

# MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE MONTH AT A GLANCE.....1

ANOTHER YEAR OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN PSC AND EUPSC ENDED WITHOUT JOINT COMMUNIQUE .....1

THE PSC REJECTS ANY FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD IN CHAD.....2

PSC AUTHORIZED THE A3 TO RESUME CONSULTATIONS WITH STAKEHOLDERS  
TOWARDS THE ADOPTION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON FINANCING AU-LED PSOS.....4

AFRICAN FIRST LADIES AS CHAMPIONS OF PEACE?.....5

PSC WARNED PERPETRATORS OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE  
AMID WIDESPREAD LOOTING AND DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN SUDAN.....6

FOOD INSECURITY DID NOT RECEIVE ADEQUATE ATTENTION  
AT PSC’S MEETING ON HUMANITARIAN ACTION .....7

PSC ADOPTED THE AU ROADMAP FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN SUDAN  
WITHOUT A STRUCTURE THAT IS FULLY DEDICATED TO THE SUDAN FILE .....8

# MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL – MAY 2023

## THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In May, Uganda chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). In total, the PSC held seven meetings. For the first time, the PSC also held an informal engagement with the Chairperson of the AU, President Azali Assoumani of the Comoros. In early May, the PSC held the annual consultative meeting with its European Union (EU) counterpart, the European Political and Security Committee (EU PSC).

Two of the sessions were held at the Heads of State and Government and Ministerial levels. All other sessions were held at Ambassadorial level.

Three of the sessions addressed country specific situations while the remaining four were committed to thematic agenda items. One of the sessions envisaged in the [Programme of Work](#), a review of the AU Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA), was postponed due to scheduling issues. It is worth noting that this is the third time the PSC postponed the planned meeting on CSVRA assessment.<sup>1</sup>

The outcomes of four sessions were adopted in the form of communiqués, while two were adopted as press statements. PSC's engagement with the Chairperson of the AU was produced as a [Press](#)

<sup>1</sup> *The agenda – Consideration of the status report on the Implementation of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF) - CSVRA and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS) – formed part of PSC's monthly programme of work for the months of September 2022 and March 2023. Having been postponed from these two months, it was tabled to be considered in May 2023 although it has once again been rescheduled. Despite various factors that may have impeded the PSC from successfully conducting the session as planned including the need for prioritising certain agenda items, the review of the CSCPF and a close follow up of the activities undertaken through its two pillars (the CSVRA and CSVMS) remains critical as it could enable the PSC to play a more active preventive role towards averting the breakout of violent conflicts in the continent.*

[Release](#) of the AU Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Similar to 2022, no outcome document was adopted for PSC's annual consultative meeting with the EUPSC. On average, it took 6 days for the release of outcome documents.

Although no session was conducted on the theme, a [Press Release](#) of the Chairperson of the PSC for May was also adopted on Commemoration of the International Day of Living Together in Peace, noted annually on 16 May.<sup>2</sup>

## ANOTHER YEAR OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN PSC AND EUPSC ENDED WITHOUT JOINT COMMUNIQUE

The first activity undertaken by the PSC during May was the convening of the 14<sup>th</sup> annual consultative meeting with the EUPSC on 03 May, which was preceded by the 6<sup>th</sup> joint informal retreat held on 02 May. Both meetings took place in Brussels, Belgium.

Similar to the previous year, the 14<sup>th</sup> consultative meeting between the two counterparts was marked with absence of agreement regarding the inclusion of language on the war in Ukraine. On the part of AU states members to the PSC, there is a clear discomfort on the inclusion of such language in the outcome document or for that matter, tabling the issue as part of the agenda items for either the joint informal retreat or the formal consultative meeting, given their stand that the subject is beyond the PSC's mandate. More generally, although discussions were held in AU policy organs on the impact of the war in Ukraine in relation to issues such as food security, no common position is adopted on the policy posture towards the war in general. Member states of not just the PSC but the AU broadly tend to approach this war individually. On the side of EUPSC, there is interest to see some form of reference reflected in the outcome document, signalling AU's recognition of concerns raised by the EU regarding the situation in Ukraine. Apparently, the lack of convergence on this matter meant that,

<sup>2</sup> *It is to be recalled that at its 89<sup>th</sup> session convened in November 2019, the PSC decided to convene an annual meeting dedicated to the theme but there hasn't been a strict implementation of this decision on the convening of the session.*

as in 2022, the two sides were unable to issue joint communique.

The two agenda items that were discussed at the joint informal retreat were financing of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and global consequences of geopolitical developments. On the side of the AU, Namibia took the lead on the issue of Financing AU PSOs, including through UN-assessed contributions. Within the framework of discussions on geopolitical developments and their global consequences – an agenda item with respect to which Ghana took the lead on AU's side – EU counterparts raised their concerns regarding the war in Ukraine and its implications to wider global peace and security trends. Although the increasing challenges faced in today's multilateralism, particularly as it relates to the maintenance of peace and security, was a factor both AU and EU sides could agree on, representatives from the side of the AU PSC maintained their position that it is beyond their mandate to discuss and comment on the situation in Ukraine.

At the consultative meeting, three region specific situations were discussed. These were situations in the Horn of Africa, in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin (LCB), as well as the Great Lakes Region (GLR). With regards to the Horn of Africa, the two counterparts mainly reflected on the progress and challenges of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the overall situation in Somalia as well as the status of the peace process in Ethiopia, particularly the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. On the Sahel and LCB region, the main focus was on the continuous spike in terrorist activities and governance challenges that compound existing insecurity. The meeting specifically served to reflect on the grave humanitarian impact of political instability and insecurity in the Sahel and LCB region. With respect to the GLR, the focus was on the conflict in eastern DRC between the March 23 Movement (M23) and the Armed Forces of DRC (FARDC).

## THE PSC REJECTS ANY FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD IN CHAD

On 11 May 2023, the PSC held its 1152<sup>nd</sup> session to consider the report prepared by the Panel of the Wise on its mission to Chad. The Chair of the Panel of the Wise, Domitien Ndayizeye briefed the PSC on the outcomes of the mission.

The session was held following PSC's [Press statement](#) in November 2022 in which it tasked the Panel of the Wise 'to gather first-hand information, in consultation with all relevant stakeholders on the ground and brief the Council' and it also decided to hold a dedicated session on the situation in Chad. Within the framework of this decision, the Panel of the Wise conducted a mission to Chad from 12-18 March 2023.

After receiving the briefing from the Chair of the Panel and considering the report, the PSC adopted as outcome, a [Communique](#). Not surprisingly, on the question of the extension of the timeline of the transition, the PSC opted for taking note of the extension of the transition period but rejected any further postponement. Other than manifesting diplomatic censure, the material import of this rejection remains doubtful.



Source: @AUC\_PAPS

### Briefing by the Panel of the Wise, 1152<sup>nd</sup> PSC Meeting, 11 May 2023

Of particular policy significance from the decision of the PSC is its reaffirmation of its decision on the non-eligibility of members of the Transitional Military Council (TMC), including its head and president of the transition, Mahamat Debi. This signifies the intention of the PSC to maintain suspension on the table. It will

remain to be seen whether the PSC will follow through on this policy posture for applying suspension if Debi, under the authority of the outcome of the October 2022 national dialogue, stands for election at the end of the transition period.

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The PSC reiterated its rejection of any form of unconstitutional changes of government, including constitutional manipulation. On the transition process, the PSC implies that it remains inadequate and it thus 'emphasizes that need for continued dialogue and mediation processes in Chad, particularly amongst all the political parties and politico-military groups with a view to amicably resolving their differences.' It is worth noting that the PSC also calls of the transition authorities in Chad to respect the human rights of the Chadians and ensure that all perpetrators of human rights violations are brought to justice. The PSC also continues to be concerned about the tardiness of the investigation into the death of former President Debi, hence calls for the speeding up of the investigation.

Curiously, the PSC urged for enhancing the implementation of the outcome of the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue that was concluded on 8 October 2022, which actually adopted a decision that is in direct breach of applicable AU norm and clear decision of the PSC on ineligibility of members of the TMC.

The PSC also made reference to the two regional conferences that were held in Kinshasa and the last one in Yaoundé. The 15th Conference of Heads of State of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) held in Yaoundé, recognized Chad's extended transition and there was expectation by some PSC members to have a similar decision by the PSC in the context of the principle of subsidiarity. The PSC however decided, rightly, to only take note of the outcome. The principle of subsidiarity does not necessitate that the PSC operates to rubber stamp whatever decision taken by RECs/RMs. The mandate entrusted to the PSC under the Protocol establishing it requires that the PSC takes responsibility for its action and can endorse only those decisions of RECs/RMs that are consistent with the principles enshrined

in PSC Protocol and related AU policy and normative instruments.

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During the session, the PSC requested the AUC to provide support to the transition process in Chad through the AU led Support Mechanism. The last time the PSC discussed the AU led Support Mechanism was at its 1016<sup>th</sup> session in August 2021 and so far, there hasn't been any update on the work of the Mechanism. While the PSC underscores the critical leadership of the AU in mediating between various Chadian actors, it remains unclear if AU is actually engaged in mediation in Chad beyond the ad hoc political accompaniment it has been providing.

The PSC expressed concern over the humanitarian situation and called for a more robust support and assistance to the increased humanitarian needs in the country which has been further exacerbated due to the conflict in Sudan.

### Relevant previous PSC decisions:

996<sup>th</sup> session [[PSC/BR/COMM.\(CMXCVI\)](#)]: the PSC urged the Chairman and members of the TMC not to contest or take part in the national elections towards democratic rule and emphasised that the military will be held fully accountable in this respect.

1106<sup>th</sup> session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1106 \(2022\)](#)]: the PSC reiterated that members of the TMC 'shall be ineligible to participate as candidates for the elections at the end of the transition'.

### Key actionable decisions requiring follow up:

The PSC called on the Transition Authorities:

- To provide a clear roadmap with specific time-lines for the second phase of the transition process in Chad
- To promptly finalize the official investigation into the assassination of former President Idriss Deby

## PSC AUTHORIZED THE A3 TO RESUME CONSULTATIONS WITH STAKEHOLDERS TOWARDS THE ADOPTION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON FINANCING AU-LED PSOS

On 12 May, during its 1153<sup>rd</sup> session, the PSC met at the ministerial level to discuss the issue of financing AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs), one of the longstanding issues in the AU-UN relationships. Uganda's Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chair of the PSC for the month, Jeje Abubakhar Odongo, presided over the session. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia and Head of AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), Mohammed El-Amine Souef, as well as the representatives of the UN and EU were the speakers during the session.

One cannot help but notice the absence of the African Members in the UN Security Council (A3) and the AU Mission to the UN – key players on the file of financing AU-led PSOs - from this meeting. The session was an opportunity for both the PSC and the A3 as well as AU Mission to the UN to discuss and strategize approaches in pursuit of the adoption of a UN Security Council (UNSC) that authorizes the use of UN assessed contributions for AU-led PSOs on a case-by-case basis.

Three major outcomes can be identified from the [communiqué](#) adopted at the session. The first is PSC's request of the A3 to 'resume consultations with the relevant stakeholders towards the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution on financing AU-led PSOs'. This will set the negotiation process towards the adoption of UNSC resolution in motion, a process that was put on hold after the request of the PSC to suspend the negotiation over the draft resolution put forward by South Africa. (See Amani Africa's [special research report](#) for more details on the subject). Ghana, as a country having concurrent membership in the PSC and UNSC, is currently spearheading the process of holding extensive consultations with wide range of stakeholders that would pave the way for tabling a draft UNSC resolution, possibly in August during the Presidency of the US.

However, if this resumption of negotiations is to succeed, it requires AU's strong leadership for seizing the new window of opportunities both by ensuring close and regular coordination with the A3 and by articulating the scope for negotiating on the issues that require further clarification.



'We would like to propose that at its core the subject of this session [financing AU-led PSOs through UN assessed contribution] is not about money. Rather, it is first and foremost about the kind of arrangement that can best deliver on the pledge of the UN Charter of 'saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war' at a time when existing arrangements and tools for delivering on this promise have been found wanting.'

*Amani Africa's statement  
to the 25<sup>th</sup> UNSC meeting*

The second key outcome of 1153<sup>rd</sup> session is PSC's decision to increase the ceiling of the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) from \$5 million to \$10 million for 2023 and 2024 to ensure a timely and effective response to emergency peace and security issues in Africa. In addition to this, the PSC also requested the AUC to use the Peace Fund to fill the current financial gap in the ATMIS 2022 to 2024 budget. Yet, it is not clear how this increase can apply for 2023 considering that such increase has not been adopted following the applicable financial rules and decision-making processes during the decision-making cycle for 2023. AU PSC's decision to increase CRF's ceiling and to use the Peace Fund for filling the shortfalls of ATMIS are clear steps signaling AU's commitment for financial burden sharing, which has been one of the sticking points in the negotiation process for the adoption of UNSC resolution on financing AU-led PSOs.

The third key outcome is PSC's request of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, in consultation with the Chair of the AU, to nominate an AU Champion Leader to mobilize resources for peace and security activities. Although it is a standard practice for the AU to appoint Champion Leaders for its key initiatives and flagship projects, its contribution cannot be underestimated as the leadership role played by South Africa's president in shaping Africa's response to the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic could attest.

However, the PSC missed an opportunity for welcoming the UN Secretary-General's report which makes a solid case for the use of UN assessed contributions for AU-led PSOs. This is more so the case considering that this report was developed in close consultation with the AU and carried much of the contributions of the AU.

### Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC requested the AUC to:

- Submit the decision to increase the ceiling of the Crisis Reserve Facility as well as the decision to use the AU Peace Fund to fill the current financial gap in the ATMIS to the relevant AU Policy Organs for consideration.
- Expedite the establishment of the Peace Fund Secretariat, including its governance structure.
- develop, in collaboration with the UN, the modalities for enhanced AU-UN joint work, including collaborative planning and mandating processes which provide a standardized mechanism through which the AU and the sub-regional configurations can collaboratively assess and more effectively respond to crisis situations, as well as access financial support from the UN Assessed Contributions on a case-by-case basis.

## AFRICAN FIRST LADIES AS CHAMPIONS OF PEACE?

On 16 May, one of the agenda items the PSC considered at its 1154<sup>th</sup> session was a briefing on the activities of the African First Ladies Peace Mission (AFLPM). Delivered to the PSC for the first time, the briefing was made by Aisha M. Buhari, First Lady of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and President of

AFLPM. Statement was also delivered on behalf of the incoming Chairperson of the AFLPM, Angeline Ndayishimiye, First Lady of the Republic of Burundi.

Despite the length of years since its establishment – having been launched in 1997 with the core mandate of contributing to peace efforts throughout Africa – AFLPM has been dormant. The outcome of the 1154<sup>th</sup> PSC session, which was adopted as a [Communiqué](#), did manage to highlight some of the important ways through which the mission could meaningfully contribute to peace and security efforts.

One of the key approaches indicated in this respect is the promotion of women's participation and representation in decision-making processes related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. However, it would have been most fitting to see concrete ways reflected in the outcome document, on how the AFLPM could promote and provide leverage to the relevant AU mechanisms such as Fem Wise and the Office of the AU Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security (WPS), a component that is missing from the Communiqué.



Source: @AUC\_PAPS

### Briefing by the African First Ladies Peace Mission (AFLPM), 1154<sup>th</sup> PSC Meeting, 16 May 2023

Considering the many pressing issues of peace and security, it is unfathomable how the PSC found it fitting to spend its limited diplomatic resources to prop up an organization whose status and relevance remain little known.

As expounded in Amani Africa's [insight](#) on the agenda, the absence of sufficient clarity regarding the legal status as well as operational methods of the AFLPM mean that the effort of the PSC may end up being in vein. In addition, there is also the sensitivities that may arise from its members' political proximity to power. Resource constraints, in terms of both technical expertise and financial sources form another area of challenge that confronts the AFLPM.

Given the fact that the AU Commission is already lacking the requisite capacity and resources to deliver on the core mandate of supporting the implementation of the decisions of the PSC with respect to conflict files, it would not be surprising if the PSC's request for the AU Commission to provide necessary support to the AFLPM, a body that does not have any statutory standing in the AU and from all indications seem to be an NGO, does not get followed up. Having regard to the fact that the AFLPM falls outside of the structure of the AU and taking into account constraints faced in supporting the effective functioning of various AU missions and offices across the continent, it is difficult to contemplate this request as encumbering the AU Commission with responsibility that goes beyond collaboration with the AFLPM as the AU Commission collaborates with other non-state entities.

Another question as critical as the first one is whether the intended dedication of yearly briefings of the AFLPM is in tune with the PSC's already somewhat crowded annual indicative programmes as well as its pre-existing framework of engagement with relevant stakeholders. While the exact legal status of the mission seems a bit illusive, it would avoid multiplicity of meetings if the engagement was to take place within the overall framework of the recently inaugurated PSC's annual consultative meeting with CSOs.


### Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

- The PSC requested the AU Commission to facilitate annual briefings by the AFLPM.
- The PSC requested the AU Commission 'to provide the necessary support towards the effective implementation of the mandate of AFLPM'.

## PSC WARNED PERPETRATORS OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE AMID WIDESPREAD LOOTING AND DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN SUDAN

The situation in Sudan was the other agenda item considered by the PSC during its 1154<sup>th</sup> session on 16 May. The briefing on Sudan seems to be added to the agenda of the 1154<sup>th</sup> session more as a reflection of PSC's concern with the deteriorating situation than as an attempt for taking more action than it did not only because the item was not envisaged within PSC's program of work but also the outcome document, released as [press statement](#), is largely a rehash of previous pronouncements.

The press statement reiterated its condemnation of the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and its demand for immediate, unconditional, and comprehensive ceasefire. It also reiterated the imperative of enhanced collaboration and complementarity of efforts in the Sudan peace process by the international community under the umbrella of the Expanded Mechanism (for detail on this mechanism, see below the part on PSC's 1156<sup>th</sup> session).



Members of the Expanded Mechanism



In light of the widespread looting and destruction of civilian infrastructure as well as diplomatic missions being witnessed during the ongoing fighting, the PSC warned that 'all perpetrators of criminal actions will be held accountable'.

The PSC also commended the efforts of the AUC, particularly the support provided by the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa-CDC) and the PRC Subcommittee on Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons, which provided an amount of \$3 million and \$650,000 respectively to mitigate the suffering of the Sudanese population, although details on the mechanics of the actual delivery of the assistance are lacking.

## FOOD INSECURITY DID NOT RECEIVE ADEQUATE ATTENTION AT PSC'S MEETING ON HUMANITARIAN ACTION

The 1155<sup>th</sup> PSC session was held on 18 May, as an open meeting dedicated to the theme 'Humanitarian Action in Africa'. While various stakeholders attended the open session, invited briefers that made presentation were AU Director for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, Professor Julio Rakotonirina; Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), Parfait Onanga Anyanga; and World Food Programme (WFP).

Although the main area of focus for the 1155<sup>th</sup> meeting was the increasing rate of food insecurity in Africa, the issue was not sufficiently reflected in the outcome of the session, adopted in the form of a [Press Statement](#). It is in fact interesting and curious to note that the term 'food insecurity' was mentioned nowhere in the Press Statement. In the only paragraph that directly addressed concerns related to this issue, the PSC emphasised the need for 'redoubling investments in mechanized agriculture, with a view to boosting food self-sufficiency on the Continent and reducing the risks and vulnerabilities associated with dependency on external sources of food'.

The session instead focused on broader humanitarian issues. In this respect, it highlighted the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the 'dwindling resources' for humanitarian action.


In light of its intended focus on food insecurity, the session could have served to follow up on the status of implementation of some of the concrete decisions from PSC's earlier engagement on the topic.

### Relevant previous PSC decisions:

1083<sup>rd</sup> session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1083 \(2022\)](#)]: in view of the increasing food insecurity and also the link between violent conflicts and shortage of food in Africa, the PSC requested the AU Commission to:

- 'Undertake a study and propose to Member States recommendation on the strategies to boost food production in Africa and submits to the PSC for consideration';
- 'strengthen the linkage between humanitarian assistance, development and peacebuilding, with a view to enhance greater cooperation and coordination between actors in humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peacebuilding'; and
- 'in close collaboration with the relevant regional centres on climate change, agriculture, food security to regular brief the Council on the matter.'

The outcome document of the 1155<sup>th</sup> session interestingly specified particular country and regional situations facing the gravest humanitarian crises in the continent. Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Somalia and Sudan were the countries identified. The Horn of Africa and the Sahel were however identified in addition to the Lake Chad Basin and the Southern Africa, in the context of regions experiencing grave humanitarian situations. Yet, no mention was made of the countries with populations facing severe hunger.



Source: UN OCHA

### People in need of assistance in countries worst affected by food security crisis, 2021 to 2023

Attesting to the increasing contribution of governance issues that lead to violent conflicts which consequently predominantly account for humanitarian suffering in Africa, the PSC identified unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) among the man-made factors that contribute to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the continent.

Another key element of the Press Statement of the 1155<sup>th</sup> meeting was the need for increased financing of humanitarian action in Africa. Having regard to progress achieved towards operationalising the AU Humanitarian Agency (AUHA), principally through the adoption of the AUHA Statutes by the 36<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly [[Assembly/AU/Dec.856\(XXXVI\)](#)], mobilisation of the necessary funds from within the continent will need to be prioritised in order to give full effect to the Agency's functioning. As pointed out by the PSC, there is also need for

integrated and inclusive approach that coordinates efforts at community level through engagement of CSOs and the private sector so as to leverage all existing capabilities that can meaningfully contribute towards alleviating humanitarian suffering. In this regard too, the full operationalisation of the AUHA could be expected to play a critical role as one of the main mandates of the Agency is around coordination of humanitarian response.

## PSC ADOPTED THE AU ROADMAP FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN SUDAN WITHOUT A STRUCTURE THAT IS FULLY DEDICATED TO THE SUDAN FILE

On 27 May, during its 1156<sup>th</sup> session, the PSC met at the level of Heads of State and Government to discuss the situation in Sudan. Uganda's President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni and the Chair of the PSC for the month of May presided over the session while the Chairperson of the AUC, Moussa Faki Mahamat, briefed the PSC. The representative of the Chairperson of the AU, Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the representative of Ethiopia as neighbouring countries, as well as the Executive Secretary of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS), and the representative of UN Secretary-General were among the speakers during the session. Despite that this was a summit level session, PSC members' representation at the Heads of State and Government level was extremely low, perhaps owing to the fact that the session was planned due to the rising concern over the worsening of the fighting in Sudan despite not originally envisaged within the Program of Work of the PSC.



'Sudan does not belong to the Sudan Army. It belongs to the people. Therefore, unconditional and immediate cessation of hostilities to stop the tragedy and mockery of Africa is of utmost importance.'

*Yoweri Kaguta Museveni,  
Uganda's President and the Chair of the PSC for  
the month of May, during the 27 May PSC Summit  
level session.*

In his opening statement, President Museveni concretely proposed the establishment of a structure exclusively dedicated to the Sudan file taking the form of a high-level facilitator or panel of facilitators. This proposal echoes the briefing note of the session initially shared with member states before its removal when the document was recirculated as rev 1.

### Relevant previous PSC decisions:

1149<sup>th</sup> session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1149 \(2023\)](#)]: the PSC:


- requested the AUC Chairperson to continue using his good offices to engage with the parties to the conflict in order to facilitate dialogue and peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sudan.
- decided to undertake a Field Mission to Sudan.

1154<sup>th</sup> session [[PSC/PR/BR.1154 \(2023\)](#)]: the PSC reiterated the imperative of enhanced collaboration and complementarity of efforts in the Sudan peace process in line with the coordination role played by the AUC with the Expanded Mechanism.

The PSC, in the [communique](#) adopted at this 1156<sup>th</sup> session, apart from reiterating its condemnation of the ongoing fighting and its demand for immediate and unconditional ceasefire, adopted the AU Roadmap for the Resolution of Conflict in Sudan (de-escalation plan), which is meant to serve as a blueprint for the AU to end the conflict.

The Roadmap the PSC adopted was developed by the AUC in line with the request of the 20 April High-Level Meeting comprising wide range of regional, continental and global actors under the auspice of AUC Chairperson. The roadmap outlines six priority areas, namely:

1. the establishment of a coordination mechanism to ensure all efforts by the regional and global actors are harmonized and impactful;
2. an immediate, permanent, inclusive and comprehensive cessation of hostilities;
3. effective humanitarian response;
4. protection of civilians and civil infrastructure;
5. strategic role of neighbouring states and the region; and
6. resumption of a credible and inclusive political transition process towards a democratic civilian rule.



Source: @AUC\_PAPS

### Situation in Sudan, 1156<sup>th</sup> PSC Meeting, 27 May 2023


One of the issues of concern in terms of the diplomatic efforts for the session was the 'multiplicity' and 'proliferation' of mediation initiatives, which, as the AU Commission Chairperson put it, has become 'a complicating factor than a facilitation of the solution'. In this respect, the communique stressed the imperative of a 'single, inclusive and consolidated peace process for Sudan' under the joint auspices of the AU, IGAD, LAS and UN, along with partners. Indeed, it is against the backdrop of the multiplicity of actors and proliferation of diplomatic initiatives which was apparent from the very start of the conflict that the 20 April High-Level Ministerial Meeting established the Expanded Mechanism with the aim to coordinate and consolidate all international actions

on Sudan, although there was lack of clarity on what such mechanism meant vis-à-vis facilitating talks on ceasefire, humanitarian access etc.

During the session, PSC also endorsed the initiative of the Chairperson to dispatch emissaries to the neighbouring states of Sudan and the Horn of Africa region to find a common approach towards lasting solution to the crisis. This initiative is on account of the serious implication of the conflict to the peace and stability of the region with the high risk of spill over as well as the refugee crisis it triggered. It also has the political purpose of mobilizing support for AU's effort to take lead role on the Sudan file.

### Expanded Mechanism on the conflict in Sudan

- **Creation:** The Mechanism was established by the High-Level Meeting, which was convened by the Chairperson of the AUC on 20 April 2023.
- **Composition:** wide range of regional and international actors that have the interest to resolve the conflict and leverage on the warring parties are included in the Mechanism.
- **Purpose:** The Mechanism aims to bring together all the relevant regional and international stakeholders under one platform and facilitate a single-tack mediation/facilitation process.
- **Coordination and Leadership:** Given the expanded nature of the Mechanism, the AU Roadmap envisages the establishment of an additional layer of structure, the 'Core Group', for quick action and implementation of decisions. Accordingly, the Core Group is expected to coordinate and lead mediation/facilitation process but under the leadership of the AUC Chairperson.



Members of the Core Group of the Expanded Mechanism

The Core Group held its inaugural meeting on 2 June to define modalities and work streams for implementing the Roadmap for the Resolution of the Sudan conflict, according to PAPS tweet on the same day.

For the Chairperson to effectively deliver his leadership role, the Roadmap further envisages that the Chairperson will be supported by a 'Sudan Task Team' composed of the African experts in crisis management and resolution, mission planning, humanitarian assistance, women, youth, peace and security, and emergency response.

- **Meetings:** The Mechanism convened three meetings thus far: on 20 April (inaugural meeting), 2 May, and 31 May 2023.

In his briefing to the PSC session, Faki stated that '[i]t is incumbent upon us, as Africans, to show the requisite Continental leadership and to give concrete meaning to the mantra of "African solutions to African problems"'. The establishment of the expanded mechanism with the participation of all the major regional and international actors, the articulation of a roadmap for de-escalation of the conflict in Sudan and the establishment of the core group reflect AU's convening power.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, AU's efforts face at least two challenges. First, in the absence of the high-level facilitator or panel of facilitators that lead and coordinate AU's action on Sudan **on a full-time basis** (rather than one carried out as one assignment among many others) under the authority of the AU Commission Chairperson, the AU runs the risk of engaging on the Sudan file on an *ad hoc* basis. Second, the diplomatic efforts initiated under the AU – the various meetings of the PSC, the Sudan taskforce established under the AUC, the extended mechanism and the core group – did not lead to any breakthrough in terms of the start of any peace process. Despite starting well and maintaining high-level attention on Sudan, the AU has as yet to translate this into the convening of talks.

The only initiative that has made relative progress in initiating talks, as admitted in the briefing note for the PSC session, is the Jeddah talks. In this respect, while welcoming the outcomes of the Talks (11 May Jeddah

Declaration and 20 May ceasefire agreement) and appreciating Saudi Arabia and the US for facilitating the Talks, the PSC also took the opportunity to remind the facilitators about the need for inclusivity by ensuring the participation of Sudanese stakeholders as well as regional and continental bodies in the negotiation process. In relation to IGAD's mediation effort, PSC expressed its support to the High-Level mediation delegation led by South Sudan's President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, but also re-emphasized the need for IGAD and the AU to strengthen coordination and speak in one voice.

### Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC:

- requested AUC Chairperson to coordinate the implementation of the AU Roadmap in close cooperation with the Sudanese Parties, IGAD, LAS, UN and partners, towards the restoration of peace and stability in Sudan.
- directed the AUC to promptly develop and execute the means of implementation for the adopted AU Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan.

### Other PSC activities during the month

In May, the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) as well as the Military Staff Committee (MSC) undertook various activities. The CoE, in addition to convening a meeting on 15 May to consider PSC and PAPS budget for the coming year 2024, also conducted a retreat from 22 to 26 May.

The CoE retreat served to discuss three main agenda items: finalisation of the terms of reference for the Sanctions Committee to be established in line with the May 2022 Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and UCG; finalisation of terms of reference for the Ministerial Committee on Counter Terrorism, also to be established in line with the decision of the May 2022 Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and UCG; and finally the codification of working methods/modalities for engagement between the PSC and the African three member of the UN Security Council (A3). On the first two documents, the CoE identified issues that necessitate the guidance of the PSC on the first

and referred the second document back to the AU Commission which is tasked with the preparation of the ToRs. The CoE finalized the work on the third document.

The MSC which met on 30 May considered lessons learnt and ways forward with regards to current support models for AU PSOs.



## MEDIA AND RESEARCH SERVICES


### ABOUT AMANI AFRICA

Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research; training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African Union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

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