

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

AMANI AFRICA

Media and Research Services

April, 2026

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
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THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In April, under the chairship of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) adopted a [Provisional Programme of Work](#) (PPoW) consisting of five substantive sessions covering a total of six agenda items. However, during the month, the PPoW underwent two revisions. These revisions led to seven sessions being held, covering nine agenda items. Out of the nine agenda items, four focused on country-specific situations, while the rest addressed thematic issues. Of all the agenda items, only one was held at the ministerial level, while the rest were held at the level of permanent representatives. It is also worth noting that only one was held as an open session.



In addition, during the month, the PSC had a field visit to the Republic of South Sudan. At the end of the month, it held the 5th Annual Joint Retreat with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

Over the course of the month, the PSC PPoW underwent two revisions. The first change on the programme saw the inclusion of an informal session on 9 April on 'The Impact of the Middle East Crisis on the Peace and Security Situation of Africa,' as a second agenda item. The second revision saw the addition of a session with two agenda items on 28 April. The first item was the 'Consideration of the Report on Joint AU-FGS-UN Progress against Benchmarks and AUSSOM Mission Configuration Plan,' and the second item was a briefing on the 'Situation in Mali.'

The sessions of the PSC led to the adoption of six communiqués, two press statements, a field mission report and a Declaration, as outcome documents.

PSC TALKS OF PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO THE GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE IN SUDAN

On 8 April 2026, the PSC convened its 1337th meeting as an Open Session on the theme 'Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocidal Ideology in Africa and the 32nd Commemoration of the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.'¹ The outcome of the

¹ *The session received opening remark from Hirut Zemene Kassa, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for April 2026 made the opening remarks, followed by an introductory statement by Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner, PAPS, delivered on his behalf by Neema Chusi, Head of the AUPSC Secretariat. In addition, Gen. (Rtd) Charles Karamba, Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the AU, made a statement in the opening segment. Several Member states including DRC also intervened during the plenary session.*

session was a [press statement](#).



Figure 1: PSC 1337th Meeting on ‘Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocidal Ideology in Africa,’ and the 32nd Anniversary Commemoration of the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, 8 April 2026. (Source: X @[AUC_PAPS](#))

The statement welcomes ‘the progress made on various regulatory and institutional frameworks’ to enforce accountability, operationalise ‘never again’ and prohibit genocide denialism, while calling for continental mechanisms to monitor denial narratives, including online, counter hate speech, and encourage Member States to reject ‘identity politics’ in favour of ‘the politics of interests’.

Beyond marking the commemoration, substantively speaking, the outcome of the session is largely abstract and declaratory. Such an outcome is not necessarily problematic if it happened in a peace and security landscape that was free from genocidal violence. However, this session was held in a context in which genocidal violence is unfolding at the very least in Sudan, and risks of such violence are present in other conflict settings such as South Sudan. What makes this omission striking is the fact that during the session, some member states delivered statements that clearly took the discussion on the agenda of the session from the abstract and commemorative to the concrete by highlighting its immediate and direct relevance, particularly in the context of the war in Sudan. The intervention from South Africa thus echoed the reference made in the edition of [Insights on the PSC](#) dedicated to the session to the findings of the UN, that the hallmarks of the violence in Darfur ‘point to genocide.’

Instead of directly speaking to specific cases involving such risks, the PSC only went as far as noting ‘the evolving situation in some parts of Africa, including reports of human rights violations and also acknowledged the impact on affected individuals and communities.’ First, rather than expressing concern, the PSC opted for noting. Second, it only made reference to human rights violations in general and without properly establishing the gravity of such violations, which in some instances, amount to grave circumstances specified in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. Such an understatement of grave circumstances flies in the face of PSC’s statement on fighting against genocide denial and its reference to ‘never again.’ Naming events appropriately is and should have been a part of what the PSC does in properly discharging its responsibility under Article 7 of the PSC Protocol, tasking the PSC ‘to anticipate and prevent...policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity’.

It is these omissions and understatement of the gravity of some of the violations in some of the conflict settings that make it difficult to consider that the PSC means what it says. That is why the statement’s call for strengthening early warning to detect signs of situations degenerating into violent conflicts and genocide appears to be nothing more than performative.



Figure 2: DPR of South Africa delivering a statement during the session. (Source: X @[africa_amani](#))

Although Council does not mention the UN General Assembly's [recognition](#) of the transatlantic slave trade and racialised chattel enslavement of Africans as 'the gravest crime against humanity' the statement, echoing the edition of Insights on the PSC dedicated to the session, is notable in making reference to Assembly Decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.953\(XXXIX\)](#), adopted in February 2026, which recognises 'slavery, deportation, and colonisation as crimes against humanity and genocide against the peoples of Africa.' As noted in the Insight, such comprehensive recognition 'reinforces the importance of confronting the historical and contemporary legacies of racialised dehumanisation, denial and exclusion, and lends further weight to the view that remembrance, historical truth and accountability are integral to preventing hate-driven violence and atrocity crimes.'

It is also worthy of note that PSC followed up on one of the key decisions it adopted in earlier sessions on the same subject. This is particularly the case with respect to PSC's long-pending request tasking the Panel of the Wise to review the status of implementation of the recommendations issued by the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities to investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the surrounding events. Strikingly, instead of framing it as a reiteration of a previous decision, the PSC framed the request to the Panel of the Wise as if it were made for the first time. Together with the lack of a timeline for the delivery of this task, this formulation makes the request susceptible to further delay.

Relevant Previous Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

1206th Session [[PSC/PR/BR.1206 \(2024\)](#)] held on 4 April 2024:

PSC:

- Reiterated the call for the Panel of the

Wise to undertake a review of the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in the Report of the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities on the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and surrounding events.

1272nd Session [[PSC/PR/PS.1272 \(2025\)](#)] held on 2 April 2025:

PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to further strengthen the operational capacities of the cyber units integrated into the CEWS, by equipping them with advanced technologies for the automated detection of online disinformation campaigns, in particular those of an ethnic or religious nature.
- Reiterated the call for the Panel of the Wise to undertake a review of the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in the Report of the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities on the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the Surrounding Events.

The session was notable for the display of civility in the statements delivered by Rwanda and the DRC. This was deemed important, so much so that it attracted the commendation of the PSC. Thus, the PSC outcome on the session stated that the 'Council expressed appreciation for the constructive and principled statements by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Republic of Rwanda on the issue of fighting hate crimes and genocide ideology in Africa.'

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to strengthen the AU's early warning mechanisms to detect early warning

signs in situations which could degenerate into violent conflicts and genocide in order to monitor, assess, and respond to actionable risk factors that indicate a situation is degenerating from political tension into mass atrocities.

- Requested the Panel of the Wise to undertake a review of the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in the Report of the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities on the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the Surrounding Events.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- [Open Session on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocide Ideology in Africa, Insights on the PSC, 7 April 2026.](#)

PSC DIRECTS AU COMMISSION TO ASSESS MINUSCA'S DRAWDOWN RISKS

On 9 April 2026, the PSC convened its 1338th meeting to consider the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR)², at a critical post-election moment following the December 2025 general elections, which resulted in the re-election of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra for a third term and included the first municipal elections held since 1988.

Adopted as the outcome document, the [communiqué](#) reaffirmed 'the critical role of the AU as a guarantor of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in

² Statements were made by Alice Nzomukunda, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for CAR; and representatives of CAR, ECCAS, and Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU).

the Central African Republic (PAPR-CAR), signed on 6 February 2019 in Bangui, CAR, by the Government of the CAR and fourteen (14) armed groups.' The PSC highlighted a number of concerns, including the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA's) financial and other constraints, the risk of a security vacuum, continued recruitment by armed groups, illegal exploitation of natural resources, socio-economic reintegration needs and limited state presence across the territory.




Figure 3: PSC 1338th Meeting on the 'Situation in the Central African Republic,' 9 April 2026. (Source: X @ [AUC_PAPS](#))

From the perspective of the expansion of state presence, a noteworthy development acknowledged in the PSC session is the holding of the first municipal elections since 1988.

Another salient aspect of the communiqué is its recognition of 'the progress made in the implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDR) process' and commendation of 'the signing of the N'Djamena Agreements in 2025 between the Government of CAR and three armed groups, namely: UPC, 3R and MPC, under the auspices of the Republic of Chad.' This follows the AU Commission Chairperson's earlier [welcome](#) of the 19 April 2025 N'Djamena Peace Agreement with Union for Peace in the CAR (UPC) and Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation (3R) as

part of efforts to revitalise the PAPR-CAR. Council also urges 'all armed groups who are yet to join and sign the Peace Agreement to urgently do so for the stability of the country,' underscoring the importance of widening adherence to the 2019 framework. Together with the 19 November 2025 agreement with the Patriotic Movement for the CAR (MPC), these arrangements are best understood as supplementary efforts to bring armed groups back into, or more firmly within, the 2019 PAPR-CAR. At the same time, the Council 'reiterates that Article 35 of the PAPR-CAR clearly provides for sanctions against any party or armed group that violates the Agreement,' and condemns 'continued recruitment by some armed groups including from some neighbouring countries' as well as 'all violations of human rights including gender-based violence against women and girls.' Taken together, these elements present both progress and fragility in CAR's peace process: while the N'Djamena Agreements mark renewed engagement with key armed groups, the Council's emphasis on broader adherence, sanctions, recruitment, cross-border dynamics and human rights violations underscores the need for credible verification, sustained reintegration support and clearer enforcement of commitments under the PAPR-CAR.

Of particular significance, the communiqué commends MINUSCA's role in civilian protection, creating conditions for the harmonised elections, and supporting peace and stability, while expressing 'deep concern over the financial challenges' affecting personnel, air rotations, maintenance, long-distance patrols and military bases. It supports MINUSCA's continued presence and appeals for mandate renewal. This frames the mission's resource crisis as a direct stabilisation risk, especially given the Council's concern over the 'volatile security situation' in parts of the country.

Operationally, Council directs the AU Commission to assess the impact of any possible MINUSCA drawdown or withdrawal, propose recommendations, develop a strategy to strengthen the PAPR-CAR Guarantors towards 'AU-led stabilisation support for CAR,' and report within two months. Its request to transmit the communiqué to the A3 for circulation to UN Security Council members is significant, as MINUSCA's mandate, financing and future configuration fall within the Council's remit. This is particularly relevant given Resolution [2800 \(2025\)](#), which extended MINUSCA's mandate until 15 November 2026 and, in paragraph 48, requested the Secretary-General to report by 15 September 2026 on transition, task handover and drawdown planning. The A3 channel, therefore, offers a route for placing PSC concerns before the Council, though its effect will depend on whether they shape mandate renewal, financing debates and future planning.

While the proposition for a possible 'AU-led stabilisation support for CAR' is meant to be considered alongside the close follow up of the implications of potential drawdown of MINUSCA, previous experience of the AU with the AU Military Observer Mission in the CAR (MOUACA), authorised by the PSC at its [936th](#) meeting on 10 July 2020 but did not take off the ground and came to an end before full operationalization, should be instructive.

Relevant Previous Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

1157th session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1157 \(2023\)](#)] held on 13 June 2023:

PSC:

- Urged the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) 'to urgently identify the long term peacebuilding and development needs and priorities.'

1221st session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1221 \(2024\)](#)]

held on 11 July 2024:

PSC requested:

- The Chairperson of the AU Commission to take steps to further enhance the institutional capacity of the AU Liaison Office in CAR.
- The AU Commission to continue providing necessary support for the DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes in CAR.
- The AU Commission, through the AU PCRDC Centre, to urgently conduct a needs assessment in CAR to identify priority areas of need for development and rebuilding.

1241st session [[PSC/PR/COMM.2.1241 \(2024\)](#)]

held on 30 October 2024:

PSC requested:

- The Government of the CAR to continue constructive engagements with all political groups in the country to reach consensus on the organisation of inclusive, transparent and credible democratic elections.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Directed the AU Commission, to undertake a comprehensive study on the impact of the drawdown and possible withdrawal of MINUSCA and to propose concrete recommendations on the way forward..., as well as to develop a strategy on strengthening the role of the Guarantors of the PA-PR-CAR, towards an AU-led stabilization support for CAR and to report to the PSC within two months from the date of the adoption of this Communiqué.

- Requested the AU Commission Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development Department to provide the necessary humanitarian support to the CAR.

- Requested the Chairperson of the Commission to provide the AU Liaison Office (AULO) in Bangui with all necessary resources to enable the Office to more effectively discharge its mandate.

- Requested the AULO to provide monthly reports/fact sheets of the political, security and economic situation in CAR to the PSC.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Consideration of the Situation in the Central African Republic](#), Insights on the PSC, 8 April 2026.
- [Update on the situation in the Central African Republic](#), Insights on the PSC, 18 September 2025.

IN A SHIFT FROM ITS TECHNO-OPTIMISM STREAK, PSC URGES AI AND DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY

The PSC held its 1339th meeting on 16 April, at the ministerial level, on the theme 'Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security.'³ The session was held against

³ *Gedion Timothewos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ethiopia and Chairperson of the PSC for April 2026 made the opening remarks followed by statement by Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, read on his behalf by Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs Peace and Security. The meeting further received briefings from Worku Gachena Negera, Director General of Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute, Samson Itodo, Chairperson of the AU Advisory Group on Artificial Intelligence, and Bernardo Mariano Junior, Assistant Secretary-General, Chief Information Technology Officer at UNOICT.*

the growing recognition that Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly reshaping the global governance, development, and security environment, while Africa currently accounts for only about [1%](#) of the world's AI computing capacity. It also built on, and further expanded, the PSC's engagement of the nexus between AI, governance, peace and security in Africa, particularly its [1214th](#) session held on 13 June 2024 — Council's first dedicated session to the theme as part of its 20th anniversary commemoration — and its [1267th](#) session held on 20 March 2025, which marked the first ministerial-level meeting on the theme.

While the PSC in its earlier sessions such as 1214th session came across as AI optimist with its enthusiastic expression of its expectation of the contribution of AI 'towards the promotion of peace, security, stability, democracy and development in Africa, as well as in accelerating global development and the achievement of the aspirations of AU Agenda 2063 and the UN Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development Goals, this session projected a more realistic, if incomplete, take on the role of AI and digital technologies. The outcome of this 1339th meeting was a [communiqué](#).

The PSC emphasised the importance of developing AI systems in African languages as a means of promoting inclusivity, preserving cultural heritage, and strengthening social cohesion. The Council also recognised the transformative potential of AI in supporting conflict prevention, mediation, peace support operations, and post-conflict reconstruction across the continent.




Figure 4: 1339th Meeting of the PSC on 'Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security in Africa,' 16 April 2026. . (Source: X @[AUC_PAPS](#))

The PSC welcomed the adoption of the AU Continental AI Strategy (2024) and called upon Member States to accelerate its implementation through the development of national AI strategies aligned with Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It further emphasised the imperative for Africa to shape, develop, and control its own AI technologies in order to guarantee the continent's sovereignty across the entire AI ecosystem. It also emphasised that the development and deployment of AI technologies must be guided by the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusivity, ethical governance, benefit-sharing, social cohesion, and full respect for international law.

Recognising the strategic importance of digital independence, the PSC underscored the need to safeguard Africa's digital and data sovereignty. In this vein, there is a need for promoting digital industrial policies that support data localisation, technology transfer, and the disclosure of source code to facilitate and strengthen Africa's digital space and technological advancement.

Having regard to Africa's place in the global AI systems, the Council stressed the need to strengthen Africa's participation in global norm-setting processes through coordinated continental positions and strategic engagement within multilateral platforms, including through the AU Commission's AI Advisory Group on

Governance, Peace and Security. It further advocated for the progressive development of context-specific and adaptable AI governance and regulatory frameworks or charters aligned with international humanitarian law and the principle of meaningful human control.

At the same time, the Council expressed concern over the risks associated with the misuse of AI technologies, including cybercrime, disinformation, privacy violations, technology-facilitated violence, and the potential weaponisation of AI, especially in conflict settings. In this regard, it highlighted the urgent need to 'bridge the global and continental asymmetry in AI capabilities, including access to electricity, computing power, high-quality datasets, infrastructure and technical expertise, and calls for enhanced efforts to build African capacity in these critical areas.'

To support these ambitions, the Council called for increased investment in Africa's AI ecosystem, including digital infrastructure, data systems, computing capacity, and human capital development. It further encouraged the 'establishment of multi-stakeholder and multilevel governance systems,' as well as the 'institutionalisation of an African network of National AI Centres to coordinate African efforts to speak with a common and influential African voice on the future of AI.'

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1334th session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1334 \(2026\)](#)] held on 9 March 2026:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission, in particular the AI Advisory Group on Governance, Peace and Security, to ensure the inclusion of issues relating to women in the development of the Common African Position on AI Gov-

ernance, Peace and Security.

1267th Session [[PSC/MIN/COMM.1267 \(2025\)](#)], held on 20 March 2025:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to develop and integrate AI-based early warning systems to support the decision-making and efforts of the AU Member States, AU and the RECs/RMs in detecting signals of radicalisation, community violence and emerging conflicts.
- Tasked the AU Commission to elaborate the African Common Position on AI and its impact on peace, security, democracy and development in Africa, and to update the Council regularly on the developments in the field.
- Requested the AU Commission to develop **an African Charter on AI for the responsible use of AI**, with a section dedicated to the promotion of peaceful use of AI towards the promotion of peace and security in Africa.
- Requested the AU Commission to organise an African forum bringing together relevant partners and stakeholders to discuss AI as a key tool suited to share best practices and strategies for peace, security and governance in Africa.

1214th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1214 \(2024\)](#)] held on 13 June 2024:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive study on the impact and implications of AI on peace, security, stability, democracy and development in Africa and submit the Report to the PSC as soon as possible.
- Requested the PSC to develop frameworks to oversee the responsible integration of AI in military operations,

ensuring compliance with ethical standards and international humanitarian law; and also to propose options for Continental AI governance, including its military application and to report to the Council every six months.

Overall, the communiqué reflects a strategically ambitious and geopolitically aware vision for Africa's role in the global AI landscape. However, it remains cautious in confronting some of the more complex regulatory and security dilemmas emerging from the latest generation of advanced AI technologies. While it acknowledges risks such as disinformation, it insufficiently addresses some of its previous commitments, especially the ones pledged during its [1267th](#) ministerial-level session held on 20 March 2025.

For example, although the communiqué refers to the principle of meaningful human control, it did not go far enough in recognizing the implications of lethal autonomous weapons systems, AI-driven military escalation, autonomous drone warfare, and algorithmic targeting, in the context of the rapid evolution of AI-enabled warfare technologies, which is changing the conflict landscape not just globally but also here on the African continent as drone becomes a weapon of choice in various conflict settings.

Also missing is the Council's limited attention to the environmental consequences of expanding AI infrastructure, such as the energy demands of data centres and water consumption. These concerns are particularly significant in the context of Africa's climate vulnerabilities and energy deficits.

In addition, the PSC missed an important opportunity to address the potential impact of AI-driven automation on labour markets and social stability, especially given the

continent's large youth population and fragile employment structures.

Finally, although the communiqué references the inclusion of women and youth, it lacks a comprehensive human rights framework capable of addressing growing concerns around biometric surveillance, facial recognition abuses, and the spread of digital authoritarian technologies.

Key Actionable Decision Requiring follow-up:

The PSC:

- Tasked the Commission to expedite the finalisation of the comprehensive study and the Common African Position on AI and its Impact on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in Africa, in line with the relevant PSC decisions and submit to the PSC for its consideration.
- Requested the AU Commission to expedite the establishment of an African Fund for AI, following due process, to finance the continent's AI infrastructures and startups, including targeted support for African youth-led technology enterprises, in line with the Youth, Peace and Security agenda.
- Directed the AU Commission to explore the establishment of an African Centre of Excellence on AI, following due process, with a view to strengthening research, policy coordination, technical expertise and capacity-building for Member States, as well as to facilitate the responsible integration of AI in the peace and security architecture.
- Requested the AU Commission, in collaboration with the Advisory Group, to continue monitoring developments in AI and submit periodic reports to the Council; including emerging risks,

opportunities and governance development, with recommendations on regulatory policies and frameworks.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security in Africa](#), Insights on the PSC, 15 April 2026.
- [Women, Peace and Security: Women's Leadership in Addressing Emerging Threats to Peace and Security: Artificial Intelligence and Technology-Facilitated Violence](#), Insights on the PSC, 8 March 2026.
- [Artificial Intelligence and its impact on peace, security and governance](#), Insights on the PSC, 19 March 2025.
- [Looking into the future: Artificial intelligence and its impact on peace and security in Africa](#), Insights on the PSC, 12 June 2024.

PSC SESSION ON COORDINATION WITH A3 ENDED WITH A REITERATION OF EXISTING DECISIONS

On 19 April 2026, Council convened for its 1340th session to receive a briefing from the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3).⁴ The outcome document adopted as a [communiqué](#) largely involves a rehashing of previous decisions that were not followed up in practice, complemented by a few new decisions.

This session marked the first A3 briefing to the PSC in 2026, and only the second since the adoption of the Manual on the Modalities

⁴ In addition to statements by the PSC Chair for April 2026 and Commissioner, PAPS, Somalia, serving as A3 coordinator for the first quarter of 2026, led the briefing on behalf of the group, which for the 2026–2027 term comprises the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Somalia.

for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3. The Manual formalises a quarterly briefing by the A3, yet the 1340th session itself, convened in April 2026 as the first briefing of the year, illustrates the persistence of the implementation challenge. This ad hoc, rather than systematic, implementation of the agreed coordination arrangements will have an impact on the effective engagement of the PSC and the A3. As indicated in Amani's [Policy Brief](#), 'Sierra Leone's 2024 - 2025 UN Security Council Tenure and Africa's Recalibration in a Retreating International Law-Based Order', 'Addis Ababa–New York linkages must be made more systematic so that AU and PSC strategy informs Security Council diplomacy in real time, and vice versa.'

Against this backdrop, the PSC's decisions at this session have continued to deepen the coordination architecture in several respects. The majority of the decisions in the communiqué concern coordination and information flow. The communiqué underscored the importance of a sequencing principle, namely, that PSC deliberations on African peace and security issues should precede, to the extent possible, the consideration of the same issues within the UNSC, so that the A3 enters negotiations in New York with clear and strategic continental guidance. This principle, while articulated in previous decisions including the 983rd and the 1289th sessions, has not been fully followed up on, more so given that many of the UNSC sessions on many of the African files are reflected in the annual program. The Council also reiterated that all PSC decisions and positions on African issues under UNSC consideration should be transmitted in a timely manner to the A3, reinforcing a decision taken at the 1289th session that PSC communiqués on such issues be forwarded to the UN Secretary-General as working documents.

In a notable institutional step, the PSC underscored the importance of establishing a dedicated digital platform between the two bodies to enable real-time information sharing ahead of coordinated meetings, particularly to support timely responses during emergency or extraordinary UNSC sessions. This proposal builds on earlier calls for an informal information-sharing platform for PSC and A3 experts embedded in the Manual adopted in July 2025.

The Council also reiterated the importance of inviting A3 representatives to PSC meetings on crisis and conflict situations under UNSC consideration, as well as on pertinent thematic peace and security issues. This also mirrors language from the 1299th session communiqué, but represents a commitment that has also been unevenly applied in practice. Additionally, the PSC called for enhanced collaboration between the PSC Committee of Experts and the A3's Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, a decision with precedent in the 983rd session of March 2021, where the Commission was similarly tasked to enhance cooperation at the expert level. Whether the current iteration will fare better than earlier efforts depends on concrete follow-through by the AU Commission.

On quarterly briefings specifically, the Council directed that these continue regularly and requested the AU Commission to assess the feasibility of holding one of the quarterly sessions at AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa. This spatial dimension, physically bringing the New York conversation to Addis Ababa, is new to the communiqué record and reflects and may have emanated from the understanding that proximity may matter for the quality and depth of engagement between ambassadors and experts who do not ordinarily share the same institutional geography.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1299th Session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1299 \(2025\)](#)] held on 29 August 2025:

The PSC:

- Decided to institutionalise and to include the consultative meeting between PSC and A3+, at ambassadorial level, in the PSC's annual indicative programme as a statutory activity.
- The A3+ to brief and consult with the PSC on a quarterly basis and at any other time necessary, on African issues on the UNSC agenda.
- AU Commission tasked to develop regular reports on its activities in connection with the meetings of the UNSC on African issues, including its interaction with the A3+ and their contributions to the success of efforts to defend the decisions of the Council and the AU, particularly in terms of the implementation of AU decisions, as well as, strengthening the role of the PSC in its engagement with the A3+.

1289th Session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1289 \(2025\)](#)] held on 24 July 2025:

The PSC:

- Decided to adopt the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination Between the PSC and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3) and requested the AU Commission to transmit it to the current A3+1 and its Secretariat, all AU Member States, the Friends of the Seminar, the Regional Economic Communities and Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), the United Nations and other partners, while also ensuring its effective implementation.

983rd Session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.\(CMLXXXIII\)](#)], held on 4 March 2021:

The PSC:

- Decided to ensure the monthly consultations between the A3 and the PSC Troika and to ensure the timely provision of updates and strategic guidance to the A3 on peace and security issues ahead of the UN Security Council meetings.
- Tasked the AU Commission to ensure enhanced cooperation between the PSC Committee of Experts and the Experts of the A3, with a view to more effectively supporting the PSC and the A3.
- Agreed to establish a focal point from PSC Members to be in charge of cooperation and coordination between the PSC and the A3, and following up on the issues of the PSC and the UNSC.

Most substantively, the PSC directed the AU Commission to develop a Matrix of Common African Positions on peace and security matters, to be adopted by the Council for use by the A3 as a reference tool in UNSC decision-making. Alongside this, the Commission was directed to develop an Annual Plan of Action for advancing Common African Positions and PSC decisions in UNSC resolutions. Given the lack of follow-up with existing decisions noted in the foregoing, it is to be seen if these decisions will not meet the fate that other decisions of the PSC faced.

The PSC also reiterated the need for the A3 to 'promote and defend these positions consistently in all circumstances', language that echoes the 1299th session communiqué but which takes on added weight given the structural challenges the A3 faces in influencing UNSC outcomes. In its Communique, the PSC also spoke to the question of African agency within the UNSC's decision-making structures. The PSC, echoing earlier positions, encouraged the A3 to assume greater responsibility in shaping UNSC outcomes on African files by actively pursuing pen-holding and co-pen-

holding roles, not only on African situations but also on other files of broader concern to the continent.

The challenge of pen-holding deserves particular analytical attention. Despite repeated calls across multiple PSC communiqués, including at the 1299th and 1289th sessions, African representation in pen-holding arrangements has remained limited. The structural barriers are considerable: pen-holding is largely distributed among P3 members (France, the United Kingdom, and the United States). While breaking into these arrangements is generally viewed (not without merit) as requiring the possession of enormous technical capacity, the reality is that technical capacity is used as a barrier for maintaining the P3's grip on the power of the pen, in addition to the influence that they wield as permanent members. Indeed, the issue is not solely one of capacity, but also of power and control within the UNSC, particularly the reluctance of P3 to relinquish their monopoly over the pen-holding system and create greater space for elected members in agenda-setting and drafting processes. These challenges are further compounded by the absence of a structured institutional framework to support coordinated A3 engagement on pen-holding responsibilities within the Council. It is therefore necessary that the engagement of the PSC and the A3+ on the issue of the pen-holding needs to go beyond a call for more pen-holding and systematically plan for and overcome these structural barriers, including the AU Commission and AU Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations (AUPOM) developing a concrete strategy to support the A3 in identifying and pursuing pen-holding opportunities. The PSC should also use the Oran process for engaging in such strategic issues rather than generic thematic issues that rarely guide the yearlong engagement of the PSC and the A3.

The communiqué further devoted attention to the institutional infrastructure underpinning A3 operations, with a particular focus on the AUPOM, which serves as the A3 Secretariat. The PSC commended AUPOM for its technical, administrative, and logistical support to the A3, and notably for the development of institutional memory through integration of A3 materials into the PAPS mainstream Repository and the finalisation of a documentary on the A3 aimed at preserving lessons learned across transitions between outgoing, current, and incoming A3 members.

This latter point addresses a weakness that has been identified consistently across multiple PSC sessions and Oran Process conclusions: the loss of institutional memory at the end of each A3 term, which disrupts continuity and forces incoming members to start from scratch. The documentary and the Repository are practical steps toward addressing this, though their utility will depend on whether incoming A3 members are systematically inducted into their contents, a function the Manual assigns to training programmes that the AU Commission is expected to organise for incoming A3 members.

The PSC also requested the AU Commission to continue strengthening AUPOM's institutional capacity by making available the required resources. This too is a recurring request; versions of it appear in the communiqués of both the 983rd and 1299th sessions, and its repetition in the present communiqué suggests that resourcing gaps remain unresolved. The inclusion of A3 activities in the 2025 Annual Report of the PSC to the 39th AU Assembly was welcomed, and the Council called for this to be maintained as a regular practice, reinforcing a decision first taken at the 1299th session.

The Council also addressed Africa's engagement with the broader multilateral architecture, extending the A3's mandate beyond the management of African files. On financing for AU-led peace support operations, the PSC stressed the need for accelerated implementation of UNSC Resolution 2719, adopted in December 2023, and encouraged sustained A3 advocacy toward this end. Resolution 2719 is widely regarded as the most significant achievement of coordinated A3 engagement in recent years, and its adoption has featured in PSC and A3 discussions since the 12th Oran Process. The emphasis on 'accelerated implementation' at the 1340th session reflects a growing impatience with the pace at which the resolution's provisions are being translated into operational financing arrangements.

Key Actionable Decision Requiring follow-up:

The PSC:

- Directed the Commission to assess the feasibility of conducting one of the quarterly briefings at the AU Headquarters.
- Directed the AU Commission to develop, in full respect of AU Assembly Decisions, a Matrix of Common African Positions, on peace and security matters, to be considered and adopted by the Council, in line with established rules and procedures, for use by the A3 as references in promoting common African interests in the decision-making process of the UNSC.
- Directed the Commission to develop, in full respect of AU Assembly Decisions, an Annual Plan of Action for advancing Common African positions on peace and security matters, and PSC decisions in the resolutions of the UN Security Council.
- Requested the AU Commission to

continue to further strengthen the institutional capacity of the AU Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations (AUPOM), by availing the required resources that enable the Mission to more effectively discharge its mandate.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Briefing by the A3 on its Activities](#), Insights on the PSC, 19 April 2026.
- [Sierra Leone's 2024 - 2025 UN Security Council Tenure and Africa's Recalibration in a Retreating International Law-Based Order](#), Policy Brief, 16 April 2025.
- [Briefing by the African Members to the UN Security Council](#), Insights on the PSC, 28 August 2025.
- [General debate of the PSC and A3+1 on African matters in the UNSC Agenda](#), Insights on the PSC, 17 January 2022.
- [Making Africa's voice matter in the UN Security Council: Bridging the gap between ambition and reality in the role of the A3](#), Special Research Report, 24 March 2021

PSC REQUESTS A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY ON AU PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS, FOR SUBMISSION WITHIN SIX MONTHS

On 27 April, at its 1341st session, the PSC held an open session on Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Africa, one of the signature events of the chair of the PSC for the month.⁵ A [communiqué](#) was adopted as

⁵ El-Ghassim Wane delivered a presentation to the Council. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU)

the outcome of the session.



Figure 5: 1341st Meeting of the PSC on 'Peace Support Operations in Africa,' 27 April 2026. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

The various considerations that El-Ghassim Wane put forward in his [presentation](#) during the session are largely reflected in the communiqué adopted by the PSC. For instance, while the communiqué recognises PSOs as an important tool for promoting peace and stability on the continent, it equally underscores the importance of other conflict management instruments, including prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. This directly reflects Wane's argument that these dimensions are equally, if not more, important than PSOs themselves. The communiqué further emphasises the need to strengthen early warning mechanisms, conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, mediation, conflict management, and peacebuilding efforts, while also stressing the importance of a collective security approach. This, again, demonstrates PSC's recognition that discussions around PSOs should not divert attention from more important instruments such as conflict prevention mechanisms, which, as highlighted in the communiqué, could ultimately reduce the need for complex and resource-intensive PSOs.

Furthermore, during the session, the PSC requested the Commission to prioritise 'lean, targeted, and time-bound missions' when making recommendations to the Council on PSO deployments. This also reflects

was also a speaker during the session.

recognition of the financial and logistical challenges the AU has faced in sustaining large-scale peace operations and the need to focus on limited and smaller-scale PSOs that are more closely aligned with the AU's available resources and expertise. This also aligns with an [analysis](#) published by Amani Africa, that a sound division of labour should be established between the AU and the UN.

The communiqué is commendable not only for its strategic clarity but also for several concrete decisions it contains, which, if effectively implemented, could help advance the agenda on African PSOs. One of the most notable decisions was the PSC's request for the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive study on AU PSOs, covering all relevant aspects, including mandates and tasks in the context of Africa's evolving peace and security landscape, capabilities, linkages with other conflict management tools, modalities and partnerships, as well as financing arrangements.

Beyond the significance of commissioning the study itself, which could provide strategic guidance on AU PSOs, the Council's decision to make the process time-bound is particularly commendable. The AU Commission is expected to submit the study to the Council within six months of the adoption of the communiqué. This is an important departure from the PSC's deadline-free decisions. In addition, the study is expected to produce concrete and actionable recommendations, reflecting the Chairperson's push for action-oriented sessions going beyond generic discussions.

The other key decision is the PSC's direction to the AU Commission to establish an annual ministerial forum on AU PSOs, in collaboration with the UN and as a regional segment of the UN-led ministerial process on peacekeeping, which is in line with our recommendation highlighted in the [Insights](#)

[on the PSC](#) dedicated to the session. The forum is envisaged as a strategic platform for mobilising financial, strategic, logistical, and technical support for AU PSOs.

In addition to the above decisions, several key highlights of the session are worth noting. The first is its emphasis on the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, including in relation to peace and security in Africa. It is in this context that the PSC, under paragraph 8 of the communiqué, reiterates that 'when the AU deploys PSOs, it does so on behalf of the Security Council and within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.' The implication of the primary responsibility of the UN, as captured in the communiqué, can have two dimensions. The first is through the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations where required. (The UN has not deployed a new mission in Africa since 2015.) The second is through the provision of support for the deployment and sustenance of AU PSOs in situations where UN missions are not feasible. This necessitates, at the very least, the UN Security Council honouring its own decision through Resolution 2719. The PSC during this session requested the Commission to develop recommendations on how to expedite the implementation of Resolution 2719, including options for applying the framework to PSOs in contexts where it is deemed relevant.

Another key highlight is the emphasis on regular strategic reviews of AU PSOs, as well as the call for the systematic follow-up and integration of the outcomes of the Abuja Lessons Learned Forum on PSOs and the African Standby Force (ASF) into the ongoing AGA-APSA and PSO reform processes. The Council further recognises that the AU already possesses the necessary tools to ensure the effective deployment of PSOs, while rightly placing emphasis on the

full utilisation of these existing instruments rather than reinventing the wheel.

Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC requested/directed the AU Commission to:

- Come up with recommendations on how to expedite the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2719, including options for the possible deployment of PSOs under that framework in situations where these are deemed relevant.
- Prioritise lean, targeted, and time-bound missions when making recommendations to the Council on the deployment of PSOs.
- Undertake a comprehensive study on the AU PSOs addressing all relevant aspects, including mandates and tasks in the context of Africa's evolving peace and security landscape, capabilities, linkages with other conflict management tools as provided for in the PSC Protocol, modalities and partnerships, and financing, with a view to proposing concrete and specific recommendations for consideration by the Council, within six months of the adoption of this Communiqué.
- Establish, based on the most appropriate and cost-effective, an annual Ministerial forum on AU PSOs in collaboration with the UN and as a regional segment of the UN-led ministerial process on peacekeeping as a strategic forum for mobilising financial, strategic, logistical and technical support for AU PSOs.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- [Peace Support Operations in Africa, Insights on the PSC](#), 26 April 2026.

- [The Future of United Nations – African Union Peacekeeping Partnership: Practical Considerations for the Berlin Ministerial Conference](#), El-Ghassim Wane, Amani Africa Special Research Report, May 2025.
- [Remarks by El-Ghassim Wane during the Open Session of the PSC on Peace Support Operations in Africa](#), 27 April 2026.
- [African and the African Union in Shaping the Future of Peacekeeping and the Berlin Conference](#), Policy Brief, 6 May 2025.

PSC SOUNDS MAJOR CONCERNS ABOUT THE STATE OF AUSSOM AS IT ENDORSES A JOINT AU-FGS-UN PROGRESS REPORT

On 28 April, at its 1342nd session, the PSC considered the report on joint AU - Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) – United Nations (UN) progress against benchmarks and the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) mission configuration plan, a session that was not in the initial PPOW of the month. The report was developed in line with UN Security Council Resolution [2809](#) (2025), which encouraged the AU, jointly with the FGS, to transmit updated plans for AUSSOM's configuration to the Security Council by 30 April 2026.




Figure 6: 1342nd Meeting of the PSC on 'The Report of the Joint AU-FGS-UN Progress against Benchmarks and AUSSOM's Configuration Plan,' 28 April 2026. (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

As highlighted in detail in our [Insights on the PSC](#) prepared for the session, the report contains two main components. The first is an assessment of progress against the seven benchmarks guiding the transition of security responsibilities in Somalia for the period from September 2025 to February 2026. The second is the AUSSOM configuration plan, which is shaped by the findings of the benchmark assessment. Overall, the report presents a mixed picture of AUSSOM's operations, highlighting measurable success in implementing its mandate while also underscoring major operational and structural challenges.

Relevant previous PSC decisions

1317th Session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1317 \(2025\)](#)] held on 15 December 2025

The PSC:

- Requested the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit a detailed report with their recommendations for Council's consideration.

One of the key outcomes of the 1342nd session was the PSC's endorsement of the report, while requesting the Chairperson of the Commission to transmit both the report and the [communiqué](#) adopted at the session to the UN Secretary-General, the Coordinator of the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3), and the rest of the Security Council members.

Despite the endorsement of the report, the communiqué reflects deeper concerns around the state of AUSSOM. The first area of concern relates to the delivery by the Somali Government of its part of the bargain.

As pointed out in the Insight on the PSC dedicated to the session, a major missing link in the quest for achieving the end state of the AU mission in Somalia is the Somalia Government's failure to put in place the institutional arrangements for assuming full security responsibility and secure political consensus and national reconciliation. Accordingly and echoing these concerns, the PSC urged the government 'to enhance force generation, regeneration and capacity building, including the recruitment of Community/ Local Defence Forces (LDFs), and mobile forces to hold areas, and undertake operations as part of the clear, hold and build strategy, so as to preserve the gains made and as an overarching factor to inform the exit strategy.'

Further to the foregoing and acknowledging gaps in holding areas liberated from Al Shabaab, the PSC urged the Government 'to support effective stabilisation programs in the areas liberated from Al Shabaab so as to win the hearts and minds of the people...as well as the establishment of effective state institutions.'

The other area of concern relates to the state of full operationalisation of the AUSSOM. Currently, not only is AUSSOM not fully deployed, but its areas of deployment are not reflective of that envisaged for the 11,146 military personnel. Thus, while AUSSOM's force level of up to 11,146 military personnel reflects a significant downsizing compared to earlier ATMIS and AMISOM configurations, the mission remains deployed across 49 inherited locations from previous missions, rather than the envisaged 23 locations under the AUSSOM CONOPs.

The PSC also stressed that, since its establishment in January 2025, AUSSOM has yet to achieve its full mandated configuration and underscored the need to ensure full deployment of forces to enable the Mission

to effectively implement its mandate. Nevertheless, the communiqué fell short of outlining concrete measures for achieving this objective. It is to be recalled that Egypt has yet to deploy its contingent, forcing the PSC to postpone—twice—the first phase of the mission, which requires the realignment of all AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM by 30 June 2025. This process remains pending.

The near existential financial challenge facing AUSSOM is the other major concern addressed by the. It is worth noting that troops have gone extended periods without receiving stipends, likely to affect morale and operational readiness, while compelling troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to subsidise the Mission—an arrangement that is fundamentally unsustainable. The estimated budget for the period from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 stands at approximately USD 190 million, in addition to substantial financial liabilities inherited from ATMIS, including unpaid troop allowances and outstanding reimbursements for contingent-owned equipment (COE).

Expressing **deep concern** over the lack of predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for AUSSOM, the PSC underlined the urgent need to scale up resource mobilisation efforts. In practical terms, beyond reiterating the need for sustained engagement regarding the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719, the PSC recommended the use of part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment, including the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), to ‘substantially’ contribute to addressing funding gaps in the mission’s 2025 and 2026 budgets. This reflects the AU’s determination to continue utilising the CRF at a significant scale, as demonstrated in 2025 when it committed USD 20 million to support the mission. Furthermore, the Council urged the Commission to convene a High-Level Resource Mobilisation

Conference to support the mission’s operational and financial requirements. However, given the limited success of similar past initiatives, including the September 2025 High-Level Financing Event held in New York, expectations regarding the effectiveness of the proposed conference remain modest, at very best.

These and related issues pose a major strain over the sustenance and viability of AUSSOM. Indeed, uncertainty over the future of the mission is echoed in a public statement posted on 26 January by Uganda’s army chief, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, indicating an intention to withdraw Ugandan forces from Somalia after 19 years of engagement. Although it remains unclear whether this reflects official government policy, the statement underscores growing uncertainty surrounding the Mission’s future. In view of this, PSC’s insistence that the withdrawal of AUSSOM should be dependent on security conditions sounds luxurious.

In view of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the PSC made a more realistic call in reiterating ‘its call for the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss on the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit detailed report with their recommendations for Council’s consideration.’

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring follow-up:

The PSC:

- Recommended the use of part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment, including the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), to substantially contribute to addressing the funding gap in the 2025 and 2026 budget of

AUSSOM, including for training, technical assistance, and ammunition.

- Urged the Commission to convene a High-Level Resource Mobilisation Conference to support AUSSOM's operational and financial requirements.
- Call on the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit a detailed report with their recommendations for Council's consideration.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- [Consideration of the Report on Joint AU-FGS-UN Progress against Benchmarks and AUSSOM Configuration Plan](#), Insights on the PSC, 27 April 2026.
- [Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and the Operations of AUSSOM](#), Insights on the PSSC, 11 February 2026
- The [Pan-Africanist](#), Exclusive interview with El Hadji Diene, SRCC and head of AUSSOM, 3 December 2023

A CALL FOR RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, PSC'S RESPONSE TO THE LARGE SCALE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN MALI

On 28 April 2026, the Council added an agenda item to its programme to consider the situation in Mali. The PSC adopted a [Press Statement](#) to make its pronouncement on the developments in the country, particularly the deadly attacks perpetrated on 25 April 2026. Following an [X Post](#) from the Chairperson of the AU Commission on 25 April condemning the acts, the PSC addressed the matter three days later by

engaging representatives of MISAHEL and ECOWAS. Despite the post, however, the Chairperson did not pronounce the Union's substantial approach and immediate practical efforts to manage the existential threat that Mali faces. While the AU Commission statement omitted reference to sovereignty and territorial integrity, which were threatened by the attacks, the PSC 'reaffirmed the unwavering commitment of the AU to respect the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali.' The PSC additionally expressed AU's 'solidarity with the people and the transitional government of Mali.'

However, conspicuously absent from the PSC statement is the condemnation of the role of external actors. Indications are that the level of coordination that was on display in orchestrating simultaneous attacks across different regions of Mali could not have happened without some level of intelligence or other support from state actors within the region or beyond. Indeed, during the session, some member states explicitly expressed themselves, emphasising the need to condemn external interference. However, this concern did not find expression in the final copy of the statement adopted by the PSC.

From the Press Statement Council expressed deep concern over the widespread and coordinated attacks carried out by the Azawad Liberation Front and the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa-Muslimin (JNIM) terrorist groups across Mali on 25 and 26 April 2025, including in Gao, Kidal, and the capital city of Bamako. Council condemned the assassination of the Minister of Defence, General Sadio Kamara, the systematic killings of civilians, and all other terrorist acts committed in the country. The PSC further expressed alarm at the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Mali and across the wider Sahel region.

The events of April 2026 demonstrated that the conflict in Mali cannot be reduced to a simple struggle between a state and isolated extremist groups. Rather, it is a multifaceted conflict involving separatist movements, jihadist organisations, ethnic militias, foreign actors, and political opposition groups. The PSC, instead of prioritising the existential security crisis facing Mali and putting emphasis on the efforts required for first saving Mali from the fire of terrorist onslaught, conflated the threats from these sources with its concern with the restoration of constitutional order. Signifying its obliviousness to the fact that the processes for restoration of constitutional order cannot be pursued in a security vacuum, the PSC's insistence for Malian authorities to expediate the restoration of constitutional order comes across as a statement that the PSC is concerned more with how the furniture in the house is set up than in saving the house from the fire of terrorist violence threatening to engulf it as recent events highlighted. Thus, instead of the stabilisation of Mali and the restoration of state authority as the necessary condition that facilitates the effective pursuit of processes required for the restoration of constitutional order, the Council urged the Malian transitional authorities to expedite the restoration of constitutional order **in order to create conducive conditions for durable peace, security, stability, and prosperity, and thereby alleviate the suffering of the Malian people.** (emphasis added)

The contents of the PSC's statement also fail to approach the situation in Mali sequentially, as the gravity of the situation warrants. PSC did not prioritise stabilisation and restoration of state authority and the provision of support towards such first-order concerns in the prevailing context of Mali. Instead, the statement of the Council continues to touch on all over the place, lacking focus and hence failing to adopt a policy statement

that warrants the gravity and immediate realities of the conflict situation. Thus, the Council encouraged the AU Commission to reinforce preventive diplomacy efforts through intensified high-level engagement aimed at promoting inclusive political dialogue, restoring constitutional order, and establishing a credible and time-bound transition roadmap.

The aspect of the statement that corresponds to the immediate and overarching security challenge in Mali involves the PSC's call for enhanced coordination among Mali, neighbouring countries, and regional mechanisms, particularly in the areas of intelligence and information sharing, joint operations, border management, and broader counter-terrorism cooperation.

Finally, the Council underscored the imperative of placing the protection of civilians at the centre of all response efforts and called on all parties to ensure the safety, dignity, and human rights of affected populations. It emphasised the urgent need for a coordinated humanitarian response, in collaboration with international partners, including the UN and humanitarian agencies, to support internally displaced persons and vulnerable communities and to ensure safe and unhindered humanitarian access. The Council further encouraged stronger coordination among ECOWAS, the AU, the UN, and other strategic partners to ensure a coherent, harmonised, and impactful response to the crisis, including through joint assessments and aligned recovery and stabilisation efforts.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to scale up technical and operational support to Mali's security sector, in-

cluding in terms of capacity-building, early warning, and strategic advisory support in full compliance with the AU normative frameworks and international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL).

- Council requested the Chairperson of the Commission to continue to closely monitor the situation in Mali and to regularly provide updated briefings to Council.

PSC CALLS FOR THE CONVENING OF AN EXTRAORDINARY IGAD MEETING ON SOUTH SUDAN

On 30 April 2026, the PSC adopted, through official emails, a [communiqué](#) following consideration of the [Report](#) of the PSC Field Mission to the Republic of South Sudan conducted from 23 to 25 April 2026. The field mission itself was led by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the AU and PSC Chairperson for April 2026.



Figure 7: PSC Members during the Field Visit to the Republic of South Sudan on 23 and 24 April 2026. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

This was the second PSC field mission to South Sudan in less than a year, following the August 2025 mission whose report was adopted at the 1297th session. The mission's primary objectives were to gather first-hand information on progress in implementing

the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), and to assess the state of preparations for the elections scheduled for December 2026, the constitutionally mandated endpoint of the transitional period. In doing so, the mission navigated a landscape markedly more fragile than at the time of the August 2025 visit. Between the two field missions, the PSC had convened three additional substantive sessions on South Sudan: the 1302nd session of September 2025, which adopted a press statement through email exchange without formal deliberations; the 1308th session of October 2025; and the 1326th session of January 2026.

The field mission and the communiqué adopted at this session must therefore be read not only against the findings of the [mission report](#) but against the full arc of PSC engagement on South Sudan since March 2025. That trajectory, from the press statement of the 1270th session in March 2025 calling for Machar's 'immediate and unconditional release,' through six subsequent sessions, to the present communiqué, reveals a Council largely unable to produce any substantive improvement on the situation in the country.

With regards to the political situation, the communiqué adopted at this session commends the RTGoNU for its commitment to implementing outstanding transition tasks, a commendation that sits in uneasy tension with the field mission report's finding that indicates 'progress in the implementation of the remaining aspects of the R-ARCSS has been stalled.' It is also contradictory with its own communiqué, as the communiqué identifies different elements of the R-ARCSS that are stalled, including that which is reflected in its call 'for an immediate and unconditional permanent ceasefire across the entire territory of South Sudan'. This gap between the diplomatic language of encouragement

and the empirical findings of the mission report is itself significant: it reflects the PSC's persistent structural difficulty in holding parties to account while preserving enough political goodwill to keep them engaged. It also reflects the political dynamics in the Council.

The most consequential political finding of the field mission and the one most directly linked to the accumulation of unimplemented PSC decisions is the continued house arrest of First Vice President Riek Machar and the detention of senior SPLM-IO officials. The communiqué reiterates deep concern over Machar's detention and underlines the need for sustained and harmonised engagement by IGAD, the AU, and the UN to ensure an amicable resolution of the political and security impasse, including Machar's release. Before arriving at this version, a proposal calling for the 'pardoning' of Machar was floated. Given its assumption of guilt on the part of Machar, rather than being a political matter and the lack of support for such formulation by most, the PSC upheld existing language calling for his release. This is the fourth consecutive PSC session to make this call. The 1283rd session of June 2025 called for Machar's 'immediate and unconditional release and reinstatement.' The 1326th session of January 2026 reiterated the release demand explicitly. Now, at the 1343rd session, reiterated it once more, now framing it as a necessary precondition for 'meaningful dialogue and a return to the implementation of the R-ARCSS.'

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1326th PSC session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1326 \(2026\)](#)], held on 23 January 2026:

The PSC:

- Reiterated the request for the Chairperson of the Commission to urgently appoint a High Representative for

South Sudan to support the peace process.

- Reiterated the request for the AU Commission to provide the necessary resources to enable the AULO in South Sudan to effectively implement its mandate.

1297th Session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1297.1 \(2025\)](#)], held on 15 August 2025:

- Requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to urgently appoint an AU High-Level Representative to South Sudan, preferably a former Head of State, to maintain regular engagements with the South Sudanese authorities and other key stakeholders aimed at addressing the challenges in the country with the view to working with the Parties towards the conclusion of the Transition.

1283rd Session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1283 \(2025\)](#)], held on 12 June 2025:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission, working in collaboration with the IGAD Secretariat, to further strengthen political engagement and mediation support to the South Sudan peace process, including through the continued use of the Panel of the Wise.
- Encouraged the Trilateral Mechanism to work with the RTGoNU 'to reactivate the Government Trilateral Joint Task Force (JTF) and facilitate the implementation of pending R-ARCSS provisions, including constitution making and electoral processes.
- Reiterated its call on the RTGoNU to continue working with the AU Commission – Office of the Legal Counsel (OLC) - to develop the Guidelines for the Establishment of the Hybrid Court of South Sudan and the modalities for the truth, reconciliation, compensation and reparation processes.

The communiqué also addresses directly, for the first time at this level of specificity, the RTGoNU's proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS. The mission report documented that the RTGoNU had proposed amendments to Articles 1.2.5 and 1.2.14 to delink constitution-making and census processes from the December 2026 elections. Still, it had also included amendments to Articles 8.2 and 8.3 that would delink the R-ARCSS from the Transitional Constitution and repeal its supremacy. International stakeholders consulted during the mission, including the Troika, the EU, IGAD Partners Forum, and civil society, raised serious concerns about this, warning that the proposed amendments in their totality would undermine the very legal architecture of the peace process. The PSC's communiqué also strongly urged the RTGoNU to ensure that any amendments follow the due process stipulated in the R-ARCSS, and requested R-JMEC, in consultation with the RTGoNU, to coordinate with the IGAD Secretariat **to convene an extraordinary IGAD ministerial meeting** to find a solution. This is procedurally sound but falls short of explicitly signalling the consequences if the RTGoNU proceeds unilaterally, a gap that international interlocutors at the mission meeting had clearly identified as a red line.

On institutional processes, the mission found no progress in the implementation of the Judicial Reform Committee report, the Judicial Services Committee having not yet been reconstituted. The communiqué does not address this finding specifically. Nor does it include an operative decision on the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, despite the fact that calls for its establishment have featured in every PSC session on South Sudan going back to the 1283rd session.

On the positive side, the communiqué welcomes the appointment of former Tanzanian President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete

as AU High Representative and Special Envoy for South Sudan, and commends his April 2026 visit to Juba. This appointment, first requested at the 1297th session in August 2025, was reiterated at the 1308th session in October 2025 and reiterated at the 1326th session in January 2026. Finally, it materialised, having taken approximately nine months from the first formal PSC request to its delivery. The communiqué appealed to the leaders of the RTGoNU and all relevant stakeholders to cooperate with the High Representative and enable the execution of his mandate.

Concerning the security situation in the country, no tangible progress has been registered in the implementation of Chapter 2 of the R-ARCSS on the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements. Active fighting between the SSPDF and the SPLM-IO continues across Greater Equatoria, Greater Bahr el Ghazal, and Upper Nile, with the highest concentration of ceasefire violations recorded in Jonglei State, in Ayod, Pigi, Nyirol, and Akobo Counties.

Most consequentially, the mission found that the Necessary Unified Forces (NUFs), whose training and deployment the PSC had called for as a cornerstone of security sector reform, 'no longer exist as the independent forces they were meant to be.' The cantonment sites and training centres have collapsed. Phase 2 of force reunification has been halted, with only the integration of defectors and surrendered SPLM-IO elements continuing. Despite these major indications of serious violations and gaps in the implementation of the R-ARCSS and perhaps because of them, the PSC underscored the centrality of R-ARCSS.

The PSC communiqué categorically underlined that there can be no viable and sustainable military solution, called for an immediate and unconditional permanent

ceasefire across the entire territory of South Sudan, and strongly urged the parties to the R-ARCSS to embrace mediation and dialogue in partnership with the AU High Representative. This is the sixth time in as many PSC sessions that this call has been issued in substantially similar language.

The December 2026 election deadline is the central operational challenge facing South Sudan and the issue on which the communiqué's most detailed and sequenced decisions are clustered. The 1326th session of January 2026 explicitly warned against the idea of 'separating the convening of elections from the peace process and the R-ARCSS,' echoing [Amani Africa's briefing to the UNSC](#) that elections held in the prevailing conditions risked plunging the country into conflict rather than consolidating the transition. That warning is now directly supported by the field mission's empirical findings: the National Elections Commission lacks financial and technical resources; there is no agreed voter roll; constituency boundaries date to 2010 and are contested; there is no common understanding on the nature of elections to be held; voter and civic education has not been conducted; no election security measures are in place; and IDPs face acute documentation challenges under a 2008 census framework.

In relation to the UNMISS drawdown, the field mission report noted that UNMISS is reducing its presence due to funding shortfalls and operational challenges at precisely the moment the country's civilian protection needs are most acute. The PSC's communiqué expresses AU support for the renewal of the UNMISS mandate, recognising the Mission's critical role in implementing the R-ARCSS and protecting civilians. On the same day that the PSC considered the field mission and adopted the communiqué (30 April), the UNSC adopted Resolution

2820, extending the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) for one year, until 30 April 2027.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the R-JMEC, in consultation with the R-TGoNU, to coordinate with the IGAD Secretariat to facilitate the convening of an extraordinary IGAD ministerial meeting with a view to finding a solution on this matter.
- Requested:
 - a) The Chairperson of the AU Commission to expedite the deployment of a multidimensional technical needs assessment Team to South Sudan to engage with the transitional authorities on the needs in the preparations for the elections in December 2026, as well as to support the transition process, and to continue to provide technical support.
 - b) The RTGoNU to submit to the AU Commission, after the technical needs assessment, the needs for the organisation of the elections in December 2026 to garner the required support and ensure free, fair, democratic and inclusive elections; and
 - c) Member States in a position to do so, to also contribute technical, material and financial assistance needed to support the National Election Commission and other related bodies for the elections scheduled for 2026; and requests the Commission to coordinate resource mobilisation efforts to support RTGoNU in preparation for the December 2026 elections.
- Reiterated its request for the Chair-

person of the Commission to provide the resources that will enable the Mission to more effectively discharge its mandate.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Briefing on the Situation in South Sudan](#), Insights on the PSC, 22 January 2026.
- [Amani Africa tells the UNSC to deploy preventive measures with urgency and decisiveness to pull South Sudan from the brink](#), Amani Africa Briefing to the UNSC, 11 November 2025.
- [Update on the Situation in South Sudan](#), Insights on the PSC, 27 October 2025.
- [Update on the situation in South Sudan](#), Insights on the PSC, 11 June 2025.

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES DURING THE MONTH

5th Annual Joint Retreat between the PSC and the APRM

On 29 and 30 April, the PSC and the APRM convened in Burayu, Ethiopia, for their 5th Annual Retreat. This led to the adoption of the Joint [Burayu Declaration](#) on Five Years of Engagement between the PSC and the APRM (2021–2026).

The two bodies reviewed progress made since their inaugural 2021 retreat in Durban, including institutionalising annual collaboration, integrating APRM governance assessments into the APSA, and enhancing preventive diplomacy through governance-focused early warning tools. From the Declaration, the two bodies reaffirmed commitments to democracy, constitutionalism, human rights, and good governance as foundations

for peace and security, while outlining future priorities such as formalising APRM country reports within the Continental Early Warning System, improving coordination among AU governance and mediation bodies, strengthening member-state implementation capacity, and enhancing data-sharing and rapid response mechanisms.



Figure 8: 5th Annual Joint Retreat between the PSC and the APRM, 29 and 30 April 2026, Burayu, Ethiopia. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

Committee of Experts (CoE) Meetings

Council's subsidiary body, the CoE, also met two times during the month. On 14 April, the experts met for the 'Preparation for the PSC Ministerial Session on Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security in Africa.' In addition, on 21 April, they also met to prepare for the 5th PSC/APRM Annual Joint Retreat.

PSC Visit to the Ethiopian AI Institute and Science and Technology Museum

On 18 April, the Council visited the Ethiopian AI Institute for an experience-sharing session. The visit further explored the role of artificial intelligence in promoting peace and security in Africa and identified potential areas for future collaboration.



Figure 9: PSC Visit to the Ethiopian AI Institute, 18 April 2026. (Source: LinkedIn [Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute](#))

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
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Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research; training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African Union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

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Ambasáid na hÉireann
Embassy of Ireland



Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs



Ministry for Foreign
Affairs of Finland

ADDRESS

On the Corner of Equatorial Guinea St. and ECA Road,
Zequala Complex, 7th Floor, Addis Ababa
Tel: +251118678809
Mobile: +251944723204 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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