its establishment, the activities of this Court have been met with high expectations as a result of the many crimes committed by armed groups. Its sittings began on 16 May 2022 with the hearing of members of the «3R» armed group involved in the massacres committed in two villages in the CAR, namely **Koundjili** and **Lemouna**. These massacres, which claimed the lives of more than 20 people, will remain etched in the memory of Central Africans for a long time because it took place on 21 May 2019, three (03) months after the signing of the PAPR-CAR.

## **i. Issues relating to the deployment of MOUACA**

33. The decision to deploy the African Union Military Observer Mission (**MOUACA**) was taken by the AU PSC during its 834<sup>th</sup> meeting held on 9 May 2019 as part of the implementation of the PAPR-CAR. Its **mandate** includes (i) monitoring the progress of the activities of the Joint Special Security Units (USMS) in securing the transhumance corridors and mining sites; (ii) **reporting on the overall implementation of the PAPR-CAR in order to enable the Mission to act timeously and appropriately for the restoration of sustainable peace in the CAR**, and (iii) supporting the overall efforts towards the implementation of PAPR-CAR, with particular regard to aspects relating to the activities of the USMS which include every possible contribution to the protection

of civilians (PoC) and their property, as well as the protection of resources necessary for the economic recovery of the CAR.

34. To enable MOUACA to deploy and carry out its mission, an agreement on its status (**SOMA**) together with its Concept of Operations (**CONOPS**) were signed on 13 November 2019 between the AU and the Central African Government. A Memorandum of Understanding (**MoU**) was also signed between MISAC and the Multidimensional Integrated Mission for the Stabilization of the CAR (MINUSCA) on 5 May 2020 to set out the modalities for the UN mission's multifaceted support to MOUACA.

35. The initial planned contingent for MOUACA was 49 African officers, 4 of whom were from the Bangui-based command and 45 (up to 15 per region) were to be deployed in the 3 CAR military regions hosting the USMS. Following the various difficulties encountered, this number was reviewed downwards to 34. This notwithstanding, the MOUACA contingent never reached this threshold.

36. It is important to point out that MOUACA, which will have to bring its presence to an end on 31 July 2022, was unable to attain its objectives for a number of reasons which were particularly related to the following:

- a- centralized financial and administrative management of the mission by the AU Commission, delays resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and widespread insecurity due to the resurgence of military activities between the FACA and rebel fighters in the three areas identified for their deployment;
- b- lack of security – Article XV of the SOMA provides that the relevant authorities of the Central African Republic should ensure the safety and protection of the MOUACA. This commitment was not actualised by the Internal Security Forces, including the FACA and Gendarmerie on the grounds of limited resources;
- c- Delays in the construction or servicing of sites that are expected to house MOUACA in their areas of deployment in the provinces. This task was entrusted to IOM and later to the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), and proved to pose security risks to MOUCA personnel when it was realized that armed USMS personnel were to also be accommodated in these same sites; and
- d- MINUSCA's continued reluctance to host MOUACA in their provincial camps, citing lack of space and social distancing constraints posed by the Covid-19 pandemic.

37. Unfortunately, MOUACA must end its deployment as a result of factors that could actually be managed. The European Union's representative in Bangui informed us in writing and verbally that some of the **reasons that prompted the EU Headquarters to take this measure** to freeze funding for this project are as follows:

- e- Since the start of MOUACA, the AU had used only about **€1,100,915** of the **€9,551,897** (USD 1, 128, 455), representing an absorption rate of **11.53%**;
- f- and
- g- the security situation is a difficult obstacle to surmount, a situation which means that the AU Military Observers have been stationed in Bangui for more than 2 years, and can only



be effectively deployed to carry out their mission in the team sites if the UN forces provide protection for them, or MOUACA expands its capacity to protect its own personnel.

38. Despite the security constraints, the closure of the MOUACA under such conditions and for such reasons does not bode a favourable outcome for the image of the African Union because the timing is not in tune with the current situation on the ground and due to the fact that new initiatives for the revitalization of the political process are on the horizon. The AU, as a main Guarantor of the PAPR-CAR, is expected to play a leading role in this regard as usual.

#### **j. Running of the Liaison Office**

39. The liaison office in Bangui continues to operate under extremely difficult conditions. PSC should to be made aware that the implementation and monitoring of the decisions of the last three (3) PSC meetings on the CAR have not lived up to our expectations.

40. For example, Point 8 of the communiqué of the **848<sup>th</sup> meeting** of the PSC held on 9 May 2019 stated in verbatim that *“the PSC supports fully the actions taken by the AU Commission to mobilize human resources in order to enable the AU and its Mission in the Central African Republic (MISAC) to effectively honour the commitments as Guarantor of the PAPR-CAR, including the strengthening of MISAC and the contribution to the implementation of the PAPR priorities identified by the Government.”*

41. The communiqué of the **979<sup>th</sup> meeting** held on 16 February 2021 requested, in Point 17, *“the AU Commission to take all necessary measures to ensure that the AU Liaison Office in Bangui is equipped with all the necessary capacity and resources; in this regard, requests the AU Commission, in collaboration with the relevant deliberative bodies of the AU, to examine the modalities for the use of the Peace Fund in order to enable it to function effectively, taking into account the role of the AU as a guarantor of the PAPR-CAR process.”*

42. In the same vein, the communiqué of the **1011<sup>th</sup> meeting** of the PSC held on 22 July 2021 noted in Point 24 *“with deep concern the institutional capacity constraints facing the Office and, in this regard, requests the Chairperson of the Commission to as a matter of urgency, the necessary measures to ensure that the Bureau is equipped with all the necessary capacity to enable it to discharge its mandate effectively, including support for the implementation of the 2019 Political Agreement, taking into account the role of the AU as Guarantor of this Agreement”*

**43.** Despite the efforts made by PSC, the situation of MISAC has not changed, as it lacks the necessary human and financial resources to effectively discharge its mandate. All public servants who have since 2017 left this office on the grounds of transfer or retirement have not been replaced. **From January to May 2022, the Office, as was the case for most AU liaison offices in Africa, was practically or technically closed due to a lack of an operating budget.**

### **III. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

44. In the light of all the foregoing issues, the PSC may wish to consider the following:

- i. Welcome the continued progress towards the implementation of the PAPR-CAR strengthened by the Luanda Roadmap and the review of the political process launched by President Faustin Archange Touadera on 4 June 2022; in this regard, commend the Central African Government for the decision taken during the 8<sup>th</sup> meeting of the DDRR/RSS/RN Strategic Committee of 15 July 2022 to set up a commission for the integrated implementation of the PAPR-CAR and the Luanda Roadmap under the supervision of the Prime Minister and Head of Government;
- ii. Congratulate the government and all political and social actors of the CAR for holding the Republican Dialogue from 21 to 27 March 2022 and urge them to implement the recommendations of this conclave particularly by appointing the members of the implementation and monitoring committee in line with the presidential decree issued for this purpose;
- iii. Encourage the government and all political and social actors in the CAR to take all necessary measures to ensure that local elections scheduled for the beginning of 2023 are held on time, and urge the technical and financial partners to provide all necessary support for the success of this electoral process;
- iv. Condemn the actions of the CPC, particularly attacks against the civilian population and the symbols of State, as well as against the MINUSCA peacekeepers, firmly warn that those responsible for these heinous acts will be brought to justice, and urge them to immediately and unconditionally put an end to violence and return to the peace process;
- v. Urge the Guarantors and Facilitators of PAPR-CAR as well as the ICGLR experts grouped in the Integrated Implementation Commission under the supervision of the Prime Minister to find a plausible and urgent solution to the situation of the CPC leaders, including former President Francois Bozizé, who are in Ndjamena, Republic of Chad;
- vi. Reaffirm the need expressed during its 1011<sup>st</sup> meeting for the **lifting of the arms embargo** imposed on the CAR by the United Nations Security Council to enable the country to strengthen the required capacity of the Defence and Security Forces for them to carry out their Constitutional mandate of defence of the country more effectively; in this regard, encourage the Central African authorities to take all necessary measures to **implement the benchmarks set out by the UNSC** for the lifting of the arms embargo and calls on all CAR partners to provide the technical, material and financial support necessary for the achievement of these benchmarks;
- vii. Urge countries bordering the CAR to strengthen the work of the Joint Bilateral Commissions with the CAR to address the security and other challenges facing the sub-region;
- viii. Congratulate AfDB for the grant of US\$5.6 million to promote food production and to strengthen food security, and calls on all other CAR partners to also support the humanitarian efforts of the Central African Government;
- ix. Thank all the African Military Observers who agreed to join MOUACA for their dedication and sense of mission for the success of this mission and learn lessons on the challenges encountered and impact on other AU peace missions, its image and cooperation between the AU and the EU;
- x. Reiterate its deep concern about the institutional capacity constraints facing the Office and, in this regard, request the Chairperson of the Commission to, as a matter of urgency, take the necessary measures to ensure that it is equipped with the necessary capacity to enable it to discharge its mandate effectively, including support for the implementation

of the 2019 Political Agreement and taking into account the role of the AU as a main guarantor of this Agreement.

- xi. Direct the Commission to confirm the EU response to the AU request for the no-cost extension of funding to continue MOUACA for 12 months. In the event the no-cost extension request is approved by the EU, the Commission should, as a matter of urgency:
  - a. Develop and sign a new Contribution Agreement with the EU to enhance the implementation of MOUACA's mandate
  - b. Undertake a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) to develop a detailed plan and budget for the implementation of MOUACA's mandate and finalise negotiations with MINUSCA for the signing of a new MoU on the provision of logistical and security support to MOUACA personnel to be deployed at various Team Sites across the country.
  - c. If the EU rejects the AU's request for a no-cost extension for the MOUACA project, the Commission should immediately commence MOUACA's liquidation process that must be completed not later than 31 October 2022 (3 months). This should be done in line with the relevant AU institutional framework, rules, and procedures to avoid any liabilities to the organisation.
  - d. The process of liquidation of MOUACA should entail the transfer of the mission's core mandated tasks and assets to the African Union Mission for the Central African Republic and Central Africa (MISAC) to ensure continuity of the AU's support for the implementation of the peace agreement, in line with its role as co-guarantor.
  - e. In this regard, the Commission should submit a report to the Council not later than 31 October 2022, outlining the critical MOUACA tasks to be transferred to MISAC and additional financial resources (financial and human) that the expanded MISAC will require.