

SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT

SEIZING THE NEW MOMENTUM FOR UNSC RESOLUTION ON UN FUNDING OF AU PEACE OPERATIONS

AMANI AFRICA

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'Providing African Union peace support operations with access to United Nations assessed contributions... would represent a concrete demonstration that the Security Council stands ready to break new ground and address a critical gap in the international peace and security architecture as well as a strong reaffirmation of the willingness of the Council to stem the scourge of armed conflict on the African continent.'

**Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of the UN
(April 2023)**

I INTRODUCTION

There is a new momentum for resumption of negotiation on a framework UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution on financing of African Union (AU) led peace support operations authorized by the UNSC,¹ four years after the collapse of the last attempt at securing such resolution in 2019. Following the lack of consensus and clarity around key issues raised in the proposed resolution and the threat of veto by the United States (US) under the Trump administration, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) through its Chairperson for the month of September 2019, Morocco, requested the African 3 members (A3) of the UNSC to suspend the process of negotiating the draft resolution that was put forward by South Africa.² Apart from the charge that the version of the resolution that was under consideration seriously watered down the version of the draft resolution that the A3

¹ The issue financing of AU PSOs using UN assessed contributions has been a major subject in AU-UN relationship on peace and security for a long time. See Security Council Report, *The Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?*, Research Report (April 2023) (Security Council Report, Research Report (April 2023); Amani Africa, *Insights on the PSC, 'Session on the common African Position on the Financing of AU led peace support operations through UN Assessed contributions'*, 21 July 2021.

² Chairperson of the African Union Peace and Security Council for September 2019 letter addressed to the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire and Coordinator of the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3), dated 19 September 2019.

spearheaded by Ethiopia put in blue in December 2018,³ the key issues that led to the decision of the PSC for the suspension of the negotiations include the difference of views that arose over the understanding of AU's commitment to contribute 25 % of peace support operations budget and the division of labour between the PSC and the UNSC particularly vis-a-vis the degree of autonomy of the AU for exercising of a level of control over the peace support operations that it deploys under UNSC authorization.⁴

Despite remaining uncertainties, 2023 is poised to be the year for restarting the process that stalled since 2019. The AU Commission developed what it called the Consensus Paper that presents the view of the AU on the subject. The Consensus Paper was adopted during the AU summit held in February 2023.⁵ On 29 April 2023, the UN Secretary-General also released the Report on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) and considerations related to the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Security Council.⁶ As the Secretary-General put it, granting of access to UN assessed contributions to AU-led peace support operations 'would represent a concrete demonstration that the Security Council stands ready to break new ground and address a critical gap in the international peace and security architecture as well as a strong reaffirmation of the

³ It is to be recalled that that draft was not put for voting due to the threat of US veto, the emergence of another draft by Côte d'Ivoire (apparently at the behest of France purportedly to accommodate US demands), and the uncoordinated message from the AU Commission. Amani Africa - *Insights on the PSC, Briefing on sustainable financing of African Peace and Security Agenda under the UN Charter* (19 September 2019).

⁴ Various consultations and meetings were held at the level of both the PSC Committee of Experts including their 17th meeting (on 17 September 2019), 23rd meeting (9 August 2021) and 24th meeting (23 August 2021) and that of the PSC.

⁵ African Union, *Consensus Paper on predictable, adequate and sustainable financing for African Union peace and security activities* (February 2023). (AU Consensus Paper)

⁶ UN Secretary General, *Report on implementation of Security Council Resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) and considerations related to the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Security Council* (29 April 2023). (Secretary General's Report (April 2023))

willingness of the Council to stem the scourge of armed conflict on the African continent.⁷

These two documents, together with the prevailing strategic environment including the ongoing discussion about reform of the multilateral system and the changing security landscape in Africa necessitating peace enforcement, have set the stage to kick start the discussion in the UNSC for resuming negotiation on the draft framework resolution on financing of AU-led peace support operations.⁸ In New York, following the adoption of the Consensus Paper, preparations have kicked off in earnest.⁹ During May 2023, both the PSC and the UNSC are scheduled to have their respective sessions on the subject.¹⁰

This special research report seeks to examine how the AU Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General's report advance the consideration of the draft resolution in the UNSC, the issues that may still require further engagement and negotiated compromise, the next steps in the process for updating and presenting the draft resolution, and the role expected of various African policy actors for running smooth and effective show in the negotiation process. The report has eight parts. Following this introduction, the second part offers overview of the journey of the AU in the discussion on securing predictable and sustainable financing of AU-led peace support operations through UN assessed contributions. In part III, the research report highlights the changes in the strategic and operational environment that sets the background to the imminent commencement of negotiation on the resolution. The subsequent two sections present the salient themes discussed in the AU Consensus Paper and in the UN Secretary-General's Report. In part VI, this research report identifies

⁷ As above, para 44.

⁸ See Security Council Report, *Research Report (April 2023)*.

⁹ The AU Permanent Observer Mission to the UN and the A3 are working on a roadmap that sets the various steps on the negotiation for the tabling of such resolution to the UNSC.

¹⁰ The PSC is scheduled to hold ministerial session on 12 May, see Amani Africa, *Monthly program of work for May (2023)*. The UNSC plans to convene a briefing on the financing of AU led PSOs on 25 May, see Security Council Report, *Security Council Program of Work for May (2023)*.

the issues that require further engagement in order to achieve consensus for the adoption of the framework resolution by the UNSC. After discussing the next steps and implications for African policy actors in part VII, the report closes in part VIII with brief conclusion.

II THE ROAD TRAVELLED SO FAR: THE EVOLUTION IN NORMATIVE, TECHNICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AT THE LEVEL OF THE AU

The expectation for having a resort to the use of UN funds for AU peace support operations is established in the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU (the PSC Protocol). Article 17, which affirms the primary responsibility of the UN for the maintenance of international peace and security, stipulates that '[w]here necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Union's activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.'¹¹

The PSC recognized the need for such support from the UN early on when it started deploying peace support operations soon after its operationalization. This emerged soon after it mandated the deployment of the AU Mission to Sudan (AMIS). In this respect, the PSC called on the UN and all the AU partners to provide 'financial and logistical assistance to sustain the AU-led mission deployed in Darfur and to enhance its effectiveness.'¹² Yet, the experience of AMIS highlighted the challenges that AU faces in conducting peace operations in the absence of predictable and sustainable financing. Subsequently, the PSC, at the ministerial session it held in July 2005, appealed 'to the AU Partners to provide the much-needed additional financial

¹¹ PSC Protocol, Art. 17 (2).

¹² Peace and Security Council, 13th session, AU Doc.PSC/PR/Comm.(XIII) (27 July 2004) para 3.

resources¹³ to fill in the funding shortfalls facing AMIS. Similarly, the AU Assembly urged 'the African Members of the Security Council to take the required initiatives for the early adoption, by the United Nations, of the necessary decisions on the funding of the peace support operation in Darfur through assessed contributions.'¹⁴ Eventually, various factors including the financial shortfalls facing AMIS led to the eventual transition of AMIS to the UN and AU Mission to Darfur (UNAMID). As part of the transition to UNAMID, the UN provided a light and a heavy support package to AMIS, funded through UN assessed contributions.

It was in this context that the AU at the level of its highest decision-making body, the Assembly, put forward the call for the use of UN assessed contributions for AU peace support operations. At its January 2007 ordinary session, the AU Assembly, recalling that the maintenance of international peace and security is the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council, called upon 'the United Nations to examine, within the context of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, the possibility of funding, through assessed contributions, peace-keeping operations undertaken by African Union or under its authority and with the consent of the United Nations.'¹⁵ Laying the foundation for the A3 to take this issue forward, the Assembly requested 'Member States working together with the Commission, to undertake the necessary follow-up in this regard.'¹⁶ This was the basis on which South Africa, as A3 member, organized high-level meeting on financing of AU peace support operations.

In March 2007, South Africa's initiative led to the adoption of a presidential statement requesting the Secretary-General to present specific proposals on how to further the cooperation and coordination between the UN and the AU on the basis of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.¹⁷ It was

¹³ *Peace and Security Council, 34th session, AU Doc. PSC/Min/Comm.(XXXIV) – (iii) (3 July 2005) para. 3.*

¹⁴ *AU Assembly, AU Doc Assembly/Dec.145 (VIII) at its 8th Ordinary Session in 2007, para 8.*

¹⁵ *As above, para 20.*

¹⁶ *As above.*

¹⁷ *UN Security Council, Statement of the President of the Council, UN Doc S/PRST/2007/7, (28 March 2007).*

against this background that the UN Secretary-General proposed and, upon authorization by the UNSC, established the AU-UN Panel on options for financing of AU peace support operations, headed by former Prime Minister of Italy Romano Prodi.¹⁸ Following the submission of the Prodi report with proposal for both the use of multi-donor trust fund and UN assessed contributions, at its 178th meeting held on 13 March 2009, the PSC stressed that the report of the Panel marked an important step in the overall efforts to enhance the capacity of the AU to meet the peace and security challenges facing the continent and to mobilize greater support within the larger international community. The PSC also underscored the need for continued efforts to ensure predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for AU-led peace support operations.

The AU continued to experience similar challenges of finding predictable and sustainable funding that it faced in AMIS for the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). In the context of the UN's inability to deploy to Somalia taking over from AMISOM as initially envisaged and considering the need to support AMISOM, the UNSC on 16 January 2009 adopted Resolution 1863, following proposal from the Secretary-General, authorizing the Secretary-General to deliver a logistical support package to AMISOM. While this was a development welcomed by AMISOM, there was need for increased support for expanding and sustaining the work of AMISOM. Thus the PSC, at its session in October 2010, called on the 'Security Council to take the decisions now required of it in line with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, by', among others, 'authorizing an enhanced support package for AMISOM, funded through UN assessed contributions, on the basis of the newly-authorized strength, and catering for reimbursements for Contingent Owned Equipment, including minor and major equipment, and the payment of troop allowances at UN rates, in order to ensure adequate, predictable and sustainable support to the Mission'.¹⁹

¹⁸ *For details on the Prodi Panel and its report, see Security Council Report, Research Report (April 2023) 3-4.*

¹⁹ *Peace and Security Council, 245th session, AU Doc.PSC/MIN/1(CCXXXV), para 15 (ii).*

This demand of the PSC was partially met when the UNSC adopted Resolution 2010 (2011). Yet, the AU reported that even this enhanced support fell short of what was needed. In 2012, the AU Commission Chairperson stated that '[w]hile the logistical support being delivered by UNSOA has been invaluable to AMISOM, enhancing the operational effectiveness of the Mission, it remains nonetheless inadequate in view of the challenges on the ground.' It went on to state that, the support 'does not cover all the critical mission support elements, including troop and police personnel allowances ...and reimbursement for contingent owned equipment (COE).'²⁰ On the challenges that the multi-donor trust fund is fraught with and why it does not address the need for sustainable, adequate and predictable funding, the Chairperson's report noted that this fund is 'mainly from voluntary contributions,' and 'subject to caveats from the donors, many of whom reject reimbursement for lethal equipment.'²¹

In Mali and Central African Republic (CAR), one of the major challenges the AU was facing in the missions it deployed was financing. In order to fill this gap, the AU has held a pledging conference for its mission in Mali, known by its French acronym as AFISMA, following the decision of the PSC²² to mobilize support both within the continent and from international partners. Similarly, the AU held a pledging conference for its mission in the CAR, MISCA, in collaboration with the UN in February 2014. PSC's unheeded²³ calls, for a support package funded by UN-assessed contributions to AFISMA, has created rifts between the AU and the UN.

Yet, with the deepening of the appreciation of the strategic significance of the relationship of the AU with the UN in the implementation of AU's peace and security activities as part of the maintenance of international peace and security, the AU Assembly in its decision at its 16th ordinary session held in January 2016 'encouraged the Chairperson of the Commission to prepare and submit to the Peace and Security Council a report on the African Union's (AU) strategic vision of the cooperation between the AU and the United Nations (UN) on peace and security matters.'²⁴ This led to the submission by the Chairperson of the AU Commission of the Report on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards greater strategic and political coherence' in January 2012.²⁵ As AU's first and most comprehensive and ambitious report outlining AU's vision of how to elevate the strategic partnership between the AU and the UN on peace and security, the report underscored 'the importance of finding a lasting solution to the funding of AU-led peace support operations cannot be over-emphasized. Time and again, experience has demonstrated that support using UN assessed contributions is the most viable response to the challenge at hand, especially when the operations concerned, as is the case for AMISOM, are undertaken with the consent of the Security Council.'²⁶ The PSC in a decision it adopted on the report called on the UN to address in a systematic manner the issue of the funding of AU peace support operations undertaken with the consent of the UN, through the use of UN assessed contribution.²⁷

In September 2013, the AU Commission Chairperson submitted another report following a request the AU Assembly made on the occasion of the summit it held marking the 50th anniversary of the Organization of African Unity/African Union in May 2013. The report of the Chairperson of the Commission submitted to the PSC in September 2013 reaffirmed the decision of the 307th session

20 *Report on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards greater strategic and political coherence' in January 2012 presented to the 307th session of the PSC, (January 2012), para. 70. (AU Commission Chairperson Report on AU-UN Partnership on Peace and Security (2012))*

21 *As above.*

22 *Peace and Security Council, Communique of the 341st session, 13 November 2012.*

23 *Peace and Security Council, Communique of the Communique 353rd session, 25 January 2013.*

24 *AU Assembly, AU Doc Assembly/AU/Dec. 338 (XVI) para. 31.*

25 *This report was presented to Peace & Security Council, 307th Meeting, AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCVII) (9 January 2012).*

26 *As above, para 111.*

27 *Peace & Security Council, 307th Meeting, AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCVII) (9 January 2012) para 18.*

of the PSC calling for 'addressing effectively and in a systematic manner the issue of predictable, sustainable and flexible funding of AU-led peace support operations undertaken with the consent of the Security Council, through the use of assessed contributions.'²⁸ The PSC, apart from reiterating this call,²⁹ endorsed 'the implementation, as an initial step, of all the recommendations' of the Prodi report³⁰ and affirmed the need for 'the mobilization of greater financial support by African member states to African peace efforts'.³¹

Following the appointment of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in October 2014, the AU had developed a common position on the UN review of peace operations³². Beyond outlining key principles that should underpin the AU-UN partnership, the common position presented a set of recommendations on financing of AU led PSOs. It reaffirmed AU's preferred support modality, namely the use of UN assessed contributions. It further outlined the challenges it faced with the unpredictable nature of Trust Funds and their inability to respond quickly.

In 2012, the AU Commission Chairperson's activity report³³ presented a comprehensive overview of the challenge and prospects for the realization of the continent's ambition for achieving peace, security and development. Various recommendations towards enhancing the broader financial independence of the AU by 'implementing strategies of resource mobilization, including alternative sources of funding, to enable Africa to finance its programmes and development' were put forward. Taking this proposal and the commitment in the communique of the 397th session of the PSC forward in concrete terms

28 *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the African Union-United Nations Partnership: The need for greater coherence, submitted to the 397th session of the PSC, (23 September 2013) para 23.*

29 *Peace and Security Council, Communique of the 397th session, AU Doc. PSC/AHG/3.(CCCXCVII) para 8(c)(i).*

30 *As above, para 8 (c) (ii).*

31 *As above, para 9(vi).*

32 *The Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations, 29 April 2015.*

33 *Annual Report of the Chairperson on the Activities of the Commission Covering the period January to December 2012.*

within the framework of the institutional reform of the AU, the AU Assembly at its 27th Ordinary Session held in July 2016 in Kigali, Rwanda, decided to revitalize the Peace Fund through Member State contributions to be drawn from a 0.2% levy on imports.³⁴ Through this decision³⁵ member states agreed to endow the AU Peace Fund with \$400 million by 2020 across three windows of intervention: a) preventive diplomacy, mediation activities b) building of institutional capabilities and c) peace support operations as well as a crisis reserve facility for funding rapid response to emergency crisis. Although the source of contribution to the revitalized Peace Fund was subsequently made the scale of assessment,³⁶ the AU upheld the decision to endow the Fund with \$400 million,³⁷ albeit by 2023 rather than the initial timeline of 2020.³⁸

The progress made with the revitalization of the Peace Fund for mobilization of resources from within the continent for peace and security is nothing short of remarkable.³⁹ However, the Peace Fund, even with its full capacity, would not be nearly adequate for the financial needs of peace missions. As indicated in the report on Predictable and Sustainable Financing by the AU High-Representative for the Peace Fund, '[t]he onerous nature of these missions is illustrated by the total cost of current operations which, for 2016, is estimated at \$1.2 billion per year. AMISOM alone (with an approved strength of 22,126 uniformed personnel and 114 civilians) accounting for an estimated \$900 million per year'.⁴⁰

34 *Amani Africa, Financing Peace and Security in Africa: Breakthrough in increased African ownership? Special Research No. 2 (July 2017).*

35 *AU Assembly 26th Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII)*

36 *AU Assembly 32nd Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec734 (XXXII).*

37 *See for further, Amani Africa, The African Union Peace and Security Council Handbook 2021: Guide to the Council's procedure, practice and traditions (2021) p 100-105.*

38 *AU Assembly 33rd Ordinary session (February 2020).*

39 *Amani Africa, Financing Peace and Security in Africa: Breakthrough in increased African ownership?, Special Research No. 2 (July 2017).*

40 *Predictable and Sustainable Financing by the AU High-Representative for the Peace Fund, (August 2016) para 10.*

III CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Beyond the normative, technical and institutional considerations on which the adoption by the UNSC of the resolution on financing of AU-led peace support operations through UN assessed contribution depends, the politics and calculations of UNSC members is also informed by the prevailing strategic and operational peace and security context in Africa and its implications for peace diplomacy tools. Africa, as other parts of the world, is experiencing an increase in the number, geographic spread and impact of conflicts. First, despite the decline in the number of conflicts from late 1990s through early 2010s the world has experienced, this positive trend started to be reversed from early 2010s. Africa is one of the regions of the world that has experienced this reversal. During the last decade, the continent has experienced an increase in the number of conflicts by as much as twice from the early 2010s.

Second, while the regions of the continent with the most conflict burdens remain the sites of major hotspots, wider territories and more regions are affected by conflicts currently. In 2010, when the AU first issued a report on terrorism, only a few pockets of territories in East Africa and North Africa were affected by terrorist violence.⁴¹ During the past several years conflicts, particularly those involving terrorist groups, have expanded to cover all parts of the continent, affecting regions that have hitherto been immune, including Southern Africa. The spread of conflicts involving terrorist groups along with the continuing year on year spike in incidents of attacks and number of fatalities from these conflicts in Africa has now made parts of the continent, particularly the Sahel, the epicentre of conflicts involving terrorist. These are also conflicts characterised by the widespread use of non-conventional methods of warfare and a fusion transnational with organized crime. Third, with many of the conflict situations involving increasing

⁴¹ AU Commission, *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on measures to strengthen cooperation in the prevention and combating of terrorism (2010)* para 7.

level of attacks targeting civilians, today's conflicts have increasingly devastating consequences on civilians.

In the light of the foregoing peace and security context, the effectiveness of traditional UN peacekeeping has come under enormous pressure for failing to meet the challenges that these situations pose as current experiences in CAR, DRC and Mali attest.⁴² Corresponding to this, the prevailing context has given rise to the need for peace support operations that not only have stabilization and peace enforcement mandates and capabilities but also are willing and able to act on their peace enforcement mandates. While the AU observed that 'the AU's peacekeeping posture in Burundi, Darfur and now Somalia points to the emergence of a different peacekeeping doctrine; instead of waiting for a peace to keep, the AU views peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it' as far back as 2012,⁴³ the need for rethinking the approach to peace support operations along these lines have gained traction in recent years partly on account of the advocacy of the Secretary-General and the difficulties that UN missions in Africa have run in to. Indeed, the Secretary-General in this respect states, echoing AU's Consensus Paper, that the 'changing nature of conflicts in Africa has forced the United Nations and the African Union to adapt their operations to respond to new and evolving challenges.'⁴⁴

One of the key areas that has become a centre of gravity in the current high-level debate on the reform of the UN, particularly vis-à-vis the preparation of the Secretary-General's *New Agenda for Peace* due by the end of June 2023 is the Secretary-General's proposal for what he calls the 'new generation of African Union-led, United Nations supported peace operations'⁴⁵ that involve peace enforcement and counter-terrorist tasks. It is thus cogently proposed, in this connection, that one way to secure measurable reform short of UNSC reform 'would be to establish a new process

⁴² See Njali Dayal, *UN's African peacekeeping missions face legitimacy crisis*, IOL, (7 August 2022).

⁴³ AU Commission Chairperson Report on AU-UN Partnership on Peace and Security (2012) para 71.

⁴⁴ Secretary-General's Report (April 2023) 4.

⁴⁵ As above, 43.

for the Security Council to offer systematic funding (using “assessed contributions” similar to those that pay for UN missions) to pay for more robust African-led stabilization operations as alternative to blue helmet mission.⁴⁶

Another aspect of the change in the strategic environment has to do with the intensification of the geostrategic tensions between major powers with consequences both to the effective functioning of the UNSC and the minimum level of cohesion required for addressing peace and security issues in places such as the Sahel. In Africa, one avenue of mitigating the negative consequences of these developments is elevating the partnership with AU. A recent book on peace and security diplomacy in a time of multipolarity and big power rivalry thus pointed out that supporting the increasing willingness of regional organizations and ‘taking advantage of their willingness to step up to the plate could be a central element of a reformulated peace and conflict diplomacy portfolio.’⁴⁷

The final aspect of the change peace diplomacy environment has to do with the fact that the US is more disposed to support the adoption of a resolution, albeit subject to negotiations on some issues. It is to be recalled that in 2018/2019, one of the major reasons for the collapse of the process towards the tabling of the draft resolution for voting in the UNSC was the threat by the US for vetoing it.⁴⁸ Despite remaining works, today under the current administration the threat of veto does not seem to be on the cards.⁴⁹

46 Richard Gowan, *The future of multilateralism*, GCSP Policy Brief No. 6 (April 2023), 11.

47 Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall, *Grasping global problems by root or by branch*, in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall (eds.) *Diplomacy and the future of world order* (2021) 29.

48 Crisis Group, *The Price of Peace*, 22; Amani Africa - *Insights on the PSC, Briefing on sustainable financing of African Peace and Security Agenda under the UN Charter* (19 September 2019)

49 Security Council Report, *Research Report* (April 2023) 9.

IV ADVANCES THE AU CONSENSUS PAPER MADE

The AU Assembly’s 36th Ordinary Session held in February 2023 adopted the much-awaited Consensus Paper on financing of AU peace support operations.⁵⁰ In addition to the executive summary, the consensus paper is comprised of five sections. The first of these is the section that provides briefly the background with a focus on some key AU policy actions since 2015. In this respect, it discussed **a)** the AU Assembly decisions of January and June 2015 that commit AU member states to contribute 25% for peace and security budget, **b)** the Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Support operations, **c)** the 2016 Report on Predictable and Sustainable Financing by the AU High-Representative for the Peace Fund and **d)** the communiqué of the 689th session of the PSC. The next section outlines the rationale for predictable and sustainable funding drawing on both own resources via the Peace Fund and through partnership mainly with the UN based on the prevailing security environment, AU’s comparative advantage and the need for effective strategic partnership for the maintenance of international peace and security. However, it is worth noting that the proposal for access to UN assessed contributions to AU PSOs and measures towards achieving this has been underway prior to 2015.⁵¹

The other and most extensive section is dedicated to ‘The African Position’. This is the part of the Consensus Paper that, apart from discussing the effort for achieving ‘African ownership’ through the revitalized Peace Fund, goes to the heart of the matter in clarifying some of the key issues that

50 The presentation of this Consensus Paper, articulating a common understanding on respective roles of the AU and the UN in respect to use of UN assessed contribution for AU PSOs, was on the cards as early as the February 2020 AU summit.

51 As the report of the Secretary-General observes, ‘[o]ver the past fifteen years, numerous reports have been submitted to the Security Council on the imperative of predictable and sustainable financing for African Union peace support operations.’ The engagement of the AU Assembly goes as far back as January with the adoption of Assembly/Dec.145 (VIII) at its 8th Ordinary Session in 2007 and the PSC has been seized with this matter at least as far back as its 98th session.

are central to the negotiations on the framework resolution in the UNSC. In discussing the substantial progress made towards the operationalization of the Revitalized Peace Fund, the Paper highlights both the governance and management structure and revised AU financial rules (which aim at ensuring financial transparency and accountability) and the recent efforts to start using the resources from the Peace Fund towards supporting peace support operations such as ATMIS, as clear evidence of AU's commitment for burden sharing.

On the question of the meaning of 25% of peace support operations budget of the AU, the Consensus Paper largely reiterated what the AU High Representative for Financing of the AU and its Peace and Security, Donald Kaberuka, told the UNSC in December 2018.⁵² There are two aspects to the clarification that the Consensus Paper provided on this key issue. The first is what the AU Assembly meant by 25% of AU budget. On this, it states that the commitment is for the AU to 'endeavour to pay up to 25% of PSO **budgetary component of the AU annual budget** as approved by Member States to supporting priority initiatives of the AU in support of **peace and security** efforts on the continent.' (emphasis added) Apart from the proviso 'up to' taken from the communiqué of the 547th session of the PSC,⁵³ this formulation makes it clear that this percentage is calculated on peace support operations budgetary component of the AU annual budget for all of AU's peace and security activities.⁵⁴ It is evident from this that if 25% were meant, as formulated in the 2018 draft resolution, to be reference to the budget of each PSO to be deployed by the AU under UNSC authority then the AU would have been considered as contemplating to dedicate a budget to PSOs whose amount takes substantial proportion of the overall budget of the AU. A commitment to such budget would

⁵² Crisis Group, *The Price of Peace*

⁵³ AU Peace and Security Council, *Communique of the 547th session, AU Doc. PSC/AHG/COMM/2(DXLVII)*.

⁵⁴ The communiqué of the 547th session of the PSC in mandating the AU Commission Chairperson to start consultation with the UN stated AU's commitment 'to assume responsibility for up to 25% of all AU peace and security activities, including peace support operations, while the other 75% of the cost of such missions would be provided by UN through assessed contributions.' Para 11.

make AU's PSOs budget to be bigger than all other areas of work of the AU or even AU's annual overall budget.⁵⁵

The Consensus Paper states, in the executive summary, that 'the decisions (on 25%) mean that the AU Assembly committed to financing 25% of its overall peace and security activities, and not only peace support operations'. The importance of this clarification is in affirming the formulation used in both the June 2015 Assembly Decision⁵⁶ and the communiqué of the 547th session of the PSC with the effect of **setting aside** the different formulations used in the January 2015 and July 2017 AU Assembly decisions,⁵⁷ thereby removing the confusion that arose from such differing formulations.

In the annex, the Consensus Paper further states that '[w]hile the full financing of small-scale observer missions through the AU Peace Fund may be possible, the Fund is **not intended to fully finance certain categories of AU-led PSOs.**' (Emphasis in the original) Accordingly, the second aspect of the clarification on this point is the kind of costs the 25% would cover for AU-led PSOs. As the Consensus Paper put it, this percentage 'progressively covers in large part the **preparation stage of AU-Led PSOs.**'⁵⁸ (Emphasis added)

⁵⁵ In this respect Crisis Group in its report on the Price of Peace pointed out that 'AMISOM costs an estimated \$1.2 billion per year, meaning that the AU's portion of a comparable future mission would be \$300 million. Even if the Peace Fund's entire expected annual income of \$400 million were expended on peace support (as opposed to the \$235 million now earmarked), it would not be enough to cover the AU's portion of two AMISOM-type missions.' Crisis Group, *The price of peace*, 13

⁵⁶ This decision, Assembly/AU/Dec.578(XXV), envisages that 'Member States finance 25% of Peace and Security budget.'

⁵⁷ Assembly/AU/Dec.561(XXIV) provided for 'Member States to fund the Peace support operations budget at 25%' and Assembly/AU//Dec.642-664(XXIX)Rev.1 stipulated plan to cover '25% of the Peace Support Operations'.

⁵⁸ It adds further that, 'this will cover costs related to strategic planning, mission-specific pre-deployment training, mission-specific technical assessments and fact-finding missions, recruitment and selection process of mission personnel, pre-deployment verification of personnel and equipment, negotiations and signing processes for the MoU between the AU and Police/Troop Contributing Countries (PTCC), negotiations and

Other themes discussed in this section of the Consensus Paper include **a)** the model for financing PSOs, **b)** the link between financing of AU peace support operations and implementation of proposals on strengthening of AU-UN partnership, **c)** AU's recognition and plan to organize its engagement in peace enforcement as part of a continuum involving complementary use of rather than in isolation from peace-making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and **d)** progress made in the development and operationalization of AU's human rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework for its peace support operations.

On the model for financing AU-led peace support operations, the paper outlines three models. The hybrid mission model drawing on the UNAMID experience, support through assessed contribution for sub-regional peace support operations and what may be called the '**AMISOM/ATMIS plus**' model of financing AU PSOs. The latter is envisaged to involve the use of UN assessed contributions not only for Logistics Support Package through the support office (to which the current support to ATMIS is confined) but also for monthly allowances for military & police personnel and for death and disability compensation.

On the strategic imperative of financing of AU peace support operations through UN assessed contributions for scaling up the strategic partnership between AU and UN and for implementing longstanding proposals on strengthening this partnership,⁵⁹ the Consensus Paper reiterated that in undertaking peace and security activities particularly peace support operations authorized by the UNSC the AU is not only supporting the global public good of the maintenance of international peace and security but also shouldering the burden of the

signing processes for AU-Host Country Status of Forces/Mission Agreements, negotiations and signing processes for Letters of Assists between the AU and Countries Contributing capabilities for AU-Led PSOs.'

⁵⁹ UN Reports that made such proposal include the *Report of the African Union - United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to African Peacekeeping Operations (2008)* and the *Report of UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) (2015)*.

UNSC, which bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. As the Paper put it, AU's 'peace support operations are a global good undertaken on behalf of the UN Security Council which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Accordingly, in instances where the UN authorizes the AU to undertake a peace support operation in lieu of the UN, the UN should provide the means to undertake such missions.'⁶⁰ The Secretary-General's report agrees that UN assessed contributions in support of AU peace support operations 'can also serve as a tangible representation of the strong partnership between our two organizations.'⁶¹

The last sections of the Consensus Paper outline lessons learned from various experiences and the conclusion.

V THE MOMENT FOR A NEW GENERATION OF AU-LED PEACE OPERATIONS SUPPORTED BY THE UN: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT

The Consensus Paper noted that the Secretary General's report presents an opportunity for taking forward the consideration of the proposal for the use of UN assessed contributions for AU led peace support operations authorized by the UNSC. The Secretary-General's report on its part states that 'this is an opportune, timely moment for the United Nations Security Council to rise to the challenge of laying the foundation for a new generation of African Union-led, United Nations-supported peace support operations on the African continent.'⁶²

There is substantial overlap between the Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General's report on several aspects of the issues that they canvassed and the conclusions and proposals they made on those issues. On the question of the model of financing AU-led peace support operations through UN

⁶⁰ Consensus Paper, para 40.

⁶¹ Secretary-General's Report (April 2023) para 44.

⁶² As above, para 43.

assessed contributions, the Secretary-General, drawing on the part of the report on lessons learned, presents two options. The first, which is similar to what the Consensus Paper called the hybrid mission model, is 'a joint United Nations African Union Mission.'⁶³ The other is 'delivery of a support package by the United Nations through assessed contributions',⁶⁴ which is similar to what is called the 'AMISOM/ATMIS plus' model.

Explaining the reason for the choice of the two models, the Secretary-General's report states that '[b]oth approaches would facilitate the application of United Nations roles and regulations, standards for financial oversight, accountability mechanisms and requirements for human rights due diligence, and can be implemented under existing policies and procedures.'⁶⁵ This is a crucial consideration on which the adoption by the UNSC of the resolution on financing depends. These two approaches, for which relevant frameworks and processes for their shared management have jointly been developed by the UN and the AU, are also models that have already been tested in practice over a long period of time. The AU Consensus Paper, despite proposing the three funding models, stated that the two models, subsequently endorsed by the Secretary-General, 'provide the best starting points for discussions on financing options' with necessary adaptations based on 'key experiences and lessons learned over the years.'⁶⁶

In the part that discusses progress made to date, the Secretary-General's report presents the work that has been accomplished with respect to the benchmarks set out in Resolution 2320 (2016) including on human rights and conduct and discipline compliance framework, financing of peace support operations through (and the operationalization of) the Peace Fund, including the decision for starting the use of the Fund. The most crucial part of the Secretary-General's Report in this respect outlines 'considerations for United Nations support'. Apart from the two options that the Secretary-General proposed as viable models of financing from the four options he outlined in

⁶³ As above, para 29.

⁶⁴ As above, para 30.

⁶⁵ As above, para 31.

⁶⁶ AU Consensus Paper, para 33.

his 2017 report, this is where he outlines the 'UN-AU planning and decision-making /mandating process' (a key theme not discussed in the Consensus Paper), 'mission budgeting, financial management and reporting' and 'mission support'.

One key contribution of this report is the clarity that it brought on the form that the consultative UN-AU planning and decision-making /mandating process takes. It also specifies the various steps involved in this joint planning and decision-making process. This joint planning and decision-making process is also presented in a diagram that presents a clear pictorial depiction of how the process unfolds when and as the AU and the UN consider the use of AU peace support operations as response to conflicts on the continent.

On 'budget, financial management and mission report', the Secretary-General's Report states that the UN 'would support the African Union to reinforce its reporting and monitoring policies in order to provide the required budgeting, financial and performance reports to the General Assembly.'⁶⁷ On mission support, it points out that there is a need for continuously adapting the existing operational support arrangements that are premised on traditional peacekeeping operations hence the necessity to make them 'flexible and fit for purpose to allow their application to African Union peace support operations.'⁶⁸

In the conclusion, the Secretary-General's report expresses the strategic significance of the consideration and adoption by the UNSC of the use of UN assessed contributions for AU-led peace support operations.⁶⁹

VI ISSUES REQUIRING FURTHER ENGAGEMENT

While it is now widely recognized, including on the part of UNSC members that the AU is unable to dedicate 25 % of the budget of each AU peace

⁶⁷ Secretary-General's Report (April 2023) para 33.

⁶⁸ As above, para 36.

⁶⁹ As above, para 44.

support operation supported by UN assessed contribution, the clarification provided in the Consensus Paper may prove to be unsatisfactory.⁷⁰ This is significantly on the issue of the sharing by the AU of the financial burden towards AU-led peace support operations mandated by the UNSC that may receive funding from UN assessed contributions. It is true that the Consensus Paper provided that the 25% will be used for progressively covering 'in large part the preparation stage of AU-led PSOs.' What is not clear from this formulation is what percentage of the budget of an AU-led peace support operation this contribution would amount to.⁷¹ This is important on account of the fact that UNSC Resolution 2378 (2017) made a commitment to consider partially funding AU-led peace support operations authorized by the Council through UN assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, this expectation for more clarity may necessitate further clarification that specifies the percentage of the budget of AU-led peace support operations that AU's contribution constitutes even if such would be a percentage that is symbolic of AU's willingness for burden sharing.

Related to but separate from the 25% issue that is sure to be critical to securing the agreement particularly of the three permanent members of the UNSC, P3, (France, UK, and US) is the expectation that AU-led peace support operations supported by UN assessed contributions are cost effective and hence financially cheaper than UN peacekeeping operations. On this, it clearly emerges from the proposed model for financing that the funding requirement for the 'AMISOM/ATMIS plus' model is limited to AMISOM/ATMIS Logistics Support Package plus allowances of uniformed personnel. This model, which thus excludes various budget items that ordinarily are included in UN peacekeeping, is sure to be cheaper than UN peacekeeping. It is as such anticipated to meet expectations from UNSC members such as the US on cost effectiveness.⁷²

⁷⁰ Security Council Report, Research Report (April 2023) 10.

⁷¹ SCR Report notes that some UNSC members 'continue to insist on the need for the AU to demonstrate its commitment to sharing the specific burden of peace operations'. 10

⁷² Additionally, as one official of a major EU member state put it, from the perspective of EU member states one major

The other issue that is not explicitly addressed in the Consensus Paper but was one of the concerns raised by the PSC previously involves the question of decision-making, oversight and command and control. The view on the part of the AU is that its deployment of peace support operations using UN assessed contributions should not be seen as an act of a sub-contracting by the UN of its peace operations responsibility to the AU.⁷³ Rather it is an embodiment of the harnessing of the comparative advantages of the two organizations. Additionally, as a key avenue and an exercise in the implementation of the strategic partnership between the UN and the AU, the expectation is that the AU will exercise and maintain a level of decision-making role as well as control over its UN supported peace support operations while recognizing the primacy of the UNSC. Among others, this seeks to exclude the use of such expressions as 'utilisation' in the resolution that is viewed as manifesting lack of regard to AU's role as a partner in the initiation and deployment PSOs under UN support as part of the UN-AU strategic partnership. The Secretary-General's report however presents a nuanced framing duly affirming the role of the AU and this may dispel concerns that may arise in this respect. As the veto holding members of the UNSC seek to preserve their prerogatives, whether and how AU's concerns in this respect would be fully ameliorated ultimately depends on the specific language that would be formulated when the draft resolution is resuscitated for discussion in the UNSC.

The other aspect for further engagement relates to sustaining ongoing efforts for refining and strengthening effective oversight, reporting, and financial transparency and accountability frameworks. The Consensus Paper states that 'the Revitalized Peace Fund responds to the challenges that previously hindered institutional engagement in attaining predictable and sustainable financing for peace and security activities.'⁷⁴ Recognizing the progress made in this respect, the Secretary-

consideration is whether the percentage of their contribution in supporting AU peace support operations through UN assessed contributions would be less than their contribution if such PSOs were to be supported through the European Peace Facility.

⁷³ See draft summary record of the 17th meeting of the PSC Committee of Experts.

⁷⁴ AU Consensus Paper, para 24.

General's report notes that '[t]he arrangements for financial accountability and transparency for peace support operations and the Peace Fund are captured in the revised Financial Rules of the African Union.'⁷⁵ Signifying the high-level of close working relationship, coordination and trust achieved between the AU and the UN as well as the intention for continuous engagement on this issue, the Secretary-General's report signals the commitment to reinforce AU's monitoring and reporting policies 'in order to provide the required budgeting, financial and performance reports to the General Assembly.'⁷⁶ One way of mitigating concerns around institutional capacity including for meeting the demands of the time-consuming budgeting and reporting process in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly is also for the Peace Fund Secretariat to be organized in such a way that it would have the personnel with experience for working with the UN Secretariat on the Fifth Committee processes.

One of the issues that some P3 members particularly the US have repeatedly raised was the need for a robust human rights compliance framework that meets the UN's human rights due diligence and conduct and discipline standards. Both the Consensus Paper and the SG's Report provide update on the progress made with respect to the updating, institutionalizing and operationalizing of AU's human rights, international humanitarian law (IHL) and conduct and discipline compliance framework for its peace support operations pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2320 (2016). They both present the various policy advances, operational guidelines, and institutional structures that the AU, often, working in concert with the UN and the ICRC, have both adopted and set the process of their implementation in motion. As the Secretary-General's report noted, echoing the Consensus Paper, '[s]ignificant progress has been made in designing and implementing an overarching compliance strategic framework and the promulgation of policies on selection and screening of personnel, protection of civilians, prevention of and response to sexual exploitation

and abuse.'⁷⁷ According to the Secretary-General, these all are also 'based on policies and practice in the United Nations peace operations.'⁷⁸ As the AU sustains the process to enhance the refinement, consolidation and implementation of its human rights, IHL and conduct discipline framework including within the framework of the tripartite AU-UN-EU partnership, it is critical to affirm the adequacy of the progress made to meet the expectations set under UNSC Resolution 2320 and secure the assent of such UNSC members as the US.

Finally, there is also the question of the type of peace support operation that is amendable for support from UN assessed contributions. In addition to the peace support operations for which the AU takes lead, the AU Consensus Paper proposes sub-regional peace support operations as candidates for benefiting from UN assessed contributions. While the Secretary-General's report does not completely close the door for such peace operations, it does not endorse it either. Indeed, the report, rightly, makes it clear that this model is fraught with major challenges. 'These include a lack of clarity on reporting and accountability to either the United Nations Security Council or the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the conceptual difficulties of providing support through operational and reimbursement frameworks designed for military and police contingents deployed outside their home countries and practical obstacles to the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy.'⁷⁹ As recent experiences of regional operations highlight, even when they are deployed outside their home countries, as is happening in Mozambique or in Eastern DRC, the missions are characterized by a) expediency, b) lack of firm grounding in the multilateral normative and policy frameworks developed and applied in practice in the various peace operations under AU's lead, and c), like those operating in their home countries, are organized and deployed mainly as extension and in pursuit of national security interests rather than collective security interests.

⁷⁵ Secretary-General's Report (April 2023) para 22.

⁷⁶ As above, para 33.

⁷⁷ As above, para 16.

⁷⁸ As above.

⁷⁹ As above, para 37.

VII NEXT STEPS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICAN POLICY ACTORS

A major lesson from the 2018 and 2019 failed efforts to secure a framework resolution from the UNSC on access to UN assessed contributions for AU peace support operations is the need for a well-planned and constantly coordinated process. With AU's Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General's 29 April Report, the next step towards the resumption of the process for negotiating the resolution is **the authorization by the PSC of the A3** to initiate the process for the consideration and adoption in the UNSC of the draft framework resolution on financing of AU peace support operations.

Both in Addis Ababa and in New York, there is also a need for ensuring that the AU Commission, members of the PSC, the A3 and the Africa Group have a shared understanding of the contents of both the Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General's Report and what these documents mean vis-à-vis the various issues that require intense negotiations.

Equally important is the need to create awareness and achieve a shared understanding on the issues and areas that are anticipated to be contentious or requiring negotiated compromise. In this respect, it is necessary that there is clarity on the margin of manoeuvre that the A3 have in engaging in negotiating the contents of the draft resolution such as with respect to burden sharing or cost effectiveness.⁸⁰ In the light of the 'breaking of ranks in December 2018 (with Côte d'Ivoire and Chairperson Faki supporting a compromise text despite strong opposition from the other A3 and PSC members),⁸¹ the other and related imperative is for the AU Commission, the A3 and the Africa Group to speak with one voice and maintain unity throughout the negotiation process. Similarly, to avoid the disappointment that led to a 'heated exchange' between 'the A3 and PSC representatives... in front of non- African

⁸⁰ For example, would it be acceptable in this context for the A3 to concede that UN assessed contributions may not cover reimbursements for Contingent Owned Equipment?

⁸¹ Crisis Group, *The Price of Peace*

counterparts over the PSC's decision not to support the new draft resolution⁸² in 2019, the PSC and the A3 need to maintain frequent and sustained coordination.⁸³ This is critical for ensuring coherent communication by the PSC, the AU Commission and the A3.⁸⁴

The foregoing necessitates that the relevant AU entities establish and maintain coordination arrangements dedicated for close consultation and coordination at all stages of the negotiation process on this resolution both in New York and Addis Ababa and between New York and Addis Ababa. This means that rather than being ad hoc as in the past such consultation process has to be systematic and hence a standing arrangement for the duration of the negotiation over the resolution. The onus for putting in place and ensuring that such consultation process operates efficiently is on the AU Commission with the AU Permanent Observer Mission to the UN serving as the hub for providing technical support to the A3 and coordinating with the AU Commission and the wider Africa Group in New York. It is also necessary that this arrangement keeps the members of the PSC regularly in the loop beyond and above the coordination between the PSC and the A3 as highlighted above.

Ghana, which convened some sessions in the UNSC relevant to the subject in the last year,⁸⁵ along with the AU Permanent Mission to the UN is in the process of finalizing a roadmap that outlines the various consultations expected to be undertaken by the A3. Under this roadmap, it is expected that the A3 would engage in extensive outreach and consultation. The first level of such engagement is expected to involve the wider Africa Group. Building on the Secretary-General's report, it would also involve close coordination with the UN Secretariat. It is also expected that this outreach and consultation would cover engagement with the P5 including the US (both in New York and Washington DC).⁸⁶

⁸² As above, 10

⁸³ Amani Africa, *Making Africa's voice matter*, 12-13.

⁸⁴ Amani Africa, *Making Africa's voice matter*, 15.

⁸⁵ Security Council Report, *Research report*.

⁸⁶ Amani Africa, *Making Africa's voice matter*.

The various consultations would understandably need to be organized in a way that addresses the specific areas of concern of various role players. Accordingly, the engagement may focus particularly on the strides the AU made in putting in place the requisite financial transparency and accountability mechanisms, human rights compliance and notably the comparative advantage of AU peace support operations both in cost saving and addressing current challenges. Within the UN, particularly on matters of compliance with UN financial requirements, the A3 are expected to engage the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. This would be done within the framework of the themes broached by the Secretary-General's report.

Considering that this is only a framework resolution that still leaves ultimate decision to the UNSC on whether or not UN assessed contributions are used in response to a specific situation, an issue that is deserving of attention in the A3 plan is the identification of items that should be included in the framework resolution and those other items that should be addressed in the resolution that the UNSC adopts when authorizing the use of assessed contributions for a particular AU led mission. This is critical if the use of assessed contributions is both to become more than an exception as is currently the case and meet the need for predictable and sustainable funding of AU peace support operations.

As pointed out in the foregoing section, continuing the enhancement of the institutional capacity of the AU Commission is also crucial. Considering the expected heightened demand that utilization of and reporting on UN assessed contributions put on AU's human resources capacity, this puts an expectation on the AU, building on its experiences of managing various peace support operations including AMISOM/ATMIS and working with the UN, to organize the Peace Fund Secretariat in such a way that it is able to meet these demands.

It is also worth noting that the issue of the use of UN assessed contribution for AU peace support operations is not just about the alignment of AU's technical, institutional and regulatory set up with

that of the requirements of the UN. It is also deeply political as well. This political dimension of the issue should inform the engagement of AU's policy actors. This fact means that the process requires and deserves high-level and sustained political attention and engagement by the leadership of the AU Commission and A3 members particularly Ghana at the highest levels.

VIII CONCLUSION

The policy quest towards securing the use of UN assessed contributions for AU peace support operations for meeting the demand for predictable and sustainable funding has been underway for nearly two decades. It has been a subject of major interest in the relationship between the AU and the UN since at least the mid 2000s. Over the years, it has acquired expanding strategic importance on account of the changing peace and security dynamics and the gaps in the international peace and security architecture. Since the last attempt at securing from the UNSC the framework resolution on use of UN assessed contributions for AU-led peace support operations in 2019, engagements both at the level of the AU,⁸⁷ between the AU and the UN⁸⁸ and indeed within the UNSC⁸⁹ have contributed to making significant advances towards meeting the expectations set in the relevant UNSC resolutions that set the parameters for the adoption of the framework resolution. The progress made is of such a nature that has both significantly narrowed down the differences of opinion and matured the issue for a new consideration by the UNSC.

Although the Consensus Paper did not make any reference to what an AU Official termed recently the various unaccounted costs that AU member

⁸⁷ *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the African Union-United Nations Partnership: The need for greater coherence, submitted to the 397th session of the PSC, (23 September 2013); AU Consensus Paper.*

⁸⁸ *Secretary-General's Report (April 2023).*

⁸⁹ *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the African Union-United Nations Partnership: The need for greater coherence, submitted to the 397th session of the PSC, (23 September 2013); Security Council Report, Research Report (April 2023).*

states absorb when deploying for peace support operations, providing clarity on such costs as part of this process may also prove necessary and useful. Among others, this brings to the centre of attention an important element not canvassed in the Consensus Paper and in the discussion on AU's comparative advantages.⁹⁰ This is the enormous price that AU personnel pay with their lives and limbs and the resultant financial, social and other costs to the families, communities and institutions that these personnel are part of. In some ways, it is quite odd that the commitment under international law and the AU norms for the sanctity of human lives has not led to according more attention and space in policy discussions to the price that personnel of AU missions pay with their lives and limbs in the service of international peace and security. Apart from the nature of the difficulties that the nature of the peace and security issues poses for the deployment of UN peacekeepers that necessitates the resort to AU peace operations that deploy fast and engage in peace enforcement,⁹¹ **a key aspect of AU's comparative advantage** is that AU member states have shown much more willingness to sustain casualties than other troop and police contributors to UN peacekeeping.

On cost effectiveness and burden sharing, while the Consensus Paper, along with the Secretary-General's Report, has provided the basis for taking these issues forward through the clarification provided on both burden sharing and the comparative advantage of AU led peace support operations vis-à-vis UN peacekeeping, the negotiating positions of the A3 may need to identify areas for further engagement or negotiated compromise, along the lines stated above.

With respect to the model of financing, while there seems to be inclination for the 'AMISOM/ATMIS plus' model, it may be wise for the framework resolution to allow the UNSC to have the option of choosing from the two models outlined in the Secretary-

⁹⁰ This omission may come from a values-based aversion to including the human dimension of the cost of peace support operations.

⁹¹ As the UN Secretary-General's report noted, these AU peace operations engage in 'kinetic tasks beyond those undertaken by United Nations Peacekeeping', (April 2023) para 16.

General's report. Such flexibility will ensure that the choice would be informed by the exigencies of the particular context and as such allow a peace support operation and financing model tailored to the specific situation.

On the issue of oversight and command and control as well as reporting, it is very likely that the UN and the AU would reach at an agreement with respect to peace support operations that the AU itself leads and implements. However, the same may not be said with respect to peace support operations that are initiated and implemented by sub-regional arrangements such as the G5 Sahel. Given the issues that such operations also raise for the cohesion of the African Peace and Security Architecture, the AU may and is expected to avoid (as part of necessary compromise for securing the resolution) the lack of support in the UNSC to allow assessed contributions for such sub-regional missions from becoming deal breaker.

While the adequacy of the contribution of the various developments discussed in the foregoing parts for the adoption of the resolution will be tested during the negotiations in the UNSC, it is worth noting that the success of securing the resolution is not a function merely of the degree of progress made in meeting expected technical and institutional benchmarks. This is a matter also of, first and foremost, politics. Indeed, the Secretary-General pointed out in his report that 'the decision to take forward sustainable financing and expand the scope of mission support for African Union peace support operations is political.'⁹² The coming months will indicate whether there is sufficient political will on the part of the P5 for taking the penultimate step of adopting the long pending framework resolution and demonstrate 'readiness to address a critical gap in the international peace and security architecture'.

⁹² Secretary-General's Report (April 2023) para 43.

Annex-I

PSC Sessions on Financing Peace and Security Activities and AUPSOs					
Date	Session	Level	Outcome	Relevant Report	Key Outcomes
13-Mar-09	178th	Ambassadorial	Communiqué	-	In its session dedicated to exchange of views with respect to modalities for supporting AU PSOs, the PSC emphasised the 'need to address, in a more comprehensive and effective way, the issue of predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for AU-led peace support operations'.
09-Jan-12	307th	Ambassadorial	Communiqué	AUC Chair Report	Considering the partnership between AU and UN on peace and security, the PSC called on the UN 'to address in a systematic manner the issue of the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of the funding of AU peace support operations undertaken with the consent of the Security Council, through the use of UN assessed contributions'.
23-Sep-13	397th	Summit	Communiqué	AUC Chair Report	The PSC highlighted the need to devise innovative approaches to address complex challenges to peace and security on the African continent and reiterated its call for the UN to 'address in a systematic manner the issue of the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of the funding of AU-led peace support operations undertaken with the consent of the Security Council, through the use of assessed contributions, bearing in mind, that, in undertaking peace support operations, the AU is contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security in a manner consistent with the provisions of Chapter VIII on the UN Charter'.

26-Sep-15	547th	Summit	Communiqué	<p>Considering partnership between the AU and UN, in particular with regard to the funding of AU-led PSOs, the PSC reiterated the AU Assembly's decision of its 8th Ordinary Session [Assembly/AU/Dec.145(VIII)] which 'recalled the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, called upon the UN to examine, within the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter, the possibility of funding, through assessed contributions, peacekeeping operations undertaken by the AU, or under its authority, with the consent of the UN'.</p>
14-Mar-16	582nd	Ambassadorial	Press Statement	<p>The PSC received briefing by the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund, on consultations made with key partners regarding AU's proposals that AU-led PSOs be financed from UN assessed contributions. The imperative for 'Member States to enhance ownership of the budget of the Union by financing 100% of the operating budget, 75% of the programme budget, and 25% of the peace and security budget' was emphasised and the PSC also called on the UN to 'respond positively to its call for financing of AU-led peace support operations from UN assessed contributions, and urged African members of the UN Security Council to promote this agenda vigorously'.</p>

05-Sep-16	621st	<u>Ambassadorial</u>	Press Statement		The AU High Representative for the AU Peace Fund briefed the PSC on the implementation of the Assembly decision of its 27th Ordinary Session [Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII)] on Financing the AU, including through the Peace Fund.
29-Sep-16	628th	<u>Ambassadorial</u>	Communiqué		Within the framework of its session addressing AU-UN Partnership on peace and security issues in Africa, the PSC reiterated its appeal to the UN for the use of 'UN assessed contributions in support of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs), as recommended in the Report of the UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) which called on the UN to consider providing support from UN assessed contributions, on a case-by-case basis, for those AU PSOs authorized by the UN Security Council'.
<u>30-May-17</u>	689th	Ambassadorial	Communiqué		In its decision adopted on the AU Peace Fund and partnership between AU and UN on peace and security, the PSC recalled the modalities proposed by the Chairperson of the AUC at PSC's 547th meeting, regarding an African Common Position on provision of UN assessed contributions to AU mandated or authorised PSOs. Having recalled the proposal, the PSC agreed the proposed arrangements, among other points, need to be predicated upon 'enhanced strategic partnership with the UN, including the development of a framework outlining the steps necessary to activate authorization by the UN Security Council of AU-led missions to be supported by UN assessed contributions'.

02-May-18	770th	Ambassadorial	Communiqué		Receiving a briefing on implementation of the AU Assembly's decision relating to the AU Peace Fund (Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII) of the 27th Ordinary Session), the PSC appealed to the African members of the UNSC 'to continue spearheading the African Common Position on predictable and sustainable financing through UN assessed contributions for AU mandated/authorized peace support operations with specific financing decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis'.
03-Dec-18	814th	Ambassadorial	Press Statement		The PSC received briefing from the African members of the UNSC on the preparation for the draft UN resolution on 'cooperation between the United Nations (UN) and sub-regional organizations: the role of states, regional arrangement and United Nations in the prevention of conflicts'. The PSC reiterated its request for the UNSC 'to take practical steps towards the adoption of a substantive resolution that establishes the principle that AU mandated or authorized PSOs authorized by the UN Security Council should be financed through UN assessed contributions'.
22-May-19	851st	Ambassadorial	NO OUTCOME DOCUMENT	AUC Chair Report	Session was convened to consider the report of the AUC Chairperson on challenges faced by AU-led PSOs. No publicly available outcome document was issued. Amani Africa's insight produced on the session provides some highlights.
18-Mar-21	986th	Ambassadorial	Communiqué		-

21-Jul-21	1011th	Ambassadorial	NO OUTCOME DOCUMENT		Session was convened on “Update on the Common African Position on Financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations through UN Assessed Contributions”. There was no publicly available outcome document issued. Amani Africa’s insight produced on the session presents some highlights.
05-Oct-21	1036th	Ambassadorial	NO OUTCOME DOCUMENT		Session convened on “Strategic Priorities for the utilization of the AU Peace Fund and the consideration of the Zero Draft African Consensus Paper on the Financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations using UN assessed contributions”. No publicly available outcome document adopted for the session. Amani Africa’s insight produced on the meeting presents some highlights.
14-Sep-22	1105th	Ambassadorial	NO OUTCOME DOCUMENT		Session held on Updates on the AU Peace Fund. No publicly available outcome document was issued. Amani Africa’s insight on the session provides some highlights.
PSC Country/Region Specific Sessions with Decisions Relevant to Financing AUPSOs					
27-Jul-04	13th	Ambassadorial	Communiqué		Within the context of efforts deployed to resolve the conflict in Darfur, the PSC called on the UNSC and AU partners to continue supporting these efforts, ‘including financial and logistical assistance to sustain the AU-led mission deployed in Darfur and to enhance its effectiveness’.
03-Jul-05	34th	Ministerial	Communiqué		Addressing the situation in Darfur and operation of AMIS, the PSC appealed to AU Partners to ‘provide the much-needed additional financial resources in order to make up for the gap in the funding of AMIS operations’.
15-Oct-10	245th	Ministerial	Communiqué		In the context of its session on Somalia and AMISOM, the PSC called on the UNSC to authorise ‘an enhanced support package for AMISOM, funded through UN assessed contributions’.

13-Nov-12	341st	Ambassadorial	Communiqué		Within the context of financing challenges the AU was facing in its mission to Mali, the PSC made the decision for the convening of a pledging conference aimed at mobilising support to the mission.
25-Jan-13	353rd	Summit	Communiqué		In the context of financial challenges faced with AU's mission in Mali at the time (AFISMA), the PSC drew attention to the need for establishment of a support package funded by UN-assessed contributions.
08-Mar-22	1068th	Ambassadorial	Communiqué		Within the context of its meeting on AMISOM's transition to ATMIS, the PSC emphasised the importance of sustainable and predictable financing and appealed 'to the UN, European Union and other partners to establish a financial support package, including through UN assessed contributions, taking into consideration the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security'.
12-Apr-22	1075th	Ambassadorial	Communiqué		In a session dedicated to 'Predictable, Adequate and Sustainable Financing for ATMIS', the PSC urged the UNSC, 'taking into consideration its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to authorize the use of the UN assessed contributions for ATMIS'.
27-Jul-22	1094th	Ministerial	Communiqué		Noting funding challenges facing ATMIS, including the lack of adequate, predictable and sustainable financing, the PSC stressed the urgent need to provide the necessary financial support for ATMIS, including through the use of UN assessed contributions and the AU Peace Fund.
10-Oct-22	1112th	Ambassadorial	Communiqué		The PSC reiterated its appeal to the UNSC for ATMIS to be financed through UN assessed contributions.

<u>11-Nov-22</u>	1121st	Ambassadorial	Communiqué		In the context of its meeting on situation in Somalia and operation of ATMIS, the PSC reiterated the urgent need for 'the UN Security Council to positively consider authorizing access to UN assessed contributions for AU Peace Support Operations including ATMIS, in order to guarantee predictable, flexible, adequate and sustainable funding for AU Peace Support Operations'.
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Annex-2

Assembly Decisions on Financing Peace and Security Activities				
Year	Session	Outcome	Relevant Decision	
Jan-07	8th Ordinary Session	Assembly/Dec.145 (VIII)	Assembly urged 'the African Members of the Security Council to take the required initiatives for the early adoption, by the United Nations, of the necessary decisions on the funding of the peace support operation in Darfur through assessed contributions'.	
<u>Jan-11</u>	16th Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU/Dec. 338 (XVI)	The Assembly encouraged the Chairperson of the Commission to prepare and submit to the PSC a report on AU's strategic vision of the cooperation between the AU and UN, on matters related to peace and security.	
Jan-15	24th Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU/Dec.561(XXIV)	Decision relating to determination of an appropriate scale of assessment for contribution, including Member States', to fund PSOs budget at 25%.	
Jun-15	25th Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU/Dec.578(XXV)	Decision to implement the outcome of the 24 th Ordinary Session of the Assembly (Assembly/AU/Dec.561(XXIV)) on Alternative Sources of Funding where Member States finance 25% of Peace and Security Budget, effective from January 2016 to be phased incrementally over a five-year period.	
<u>Jan-16</u>	26th Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU/Dec.588-604(XXVI)	Decision related to scale of assessment and implementation of alternative sources of financing the AU.	

Jul-16	27th Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII)	Decisions relating to the AU Peace Fund, including request for the Chairperson of the Commission to undertake consultations with the UN Secretary General, the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council and other relevant partners, on the envisaged funding arrangements for the provision of the UN assessed contributions for AU-led peace operations.
Jan-17	28th Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU/Dec.621- 641(XXVIII)	Appeal of the AU Assembly to the UN Security Council for the use of UN assessed contributions in support to AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs).
Jul-17	29th Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU//Dec.642-664(XXIX) Rev.1	The Assembly requested the AU Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) to assess and make the appropriate recommendations to the Executive Council with the objective to 'fund 100% of the Operational Budget, 75% of the Program Budget and 25% of the Peace Support Operations by 2020'. In relation to the AU Peace Fund, the Assembly endorsed the communiqué of the 689 th meeting of the PSC, in particular the 'governance structures and eligibility criteria of the Peace Fund, taking into consideration representation of AU Member States in the governing structures of the Peace Fund, based on regional representation, and the modalities to implement it, in addition to the operating costs of the Fund'. The Assembly also endorsed 'the scope of operations to be submitted, on a case by case basis, for authorization by the UN Security Council and subsequent financing through UN assessed contributions'.
Jan-18	30th Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU/Dec.687(XXX)	The assembly encouraged all Member States to continue deploying efforts towards the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund.
Jul-18	31st Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU /Dec.690-712(XXXI)	All Member States encouraged to continue deploying efforts towards the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund and called on the UN for AMISOM and Somali Security Forces to be funded predictably and sustainably from the UN assessed contributions.

Feb-19	32nd Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU/Dec.713-748(XXXII)	The Assembly took note of and paid tribute to Ethiopia for 'its invaluable contribution, in particular, with regard to efforts aimed at advancing the AU position on the Financing of African Peace and Security Agenda through predictable and sustainable funding to be secured from UN assessed contributions'.
Feb-20	33rd Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU/Dec.749-795(XXXIII)	Assembly decided that the target for the collection of the \$400m in Member State contributions to the AU Peace Fund be extended by twenty four (24) months for full endowment of the Peace Fund by 2023.
Feb-21	34th Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU/Dec.802(XXXIV)	Decision relating to scale of assessment and contributions to the Union's regular budget, including contributions to the AU Peace Fund.
Feb-22	35th Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU/Dec. 838(XXXV)	Assembly took note of efforts made towards the 'pilot utilization of the AU Peace Fund in 2022 through costed and prioritized programmatic activities to address urgent peace and security challenges on the Continent'.
Feb-23	36th Ordinary Session	Assembly/AU /Dec. 839-865(XXXVI)	Appeal made by the Assembly to the UN Security Council for 'access to UN-assessed contributions (additional to the UN Logistics Support Package facilitated by the UN Support Office to Somalia- UNSOS) to fund ATMIS and other AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs)'. The Assembly further 'firmly renewed its call for the AU to be urgently granted access to the UN-assessed contributions based on the guiding principles of the UN Charter as the most assured means of achieving effective and sustainable financing of AU peace and security activities; and approved the immediate use of the AU Peace Fund and its Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), specifically to support the deployment and operations of the EAC Regional Force and to fill the financial gap in ATMIS'.



MEDIA AND RESEARCH SERVICES


ABOUT AMANI AFRICA

Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research, training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

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