

**SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT**

# **AFRICA AND THE SUMMIT OF THE FUTURE: SEIZING THE NEW WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR THE REFORM OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL**

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**AMANI AFRICA**

Media and Research Services

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***A Security Council that is more representative of the geopolitical realities of today, and of the contributions that different parts of the world make to global peace, is urgently needed.***

*The New Agenda for Peace*

## I INTRODUCTION

The multilateral peace and security architecture, with the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) as its primary forum for the maintenance of international peace and security, remains largely based on its 1945 Post-World War II power configuration. One feature of the flaw of this configuration of the UNSC is the injustice of the exclusion particularly of Africa from membership in the UNSC. Additionally, despite the rise of the number of UN member states by about four times the 51 member states that founded the UN, the composition of the UNSC remained unchanged. The other aspect has to do with the fact that the UNSC has become out of sync with the major changes in power relations of the world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, with some parts of the world, representing a small portion of the world's population and a declining economic power, being over represented in the UNSC.

The failures of the current global collective peace and security order manifesting itself today through the unfolding conflict events (from Sudan to Ukraine and to Gaza) and the emerging multipolar global power structure necessitate the

imperative of not merely reforming the UNSC through expanding its membership. But it also requires rethinking how the UNSC works in general and most notably redressing how the permanent members (mis)use and abuse their prerogatives at the expense of their responsibilities under the UN Charter. **A key aspect of the reform agenda is accordingly the institution of mechanisms that guarantee that the appropriate balance is struck between the responsibilities and the privileges of permanent membership in order to ensure that the UNSC is able to carry out its functions in a way that meets the objectives of the UN Charter.**

Building on the Secretary-General's proposition in the *New Agenda for Peace* that '[b]uilding the new multilateralism must start with action for peace' and the Report of the Joint Namibia-Amani Africa High-Level Panel of Experts on Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System, this special report presents the areas for reform of the collective peace and security system anchored on the UN Charter. This special report also articulates the proposals on the kind of reform that both redresses the historical injustice suffered particularly by Africa and makes the collective peace and security system fit for a multipolar world. In view of the ministerial meeting of the African Union's Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government on the Reform of the UN Security Council scheduled to take place in Algeria on 9-10 June 2024, this report is intended to inform the engagement of the African Union (AU) and its member states in the various policy processes for reform of multilateralism, most notably the Summit of the Future.

## II RENEWED PUSH FOR UNSC REFORM

Since the 1965 reform of the UNSC that increased the number of elected seats from six to 10, there has been no reform despite major changes in the world and the increasing ineffectiveness and illegitimacy of the Council. Yet reform of the UNSC has been on the agenda of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) since 1979 when the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council was included in the agenda of the UNGA. Reform of the UNSC continues to be illusive despite the fact that since the 47<sup>th</sup> session of UNGA in 1992 there has been annual consideration of the issue in the UNGA.

Two fundamental challenges highlight the imperative for UNSC reform. The first of this and very fundamental for Africa and UNSC's legitimacy is the lack of representation of Africa in the Council. As the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, put it last month, in the context of the UN civil society conference on the summit of the Future held in Nairobi Kenya,

' The multilateral institutions that we have today are the multilateral institutions created since the Second World War. They reflect the world of that time and not the world of today. There is no single African permanent member of the Security Council. That is unacceptable! '

The second concerns the failure or inability of the UNSC (partly, as noted earlier, owing to the abuse of the veto) to effectively respond to threats to international peace and security. In

early 2022, following the failure of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to avert the outbreak of the war on Ukraine and to contain it after its eruption, the Ambassador of Kenya to the UN, Martin Kimani, memorably told the UNSC that multilateralism was on its deathbed. While multilateralism has not collapsed but muddled through, no one would disagree that the multilateral system organized on the basis of the post WWII power dispensation is experiencing its worst crisis. This crisis has become more profound and existential for the UNSC in the context of the war in Gaza.

These failures of the UNSC in relation to the wars in various parts of the world have rekindled the call for the reform of the UNSC as highlighted by the large number of leaders of the world including several permanent members of the UNSC who expressed support for UNSC reform during the 78 Session of the UN General Assembly. A recent development that powerfully illustrates the urgency of reforming the UNSC was the extraordinary decision of the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, to invoke Article 99 of the UN Charter on 6 December 2023 in relation to the war on Gaza on account of the UNSC's failure to assume its responsibilities by taking appropriate actions in situations of concern.

The Global South in general, and Africa in particular, have been demanding for the fundamental reform of the UNSC, not only to establish seats at the table but to also ensure that they are able to influence the decision-making processes within the Council. For the African continent, this is particularly important not only for reasons of justice but also because it has been on the receiving end of the injunctions of the Council without having any effective say.

In the face of these fundamental crises afflicting the UNSC, the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Panel on Effective Multilateralism made it clear that '[w]ithout meaningful reform the Security Council risks irrelevance.' While the Summit of the Future, scheduled for September 2024, is not expected to actually adopt a decision reforming the UNSC, there are legitimate expectations that it presents a window of opportunity for establishing firm commitments and parameters for taking the agenda of UNSC reform forward. For example, the Secretary General's High-Level Advisory Panel proposed that the 'Summit of the Future is an opportunity to reaffirm our common commitment to the United Nations Charter and announce a Charter Review conference focused on Security Council reform.'

### III AFRICA AND REFORM OF THE UNSC

Fundamentally, reform of the Council by rectifying the historic injustice of not having any seat in the permanent category meted out against Africa is long overdue. Beyond submitting comments as a regional group to inform the report of the Secretary-General in 1992, in 2005, the AU adopted the Ezulwini Consensus as the continent's common position on the reform of the UNSC. Ezulwini consensus calls for two permanent seats and an additional three non-permanent ones. These demands seek to rectify the historical injustice of Africa's exclusion from permanent membership in the Council and its gross underrepresentation in the non-permanent category.

#### 3.1 Enlargement of the size of the UNSC in both permanent and non-permanent categories

The common position of Africa entails the enlargement of the size of the Council both in the permanent and non-permanent categories. Such enlargement is critical to enhancing the legitimacy of the Council and to addressing the exclusion of Africa in the permanent category and its underrepresentation in the elected category of UNSC membership. Beyond meeting the demands of the principle of legitimacy, enlargement of the size of the Council, through the allocation of permanent and non-permanent seats within the Ezulwini framework, has also the role of injecting into the Council members who have more stake in the effective functioning of the Council. Considering their heavy reliance on the effective functioning of the multilateral system for advancing their interests, these members have the incentive to act as a moderating force by breaking the gridlock that from time to time paralyses the Council owing to geopolitical contestations between rival major powers in the UNSC.

#### 3.2. Model of allocation of new permanent seats

It is also necessary to enhance engagement to ensure that the global support for Africa's position should not be conditional but is informed by the requirement of rectifying the historic injustice and the principles of equitable representation and legitimacy. Of particular significance in this respect is the abandonment by some states of the informal demand for Africa to designate states that will take up the permanent seats and their acceptance of the

legitimacy of the option for allocating seats to Africa as a region rather than specific countries. The position of the AU, as captured in the February 2024 report of the Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government of the AU Assembly (Committee of Ten) on the Reform of the UNSC is that **'[t]he African permanent Members will be chosen by the African Union.'**

### 3.3. On veto power for new permanent members and responsibility for use of the veto

Regarding the veto, Africa's position has been and should remain premised on the principle of equality enunciated in the preamble and Article 2 of the UN Charter. Thus, the joint Namibia and Amani Africa High-Level Panel supports the position advanced in the Report of the Committee of Ten that '[o]n the Veto, Africa wants it to be abolished.' The experience of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU highlights that the functioning of the UNSC without the veto is feasible and could be the only pathway for sparing the UNSC from paralysis that has become recurrent and for making it fit for a multipolar world. The Panel further supports the view that '[i]f, however, Member States (of the UN) wish to retain the veto, it must be extended to all new Permanent Members.' This is consistent with the Ezulwini Consensus position that Africa's demand for two permanent seats is 'with all the rights and prerogatives of current members, including the right of the veto if retained'.

It would also be consistent with the Ezulwini consensus should African member states support limitations to and accountability for the use of veto. In this respect, building on the recent inclusion

of the convening of a GA meeting after the use of veto by any permanent member, **consideration may be given to another UNGA resolution that allows 2/3 majority of members of the UNSC to refer a resolution vetoed by a permanent member (hence deemed to impede the collective action that is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security) to the UNGA for review by a super majority of the members of UNGA.**

### 3.4. Reform of UNSC working methods

Short of more systemic UNSC reform, African member states of the UN and other non-permanent members of the UN have also been active in pushing for more transparent and inclusive working methods of the UNSC. Improving the functioning of the Council through a review of its working methods could open new avenues for African countries to shape the scope and form of UNSC engagement on key issues. There are three areas of UNSC working methods that stand to contribute to inclusive, transparent and consultative UNSC decision-making process reflective of Africa's policy positions.

### Democratizing the penholder system

The first and of particular interest are the rules around the penholder system. Introduced in 2003, this is the informal practice by virtue of which some members of the UNSC arrogate to themselves leadership in crafting the engagement of the Council such as requesting the convening of Council meetings, leading field missions, and drafting Council products on various conflict files on the

agenda of the Council. It has granted a disproportionate influence and the ability to mould and shape the agenda of the Council, primarily to the P3 (France, United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US)). This is particularly the case with respect to African files. In 2023, only one African country, Gabon, was acting as a sole penholder. Furthermore, Ghana was a co-penholder on West Africa, including the Sahel. By contrast, the P3 – France, the UK, and the US - currently act as penholders of 14 of the 15 African situations, which perpetuates a system of paternalism by Western countries towards Africa and replicates the power relations that existed during colonialism and the Cold War.

Table x: 2023 Penholders  
(Source: Security Council Report)

Country situation or thematic matter (total 44)	Penholder
Burundi	France
Central Africa (UNOCA/LRA)	UK
Central African Republic	France
Democratic Republic of the Congo	France
Ethiopia/Tigray	N/A
Great Lakes Region	France
Guinea-Bissau	N/A
Liberia	USA
Libya-authorisations to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya	France
Mali	France
Somalia	UK
Sudan and South Sudan	The UK is the penholder on Sudan; The US is the penholder on South Sudan, Sudan/South Sudan, Sudan sanctions and South Sudan sanctions
West Africa, including the Sahel	Ghana & Switzerland
Western Sahara	US
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals	Gabon
Peace and Security in Africa	N/A

The penholder practice, as noted in key documents such as Paragraph 79 of UNSC Presidential Note, [S/2017/507](#), is informal. This makes it more susceptible to being reconfigured, especially given the repeated demands from African countries for a review of this practice since at least 2012. The Aria-Formula meeting on penholdership, convened in 2022, included several African countries that called for the democratization of the system to ensure their active participation and representation in influencing and shaping decisions that affect their societies.

A major step towards achieving this enhanced role of the African three members of the UNSC (A3) would be the implementation of the decisions of the PSC from its 397<sup>th</sup> and 983<sup>rd</sup> sessions held in September 2013 and March 2021 respectively. Of particular significance is the PSC Heads of State and Government meeting held in September 2013 calling for 'effective involvement of the African members of the Security Council in the drafting of resolutions, presidential statements and statements to the press concerning Africa, including through the designation of African states as pen holders/co-pen holders on African matters, as part of the overall efforts to ensure that lead roles for country-specific situations and thematic issues are fairly distributed among all the members of the Security Council.' This underscores the paramount importance of the A3 members assuming penholdership and being guided, in the exercise of this role, by the collective position articulated in AU decisions, notably by the PSC. To ensure that African states assuming the role of a penholder are adequately capacitated, it is necessary to enhance the technical capacity of the AU Permanent Observer

Mission to the UN. This can be achieved through the establishment of a dedicated unit comprised of a team of African experts to support African (co)penholders. Such initiatives could be financed through the AU regular budget to ensure sustained support and effectiveness.

### Inclusive consultation and opportunity for inputting into draft UNSC products

The second area concerns the availability of adequate and substantive consultation and the provision of sufficient opportunity for the engagement of African states in the crafting of UNSC decisions. During the Area-Formula meeting in 2022, Ghana proposed that 'the drafting and negotiation process should be characterised by an extensive, exhaustive, transparent, inclusive process of consultations and timely exchange of information.' In this respect, one course of action could be the establishment of a predictable and transparent framework outlining the processes and timelines for consultations and soliciting substantive engagement and contribution of all member states as well as requirements for sharing draft resolutions, presidential statements, or press elements and affording reasonable enough a timeline for submission of inputs by member states.

### 3.5. Africa and the pathways for UNSC reform

In terms of how to proceed to formal negotiations for UNSC reform, UN member states advance various positions. The first of these is what is called text-based negotiations (TBN). Thus far this has not received the support of the wider membership of the UN. On the part of the

AU, the position until recently has been that Africa would not engage in text-based negotiations before consensus has been reached among member states of the UN on all issues pertaining to UNSC reform. This position has not changed fundamentally, although some flexibility has been injected into it recently. Thus, as reflected in the February 2024 report of the C10, the position in the AU is that 'Africa to only engage in text-based negotiations provided there is prior consensus among all member States of the United Nations on the five clusters and an agreed framework, which broadly addresses the issue of historical injustice, and a model of reform which clearly addresses expansion in both categories of the UN Security Council.'

The other, which has UNGA resolution basis, is the intergovernmental negotiation (IGN). This was established in 2008 through the General Assembly's [Decision 62/557](#), whereby states continue to submit their proposals on the five clusters that have been agreed to regarding the reform of the UNSC. Under this approach, the reform process moves forward based on the consensus of UN member states on the various areas of reform.

It is possible that instead of consensus on all or no reform, another approach that can advance some progress could be to proceed to a UNGA decision on proceeding with reform on areas on which there is a large measure of consensus and convergence among UN member states. The elements paper by the Co-Chairs of the IGN can provide the basis for such an approach.

This can be taken forward on the basis of a charter review conference that the Pact



of the Future may call for. But this can have a chance of success and support from Africa only as long as it is on the basis of written recognition in the Pact of the Future of Africa's legitimate demand for membership in the permanent and expansion of representation in non-permanent categories.

It is also the view of the Panel that the risk of the Charter review conference, particularly on the unity of the African group should not be discounted. The Panel supports the cautious position of the CIO that emphasizes the imperative of maintaining the unity of the African Group. Considering that Africa's influence lies in leveraging its number in the UN, the importance of maintaining the unity of the position of AU member states cannot be overemphasized. As such, for Africa, the option of the Charter review conference can only be taken on the basis of agreement among AU member states on Africa speaking with one voice and firm recognition of the legitimacy of Africa's demand for membership in the permanent category with veto rights and expansion of representation in the non-permanent category.

#### **IV STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

One of the five clusters identified for UNSC reform under General Assembly's [Decision 62/557](#) for the IGN that it established in 2008 is the relationship between the UNSC and the UNGA. The UNGA is the UN organ where all states parties to the UN Charter are represented. As a body of the UN where all member states enjoy equal rights, the UNGA is a democratic body and

enjoys legitimacy from the wider UN membership. African member states constitute the largest regional bloc in UNGA and constitute an influential voting bloc. The UNGA is where the legitimacy of UN action on peace and security can best be gaged and the member states of the UN express their views by voting whenever an international peace and security matter is tabled for consideration of the wider UN membership. While UNGA is not the primary body for peace and security decision-making and its resolutions are not binding, it plays and can play an important role in peace and security in accordance with Article 12 of the UN Charter.

As in past instances of Security Council inaction, the deepening paralysis in the Council and the recurrent abusive use of the veto for blocking Council actions in recent years has prompted increased interest both in the role of and calls to further empower the UNGA on matters of international peace and security including by invoking Article 99 of the UN Charter. UNGA's role in the maintenance of international peace and security becomes particularly imperative when the Security Council fails or is unable to act in the face of a threat to international peace and security. In this regard, in accordance with UNGA [Resolution 377\(V\)](#), *Uniting for Peace*, the General Assembly has the power to act to maintain or restore international peace and security in case of failure by the UNSC to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. To date, 11 emergency special sessions of the UNGA have been convened under this resolution.

UNGA's role acquired particular significance during the past two years.

This came following the referral on 27 February by the Security Council of the situation in Ukraine to the General Assembly following its own failure to adopt a draft resolution after Russia launched an attack against Ukraine. It marked the first invocation by the UNSC of the UNGA “[Uniting for Peace](#)” resolution in 40 years. Apart from the situation in Ukraine, the UNGA was also called on to address the situations in Gaza and Myanmar. With respect to Myanmar, it endorsed a resolution calling for an arms embargo on the country. The role of the UNGA was further bolstered through a resolution of April 2022 ([A/RES/76/262](#)) empowering the President of the General Assembly to convene a formal meeting within 10 working days of the casting of a veto by one or more permanent members of the Security Council.

For Africa, the significance of the role of UNGA goes beyond the sphere of international peace and security. As the AU pointed out in 2012, ***the role of the General Assembly should be broadened to include the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), whose mandate straddles the development and security spheres. The now widely accepted nexus between security and development provides a strong imperative for a more pronounced role for ECOSOC in the partnership. This would help to restore the balance between day-to-day peace and security issues and long-term socio-economic development.*** Leveraging their size in UNGA, African member states can promote UNGA initiatives for fairer and more equitable international economic relations that help facilitate the socio-economic and development advancement of peoples of Africa and others in the developing world. A case in point that illustrates this potential is

the November 2023 UNGA resolution on a UN convention on international tax cooperation championed by the Africa Group under Nigeria’s leadership. Moreover, the General Assembly’s oversight function on the UN’s financial matters puts it at the heart of discussions relating to financing UNSC authorized AU-led operations.

## V SYSTEMATICALLY INVOLVING THE AU PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL ON DECISIONS PERTAINING TO AFRICAN FILES

Both the nature and complexity of the challenges facing the world along with the global context underscore the increasing importance of regional multilateral bodies today more than ever before for injecting a much-needed boost for the global multilateral system. Moreover, the nature of today’s challenges and shifts in international relations necessitates networked multilateralism, which can effectively leverage the roles of multiple multilateral actors and foster more productive partnerships among them.

The deepening polarization in the world, particularly among major powers, is among the key factors for the increasing fracturing of the multilateral system. The AU, whose member states make up 28 % of the UN, has a unique reservoir of potential for playing a moderation role in the face of such polarization, paralysing, and fracturing the multilateral system. Tapping into this moderating role of the AU (and Africa’s positionality as [the future of multilateralism](#)) through the PSC is key not just for arresting the fracturing of the

multilateral system but also for making it fit for purpose.

While the UN Secretary General recognized in his [Our Common Agenda](#) report that regional organizations ‘fill a critical gap in our global peace and security architecture’, the state of relationship between the UN and the AU is far from adequate for the AU to effectively fill in this critical gap. One manifestation of this inadequacy is the lack of **a systematic and institutionalized global arrangement** for harnessing the full potential and role of the AU as part of the global collective security and development system anchored on the UN Charter.

A key aspect of the reform in elevating the role of regional organizations accordingly concerns the close working relationship between the UNSC and the PSC. In this respect as well, the implementation of the September 2013 decision of the PSC Heads of State and Government meeting would be a good starting point. The communique of the meeting called for ‘systematic consultations between the two Councils, including through their Chairs, prior to taking decisions on matters relating to the continent.’ It also underscored the need for the ‘adoption of practical steps to ensure that the joint annual consultative meetings between the two Councils are more structured and substantive’ and the ‘implementation of the existing agreement by the two Councils to undertake joint field missions to enhance synergy and facilitate the formulation of cohesive positions and strategies in dealing with conflict situations in Africa.’ These have to be translated into operational practices.

## VI MAKING THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FIT FOR A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

As a relic of the Post-World War II power dispensation, the UNSC in its current form seems to have run its usefulness. Its repeated failures to prevent or resolve wars tearing apart international peace and security, failures that have become systematic, have become emblematic of its unfitness to the multipolarity into which the world is emerging. As the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel put it [t]oday’s Security Council is the highest profile example of failure in the multilateral system. Dominated by a small number of States and hampered by geopolitical polarization, it has proven itself unable to respond to major risks to international peace and security.’ Apart from the inconsistency and double standard in the UNSC’s response that brought it into disrepute, what has rendered UNSC in its current form unfit for purpose is the lack of shared perception of the threats to international peace and security and the tendency of using the UNSC for geopolitical score settling. Both ensuring what the New Agenda for Peace calls ‘universality’ and hence the consistent application of the UN Charter and international law rules and reducing the gridlock from failure to have a shared perception of threats to international peace and security require the provision of independent data and evidence-based analysis that is not encumbered by geopolitical influence.

Indeed, the ability of the multilateral system to uphold peace and security in the world depends on the shared understanding by its members of

common threats. As conditions of multipolarity accelerate in international relations, there is an increasing need for mitigating the paralysis in the UNSC and enabling minimum common ground for the functioning of the UNSC. A reform process should therefore envisage the establishment by the UN General Assembly of an evidence-driven Intergovernmental Panel on Threats to International Peace and Security as a standing mechanism. Beyond providing an evidence-driven report that establishes the nature both in scale and gravity and impacts of developments threatening international peace and security, the reports of such Panel helps facilitate a more consistent application of the provisions of the UN Charter and international law and equally consistent censure of breaches of the UN Charter and international law.

## **VII EXPANDING THE REGIONAL SECTIONS FOR AND LEADERSHIP ROLE OF AFRICA IN VARIOUS UN AGENCIES**

The space both for reflecting the voice of Africa in the structures of decision-making and the leadership role of Africans in the various global governance institutions including UN agencies remains hugely limited. This is one of the major factors for the fact that Africa is either excluded from certain global governance platforms and/or is severely underrepresented. There is thus a need for expanding the space for reflecting Africa's voice through increasing regional sections/divisions and increasing leadership roles of Africans. In the peace and security realm, it is also critical to increase the number of appointments of Africans in

senior leadership positions, particularly at UN headquarters.

## **VIII ENHANCING THE ROLE OF AND LEVERAGING THE PARTICULAR ATTRIBUTES OF OTHER UN BODIES SUCH AS THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION**

Established in 2005 to support UN efforts in consolidating peace in countries emerging from conflict, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) role grew in significance over the years. Its inclusive nature makes it an important platform for more legitimate decision-making that earns the support of the wider UN member states. As is the case with the UNGA, the mandate of the PBC is advisory in nature, but it can act as an important leverage to promote a redefinition of the scope, and approach to issues tackled by the UNSC. In the broader context of UN reform, the PBC emerges as a catalyst for the negotiation process, actively influencing discussions on reshaping the UNSC to better meet the demands of a changing global landscape.

The nature of conflicts and the global context necessitate a multidisciplinary approach to both the prevention and resolution of conflicts. This means that rather than a narrow security focused approach, processes for the prevention and resolution of conflicts need to harness and complementarily deploy peacebuilding, socio-economic development and inclusive systems of governance and state strengthening tools. Accordingly, there is an increasing need for tapping into and enhancing the

role of international and regional financial institutions and development tools. The PBC is best placed to and can play the role of both facilitating the integrated use of such instruments and promoting their use (by the UNSC). In the context of the Summit of the Future and the 2025 review of the UN Peace Building Architecture, African States should champion the enhancement of the mandate, authority, and role of the UN PBC.

## IX CONCLUSION

The foregoing analyses and the proposals accompanying them aim at addressing the twin challenges facing the global collective peace and security architecture viewed from the vantage point of Africa. Thus, the analyses and the proposals seek to redress the system's historical injustice meted out against Africa in particular and make it fit for an increasingly multipolar world. For Africa, the reform of the UNSC is of strategic concern not only for rectifying the failings of the UNSC in its current form to deliver on its mandate as it has become evident from developments in recent years but also importantly for addressing the historical injustice that Africa suffered with respect to UNSC membership due to its non-representation in the permanent category and under-representation in the non-permanent category.

Despite uncertainties about whether and how this moment, such as in the context of the Summit of the Future and beyond, offers an opportunity to advance the agenda of UNSC reform, African States can ill afford to remain indifferent to the heightened policy discourse on reform. It is opportune for them to elevate their engagement for enhancing wider buy-in to Africa's common position while being mindful of the challenge the current

geopolitical context presents to the pursuit of the agenda of the reform of the UNSC. In addition, it is also worth noting that there are also procedural challenges. A reform that meets the demands of expansion of the UNSC seats would necessitate amending the [UN Charter](#), which according to its Article 108, requires approval by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly. Of significance is also the additional requirement of ratification by two-thirds of UN members' legislatures, including the legislatures of all five permanent members of the Security Council. Any change in Security Council membership would require revising Articles 23 and 27 of the Charter as well.

While cognizant of these challenges, the ongoing policy discussions and efforts for reform necessitate that African states engage robustly as a collective and explore all possible options for reform. In this regard and building on the Ezulwini Consensus, African states need to seize the current window of opportunity for taking the policy process on UNSC reform forward in the context of the Summit of the Future by ensuring explicit affirmation of the legitimacy of Africa's position on the reform of the UNSC in the Pact of the Future. To this end, they should demand that the Pact recognizes the need for rectifying the historical injustice that Africa suffered with respect to UNSC membership due to its non-representation in the permanent category and under-representation in the non-permanent category.

Part of the enhanced engagement of the AU and its member states, particularly through the C10, will be beneficial if it also focuses on ensuring that support for Africa's position should not be conditional

on Africa designating specific member states for permanent membership but is informed by the requirement of rectifying the historic injustice and the principles of equitable representation and legitimacy. This is consistent with the [proposal](#) of the UN Secretary General's High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism that 'options for allocating seats for regions rather than specific countries...should also be explored.'

During the upcoming Ministerial meeting of the C10 in Algeria, in terms of promoting the responsible use of veto in the UNSC, building on the recent inclusion of the convening of a GA meeting after the use of veto by any permanent member, consideration may be given to another UNGA resolution that allows **2/3 majority of members of the UNSC** to refer a resolution vetoed by a permanent member (hence deemed to impede the collective action that is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security) to the UNGA **for review** by a **super majority of the members of UNGA**.



## MEDIA AND RESEARCH SERVICES


### ABOUT AMANI AFRICA

Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research, training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

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### ADDRESS

On the Corner of Equatorial Guinea St. and ECA Road, Zequala Complex,  
7th Floor, Addis Ababa  
Tel: +251118678809  
Mobile: +251944723204 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia