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PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
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**REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA AND
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AMISOM MANDATE**

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report is submitted to the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) pursuant to the AU PSC Communiqué (PSC/PR/COMM.(CMLXXVIII) adopted at its 978th meeting held on 9 February 2021, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in paragraph 39 of its Resolution 2568 (2021), adopted on 12 March 2021, which requested the African Union to keep it informed every 90 days, through the UN Secretary-General, on the implementation of AMISOM's mandate.

2. The UN Security Council further requested specific reporting on the following:

- a) Progress on joint operations in support of the STP including the use and effectiveness of coordination mechanisms;
- b) Progress against revised objectives and functions set out in paragraphs 11 and 12;
- c) Accountability measures taken to address underperformance, including command and control, and conduct and discipline;
- d) Measures taken to protect civilians;
- e) Equipment review outcomes and use of force assets; and
- f) Staffing of the civilian component. In this respect, the present report provides progress achieved in the implementation of AMISOM mandate during the period between February 2021 and April 2021.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND UPDATE ON NATIONAL ELECTIONS

3. Since the last reporting period, Somalia has continued to experience considerable setbacks in the implementation of the agreement on the electoral process reached on 17 September 2020. This was due mainly to diverging views and lack of consensus between the FGS and some FMS leaders backed by members of the Council of Presidential Candidates (CPC) and other opposition leaders. Despite an expressed commitment to resume substantive dialogue, the planned FGS-FMS National Consultative Summit convened to review and endorse the recommendations of the Baidoa Technical Committee was cancelled. Thus, the foundation for the implementation of the agreed electoral process, was not laid due to disagreements on the outstanding issues and the outbreak of armed confrontations between government forces and protestors. However, and in response to the appeal of international partners, the leaders of Jubaland and Puntland arrived in Mogadishu on 9 and 13 March 2021 respectively, to resume dialogue with the summit and related consultations taking place inside the AMISOM protected area at the Aden Adde International Airport Hangar.

4. Political dialogue was temporarily reactivated in April 2021, with all the FMS leaders meeting with the FGS, led by President Farmaajo. The meeting, which was meant to agree on the agenda of the National Consultative Summit, ended in a stalemate on 7 April 2021 after three

days of discussion, thus scuppering the prospects for the much anticipated summit. Consequently, the FGS and FMS offered various accounts of the outcome of the meeting and traded accusations for the collapse of the preparatory meeting. Accusations notwithstanding, progress remained elusive on key issues, including the status of President Farmaajo, the implementation of the 17 September 2020 Agreement and the implementation of the Baidoa Technical Committee recommendations.

5. On 12 April 2021, the House of the People (Lower House) passed a motion to return Somalia to a one-person, one-vote election model, by a margin of 149 in favor, 3 against and 1 abstention. Soon thereafter, the President signed the bill into a “Special Election Law.” The motion also directed the National Independent Elections Commission (NIEC) to organize elections within two years. At the same time, the mandates of the President and Parliament were extended for the same period. The leaders of Jubaland and Puntland, the opposition parties, as well as the international community, including AMISOM, expressed deep concern over these disturbing developments. The PSC, at its 993rd meeting held on 22 April 2021 condemned the actions of 12 April 2021 by the House of People and urged the Somali political leaders to prioritize the country’s national interests and to immediately resume dialogue, on the basis of the September 2020 Agreement and Baidoa technical committee recommendations. The Military Operations Coordination Committee (MOCC) also condemned the 12th April 2021 Parliamentary motion and called for the return to the 17th September Agreement 2020. Also appealed for consensus among Somali stakeholders for its implementation.

6. In response, the FGS blamed the collapse of the talks on the Jubaland and Puntland leaders, citing that the leaders of the other regions (South West, HirShabelle, Galmudug States and the Banadir region) were in support of the FGS proposals. The FGS underscored that national elections in Somalia, as in any other sovereign nation, is a national issue, and any interference in the process of national elections by external actors constitutes a breach of UN Security Council resolutions as well as international conventions and laws. However, and despite the FGS intention to hold discussions and dialogue with the FMS leaders and other Somali political stakeholders, FMS opposition parties and other Somali political stakeholders expressed serious condemnation on the extension of the term of the FGS by the Lower House and proposed the establishment of an interim government to oversee implementation of the electoral processes.

7. As a consequence of the increasing political tensions, armed clashes erupted in Mogadishu between forces loyal to the FGS and those aligned to the opposition on 25 April 2021. On 26 April 2021, the leaders of Galmudug and Hirshabelle states, who had previously supported the move by the FGS and the Lower House of Parliament, issued a joint statement rejecting the term extension of the President and federal Parliament and calling for elections in the shortest possible time on the basis of the 17 September 2020 Agreement. On the same day, Prime Minister Roble issued a statement endorsing the joint Galmudug and Hirshabelle statement and urged all parties to exercise self-restraint and return to the negotiating table in order to hold timely elections based on the 17 September 2020 Agreement.

8. On 26 April 2021, in the face of increasing local and international pressure and violence in Mogadishu, President Farmaajo addressed the nation in a televised speech, pledging his government’s commitment to hold commonly agreed elections in Somalia and stated that he

would, in this regard, make a petition to the House of the People of the Federal Parliament over the weekend to reverse their actions of 12 April.

9. On Saturday 1st May the President Farmajo requested the Lower House of the Federal Parliament to restore the 17 September 2020 Agreement and said that Prime Minister Mohamed Roble would be the one to lead the election implementation process and ensure its security. The Lower House approved the return of the country to the elections based on the agreement of 17 September 2020 by 140 majority vote.

10. the Chairperson of the AU Commission issued a statement welcoming the decision of President Farmajo to put the interest of the Somali people first. Equally, the Chairperson welcomed the lead role accorded to the Prime Minister to prepare for peaceful, credible and transparent elections and ensure their security.

III. SECURITY SITUATION

11. The general security situation remained calm but unpredictable with Al Shabaab kinetic and enabling activities across the AMISOM sectors, resulting in several attacks, including two incidents of mortar shelling on the AMISOM FHQ. In the short to medium term, Al Shabaab is likely to reduce attacks in the sectors to focus efforts and resources on Mogadishu with enabling actions in preparation for increased activity during the current political impasse. Therefore, complex IED and IDF attacks, targeting hotels, government installations and security facilities, are highly likely, and any lull in Al Shabaab attacks should be considered as a period of repositioning of weapons and equipment, to be followed, it is expected, by a period of intensified attacks. Nonetheless, and despite Al Shabab and other armed opposition groups' continued threat to security in Somalia, AMISOM forces maintain a presence in all sectors and, in support of the Somalia Security Forces, conduct routine and targeted offensive operations against Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups.

IV. PROGRESS ON JOINT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE SOMALIA TRANSITION PLAN

12. In fulfillment of its mandate, efforts are underway to implement priority tasks set out in PSC Communiqué (PSC/PR/COMM.(CMLXXVIII) and UNSCR 2568 (2021). In this regard, AMISOM, together with the Somali Security Forces, continued to plan, coordinate, and conduct joint operations to disrupt, degrade, and deny Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups freedom of movement and action, resulting in successful joint operations with about 447 Al Shabaab killed in action across the AMISOM sectors. Key amongst these include the opening of the MSR Hudur-Ceel Barde to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to Hudur Community, the Handover of Afgooye Forward Operating Bases (FOB) to SNA, counterattack operations at Bariire and Awdheegle on 3 and 4 April where AMISOM supported SNA with Close Air Support, Causality Evacuation (CASEVAC) and Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC), as well as shaping operations in Jilib Marka on 30 April 2021.

13. Consistent with its mandate, AMISOM provided escort and operational support to the SPF, including through joint non-routine motorised day and night patrols. This includes areas around the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Old Parliament, and General Kaahiye Junction in

Mogadishu, in Kismayo, and Baidoa townships as well as escort support in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo and Beletweyne. Furthermore, the AMISOM Police Component facilitated virtual communication and coordination, as well as strategic advice to the SPF in Mogadishu and in the Sectors through the Joint Operations Command Centre. Police mentors in Beletweyne, Baidoa, Jowhar and Dhobley also facilitated the review of several mentoring themes from their respective camps due to movement restrictions and social distancing protocols necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, whilst those in Mogadishu and Kismayo mentored 436 SPF officers through daily co-location.

14. The operational support and joint patrols ensured enhanced safety and security of other AMISOM partners, maintained public confidence in the police, deterred criminal activities, and enabled the public and government officials to carry out their daily activities without fear and disruptions. However, the ongoing political impasse regarding the elections and the attendant security challenges have made it necessary for AMISOM to temporarily suspend its police patrols inside Mogadishu. The temporary suspension of AMISOM Police patrols in Mogadishu was informed by the imperative to maintain neutrality in the ongoing political impasse and security challenges. Nonetheless, AMISOM retains police deployment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and continues to monitor the situation with the view to resuming joint police patrols once the situation improves.

15. The Police Component of AMISOM continued its Reforms, Restructuring and Development programme through institutional capacity building support to the Somali Police Force. Similarly, the Police Component maintained virtual communication and support to the SPF, including through provision of electoral support, and review of several training materials. AMISOM conducted various online trainings for the SPF, including a virtual training for the Galmudug Technical Vetting Committee, which will conduct vetting, selection and recruitment of the 700 Galmudug State Police personnel and a 2-day virtual training on Electoral Safety and Security for 50 members of the Federal and State Election and Implementation Teams (FEIT/SEIT). Likewise, the Police Component made tremendous efforts to support the protection of rights of vulnerable persons, including through physical and virtual co-location with SPF gender focal persons, conduct of sensitization programmes on Gender Perspective in Election Management, and on Gender, Women Protection and Human Rights for Peace Support Operations as well as donation of drugs, food, and sanitary items in support of vulnerable groups.

V. PROGRESS AGAINST OBJECTIVES AND FUNCTIONS SET OUT IN UNSCR 2568 (2021)

16. Progress in the implementation of the UNSCR 2568 (2021) and tasks therein has been slow, except for enduring and continuing operations like degrading of AS, mentoring of SSF, security of main population centres, security of MSR and protection of key FGS installations and facilities within AMISOM AoR. Despite ongoing activities in the FMS, there is limited civilian and police activities in Mogadishu due to the ongoing political and security uncertainties. Some projected tasks such as aligning AMISOM Sector boundaries with those of the FMS require further assessment because of the attendant challenge of unclear or disputed FMS boundaries.

17. AMISOM, together with SSF and relevant partners, continued to enhance coordination through joint planning and coordination, Senior Mission Leadership meetings and Joint Military

Coordination Group meetings under the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) Strand 2A. These coordination meetings and activities included the First Quarter Virtual Sector Commanders' Conference held in April 2021, also attended by the SNA CDF and partners, the Weekly AMISOM/SSF Planning and Coordination meeting, AMISOM-SNA joint visits to sectors to boost coordination and troop morale, and operationalization of the newly deployed air assets. In addition to limited co-location of AMISOM and SSF, AMISOM continues to face considerable challenges in the implementation of the objectives and functions set out in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the UNSCR 2568 (2021). These include the ongoing political impasse which has ramifications on the security situation and the conduct of military operations.

18. Additionally, implementation of set objectives is also impeded due to limited capabilities of most AMISOM P/TCC in providing spare parts and maintenance for serviceability of their Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) as per the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and P/TCCs. UNSOS also continues to experience challenges regarding its limitations in sourcing and availing required spare parts to support the efforts of P/TCCs in servicing and repairing Partner Owned Equipment (POE). These challenges are further compounded by limited SNA force generation, inadequate SNA equipment and limited SNA C-IED capabilities.

19. The current political impasse has serious ramifications not only for security and stability in and beyond Mogadishu but also for effective implementation of UNSCR 2568 (2021), including achieving the milestones against the specified timeframes. This challenge extends to the basis and viability of the STP which is premised on a National Security Architecture (NSArch) that included force generation and integration of regional forces into the SSF. Within this context, it is to be noted that some SNA personnel abandoned their positions to support respective opposition leaders in Mogadishu, thereby demonstrating factionalism and divisions within the SSF. This is a matter of serious concern for AMISOM, as it will be difficult for AMISOM to facilitate joint operations efforts in a divided and factionalized SSF. This situation is likely to undermine the SSF's ability to assume security responsibilities from AMISOM; and to plan, agree and conduct joint operations with AMISOM in line with the operational timelines, objectives and functions identified in the STP and UNSCR 2568 (2021).

VI. ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES TO ENHANCE PERFORMANCE

20. AMISOM has continued to maintain the highest standards of professionalism and compliance with acceptable standards, including command and control, and conduct and discipline. The Force Commander issues routine instructions, orders, and directives to the Sector Commanders to ensure that Sectors conduct operations in line with the AMISOM CONOPS and in support of the STP. In addition to monthly Sector Commanders' Meetings, AMISOM, through the Force Commander, also maintains effective command and control through various mechanisms, including monthly evaluation of FHQ staff activities, troops and equipment readiness assessment for Sector Quick Reaction and Mobile Forces, as well as disciplinary actions when in breach of AMISOM Standing Operating Procedures. T/PCCs have also established strict disciplinary measures to address cases of indiscipline and underperformance.

VII. MEASURES TO PROTECT CIVILIANS

21. AMISOM continues to register significant progress in its efforts to protect civilians, including through enhanced accountability and compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) standards in the conduct of AMISOM operations. AMISOM continues to adapt its activities in line with the various protocols imposed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including through various online training activities in support of its military and police components. The training primarily focuses on equipping the Female Engagement Team (FET) of the AMISOM military component with knowledge on human rights, gender, women protection, child protection, IHL, Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) and Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC), to enhance the protection of civilians, especially women and children. Importantly, the training sessions serve to remind AMISOM personnel of the continued importance of ensuring the discharge of the Mission's mandate in strict compliance with relevant obligations under international law, with particular attention to ensuring the protection of civilians in Somalia.

22. AMISOM's efforts to protect civilians are facilitated in coordination with the FGS/FMS, UN, and other protection partners through key protection coordination mechanisms. In addition to enhancing uniformity of reporting across Sectors and the overall observance of the mitigation measures, AMISOM investigated an incident involving the killing of one civilian in Beletweyne. Efforts are also underway to process this case within the AMISOM amends system. In similar efforts, AMISOM continues to facilitate mentorship programmes in support of the SNA's internal oversight and compliance mechanisms. The mentorship programmes enable AMISOM to replicate its existing measures in its support to the SSF with the aim to enhance compliance and accountability of operations conducted against Al Shabaab, including jointly with SSF. This also includes comprehensive assessments of protection risks and SNA's capability to hold recovered territories prior to transferring security responsibility to the SSF - with special emphasis on the conduct of joint operations and processes for the transfer of security responsibilities.

VIII. EQUIPMENT REVIEW OUTCOMES AND USE OF FORCE ASSETS

23. Since the last report, AMISOM undertook an equipment review and operational readiness assessment of the quick reaction and mobile forces. All sectors were found to have created quick reaction and mobile forces with all assets and equipment ready to deploy. Nonetheless, donated vehicles, especially Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), lack support packages in terms of spares and technical manpower. The need for maintenance of equipment and machinery, in particular the Partner Owned Equipment (POE), cannot be overemphasized. Equally important is the need to preposition backup spares, ensure accurate inventory management and reduce delays in obtaining resupplies. In the meantime, AMISOM has continued to advocate prudent use of equipment and force assets, while making efforts to enhance its air operations across the Sectors.

IX. STAFFING OF THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT

24. Despite efforts to expedite the recruitment of 22 additional staff to attain the approved strength of 70 International civilian staff, no significant progress has been made. The number of

AMISOM civilians remains the same with 48 international civilian staff, nine national staff, 4 in Mogadishu and 5 at the Mission Rear Office in Nairobi, two (02) seconded staff and five (05) UN consultants. As a result, the AMISOM Civilian component continues to experience considerable staffing challenges in replacing staff who either resigned or retired, as a result of the ongoing AU moratorium on recruitment of Short, Fixed Term and Special Service Contracts. As a result, the requirement for the submission of an exceptional waiver to recruit and deploy additional civilian staff has resulted in further delays.

X. STABILISATION AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

25. In support of the revised STP (2021), significant efforts have been made, in coordination with the FGS, FMS and stabilisation partners, to enhance collective delivery of stabilisation and early recovery interventions. In this regard, AMISOM has continued to ensure effective provision of security and access for stabilisation partners in the recovered areas, including through participation in the Lower Shabelle fortnightly stabilisation and early recovery fora. These fora have enabled AMISOM and partners to share information on activities, agree on stabilisation priorities and map out future intervention strategies in order to avoid duplication of effort and activities in the delivery of essential services to communities in the recovered areas.

26. AMISOM also continued to deliver peace dividends through various Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) targeting vulnerable populations in recovered areas. In this respect, AMISOM initiated seven QIPs, five of which are ongoing and two already completed, and handed over QIPs to needy communities. AMISOM handed over two shallow wells; one with a solar pump at Towfik IDP camp, Sector 5, and another one with a hand pump at Goobo village in Maxaas region, Sector 4, to provide water to a total of 416 households. Nonetheless, the current political impasse and ensuing insecurity continues to hamper AMISOM progress in the delivery of additional social services to various communities in AMISOM AOR, including the conduct of community engagements to identify and initiate QIPs.

27. Consistent with its mandate, AMISOM, within its capabilities, continues to liaise and coordinate with humanitarian partners to facilitate access and delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations. AMISOM coordinated humanitarian flights to deliver 29.61 metric tons of food commodities on behalf of the FGS Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (MOHADM) to Qansax Dheere. It also facilitated the delivery of water and food supplies to a total of 400 households in Ceel Waq and Garile in the Gedo region of Somalia. These efforts have been supported by AMISOM's Civilian Sector Teams, and includes the delivery of humanitarian support to vulnerable and needy populations as well as assistance to early recovery programmes, including support to the delivery of critical public services across the AMISOM Sectors.

XI. MEASURES TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON AMISOM OPERATIONS

28. The Covid-19 pandemic continues to undermine AMISOM activities, including joint operations, training, mentoring, and special duties as well as contact with the civilian administration and local populations across AMISOM AoR. The UN supported Vaccination Programme that is ready to roll out 6500 doses of AstraZeneca vaccine is dedicated to UN staff

and other eligible persons, including frontline workers, personnel over 60 years as well as UN police and military. This support is expected to be extended to eligible AMISOM personnel, contractors and INGOs personnel collaborating with the UN. The online registration platform is now ready for deployment, a vaccine distribution plan is in place and various vaccination sites and medical personnel to administer vaccines have been identified and prepared.

29. In addition to the 6500 doses of AstraZeneca from the UN HQ, the UN supported Vaccination Deployment Programme team received a vaccine donation from the Ministry of Health. This was used to vaccinate almost all healthcare workers in the mission and people with underlying conditions.

30. T/PCCs vaccination programmes are varied in terms of approach and coverage. Within this context, KDF vaccinated its troops deployed to Somalia. Incoming troops from Uganda and Nigeria FPU also received the first vaccination dose whilst in their countries and the challenge remains with the provision of the second dose. Given that vaccine doses received from the Ministry of Health and the UN HQ are not enough to cover all eligible AMISOM troops, T/PCCs should be encouraged and supported to ensure that all their troops are fully vaccinated prior to deployment in Somalia.

XII. OBSERVATIONS AND KEY ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE AU PSC

31. Taking note of the current political and security challenges, Council may wish to consider the following:

- a. **Reiterate** the communique [PSC/PR/COMM.1(CMXCIII)] adopted at 993rd meeting of the PSC, held on 22 April 2021, on the need for inclusive dialogue among Somali stakeholders leading to broad political consensus and compromise on the electoral processes within the framework of the 17 September 2020 Agreement and the Baidoa technical committee recommendations. This Agreement was based on consensus and represents a Somali-owned and -led process and remains the path to transparent, and credible elections capable of renewing the legitimacy of the Somali Federal Institutions within the shortest time possible.
- b. **Emphasize** that the political crisis has security ramifications and serious implications for the implementation and timelines of both the Somali Transition Plan (STP) and UN Security Council Resolution 2568 (2021), especially in light of the fracturing of the Somali National Army along factional and clan lines.
- c. **Express deep concern** at the deteriorating security situation in Somalia, and Mogadishu in particular, due to the continued electoral impasse, noting that military actions by any group in Somalia increases the risks of instability and threatens to erode the gains made by AMISOM, in support of Somali stabilization efforts and state building processes.
- d. **Reiterate** the need for relevant Somali stakeholders to refrain from undertaking any actions that might further exacerbate and deepen the current political and

security impasse, and further reaffirm support for the implementation of the 17 September 2020 Agreement.

- e. **Call** on AMISOM to avoid being drawn into partisan politics in Somalia, but should remain neutral vis-à-vis the various political factions and parties, in order to effectively facilitate the demilitarisation of Mogadishu and environs, to prevent an eruption of violent conflict in and beyond Mogadishu – whilst ensuring AMISOM positions are protected and secured.
- f. **Welcome** the rescinding by the Lower House of Parliament of its decisions of 12 February 2021 regarding the extension of its mandate and that of the President for up to two years, and the return to the 17 September 2020 agreement as the basis for the conduct of timely elections.
- g. **Emphasize** that sustained progress in the implementation of the AU's objectives and mandate in Somalia is largely dependent on the availability of appropriate logistical and financial support to AMISOM. In this regard, Council may wish to extend gratitude to all partners for the continued financial and logistical support to AMISOM and re-emphasize the need for continued mobilization of support for AMISOM, including through predictable, sustainable, and flexible financing mechanisms to ensure successful implementation of the AMISOM mandate.
- h. **Request** AMISOM to continue monitoring the unfolding political and security situation in Somalia, with the technical backstopping by the AU Commission, including ensuring that all actions to address the situation are coordinated with other efforts among the AU, European Union (EU), Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the United Nations (UN), as well as the recommendations expected from the ongoing AU independent assessment of AMISOM, on the future direction for Somalia's quest for good governance, and sustaining peace and stability.
- i. **Extend** sincere appreciation to the Special Representative for Somalia and Head of AMISOM, Ambassador Francisco Madeira, as well as the military, police and civilian components of AMISOM, for their unwavering dedication, commitment, and sacrifice in the promotion of peace, security, stability, and reconciliation in Somalia, in challenging and uncertain circumstances.
- j. **Look forward** for the report of the Independent Assessment Team to be submitted to the Council upon its finalization.
- k. **Renew** the AMISOM mandate until 31 December 2021