

# MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

---

**AMANI AFRICA**

Media and Research Services

SEPTEMBER  
2 0 2 3



# Table of Contents

THE MONTH AT A GLANCE .....1

PSC DECIDED TO WITHDRAW, 'WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS',  
3000 ATMIS TROOPS WITHIN THE SET TIMELINE OF 30 SEPTEMBER 2023.....1

PSC ENDORSED SOMALIA'S REQUEST FOR THE TECHNICAL PAUSE  
OF THE PHASE 2 DRAWDOWN BY THREE MONTHS, REVERSING  
ITS EARLIER DECISION TO UNDERTAKE THE DRAWDOWN 'WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS'.....3

THE PSC HAS ONCE AGAIN FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE  
OF EXPANDING ITS FOCUS BEYOND JUST SECURITY MEASURES.....5

TOWARDS THE RESOLUTION FOR THE USE OF UN ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS  
FOR ADEQUATE FUNDING FOR THE AU-LED PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS (PSOS):  
FROM PROMISE TO REALITY?.....7

PSC DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE INTRICATE LINK BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN  
SUFFERING IN AFRICA, AND THE LAGGED PROGRESS IN REALISING THE GOALS  
OF THE AU MASTER ROADMAP TO SILENCE THE GUNS IN AFRICA .....8

OTHER PSC ACTIVITIES DURING THE MONTH.....10

## THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In September, Cameroon chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC had a scheduled program of work that initially consisted of six sessions. However, during the month, only five sessions were convened.

Out of the five sessions, three were focused on thematic issues, while the other two addressed country-specific situations. Additionally, the PSC also held a commemoration event for Africa Amnesty Month in Maputo, Mozambique. With the expectation of one session held at a ministerial level, all the sessions were held at the ambassadorial level.

Throughout the month, the Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) of the PSC underwent five revisions.<sup>1</sup> The first revision, posted on 8 September, resulted in the postponement of the session on the situation in Somalia and the activities of African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which was originally planned for 7 September. The second revision rescheduled this session to 14 September.

The third and fourth revisions removed two sessions from the PPoW. The session on civil-military relations in Africa, aimed at enhancing conflict prevention mechanisms, scheduled for 20 September, was dropped in the third revision. The fourth revision dropped the session on the situations in Guinea and Mali, which was initially planned for 29 September.

The fifth and final revision included an additional session that addressed the request by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) for a technical pause of phase 2 drawdown of 3,000 ATMIS uniformed personnel by three months. This session took place on 30 September.

<sup>1</sup> Apart from the PSC sessions, the Committee of Experts (CoE) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) had planned to hold meetings. The MSC intended to discuss the Code of Conduct of civil-military relations in Africa on 5 September, while the CoE aimed to prepare for the 8th Informal Joint Seminar and the 17th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and UNSC. However, both of these meetings were subsequently postponed.

The outcomes of all the sessions were adopted as Communiqué. On average, it took 10 days for the published outcome documents to be released.

## PSC DECIDED TO WITHDRAW, 'WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS', 3000 ATMIS TROOPS WITHIN THE SET TIMELINE OF 30 SEPTEMBER 2023

On 14 September, during its 1173<sup>rd</sup> session, PSC considered the situation in Somalia and the operations of the ATMIS. Souef Mohamed El-Amine, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Somalia and Head of ATMIS briefed the PSC while the representatives of Somalia, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the United Nations (UN) delivered statement during the session.



1173<sup>rd</sup> Session of the PSC, 14 September 2023,  
Source: @AUC\_PAPS

The session was convened mainly to decide on the phase 2 drawdown of 3000 ATMIS troops, which was due on 30 September 2023. Phase 1 drawdown of the 2,000 ATMIS troops was completed on 30 June 2023 by handing over 6 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) with the closure of one FOB. Phase 2 drawdown is therefore part of a phased-drawdown of ATMIS and gradual transfer of full security responsibilities to the FGS by the end of 2024, in line with PSC's 1068<sup>th</sup> and 1121<sup>st</sup> sessions, as well as United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 2628 (2022) and 2687 (2023).

Two documents facilitated the discussion on the drawdown – the outcomes of Somalia Operations Coordination Committee (SOCC) meeting held on 6 September on the modalities for the completion of phase 2 drawdown; and the report of the Joint Technical Assessment (JTA) on ATMIS troop drawdowns. The

JTA report was prepared in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2687 (2023), which requested the AU and the government of Somalia to conduct a joint technical assessment by 31 August 2023 to evaluate Phase 1 drawdown and setting out a clear plan and timescale for Phase 2 drawdown.



The SRCC and Head of ATMIS, Ambassador Souef Mohamed El-Amine on a joint visit to Baidoa in South west State for the Joint Technical Assessment for the first phase of ATMIS drawdown and planning for the second phase, August 27, 2023.  
Source: @ ATMIS\_Somalia

The report, which is a collaborative work between the AU, FGS, and international partners, provides comprehensive review of the phase 1 drawdown and the lessons learned, and outlines a detailed plan and timeline for phase 2 drawdown.

The key outcome of the session was its decision to withdraw, 'without any conditions', the 3000 ATMIS troops within the set timeline of 30 September 2023 in an 'equitable manner to prevent any security gap'. It further decided to withdraw 851 ATMIS police personnel. Interestingly, the [communiqué](#) adopted at the session omitted the corresponding number of FOBs that were set for handover/closure to the FGS during Phase 2 drawdown. The decision of withdrawal was indeed based on the proposal of the JTA report as well as outcomes of the SOCC meeting, both of which are results of the discussion between the AU and the FGS, and international partners. ATMIS initially proposed 15 FOBs for handovers/closures based on pro-rata arrangement at 30 % across all TCCs deployed strength. This proposal was not accepted by the FGS, but agreed for 10 FOBs.

Despite the successful completion of the phase 1 drawdown, the JTA report reveals critical challenges that need to be addressed while pursuing phase

2 drawdown. Among others, the report indicated competing security priorities between FGS and ATMIS forces where the priority requirement of FGS is to conduct offensive operations and not the takeover of FOBs, making the FOBs vulnerable to Al-Shabaab attack. The simultaneous drawdown of ATMIS troops and SSF's offensive operations is not without consequences to the operational capacities of the SSF. With the ongoing operations and the need to simultaneously secure newly handed-over areas, the report warns, the 'SSF might find itself spread thin', which could lead to a decrease in response capabilities while leaving some areas vulnerable. The report also flagged up the challenge that the SSF may face in holding areas and FOBs that are slated for handover during phase 2 drawdown. The relative success witnessed in phase 1 is partly attributed to the proximity of the ATMIS contingents and TCCs near the FOBs that were handed over, but these dynamics may significantly vary to the remote FOBs encompassed by phase 2. The other challenge highlighted in the report is lack of intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and aviation capability in the SSF, which are essential in providing real-time understanding of the operational environment and conducting the offensive operations. This has compromised SSF's capability to respond quickly to emerging threats, and more so in the context where the SSF takes additional security responsibilities.

Notwithstanding these warnings the communiqué adopted at the 1173<sup>rd</sup> session encouraged the SSF to enhance its efforts to hold FOBs and requested partners to increase their support to the Somalia Security Forces (SSF), including in enhancing force generation, with attendant capabilities and structures. Echoing the recommendations of the report, the communiqué also highlighted the imperative of involving Federal Member States (FMS) authorities on issues of drawdown, as well as integrating the regional security forces into the SSF for a cohesive and sustainable takeover and holding of the FOBs and protection of the population. It is clear that rather than the prevailing capacity and peace and security conditions, the main consideration for the decision of the PSC for proceeding with the drawdown despite the risks highlighted in the JTA report is the financial constraint facing ATMIS.

## Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

PSC requested the AU Commission to:

- undertake a study to evaluate the progress made by the FGS in reforms, force generation, and readiness to stabilize the country;
- undertake needs assessment to determine the support required to accompany the FGS in the fight against Al Shabaab;
- work out a viable ATMIS exit strategy, which should include proposals on AU's continued engagement with and support to Somalia post 31 December 2024;

In addition, PSC reiterated some of its decisions pending implementation, which include:

- organizing a pledging conference to support the FGS in its force generation efforts, stabilizing the country and addressing the humanitarian challenges as decided by the PSC at its 1121<sup>st</sup> session held in November 2022; and
- Expediting the operationalization of the AU Ministerial Committee on Counter-Terrorism as decided by the 16th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa, held on 28 May 2022, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea.

## PSC ENDORSED SOMALIA'S REQUEST FOR THE TECHNICAL PAUSE OF THE PHASE 2 DRAWDOWN BY THREE MONTHS, REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION TO UNDERTAKE THE DRAWDOWN 'WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS'

Before the ink on which the decision of the PSC for the withdrawal of 3000 troops as part of phase two of the drawdown of ATMIS without conditions dried, the FGS sent a letter to the UN Security Council requesting a technical pause of the withdrawal for a period of 90 days. This highlights the lack of close coordination between FGS and the AU and the failure of the FGS to raise the matter with the AU directly before communicating with the UNSC. Not

surprisingly, the UNSC referred the matter back to the AU. Following a letter of the Foreign Ministers of the main troop contributing countries supporting the request for a technical pause, the matter was first raised in the PSC during the ministerial session of the PSC on 23 September. With the communique of the PSC ministerial session issued with a commitment to convene a session on the request for the technical pause, the PSC held a session on the day the phase two withdrawal of ATMIS troops was due.

On 30 September, at its 1177<sup>th</sup> session, PSC met to consider the request by the Federal Government of Somalia for a technical pause of phase 2 drawdown of 3000 ATMIS troops by three months. Souef Mohamed El-Amine, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Somalia and Head of ATMIS briefed the PSC while the representatives of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), namely Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda delivered statements during the session. A [communiqué](#) was adopted as an outcome document.

It is to be recalled that it was on 19 September, just five days after PSC's decision to withdraw ATMIS troops, the FGS wrote a letter to the UNSC requesting for 'technical pause' in the drawdown of 3000 ATMIS troops by three months.

In the letter, the FGS mentioned three factors that necessitated the technical pause. The first is the need for a comprehensive security planning for the population centres surrounding the FOBs slated for collapse or handover'. Echoing the Joint Technical Assessment (JTA) report, the letter noted that the relative success in phase 1 drawdown can be partly attributed to the proximity of ATMIS contingents and TCCs near the FOBs, but the same dynamic may not work for the FOBs located in the more remote areas earmarked for phase 2. The second factor is the 'significant setback' that Somalia's offensive operations against Al-Shabaab suffered on 26 August 2023 in Cosweyn area, Galguduud region and the subsequent retreats by the SSF from several towns that were recently liberated. The letter states, '[t]his unforeseen turn of events has stretched our military forces thin, exposed vulnerabilities in our frontlines, and necessitated a thorough reorganization to ensure we maintain our momentum in countering the Al-Shabaab threat'. The third is the logistical challenge, which the letter highlights the urgent need to

address the pressing logistical concerns and resource gaps confronting the SSF, and more so as the latter undertakes increased security responsibilities.

On 25 September, the foreign ministers of the five TCCs also sent a letter to the UN Secretary General and UNSC expressing their 'strong support' of the FGS's request for technical pause of the drawdown. Highlighting the various challenges outlined in the JTA report as well as the 19 September Somalia's letter to the UNSC, the TCCs stressed the significance of the proposed 90-day suspension of the drawdown as it gives Somalia the necessary time and space to address the pressing challenges without hastening the security transition process. Considering the financial implication of technical pause, the foreign ministers also proposed 'sourcing funding from different budget lines and partners' and expressed their commitment to work with Somalia and its partners to secure the required finance. The proposal and commitment of the ministers of the TCCs were welcomed by the PSC at its 1177<sup>th</sup> session.

On 27 September, the President of UNSC issued a letter to the FGS asking the latter to discuss its request of the technical pause with AU first and revert to the UNSC with agreed proposal. Meanwhile, on 23 September, the PSC convened its 1175<sup>th</sup> session at the ministerial level in the margins of the 78<sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly in New York to discuss the perennial issue of financing AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs). In that session, the PSC took note of Somalia's request to the UNSC for a technical pause and decided to convene a session on the matter.

Coming against this background, PSC's 1177<sup>th</sup> session addressed two important issues. The first is on how to respond to Somalia's request for the technical pause of the drawdown. Given the danger of reversing the hard-won security gains and strong backing from the TCC for the suspension of troop withdrawal, PSC was left with no option but to reverse its earlier decision to withdraw the 3000 troops and endorse the request for the technical pause by three months. This is not the first time that PSC extended ATMIS drawdown. In November of last year, upon the request of the FGS, PSC revised the operational timeline of phase 1 drawdown of 2000 troops from 31 December 2022 to 30 June 2023. This trend of 'ad hoc decisions on extension' seems to be concerning for the PSC while raising serious doubts on whether ATMIS will be able

to meet impending deadlines set for the next critical phases – phase 3 drawdown which is due in June 2024 and the final exit by December 2024. It is in this context that the PSC, at its 1177<sup>th</sup> session, found it important to request the Commission, in consultation with the FGS, the TCCs, UN and other partners, to 'reach an agreement on the transition to FGS responsibility for security' so that it informs the mandate renewal of ATMIS by the UNSC in December 2023.

The second important issue addressed by the 1177<sup>th</sup> session is funding. The mission has been grappling with funding shortfall from the very get go. The funding deficit for the year 2022 was €25.8 million. Around the beginning of this year, the deficit reportedly reached close to \$ 90 million. Cognizant of the serious financial implication of the technical pause, PSC in this session directed the AU Commission to consider various options to mobilize the required finding for the three months extension. These include:

- i. Engage with the Federal Government of Somalia to mobilize internal resources, including approaching its bilateral partners to support the financial costs for the requested extension;
- ii. Engage AU Member States for voluntary contributions in support of the request of the Federal Government of Somalia;
- iii. Identify internal resources within the AU to cover the costs for the requested extension and submit to the PRC Sub-Committee on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters;
- iv. Expedite the finalization of the development of the modalities for the utilization of the AU Peace Fund;
- v. Engage bilateral and multilateral partners, as well as the private sector to explore support options for the extension, including the organization of the pledging conference;
- vi. Engage with the African Members of the UN Security Council to expedite the finalization of the draft resolution to be submitted to the UN Security Council on financing AU-led PSOs and access to the UN assessed contributions.

## Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

PSC:

- Urged the FGS to prioritize force generation, regeneration and capacity building, in order to take over and adequately occupy all FOBs handed over by ATMIS;
- Requested the Commission, in consultation with the FGS, the TCCs, UN and other partners, to reach an agreement on the transition to FGS responsibility for security, in order to make an informed decision on the renewal of the ATMIS mandate in December 2023, including phase 3 drawdown scheduled for June 2024, and final exit by December 2024, in order to avoid future ad hoc decisions on extension; and
- Requested the Commission to transmit the present Communiqué to the UNSC for its financial support towards the extension of phase 2 for three months.

## THE PSC HAS ONCE AGAIN FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPANDING ITS FOCUS BEYOND JUST SECURITY MEASURES

On 18 September, the PSC convened its 1174<sup>th</sup> session on the maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Given the various collaborations that are established in the Gulf of Guinea region, the PSC invited the representatives of the sub-regional organizations in the region. The presenters included representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) as well as the representative of the Inter-Regional Coordination Center-Yaoundé (CRESMAO/CRESMAC). The outcome of the meeting was adopted as a [Communique](#).



1174<sup>th</sup> Session of the PSC, 18 September 2023,  
Source: @AUC\_PAPS

In relation to the growing threat of maritime insecurity that is detailed in [Amani's insight](#), the PSC expressed its deep concern over the insecurity posed by pirates and organized criminal networks in the Gulf of Guinea region. The PSC also condemned illicit maritime acts in the region and emphasized the need for concerted efforts to address this issue.

In tackling the existing threats, the PSC welcomed the recent establishment of the Combined Maritime Taskforce. [According](#) to Jose Mba Abeso, the Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, 'on 22 May - on the margins of the Presidential Fleet Review in Lagos - 11 Gulf of Guinea countries signed the Concept of Operations.'

Regarding the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, the PSC acknowledged its ten-year implementation in enhancing cooperation among signatory states in the fight against transnational organized crime in the maritime domain. While appreciating the achievements made so far through the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, the PSC recommended expanding the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to cover the entire Atlantic coast. Additionally, the PSC encouraged member states in the region that have not fully adhered to and implemented the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to do so.

The Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCoC), also referred to as the "Code of Conduct Concerning the Prevention and Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illegal Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa," was adopted in 2013 by the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Gulf of Guinea Commission during a summit on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The main objective of the Code of Conduct is to strengthen cooperation among

the participating states in combating transnational organized crime in the maritime domain. This is achieved through a regional framework known as the Yaoundé Architecture.

In addition, during its session, the PSC followed up on the various security measures that Member States of the region, the AU Commission, and other stakeholders should consider in the effort towards advancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Accordingly, the PSC called upon Member States to:

- further enhance the institutional capacities of their national navies, law enforcement and border control agencies;
- put in place measures that ensure permanent presence of African naval forces at sea; and
- develop and harmonize their national policies and strategies to a regional and continental level to enable a collective and coordinated response to maritime challenges in the continent; and to ratify as well as harmonize laws criminalizing maritime offenses including extradition of maritime offenders and facilitation of hot pursuit.

Furthermore, in following up on its decision made during the 1012th session [PSC/PR/COMM. 1012(2021)] [PSC/PR/COMM. 1012(2021)] held on 23 July 2021, the PSC expressed its anticipation for the successful organization of the inaugural maritime exercise under the African Standby Force (ASF). The objective of this exercise is to strengthen the readiness and capacity of the ASF in dealing with maritime security challenges in the Continental waters. Similarly, during its 1159th PSC session, the PSC expressed its anticipation for the successful execution of the planned ASF continental maritime exercise. However, it is important to note that in both sessions, there was no mention of the need to assess the financial, logistical and institutional implications which apparently account for the lack of follow up on the organization of the exercise.

The briefings, the deliberations and the outcome of the session suggest that much of the focus for addressing the insecurity and criminal acts in the Gulf of Guinea is on security and law enforcement measures. As a result, the PSC missed the opportunity for also engaging the socio-economic, governance and

cross border human security issues that create the conditions for the emergence and continuation of piracy and other acts of violence and criminality. The complex nature of maritime security in the area requires a comprehensive strategy. By taking a holistic approach, the PSC can better tackle the ever-evolving challenges and intricacies of maritime security in the region.

The communique adopted by the session also directed the AU Commission to establish **a coordination mechanism or Unit on Maritime Security**. While the communique states that the establishment of this unit should be done 'without any financial implication,' it also outlines several responsibilities for the unit, including coordination, knowledge sharing, producing reports, and advising on activities related to maritime security. The relevance of the unit and its function is undeniable, but these responsibilities undoubtedly require resources and funding to be effectively achieved.

During this session, the PSC also missed the opportunity to follow up on the development of the annexes to the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa ([Lomé Charter](#)).

### Key actionable requests:

The PSC:

- Directed the AU Commission to engage with the CMTF and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), to work towards supporting the alignment of the activities of the two structures;
- Requested the AU Commission to expedite the activation of the Committee of the Heads of African Navies and Coastguards (CHANS), critical to provide strategic advice to the AU, including considering the convening of its inaugural meeting;
- Reiterated the need to expedite the establishment of a body of experts or a Task Force to coordinate, share knowledge and make recommendations on maritime security to guide Member States and other stakeholders in delivering on the AU's 2050 AIM Strategy and the and Lomé Charter; and
- Directed the AU Commission to establish

within the AU Commission, a coordination mechanism and/or Unit on Maritime Security without any financial implication, that would coordinate, enable sharing of knowledge and experiences by Member States and regions, and produce reports and advise on activities related to maritime security to the Policy Organs.

## TOWARDS THE RESOLUTION FOR THE USE OF UN ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR ADEQUATE FUNDING FOR THE AU-LED PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS (PSOs): FROM PROMISE TO REALITY?

On 23 September 2023, the PSC held its 1175<sup>th</sup> meeting in New York, USA. The meeting was held at the ministerial level and chaired by Hon. Mbella Mbella, Minister of External Relations of the Republic of Cameroon and Chairperson of the PSC for September 2023. The key discussion of the meeting was on ensuring predictable, adequate, sustainable and flexible financing for AU-led PSOs.

As a session that follows various notable developments including the PSC's session held on the subject in May 2023, this 1175<sup>th</sup> PSC meeting also came at a time when there is a crucial need for sustainable solutions to address the complex challenges in the Sahel and when the efforts deployed in Somalia, Mozambique and in the Lake Chad Basin Region need to be maintained and consolidated.

The 1175<sup>th</sup> PSC meeting resulted in the release of a [Communiqué](#) on 29 September 2023, shedding light on the efforts towards sustainable financing of AU-led PSOs for ensuring peace and security in Africa. The meeting saw the participation of Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission and Donald Kaberuka, AU High Representative on Financing of the AU and the Peace Fund. The United Nations was represented by Jean-pierre Lacroix, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations.



1175<sup>th</sup> Session of the PSC, 23 September 2023,  
Source: @AUC\_PAPS

Notwithstanding appreciating deployments by regional organizations, the PSC emphasized the need to ensure that all deployments for the maintenance of peace and security are undertaken within the framework of the standards and principles outlined in the PSC Protocol and the African Standby Force framework.

Council reiterated the importance of strengthening the partnership and cooperation between the AU and the UN to effectively respond to global security threats within the framework of Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter, which underscore the need for cooperation between the UN and regional organizations to prevent conflicts, resolve disputes and promote peace. On the cooperation between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission, the AU-UN Joint Planning Guidelines for AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) will provide a framework for this collaboration. It is expected that once finalized, this framework will enable the AU and UN to work together more efficiently and effectively in responding to crises.

The Communiqué also highlighted the need to build on existing practices, including but not limited to the UN Support Office model, which facilitated the logistical support of ATMIS. The UN Support Office model provides a point of departure for enhanced collaboration and sustainably support AU-led and regional PSOs.

The PSC reiterated its call for the adoption of a resolution by the UNSC on financing AU PSOs through UN-Assessed contributions. PSC's 689<sup>th</sup> meeting held on 30 May 2017 and the Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM.(DCLXXXIX)] from the session requested the UNSC to take practical steps towards the adoption of a substantive resolution that establishes the principle that AU mandated or authorized Peace Support Operations, authorized by the UN Security Council, to be financed through UN-assessed contributions. Council has further mandated the AU Commission to provide technical support to the PSC and the A3 to develop a draft resolution to be submitted to the UN Security Council for consideration and adoption.

In the previous PSC meeting on financing of AU-led PSOs held on 12 May 2023 at the ministerial level, Council pledged a request to the Chairperson of the AU Commission, in consultation with the Chairperson of the AU, to nominate an AU Champion Leader who will work with the Chairperson of the Commission and the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund, in engaging development partners in the mobilization of resources for AU peace and security activities on the continent. During this 1175<sup>th</sup> PSC meeting, Council **renewed** its recommendation to the AU Assembly of the Heads of State and Government and the Chairperson of the Commission, to consider nominating an AU Champion, who will work with the Commission to execute this mandate.

### Key actionable decisions:

- The PSC requested the A3, with the support of the AU Commission, to commence negotiations towards generating consensus on the said resolution for consideration and adoption by the UNSC before the end of December 2023;

## PSC DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE INTRICATE LINK BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN SUFFERING IN AFRICA, AND THE LAGGED PROGRESS IN REALISING THE GOALS OF THE AU MASTER ROADMAP TO SILENCE THE GUNS IN AFRICA

The 1176<sup>th</sup> session of the PSC which was the last session of the month took place on 29 September. The session reflected on the status of implementation of pledges made at the 2022 Malabo Extraordinary Humanitarian Summit and Pledging Conference. The session also served the PSC to engage with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) and Amani Africa Media and Research Services were also among the briefers to the 1176<sup>th</sup> session.

The outcome of the meeting adopted as a [Communiqué](#), while welcoming the progress obtained in terms of realising the pledges of the Malabo Summit and Pledging Conference, also emphasised the importance of strengthening partnerships with development orientated organisations.

Another critical issue reflected well in the Communiqué of the 1176<sup>th</sup> meeting is the increasing humanitarian toll resulting from conflicts and instability throughout the continent. In addition to fuelling humanitarian crises, conflicts in Africa are also increasingly becoming a site for flagrant violation of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights standards. Noting this, the PSC underscored at the session the importance of fast-tracking implementation of AU's Silencing the Guns (STG) initiative and called for accountability for those responsible for violations of IHL and human rights by conflict parties.

The case of Sudan's ongoing conflict which continues to devastate the country's basic infrastructure while displacing and subjecting civilians to unprecedented humanitarian suffering is one timely example of the critical role the session could attend to in effectively

responding to pressing humanitarian crises. In the [statement](#) presented to the 1176<sup>th</sup> session by Amani Africa, the overwhelming humanitarian consequences of the war in Sudan elaborated in some details, urged the PSC for the establishment of a dedicated mechanism for the tracking, documenting and reporting on the humanitarian situation with a view to contribute towards lessening the impunity with which conflict parties engage in perpetrating mass atrocities and indiscriminate attacks against civilian and civilian infrastructure. However, the PSC did not seize the opportunity for adopting such concrete action that contributes towards ameliorating the plight of civilians caught up in the crossfire of violence and illustrate in practical terms the support that it expressed in the communique to AU's principle of non-indifference and African solidarity founded in Ubuntu and Pan-Africanism.



1176<sup>th</sup> Session of the PSC, 29 September 2023,  
Source: Twitter @AUC\_PAPS

With respect to the commitments made during the Malabo summit in May 2022, the PSC expressed its 'encouragement' of all member states and partners who pledged support during the pledging conference to expeditiously redeem their pledges'. The PSC also emphasized the need for finalizing pending work relating to the governing structures of the AU Special Emergency Fund for humanitarian crises and the operationalisation of the African Humanitarian Agency.

On the proposal during the session for the establishment of an African platform on humanitarian action along the lines of the African Platform on Children Affected by Conflict, the PSC requested 'the

AU Commission the possibilities of establishing a Humanitarian Platform within the African Diplomatic community in Addis Ababa based on the experience of the other existing models such as the Platform on Children in Armed Conflicts (sic).'

### Relevant previous PSC decisions:

1155<sup>th</sup> session [[PSC/PR/BR.1155 \(2023\)](#)]: the PSC underlined the 'need for Member States to generously contribute to the AU Special Emergencies' Fund and encouraged all Member States and partners who pledged support during the AU Extraordinary Humanitarian Summit and Pledging Conference, held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea from 25 to 28 May 2022 to expeditiously redeem their pledges'.

### Relevant AU Executive Council decision:

16<sup>th</sup> Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council [[Ext/EX.CL/Dec.1\(XVI\)](#)]: established and defined the mandates of the AU Special Emergency Assistance Fund.

### Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The AU Commission was directed to:

- Spearhead efforts for an all-Africa mega pledge, inspired by the post-Malabo 10-year plan of Action';
- Conduct a study on 'cooperation between the AU and the UNHCR in addressing the challenges of humanitarian crises in Africa to be submitted during the 55<sup>th</sup> anniversary of this cooperation in 2024';
- 'Explore the possibilities of establishing a Humanitarian Platform within the African Diplomatic community in Addis Ababa based on the experience of the other existing models such as the Platform on Children in Armed Conflicts (sic)';
- communicate detailed and comprehensive information about the needs and requirement of the African Humanitarian Agency's operationalisation to partners

## OTHER PSC ACTIVITIES DURING THE MONTH

Besides the sessions, the PSC held its 2023 Africa Amnesty Month commemorative event in Maputo, Republic of Mozambique on 11 and 12 September 2023. The annual observance is in accordance with the adoption of Decision Assembly [AU/Dec.645(XXIX)] by the 29<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union held in July 2017, Addis Ababa, which declared the month of September of each year, until 2020, as

Africa Amnesty Month (AAM) for the surrender and collection of illicit SALW. This decision was, however, extended up to 2030 by the 14<sup>th</sup> Extra-Ordinary Session of the Assembly held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 December 2020.

The event, officially opened by Nataniel Macamo Dlhovo, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Republic of Mozambique, under the chairship of Churchill Ewumbue Monono, PSC Chairperson for the month who made opening remarks, followed by a statement from Mr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the AU High Representative on Silencing the Guns. The

United Nations Representative for Peace and Disarmament (UNREC) delivered remarks on behalf of Izumi Nakamitsu, the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.



Commemoration of Africa Amnesty Month in Maputo Mozambique, 11 September, 2023,  
Source: @AUC\_PAPS

The event was also attended by representatives from the Government of Mozambique, SADC, AUC, UN, Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), the civil society organizations, youth, media, private sector and faith-based organizations were also present during the event. There was an interaction session on the theme: *Disarmament as a key opportunity to silencing the guns in Africa: Lessons from the Republic of Mozambique*, in which, insights from the participants emphasized the need to ensure inclusivity in the engagements and activities of the AAM among the youth, women and the wider civil society. The PSC also visited an art exhibition of the Christian Council Project on turning arms into ploughshares, where illegal weapons are transformed into art, as part of the efforts towards disarmament in promoting peace and development in society.



Commemoration of Africa Amnesty Month in Maputo Mozambique, 12 September, 2023,  
Source: @AUC\_PAPS



## MEDIA AND RESEARCH SERVICES

### ABOUT AMANI AFRICA

Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research; training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African Union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Amani Africa wishes to express its gratitude to the Government of Switzerland, the Embassy of Ireland, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Open Society Foundations for the support in the production of this Monthly Digest.



Ambasáid na hÉireann  
Embassy of Ireland



Norwegian Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs



### ADDRESS

On the Corner of Equatorial Guinea St. and ECA Road,  
Zequala Complex, 7th Floor, Addis Ababa  
Tel: +251118678809  
Mobile: +251944723204 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia