

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

AMANI AFRICA

Media and Research Services

August, 2026

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
						1 Education in Conflict Situations 
2	3	4	5 Quarterly Briefing A3 to PSC 	6 (MSC) Implementation of the MoU on ASF	7 Update on the Situation in the Sahel 	8
9	10 (CoE) Consideration of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool 	11	12 Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap: Revitalisation 	13	14 PSC – AGA APSA – Sub.Com HRDG Consultation	15
16 Field Mission to Sudan 	17 Field Mission to Sudan 	18	19 PSC – PAP Consultation 	20	21 PSC – ACHPR Consultation 	22
23	24 Coordination AU/CTC-APRM-CISSA-APRIPOL on CEWS: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM EWS	25	26 Briefing by C5 and SE South Sudan on the latest developments in South Sudan 	27	28	29 21th Extraordinary AU Summit on "Strengthening Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa," Luanda, Angola
30 26th Extraordinary AU Summit on "Strengthening Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa," Luanda, Angola	31 (PSC Sub-Committee on Counter terrorism) Consideration of Guidelines on listing and delisting					

AUGUST
2026



TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE MONTH AT A GLANCE.....1

PSC ADVANCES INTEGRATION OF EDUCATION PROTECTION INTO
AU PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS.....1

PSC RECEIVES QUARTERLY BRIEFING FROM THE A3.....7

PSC SEEKS TO RATIONALISE SAHEL COORDINATION AND
ACCELERATE IMPLEMENTATION OF EARLIER DECISIONS.....9

PSC RECOMMENDS STANDING AGENDA ITEMS ON MAJOR
CONFLICTS AT ORDINARY AU ASSEMBLY SESSIONS14

AU COMMISSION TO REPORT ON ASF’S MOU SIGNATURE AND
IMPLEMENTATION STATUS AFTER THE 8TH MID-YEAR COORDINATION MEETING.....16

PSC INSTITUTIONALISES A ‘ONE AU APPROACH’ TO GOVERNANCE,
HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACE AND SECURITY.....17

THE 4TH CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE PSC AND ACHPR SIGNALLED
THE MOVE FROM RESTATING COMMITMENTS TO IMPLEMENTATION.....22

PSC ADVANCES ITS PREVIOUS CALL FOR A CONTINENTAL DYNAMIC
TOOL FOR MAPPING RISKS AND THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY.....26

PSC RULES OUT ANOTHER EXTENSION OF SOUTH SUDAN’S TRANSITION DESPITE
DOUBTS OVER ELECTION READINESS AND RISK OF FURTHER VIOLENCE.....30

PSC AND THE PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT INSTITUTIONALISE
THE ‘PSC-PAP PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY MECHANISM’
TO ADVANCE ‘COMMON AGENDA FOR PEACE’.....34


PSC REQUESTS THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE AU COMMISSION
TO UNDERTAKE A FIELD MISSION TO SUDAN.....37

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES DURING THE MONTH.....41

THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In August, under the chairship of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled [Provisional Programme of Work](#) (PPoW) consisting of nine substantive sessions and a field mission. Following the revision of the PPoW, ten substantive sessions were held, covering eleven agenda items.

Of the eleven agenda items, three focused on country/conflict-specific situations, while four addressed thematic issues and PSC's statutory engagements with other relevant bodies. All the sessions were held at the level of permanent representatives.



Over the course of the month, the PSC PPoW underwent only one revision. The first change, which happened before the month started, saw the change of dates of the 'Quarterly Briefing by the A3 to PSC' from 26 August to 5 August. This further saw the session on 'Consideration of Guidelines on listing and delisting', which was held at the level of the Sub-Committee on Counterterrorism, being postponed from 25 August to 31 August. Moreover, a session was added on 12 August, focusing on the 'Presentation of the outcome of the meeting of the Military Staff Committee held on 6 August 2026 on the Implementation of the MoU on the ASF.' The last change saw the addition of an agenda item on 28 August, in which the PSC adopted the Report of its field mission to Sudan, which was conducted from 15 to 17 August 2026. This was, however, adopted through silence procedure.

The sessions produced ten communiqués, a field mission report, and conclusions on the engagement between the PSC and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP).

PSC ADVANCES INTEGRATION OF EDUCATION PROTECTION INTO AU PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

The first substantive session of the month was convened on 3 August 2026, coming in as its 1357th meeting dedicated to an open session on 'Education in Conflict Situations in Africa.'¹ This was the third annual session

¹ Council received opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2026. This was followed by introductory remarks from Bankole Adeaye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Presentations were then made

since the Council institutionalised this agenda in 2024.



Figure 1: PSC 1357th open session on 'Education in Conflict Situations in Africa,' 3 August 2026.
(Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

As an outcome of the meeting, the Council adopted a [communiqué](#) that is notable for attaching operational responsibilities, reporting requirements and measurable follow-up to the proposition that education is integral to protection and recovery, thereby giving the agenda a distinctly implementation-oriented character. Its significance lies in the specificity of the responsibilities assigned: embedding education in early warning and peace support operations (PSOs), tightening implementation of the Safe Schools Declaration, protecting continuity across displacement and borders, strengthening

by Professor Gaspard Banyankimbona, Commissioner for Education, Science, Technology and Innovation (ESTI), Amma Twum-Amoah, Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development (HHS), and Sabrina Gahar, Chairperson of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC). Further statements were made by Jainaba Jagne, AU Special Envoy on Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC), and Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Co-Chair of the Africa Platform on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts (AP-CAAC).

recovery responsibilities, and attaching indicators, reporting obligations and deadlines to follow-up.

The session also sits within a strengthened continental education policy architecture. The Council welcomed the [Continental Education Strategy for Africa 2026–2035](#) (CESA 2026–2035) and the Decade of Accelerated Action for Education Transformation and Skills Development in Africa 2025–2034. Their relevance to conflict settings will depend on whether protection, continuity, recovery and financing are embedded in implementation rather than treated as a parallel emergency agenda.

The protection framing remains foundational, while live interventions gave it practical content. The Council recognised that conflict and emergencies deprive children of education while exposing them to recruitment, abduction, sexual and gender-based violence, early marriage, child labour and exploitation. Commissioner Bankole Adeoye stated that 'education cannot be deferred until peace is restored,' describing it as 'a line of protection, a foundation for recovery and an investment in sustainable peace.' Sabrina Gahar highlighted recruitment, abduction and sexual violence. At the same time, Jainaba Jagne cautioned that 'education cannot be sustained in isolation' and linked safe learning spaces with psychosocial services, school feeding, water and sanitation and protection-referral pathways. As highlighted in Amani Africa's [Insights](#) on the PSC, education continuity should sit within a wider framework linking 'child-protection monitoring, DDR, humanitarian assistance, psychosocial support, mediation and post-conflict reconstruction,' rather than a parallel social-sector intervention.

The meeting also sought to place education within the operational tools of the African

Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). South Africa called for threats to education to inform early warning and for stronger PAPS–ESTI–HHS coordination. Ghana urged AU PSOs to reflect education-in-conflict considerations, while Egypt prioritised education in post-conflict reconstruction. IGAD, meanwhile, argued that attacks on education should be treated as peace and security threats.

Against this background, the communiqué's call for an 'education index' in early warning, backed by risk assessment, incident reporting and early-action protocols, could bring attacks, closures, military use and displacement-related exclusion into preventive diplomacy and early response. Member States' interventions similarly described education as 'a peace and security imperative,' reinforcing the case for integrating educational disruption into APSA early warning and preventive action.

The Council's direction to integrate 'education protection benchmarks into the mandates, planning processes, conduct and discipline frameworks, and pre-deployment training of all AU PSOs' gives this operational shift concrete form. It places education protection within mission design, personnel preparation and standards of conduct. The [implementation matrix](#) reinforces this direction by recording specialised child-protection training in PSOs and providing a framework for tracking implementation of related PSC decisions.

A further advance concerns the implementation of the Safe Schools Declaration. Jagne was explicit that 'the norms, policies and institutions exist'; however, the principal gap is implementation. Rebecca Amuge Otengo similarly observed that Africa 'is not short of frameworks,' while Cameroon condemned the military use of schools. The communiqué requires

endorsing States to report annually and translate the Declaration into 'national military doctrine, training programmes, command directives and operational practices.' The test therefore shifts from endorsement to changes in security rules and operations. Political accountability was equally prominent. Otengo stressed that predictable resource mobilisation 'requires a political decision,' while Gahar described the challenge as 'translating commitments into reality.' Jagne, on the other hand, emphasised the imperative for 'collective political will.' Together, these interventions underline that implementation depends on political commitment and resources as much as technical capacity.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1296th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1296 \(2025\)](#)], held on 13 August 2025:

PSC Requested the AU Commission to:

- Develop a policy on the protection and provision of education services during conflicts on the Continent.
- Issue periodic Scorecards on the Elimination of Harmful Practices, tracking trends in child marriage and other violations in conflict-affected areas to enable data-driven interventions.
- Develop a comprehensive and dynamic matrix listing all AU legal frameworks, strategies and initiatives aimed at promoting inclusive education for all, particularly ensuring continuity of education in times of conflict in Africa, and develop an action plan on activities to be undertaken in this area from 2025 onwards.
- Facilitate technical support and capacity-building for concerned Member States in implementing the Safe Schools Declaration, the AU Convention on Ending Violence

Against Women and Girls and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.

The Council gives ratification follow-up a more targeted form by requesting the AU Commission, in coordination with ACERWC, to organise an advocacy meeting with Member States that have not signed or ratified relevant instruments and report back to the PSC. The implementation matrix records ongoing engagement with States yet to endorse the Safe Schools Declaration and notes Somalia's ratification of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child in April 2026. This places existing technical follow-up under clearer PSC oversight. The explicit reference to the Kampala Convention alongside the Safe Schools Declaration and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child also links continuity of education for internally displaced children more directly to Africa's legal framework on internal displacement.

Continuity of learning is another area where the outcome adds practical detail. Member states' intervention advocated flexible learning, low-tech solutions and temporary learning centres. Morocco stressed temporary schools, distance learning and teacher capacity, while Algeria emphasised catch-up opportunities and continuity for conflict-affected learners, including refugees and asylum seekers. The communiqué requires measures from 'the onset of a crisis,' including low-technology and offline options. This is particularly relevant in light of Amani Africa's [August 2025 Monthly Digest](#), specifically its analysis of the 1296th meeting held on 13 August 2025. The analysis warned that digital learning may remain 'symbolic rather than actionable' where electricity, internet, infrastructure and devices are inadequate, while also overlooking the importance of in-person teaching for

socialisation and personal development. The communiqué also introduces a cross-border dimension through recognition of prior learning, portability of academic records, curriculum harmonisation and removal of administrative and fee barriers. These provisions make continuity a regional-governance issue that requires cooperation among neighbouring States and RECs/RMs, alongside national emergency planning. Another intervention further sharpened the protection principle, stressing that 'schools must be made untouchable.'

The request for the AU Commission, working with UNICEF, to 'develop an emergency framework/plan' for continuity of education in conflict, natural disasters and IDP and refugee camps reinforces this shift. Jagne underscored the wider protection ecosystem; the DRC highlighted psychosocial trauma and the demilitarisation of school premises; Sierra Leone argued that 'every attack on education is a direct attack on Africa's future'; and Libya urged curricula that promote coexistence, peace and reconciliation. Gaspard Banyankimbona, Commissioner, ESTI, framed education as a pillar of peace, healing, social cohesion and recovery, calling for conflict-sensitive curricula, peace education, trauma-informed support and better prepared teachers.

A notable institutional development was the assignment of recovery responsibilities beyond the Commission. The Council requested AUDA-NEPAD to support resilient school construction and rehabilitation in conflict- and disaster-affected areas. It also recorded a commitment by the AU Commission and the PSC Sub-Committee on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response to allocate USD 8.8 million for education in emergencies in 19 Member States. At the same time, Africa CDC committed to support health facilities within schools in conflict settings. The debate also

linked recovery to financing: Jagne described financing as ‘an essential component of accountability’ while Zimbabwe called for predictable domestic and pooled financing and integration of emergency education into national planning. Benin linked financing with institutionalised school recovery and social support and Amma Twum-Amoah, Commissioner, HHS, stressed on political leadership, institutional capacity, predictable financing and decisive implementation.

The strongest development is in accountability. The Council considered the implementation matrix as part of its working documents, while the [matrix](#) itself translates previous PSC decisions into 18 time-bound actions with designated lead institutions. It records differentiated progress on the Continental Policy, mapping and an action plan through the CESA Cluster on Education in Emergencies, and coordination through an Education in Emergencies Cluster that brings together Member States, RECs, partners, and AU institutions. The Council also stresses resource constraints, accelerated implementation and coordination to avoid overlapping initiatives. The matrix can therefore serve as both a tracking instrument and a means of clarifying responsibilities and bottlenecks. This emphasis was reflected in the debate whereby South Africa called for stronger accountability alongside early warning and emergency preparedness, while Nigeria called for ‘accelerated implementation of continental frameworks.’

The communiqué adds specific reporting deadlines and indicators. ESTI was requested to report to the PSC ‘by December 2026’ on CESA 2026–2035 implementation relating to education in conflict, together with the 2027 Action Plan and the Education in Emergencies thematic group’s work. The Commission was also tasked with developing a disaggregated continental monitoring framework covering attacks on schools,

closures, military use, safe reopening, enrolment, retention, learning outcomes, and inclusion, creating an outcome-based basis for assessing whether conditions change.

Relatedly, the Council’s request to expedite finalisation of the Continental Policy on the Protection and Provision of Education during Conflict is expressly tied to ‘credible official data’ and comprehensive mapping of AU frameworks, strategies and initiatives. Ethiopia highlighted the imperative of CESA implementation, stronger education-in-emergencies responses and post-conflict recovery. The evidentiary requirement matters where data on school closures, attacks, displacement, learning loss and military use remain fragmented. The policy should therefore clarify institutional responsibility, establish common indicators and connect existing commitments rather than become another stand-alone normative instrument.

The appointment of Jainaba Jagne as AU Special Envoy on CAAC is another institutional advance. The Council welcomed her appointment and emphasised providing her office with the financial, human and technical resources needed to discharge its mandate, while endorsing her sustained engagement campaign on protection and continuity of education. This responds to the long-standing call for an AU focal point on children affected by conflict and places institutional capacity at the centre of the Envoy’s effectiveness. Jagne’s emphasis on ‘clear instructions, clearly identified responsibilities and seriousness about implementation’ points to a coordinating role across PAPS, ESTI, HHS, ACERWC and other actors, including follow-up on the Safe Schools Declaration and ensuring attacks on education inform the wider CAAC agenda. The critical issue is whether political endorsement is matched by sufficient capacity and resources.

Of particular significance, the Council identified four priority pillars: Protection, Continuity, Learning Recovery/Inclusion and Financing/Accountability. These serve as AU assessment indicators and are accompanied by calls for time-bound national commitments. It also supported ACERWC to institutionalise national reporting on children's education in conflict and calls on RECs/RMs to integrate education protection into regional peace, security and early warning frameworks, with annual reporting to the PSC. Together with a platform for sharing Member States' experiences, these measures begin to form a multi-level accountability architecture linking national, regional and continental reporting, allowing educational disruption to feed into RECs/RMs' early-warning and preventive-response systems before reaching the PSC.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC Requested the AU Commission:

- Specifically, the Department of Education, Science, Technology and Innovation (ESTI) to submit to the PSC, by December 2026, a progress report on the status of implementation of the Continental Education Strategy for Africa (CESA 2026–2035), specifically its component on education in conflict situations, along with the Action Plan for 2027 and the work of the Education in Emergencies thematic group.
- In coordination with the ACERWC, to organise an advocacy meeting with Member States that have not yet signed or ratified relevant international and continental instruments, including the Safe Schools Declaration and African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child/ACRWC, and the Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, with a view to securing their

endorsement, full commitment and implementation, and to report back to the PSC.

- Working in collaboration with UNICEF to develop an emergency framework/plan to be shared with AU Member States to ensure the continuity of education, including in situations of conflict, natural disasters and in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.
- To expedite the finalisation of the Continental Policy on the Protection and Provision of Education during Conflict by relying on credible official data (pursuant to Communiqué [[PSC/PR/COMM.1296 \(2025\)](#)]), alongside the development of a comprehensive mapping of AU frameworks, strategies, and initiatives addressing education in conflict contexts, in accordance with the established framework.
- Based on documented sources and proven evidence, to develop and maintain a concise, disaggregated continental monitoring framework tracking attacks on schools, closures, military use, safe reopening, enrolment, retention, learning outcomes and inclusion metrics.

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD), in its capacity as the AU development agency, to support the construction and rehabilitation of resilient school infrastructure in areas affected by armed conflict and natural disasters.
- Directed the AU Commission, in coordination with the AU Special Envoy on CAAC, to integrate education protection benchmarks into the mandates, planning processes, conduct and discipline frameworks, and pre-

deployment training of all AU PSOs.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Education in Conflict Situations, Insights on the PSC](#), 2 August 2026.
- [Education in Conflict Situations, Insights on the PSC](#), 12 August 2025.

PSC RECEIVES QUARTERLY BRIEFING FROM THE A3

On 5 August, during its 1358th session, the PSC received a quarterly briefing on the activities of the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3). The Permanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations, in Liberia's capacity as A3 Coordinator, delivered the briefing.




Figure 2: 1358th PSC Meeting on the 'Quarterly Briefing by the A3 to PSC,' 5 August 2026.
(Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

The [communiqué](#) adopted at the session introduces no new elements. It reiterates previously agreed positions: PSC deliberations should precede UN Security Council deliberations on peace and security issues in Africa; the A3 should be invited to PSC meetings; and the A3 should respect, protect and promote PSC decisions and positions on common African interests. It also

reaffirms the need for unity, coordination, coherence and collective discipline among the A3 in advancing Africa's priorities at the UN Security Council, as well as the A3's quarterly briefings to the PSC.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

983rd Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.\(CMLXXXIII\)](#)], held on 4 March 2021:

The PSC:

- Decided to ensure the monthly consultations between the A3 and the PSC Troika and to ensure the timely provision of updates and strategic guidance to the A3 on peace and security issues ahead of the UN Security Council meetings.
- Tasked the AU Commission to ensure enhanced cooperation between the PSC Committee of Experts and the Experts of the A3, with a view to more effectively supporting the PSC and the A3.
- Agreed to establish a focal point from PSC Members to be in charge of co-operation and coordination between the PSC and the A3, and to follow up on the issues of the PSC and the UNSC.

1340th session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1340 \(2026\)](#)], held on 20 April 2026:

The PSC:

- Directed the Commission to assess the feasibility of conducting one of the quarterly briefings at the AU Headquarters.
- Directed the AU Commission to develop, in full respect of AU Assembly Decisions, a Matrix of Common African Positions on peace and security matters, to be considered and adopted by the Council, in line with established rules and procedures, for use

by the A3 as references in promoting common African interests in the decision-making process of the UNSC.

- Directed the Commission to develop, in full respect of AU Assembly Decisions, an Annual Plan of Action for advancing Common African positions on peace and security matters, and PSC decisions in the resolutions of the UN Security Council.
- Requested the AU Commission to continue to further strengthen the institutional capacity of the AU Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations (AUPOM), by availing the required resources that enable the Mission to more effectively discharge its mandate.

The communiqué's operational part has three parts: the A3 quarterly briefing, the consolidation of PSC–A3+ coordination, and actions to be taken. On the quarterly briefing, the PSC emphasised the need to begin Zimbabwe's transition into the A3 well ahead of its 2027–2028 term on the UN Security Council, with the support of the AU Permanent Observer Mission to the UN, which serves as the A3 Secretariat. This is with the aim to facilitate early familiarisation and knowledge transfer, preserve institutional memory and ensure continuity within the A3 mechanism.

On strengthening PSC–A3+ coordination, the PSC underscored the importance of timely, proactive and dynamic engagement between the PSC and the A3. It also encouraged the A3 to maintain close coordination with the AU Commission ahead of the review of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 on financing AU-led peace support operations, scheduled for the end of the year. Furthermore, it encouraged members of the African Groups in New York and Geneva to make explicit reference to the A3+ in relevant UN resolutions and outcome documents to enhance its visibility.

Regarding follow-up actions, the communiqué contains two main requests to the AU Commission. First, the Commission is requested to track and take all the necessary measures for the implementation of the decisions contained in the communiqué, including through the PSC Matrix of Implementation template. Second, it is requested to expedite the finalisation of the Matrix of the Common African Position on peace and security matters and the A3 Annual Action Plan for advancing the same in the UN Security Council resolutions, pursuant to the decision adopted at the PSC's 1340th session.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the A3 to continue briefing the PSC on a quarterly basis, and whenever necessary, on African issues under consideration by the UNSC.
- Requested that all PSC decisions, communiqués and positions on common African interests that will be considered by the UNSC should be transmitted to the A3 in a timely manner to inform A3 engagement, negotiations and advocacy in New York.
- Requested the AU Commission to take all necessary measures to implement the decisions contained in the present communiqué and to keep the Council regularly informed on progress made by using the PSC's Matrix of Implementation template.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- [Quarterly Briefing by the A3 to the PSC, Insights on the PSC](#), 4 August 2026.

PSC SEEKS TO RATIONALISE SAHEL COORDINATION AND ACCELERATE IMPLEMENTATION OF EARLIER DECISIONS

The PSC, at its 1359th meeting held on 7 August 2026, received an update on the situation in the Sahel.²



Figure 3: PSC 1359th meeting on 'Update on the Situation in the Sahel,' 7 August 2026. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

The meeting came almost a year after the ministerial-level 1304th session of 30 September 2025, which sought to reposition the AU response through an AU Task Force for the Sahel, intensified diplomatic engagement and stronger support to countries in political transition. As its outcome document, the Council adopted a [communiqué](#) reflecting both movement and a continuing implementation gap that has limited the practical effect of earlier decisions.

² Council received opening remarks from Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and PSC Chairperson for August 2026. This was followed by an introductory statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. The Council was further briefed by Mamadou Tangara, High Representative/Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Mali and the Sahel and Head of MISAHEL; Leonardo Santos Simão, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel and Head of UNOWAS; and Mr. George Fominyen, Director of the World Food Programme's AU Global Office.

The formal session was preceded by an informal engagement with countries of the region, enabling the Council to hear directly from Sahelian stakeholders. The subsequent discussion went beyond immediate security concerns to encompass political and humanitarian developments, human rights, and broader economic and social challenges. Against this backdrop, the Chair [highlighted](#) at the opening session the worsening security and humanitarian situation in the Sahel, pointing to the region's growing exposure to terrorism, organised crime, food insecurity and irregular migration, while underscoring the wider implications of instability in the region for continental security and the need for stronger regional coordination and cooperation. Commissioner Bankole Adeoye [called](#) for a 'comprehensive, integrated, multidimensional, and inclusive' response, alongside stronger African-led security cooperation across the wider Sahel-Lake Chad region. Mamadou Tangara likewise briefed the Council on political, security, humanitarian and human-rights developments and on MISAHEL's engagement in the region.

The security setting confronting the Council has deteriorated markedly. The communiqué expresses serious concern over insecurity across the Sahel, compounded by terrorism and violent extremism, climate change and transnational organised crime. Amani Africa's [Insights](#), prepared for the session, observed that 'the security situation in the region appears to have worsened further since the 1304th session,' citing coordinated attacks in Mali, surging JNIM and ISGS activity in Burkina Faso, and repeated attacks in Niger, including against Niamey's international airport. The AU Commission Chairperson similarly [warned](#) in July of a resurgence of terrorist attacks across the Sahel following deadly attacks in Niger and Mali.

The significance of this worsening threat picture is sharpened by the broader continental counter-terrorism context in which the 1359th session took place. Less than three weeks earlier, the PSC's [1354th ministerial meeting](#) adopted the [AU Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Countering Terrorism in Africa \(2026–2030\)](#), against the backdrop of terrorist groups continuing to 'expand their operational reach and capabilities across the Sahel.' The meeting also highlighted increasingly sophisticated and adaptable terrorist operations, including drones and emerging digital technologies, and the convergence between terrorism and transnational organised crime. The 1359th communiqué can therefore be read against this newly strengthened continental counter-terrorism policy environment, in a region where these evolving threats are particularly acute.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1304th Session, 30 September 2025 [[PSC/MIN/COMM.1304 \(2025\)](#)]

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Centre to develop programmes tailored for supporting the countries of the Sahel region.
- Decided to establish a Task Force to support the countries of the Sahel in fighting against terrorism and directed the AUC Chairperson to ensure it addresses security, socio-economic and humanitarian challenges in the region, including terrorism and violent extremism.
- Called for a field visit by Evariste Ndayishimiye, AU Special Envoy for the Sahel, with the support of the AUC, to the three countries of the Sahel, to engage on political transition processes.

1279th Session, 14 May 2025 [[PSC/PR/COMM.1279 \(2025\)](#)]

The PSC:

- Recommended the establishment of a continental mechanism, anchored by AFRIPOL, to continuously map, update and analyse criminal flows and networks and disseminate this intelligence securely to law enforcement bodies.
- Requested the AU Commission, in coordination with AFRIPOL, AU Countering Terrorism Centre and CISSA, to carry out a comprehensive study on organised transnational crime, peace and security in the Sahel region.

Following the 1304th meeting's call for intensified diplomatic engagement, including a field visit by AU Special Envoy for the Sahel Évariste Ndayishimiye to 'enhance direct dialogue with the transitional authorities,' AU outreach accelerated in 2026. The pre-session Insights records the Commission Chairperson's July meeting with Mali's Transitional President Assimi Goïta, where he reiterated support for stability, counter-terrorism, national cohesion and constitutional order and stressed that terrorism 'knows no borders'; his visit to MISAHEL headquarters; and subsequent engagement with Burkina Faso's Foreign Minister Karamoko Jean-Marie Traoré. MISAHEL diplomacy also widened: in January Mamadou Tangara [met](#) Goïta, then undertook a February mission to Burkina Faso; in March he [travelled](#) to Niger as part of 'a series of consultations' with AES countries. On 20 April, Ndayishimiye's [visit](#) to Ouagadougou and meeting with President Ibrahim Traoré focused on counter-terrorism and rebuilding AU–AES cooperation. Together, these engagements indicate intensified AU outreach consistent with the 1304th session's emphasis on dialogue and collective responses to shared security threats.

At the political level, the communiqué adopts a somewhat different formulation from the 1304th meeting. Rather than emphasising adherence to agreed transition timelines, the Council encourages Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to pursue nationally owned political, legal and institutional reforms, inclusive dialogue and conditions for the 'peaceful restoration of constitutional governance,' while taking account of the security environment. This shift is consistent with the PSC's 1356th meeting on Burkina Faso and Niger, which paired restoration of constitutional order with 'constructive engagement' and 'inclusive, nationally owned and credible political transition processes' amid deteriorating security in the central Sahel. The communiqué, however, takes a differentiated approach to Chad, encouraging the authorities to consolidate constitutional governance, strengthen democratic institutions and national cohesion, and advance reforms in support of peace, security and socio-economic development.

The shift in emphasis coincides with a changing regional diplomatic environment. The 69th Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority in July 2026 maintained engagement with the AES countries despite their withdrawal from ECOWAS, directing the Commission's President to intensify engagement towards a pragmatic security cooperation framework. This followed the March [appointment](#) of Lansana Kouyaté as ECOWAS Chief Negotiator with the AES, mandated to 'facilitate dialogue' and advance negotiations. During his 25 May [meeting](#) with Burkina Faso's President Ibrahim Traoré, Kouyaté said discussions addressed 'security' and 'stability', called for 'exemplary cooperation' and stressed that 'geography unites these two entities.' By July, he [reported](#) that the AES states were prepared to cooperate with ECOWAS even though rejoining was not then on

the agenda. Against this background, the 1359th communiqué's emphasis on trust-building and AU-ECOWAS-ECCAS-LCBC-UN dialogue is notable: political fragmentation cannot be allowed to obstruct cooperation against cross-border threats.

A consequential new element is the Council's attempt to reorganise regional coordination. It calls on the Commission to 'rationalise the coordination architecture engaged in the Sahel' and requests joint reporting with UNOWAS to align the UN strategic review with PSC decisions. This responds to proliferating initiatives across ECOWAS, the AES, the Nouakchott Process and other frameworks, and to persistent risks of fragmented mandates, duplication and competing regional strategies.

Relatedly, the PSC requests annual Technical and Ministerial Consultations linking the AU, relevant RECs/RMs and member states of the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes. The focus is operational: strategic coordination, intelligence fusion, information sharing, early warning, border security and coordinated responses to terrorism and transnational organised crime. If implemented, this could connect western and eastern security theatres of the wider Sahel-Saharan belt as armed networks, trafficking routes and extremist groups increasingly operate across regional boundaries.

The Council's decision to revive consideration of the Independent High-Level Panel on Security and Development in the Sahel is equally important. Chaired by former Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou and established under the auspices of the AU Commission, the UN, ECOWAS, and the G5 Sahel, the Panel presented its final report in 2024. Its value lies in linking governance, security, socio-economic development, resource mobilisation and partnerships. At the same time, the AU-UN

annual [conference](#) in October 2024 agreed to 'jointly take forward key recommendations' through their respective institutional mechanisms. The communiqué instructs the PSC Committee of Experts to review the report expeditiously and identify priority recommendations. The accompanying [Implementation Matrix](#) provides a basis for translating recommendations into action, allowing the review to focus on measures that can be prioritised, resourced and assigned to responsible institutions.

The communiqué further strengthens the AU Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), directing it to expand technical support on counter-terrorism, strategic intelligence, border security, terrorist financing, and the prevention of violent extremism, while tightening links between continental, regional, and national early-warning structures. This complements the July ministerial counter-terrorism session's emphasis on early warning and adapting to increasingly sophisticated terrorist operations. The challenge is to connect these continental instruments to operational needs in the Sahel rather than allow parallel policy processes to persist.

The Council also records USD 2 million from the AU Peace Fund in 2025, support through the African Facility for Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT), and a commitment to mobilise further support in 2026. Although modest relative to the crisis, this gives material content to the 1304th meeting's appeal for predictable support and raises an implementation question: whether resources are tied to visible programmes that strengthen state presence, service delivery, resilience, and transition support in affected communities.

On the humanitarian dimension, the Council goes beyond the previous session by requesting an urgent humanitarian mission

to Sahel countries by December 2026, involving the AU Commission's humanitarian department, AUDA-NEPAD and the World Food Programme to provide assistance and assess conditions first-hand. The urgency is clear: the pre-session Insight, citing UN-OCHA figures for the first quarter of 2026, recorded 2,640 conflict-related deaths and 1,179 security incidents across the Central Sahel, 2.8 million internally displaced persons and 11.4 million people requiring food assistance.

The Council also places greater emphasis on civilian protection and accountability, reiterating obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law and urging stronger accountability in counter-terrorism operations. This qualifies the growing emphasis on military cooperation and reflects wider analysis that abuses during counter-terrorism operations can deepen mistrust, weaken state legitimacy and exacerbate grievances exploited by extremist groups.

The communiqué also gives more concrete content to the frequently invoked need for a multidimensional response, explicitly stressing that 'military responses alone cannot sustainably address' the challenges confronting the Sahel. It accordingly identifies youth unemployment, peace education, climate-resilient agriculture, infrastructure development and local governance as areas requiring greater attention, linking sustainable socio-economic development to the structural conditions sustaining radicalisation and violent conflict. Significantly, it also calls for a 'whole-of-government-whole-of-society' approach that incorporates women, youth, traditional leaders, and religious leaders. Taken together, these provisions reinforce the Council's recognition that security measures need to be accompanied by governance, development and preventive interventions

that address underlying grievances and broaden participation beyond state security institutions.

Yet the central weakness exposed by the 1359th meeting is slow implementation of prior PSC decisions. The clearest example is the AU Task Force for the Sahel: established by the 1304th meeting to address security, socio-economic and humanitarian challenges, it remained pending almost a year later. The 1359th communiqué therefore requests the Commission to 'expedite the implementation of all decisions relating to the Sahel,' expressly including the Task Force. The delay risks reinforcing perceptions that Council decisions are not matched by institutional follow-through.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to expedite the implementation of all decisions relating to the Sahel, including the decision relating to the establishment of an AU Task Force for the Sahel; and to convene annual Technical and Ministerial Consultations between the AU, relevant RECs/RMs, Member States of the Nouakchott Process on the Enhancement of Security Cooperation and the Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Saharan Region, as well as with Member States of the Djibouti Process on Regional Security in the Eastern and Horn of Africa regions, with a view to further strengthening strategic coordination, intelligence fusion and information sharing, early warning, border security cooperation and coordinated responses to terrorism and transnational organised crime.
- Requested the Chairperson of the Commission to avail MISAHEL of all re-

quired resources to enable it to more effectively discharge its mandate.

- Instructed the PSC Committee of Experts to review, as soon as possible, the Report of the Independent High-Level Panel on Governance, Security and Development in the Sahel, jointly commissioned by the AU Commission, UN, ECOWAS and G5 Sahel, in 2022 and delivered in 2024, and to report to Council on priority recommendations.
- Requested the AU Commission to continue monitoring developments in the Sahel and to submit regular reports to the PSC on the implementation of the present Communiqué and on evolving political, security, humanitarian and socio-economic developments in the region.
- Urged the AU Commission, through the HHS Department, to conduct, by December 2026, an urgent humanitarian mission to the Sahel countries, in coordination with AUDA-NEPAD - in its capacity as the continent's development agency - and the WFP with the objectives to provide humanitarian assistance to local people and to observe firsthand the humanitarian situation.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Update on the Situation in the Sahel, Insights on the PSC](#), 6 August 2026.
- [Update on the Political Transition in Burkina Faso and Niger, Insights on the PSC](#), 26 July 2026.
- [Briefing on the Sahel Region, Insights on the PSC](#), 29 September 2025.
- [From estrangement to engagement: PSC and ECOWAS MSC call for a co-operation framework for engaging AES States](#), *Ideas Indaba*, 9 July 2025.

PSC RECOMMENDS STANDING AGENDA ITEMS ON MAJOR CONFLICTS AT ORDINARY AU ASSEMBLY SESSIONS

On 12 August 2026, at its 1360th session, the PSC considered 'Progress made in the Silencing the Guns in Africa Roadmap: Revitalisation.'³ The session was convened in line with the PSC's decision at its 1252nd session, held in December 2024, which requested the AU Commission, through the High Representative for Silencing the Guns, to regularly brief the Council on implementation of the AU Master Roadmap (AUMR) of Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa, at least twice a year. The session also came after the midpoint of the extended 2030 timeline for Silencing the Guns had passed, while the continent's peace and security situation continued to worsen. The PSC adopted a [communiqué](#) as the session's outcome.



Figure 4: 1360th Meeting of the PSC on 'Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa Roadmap: Revitalisation,' 12 August 2026. (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

³ During the session, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns in Africa briefed the Council while statements were delivered by Liberata Mulamula, AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), as well as the Representatives of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).

The PSC encouraged Member States to accelerate domestication of the AUMR by developing and implementing national action plans aligned with national peace and security priorities and appointing national focal points. It also encouraged them to report regularly on implementation using the standardised Monitoring and Evaluation Framework developed by the AU Commission. Emphasising Member States' primary responsibility for translating AUMR commitments into concrete action, the PSC requested them to establish National Focal Points to coordinate national implementation, monitoring and reporting.

A key highlight of the communiqué is its recommendation to the Policy Organs to establish standing agenda items specifically addressing major conflict situations during Ordinary Assembly Sessions, beginning with the January 2027 Summit. If followed through, this could strengthen the AU's role in resolving conflicts on the continent, particularly as external actors play an increasingly prominent role in mediation processes. Another important decision was the PSC's request to the Chairperson of the Commission to strengthen the deployment of Special Representatives on the ground and conduct quarterly shuttle diplomacy, mediation and field missions in Member States facing looming political/security crises. Such regular engagement could help the Commission fulfil its conflict prevention and resolution mandate under Article 10 of the PSC Protocol.

The PSC also took several actionable decisions. In particular, it requested the Commission to urgently assess the impact of actions undertaken towards Silencing the Guns in Africa by Member States, High Representatives, the AU Commission, RECs/RMs and other strategic actors and to report to the Council before the 40th AU Assembly session in January 2027.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC requested:

- Member States to establish National Focal Points responsible for coordinating the implementation and ensuring regular reporting on the political, social, economic, legal and environmental dimensions of the Silencing the Guns initiative.
- The Chairperson of the AU Commission to strengthen the deployment on the ground of its Special Representatives and to conduct shuttle diplomacy and mediation, field missions, on a quarterly basis, including through the use of Good Offices, in Member States facing looming political/security crisis situations.
- The Commission to continue convening regular high-level political dialogue, interdepartmental consultations and regional coordination mechanisms to sustain momentum in implementing the AUMR and to also promote greater coherence across the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
- The Commission to finalise the assessment matrix for the implementation, by Member States, of the Silencing the Guns Roadmap on political, social, economic, environmental and legal dimensions; and emphasises the need to prioritise building resilience, adaptation capability and sustainable livelihoods.
- AU networks for women and Youth to submit recommendations on the best practical means and ways of further enhancing their role in the implementation of the Master Roadmap.
- AUDA-NEPAD, as the Continent's development agency, to support small-scale development projects and basic infrastructure projects in remote ar-

reas of Africa with modest implementation costs.

- The Commission to urgently undertake an evaluation/assessment exercise, working in collaboration with Member States, think tanks and centres of Excellence on the impact of the actions being undertaken by Member States, High Representatives, AUC, RECs and RMs and all other strategic actors towards Silencing the Guns in Africa and to report to Council as soon as possible before the next Summit of AU Heads of State and Government.

It also recommended:

- The Policy organs to establish standing agenda items, specifically highlighting major conflict situations, during Ordinary Assembly Sessions, starting from the 40th AU Assembly Session (January 2027).

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa Roadmap: Revitalisation, Insights on the PSC](#), 11 August 2026.
- [Amani Africa Briefing to the 1252nd session of the PSC on Silencing the Guns](#), 18 December 2024.
- [Memo to the New AU Commission Leadership from the Roaring Guns on AU's First Decade of Silencing the Guns](#), Amani Africa Special Research Report, 15 October 2024.

AU COMMISSION TO REPORT ON ASF'S MOU SIGNATURE AND IMPLEMENTATION STATUS AFTER THE 8TH MID-YEAR COORDINATION MEETING

Still on 12 August 2026, Council convened for its second agenda item of its 1360th meeting to consider the outcome of the 34th Meeting of the Military Staff Committee held on 6 August 2026 on the Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding on the African Standby Force (ASF).



Figure 5: 1360th Meeting of the PSC on the 'Presentation of the Outcome of the Meeting of the Military Staff Committee held on 6 August 2026 on the Implementation of the MoU on the ASF', 12 August 2026.
(Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

It is worth recalling that Decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.978 (XXXIX)] adopted by the 39th AU Assembly held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 14 to 15 February 2026 directed the Commission to expedite the signing and operationalisation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the AU and the RECs/RMs on the use of the ASF and to report regularly on the status of its implementation. The session also builds on the [1346th meeting](#) of the Council which was [held](#) on 15 May 2026.

The meeting welcomed the Summary Record of the Military Staff Committee meeting and the progress achieved in the legal clearance and approval for signature of the MoU and the rescheduling of the signing ceremony of the MoU, to take place on the margins of the 8th AU Mid-Year Coordination Meeting to be held in Egypt on 4 October 2026.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1346th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1346.1 \(2026\)](#)], 15 May 2026

The PSC:

- Appealed to the international partners and AU Member States, in a position to do so, to support efforts aimed at mobilising the required budget of USD 4,717,606.45 for the approved structures of the Continental Logistics Base and regional logistic depots approved by the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly.
- Requested the AU Commission to continue consultations with Member States, RECs/RMs and relevant stakeholders towards the finalisation and implementation of the operational work plan emerging from the ASF Strategic Review process.
- Requested the Commission, working in coordination with the RECs/RMs, to provide an updated briefing to Council on technical, logistical, operational requirements and gaps to be urgently addressed through a clear and detailed dashboard, by July 2026.

The Council further encouraged the concerned RECs/RMs to expedite the negotiation of harmonised MoUs with their respective Member States, consistent with the ASF Work Plan, so as to ensure coherent cascading of the continental instrument to the regional and national levels. It emphasised the need for continued advocacy on the strategic value of the MoU, including its alignment with UNSC Resolution 2719

(2023), in order to strengthen political buy-in and support resource mobilisation efforts. It further underscored the urgent need to address the challenges facing the deployment of the ASF, including the political engagement of Member States and RECs/RMs, strategic airlift, interoperability, regional logistics bases, disparities in standards and the capacities and capabilities pledged by the various Regional Planning Elements (PLANELEMS), as well as their operational readiness.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

Requested the AU Commission to:

- Finalise and disseminate the MoU Implementation Plan, including the nomination of focal points, pursuant to Article 5 of the MoU.
- Expedite the development of AU and concerned RECs/RMs decision-making and planning guidelines for Peace Support Operations, including with the UN as may be required, in order to operationalise the MoU's provisions on unified political authority and co-ordinated mandating.
- Finalise its position on cost-responsibility and reimbursement arrangements, so that predictable financing mechanisms are in place to support the MoU's operational provisions.
- Submit to the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS), after the 8th Mid-Year Coordination Meeting, a follow-up progress report on the status of signature and implementation of the MoU.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Update on the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 14 May 2026.

- [Peace Support Operations in Africa](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 26 April 2026.
- [Update on the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 29 January 2025.
- [Briefing on the Status of Implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy and Other Relevant Defence and Security Instruments on the Continent, with Specific Focus on Update on Operationalisation of the African Standby Force](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 22 June 2023.

PSC INSTITUTIONALISES A 'ONE AU APPROACH' TO GOVERNANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACE AND SECURITY

On 14 August 2026, at its 1361st meeting, the PSC held its annual consultation with the African Governance Architecture–African Peace and Security Architecture (AGA–APSA) Platform and the Permanent Representatives Committee Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG).⁴



Figure 6: PSC 1361st Meeting on 'Consultation with the AGA–APSA Platform and the Permanent Representatives Committee Sub-Committee HRDG,' 14 August 2026. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

⁴ Council received opening remarks from Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2026. An introductory statement was made by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for PAPS, followed by statements from Willy Nyamitwe, Permanent Representative of Burundi and First Vice-Chairperson of the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG; and Jevin Pillay, Vice-Chairperson of the AGA-APSA Platform and Permanent Representative of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to the AU.

The adopted [communiqué](#) gives the annual engagement a more implementation-oriented character, with particular attention to institutional coherence, early warning and early action, accountability for previous decisions and the PSC's chairship of the AGA-APSA Platform for 2026–2028.

The most important institutional development is the decision to institutionalise 'One AU Approach' to human rights, democracy, governance, peace and security. The communiqué gives this formulation practical content by defining it as an approach that moves 'beyond coordination' towards 'jointly analysing risks, aligning priorities, mobilising collective action and delivering coordinated responses.' The significance lies in shifting the centre of gravity from consultation towards joint problem-solving. In practice, this would require governance, human-rights and peace and security institutions to work from shared risk assessments, clarify institutional responsibilities and connect warning signals to political engagement before deterioration becomes violent. The concept will therefore be meaningful only if it produces routine joint analysis, clear institutional leads and agreed pathways for timely response.

Relatedly, the communiqué places decision-tracking more firmly at the centre of the annual consultation. It welcomes progress recorded in an [implementation matrix](#) and requests the PSC and AGA-APSA Secretariats to continue facilitating coordination, monitoring progress and reporting on outcomes. The matrix is important because it allows the annual meeting to distinguish between institutional activity and delivery. It records that a comprehensive mapping of AU legal and normative frameworks has been developed, while the 'fit for purpose' assessment remains ongoing; the Joint AGA-APSA Roadmap is still under development and has faced funding

constraints; and operationalisation of the African Governance Facility continues to depend on resource mobilisation. As Amani Africa's [Insights](#) on the PSC, dedicated to the session cautioned, 'annual consultations risk repeating commitments while leaving previous assignments unresolved.' Routine use of the matrix can help turn the annual engagement into a clearer accountability point by identifying completed, delayed and outstanding assignments, responsible institutions and areas requiring additional political or resource support.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1295th session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1295 \(2025\)](#)], held on 8 August 2025:

PSC requested:

- AU Member States to provide political support on the implementation of the Africa Governance Report of the AGA-APSA Platform produced by APRM.
- The AU Commission to expedite the operationalisation of the African Governance Facility, in order to facilitate effective resource mobilisation to support the initiatives of the African Governance Platform and Member States towards the promotion of good governance and strengthening of democracy on the Continent.
- The AU Commission, in coordination with AGA-APSA platform, Sub Committee on HRDG and APRM, to develop a comprehensive matrix that lists all AU legal frameworks on governance, human rights, peace and security and assess whether the frameworks are fit for purpose in addressing the continent's complex governance and security challenges as part of the review process of the Governance, peace and security frameworks in line with Assembly decision Assembly/AU/Dec.920 (XXXVIII), adopted during the 38th Ordinary Session of the Assembly

of the Union held from 15 to 16 February and further, develop an Action Plan on the activities to be undertaken on this matter starting from 2025.

1167th session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1167 \(2023\)](#)]

held on 11 August 2023:

PSC requested:

- The AU Commission to expedite the operationalisation of the African Governance Facility, in order to facilitate effective resource mobilisation to support the initiatives of the African Governance Platform and Member States towards the promotion of good governance and strengthening of democracy on the Continent; and in the same context, also requests the AU Commission to further strengthen the PRC Sub Committee on HRDG and the AGP, as well as the institutional capacity of the AGA-APSA Secretariat to more effectively discharge their respective mandates.
- The AU Commission, the African Governance Platform and the AGA-APSA Secretariat to organise a joint consultative meeting to identify joint initiatives beyond the experience sharing sessions, paying particular attention to the following areas;
 - i. Joint PSC, the PRC Sub Committee and the AGP promotional visits on AU shared values instruments.
 - ii. More active role in preventive diplomacy and mediation efforts.
 - iii. PSC involvement in the planning and delivery of the AGA Flagship Initiatives.
 - iv. Establishment of follow-up mechanisms of the decisions of the joint session between PSC and AGP.

The communiqué is particularly consequential for the persistent early warning–early action gap. It welcomes finalisation of the AU Model on Trigger Mechanism for Early Warning and Early Action and supporting tools, including the Risk and Threat Mapping Tool, while stressing the need for ‘enhancing early response to early warning’ and envisaging their validation by the PSC and the Luanda Extraordinary Summit. This process had advanced further by the PSC’s [1363rd](#) meeting on 24 August 2026, which validated the prototype Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and the AU Trigger Model, describing the latter as ‘a critical step forward in enhancing the CEWS.’ It also called for interoperability among these tools and CEWS to create ‘a functional bridge’ between risk assessment, early warning, escalation thresholds and timely response. Read together with the 1361st meeting’s emphasis on the One AU Approach, enhanced information-sharing and joint analysis across relevant AU institutions, these measures provide a practical basis for integrating governance, political and human-rights indicators into preventive action. The key test remains whether improved warning, institutional coordination and agreed thresholds translate into timely and consistent preventive response.

The PSC’s assumption of the AGA–APSA Platform chairship for 2026–2028 gives it unusual leverage to move these arrangements from design to practice. The communiqué calls on the Council, in coordination with the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG and AGA–APSA Platform members, to provide strategic leadership and urges the three mechanisms to identify ‘concrete joint actions beyond the annual engagement,’ including information-sharing, joint analysis, policy dialogue and coordinated responses. This is important because it could provide a clearer political centre of gravity for

implementation. The agreement to convene both the next annual consultation and a joint retreat in Addis Ababa in 2027 provides a natural review point. Rather than functioning as another dialogue event, the retreat could be used to agree a limited number of joint priorities, allocate responsibilities and establish timelines against which the 2027 consultation can assess performance. Notably, the PSC assumes this chairship at both political and technical levels, potentially creating greater continuity between strategic direction and the technical follow-up required to translate joint priorities into implementation.

A further accountability development concerns implementation of AU Shared Values instruments. The communiqué commended Cameroon for submitting its national assessment report and encouraged other Member States to fulfill reporting obligations. More significantly, it directed the AU Commission, in cooperation with Member States, to submit an Annual Report on implementation of African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), AGA-APSA and other AU normative instruments and frameworks. This could create a clearer chain from national reporting to continental political review. It also encouraged the implementation of decisions of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR), the African Court on Human and People's Rights (AfCHPR) and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) and renewed ratification and domestication of relevant human-rights instruments.

The value of the annual report will depend on whether it measures substantive compliance, follow-up to decisions and implementation gaps rather than merely recording ratifications and submissions. Used alongside the implementation matrix, it could provide the PSC with a more systematic

basis for identifying governance and human-rights risks before they escalate into peace and security crises. A notable addition is the Council's specific linkage of this human-rights agenda to children affected by armed conflict. It called for rehabilitation, reintegration and psychosocial support, alongside accountability, for former child soldiers and victims of abduction and sexual violence, thereby connecting the AGA-APSA engagement more explicitly with protection and post-conflict recovery obligations.

The communiqué also gave stronger preventive meaning to the governance-security nexus by recognising governance deficits, democratic backsliding, human-rights violations and weaknesses in constitutional order as 'underlying fundamental and structural root causes' of violent conflict. This framing matters because it locates governance and rights squarely within the PSC's conflict-prevention mandate. Yet the operational bridge remains incomplete. The Council called for joint analysis and coordinated responses, but did not establish a dedicated mechanism through which election-observation findings, APRM assessments and information from AU human-rights organs would routinely feed into PSC deliberations.

Participation is another area where the outcome seeks to move from principle towards institutional practice. The AGA-APSA Platform and PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG were requested, working with the PSC and other actors, to strengthen engagement with 'citizens, particularly women and youth, as well as civil society organisations, academia, think tanks and the media.' The communiqué also welcomed the 5th AU Continental Dialogue on Youth, Peace and Security and Women, Peace and Security held in Bujumbura from 10-12 August. A [Bujumbura Declaration](#), adopted by the Youth Creative Consortium on the sidelines

of the Dialogue, called for commitments to be translated into 'practical and measurable action' and stressed that young people and women should be recognised as 'essential partners and leaders in its implementation.' The policy issue is therefore no longer simply access to consultative spaces, but whether citizen-generated evidence and the perspectives of women and youth shape joint risk analysis, preventive diplomacy and follow-up. The preparation of the 2028 AU Theme of the Year, 'Promoting Human Rights, Democracy and Governance to Achieve the Goals of Agenda 2063 in Africa,' provides a useful vehicle for translating this participatory ambition into measurable institutional commitments. Crucially, the outcome also called for mobilisation of the necessary political will, alongside technical, financial and human resources for the 2028 agenda and its flagship initiatives, including strengthening the institutional and operational capacity of the AGA-APSA Secretariat. This matters given that resource constraints have already delayed elements of the existing AGA-APSA implementation agenda; without a corresponding resource framework, the expanded expectations attached to 2028 risk reproducing the same implementation deficit.

Finally, the communiqué commended the increase in implementation of the Agenda 2063 ten-year implementation plan from 39 to 53 per cent, attributing the progress to governance reforms, institutional strengthening, public-sector accountability, policy harmonisation and human-capital development. While the figure provides a positive continental benchmark, its preventive relevance will depend on how far aggregate performance can be disaggregated to reveal areas of persistent governance weakness. Continental progress can coexist with democratic backsliding, shrinking civic space, unconstitutional changes of government and weak

enforcement of AU norms in particular Member States. The more important analytical opportunity is therefore to connect areas of weak governance performance to the joint analysis, early-warning and coordinated-response mechanisms that the same communiqué seeks to institutionalise. In this respect, the central test emerging from the meeting is whether the architecture can move from measuring progress to acting on risk.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AGA-APSA Platform, the PRC Sub Committee on HRDG, working in collaboration with the PSC and other relevant AU Organs and Institutions, RECs/RMs and critical stakeholders, to further strengthen engagement with citizens, particularly women and youth, as well as civil society organisations, academia, think tanks and the media, in advancing democratic governance, human rights, peace, security and development in Africa.
- Directed the AU Commission, in co-operation with Member States, to submit an Annual Report on the implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, AGA/ APSA and other AU normative instruments and frameworks.
- Requested the PSC and AGA-APSA Secretariats to continue facilitating coordination, monitoring progress and reporting on implementation of outcomes from the annual joint engagements, using the implementation matrix as the basis for follow-up.
- Agreed to convene the next annual consultative meeting and the joint retreat in 2027 in Addis Ababa.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Consultation between the PSC, the AGA-APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance, Insights on the PSC](#), 13 August 2026.
- [Consultation of PSC with the AGA-APSA Platform/Human Rights Subcommittee, Insights on the PSC](#), 7 August 2025.

THE 4TH CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE PSC AND ACHPR SIGNALLED THE MOVE FROM RESTATING COMMITMENTS TO IMPLEMENTATION

On 21 August 2026, the PSC convened its 1362nd session, dedicated to the annual consultative meeting between the PSC and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR).⁵




Figure 7: 1362nd Meeting of the PSC dedicated to the annual consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 21 August 2026.
(Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

The meeting adopted its outcome as a communiqué. The consultation allowed the two AU organs to consider the contribution of human rights protection to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and sustaining peace, as well as measures to strengthen their institutional cooperation. The session also took place against the background of the election of a new ACHPR Bureau in October 2025. During the session, the Council welcomed the election and expressed full support for the Bureau's strategic initiatives, particularly those aimed at mitigating human rights abuses during armed conflicts and political transitions.

A significant portion of the communiqué restates and extends themes that have anchored the PSC-ACHPR relationship since 2019: the centrality of human rights to conflict prevention, the need for Member States to address the structural root causes of conflict and the importance of national, regional and continental ownership of the AU human rights agenda, balanced against respect for the independence and sovereignty of Member States. The Council also renewed its call, first raised at the 866th and reiterated at the 1019th Session, for the ACHPR to work with the AU Commission to identify funding mechanisms for the Commission's work, this time framed specifically around 'innovative funding streams' to finance joint human rights monitoring and rapid-deployment activities. It further called on Member States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify and fully implement the Kampala Convention, alongside a request for the ACHPR to provide regular updates on the human rights situation in Africa through credible and verified sources to guide targeted humanitarian assistance.

Notably, unlike previous consultations, the Council has moved from restating commitments to specifying how they are to be implemented. The 1284th session, held

⁵ During the meeting presentation was made by Honourable Idrissa Sow, Chairperson of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.

in June 2025, as assessed in the month's Amani Africa [Monthly Digest](#), was couched in general terms with few operational details, and as having failed to build on the practical modalities agreed at the inaugural 866th session in 2019, namely joint field visits to conflict-affected countries, PSC communication of human rights-relevant decisions to the ACHPR and regular ACHPR briefings to the Council. The 1362nd session's communiqué addresses this gap more directly than previous consultations of the two organs. It mandates the AU Commission and the ACHPR to establish structured communication channels through the 'immediate designation of dedicated Focal Points' tasked with routine information-sharing, joint thematic briefings, and monitoring the implementation of agreed outcomes, the clearest operational answer yet to a modality that has remained unimplemented since 2019. It further directs the AU Commission, in consultation with the ACHPR Secretariat, to develop clear timelines, responsibility matrices and annual reporting mechanisms and explicitly designates the Implementation Matrix as 'a living document.'

In addition, the communiqué's early-warning dimension reflects an effort to strengthen the preventive link between human rights monitoring and the AU peace and security architecture. Still, its added value will depend heavily on implementation. The recognition that systematic human rights violations constitute early warning indicators, coupled with the request to integrate human rights indicators into CEWS, provides a stronger institutional basis for connecting ACHPR monitoring with PSC conflict-prevention processes and builds on the longstanding call for closer early-warning cooperation between the two organs from the 866th session. However, the communiqué does not specify the indicators to be integrated, modalities for data sharing and verification,

institutional responsibilities, or how human rights alerts generated through CEWS would trigger early action by the PSC.

The call for structured engagement with national human rights institutions and the acknowledgement of Civil Society Organisations' role in early-warning monitoring could help broaden the information base, but these mechanisms also require clear safeguards to ensure credibility, independence and protection against the politicisation of human rights information. Consequently, while the decision strengthens the normative and institutional recognition of human rights as an early-warning tool, it risks reproducing the longstanding gap between early-warning information and early action unless the proposed implementation matrix, focal points, reporting mechanisms and resource commitments translate this recognition into a functioning human rights–early warning–early response mechanism.

Additionally, across the four consultations, the Council explicitly recognised the contribution of civil society organisations under the Livingstone Formula to civic education, advocacy, early warning, victim protection and peace education, addressing a gap identified in the analysis of the 1284th session. However, nearly a fifth of the operative paragraphs turn to a new regulatory agenda, requesting the ACHPR to monitor NGO compliance with the obligations attached to observer status under Resolution 572, review its roster of nearly 600 NGOs and withdraw observer status from organisations found in violation of the applicable principles. The concern is not that the PSC cannot address civil society conduct: its mandate expressly encompasses follow-up on human rights and democratic governance as elements of its peace and security responsibilities. Rather, the communiqué appears to cross from coordination into prescribing the exercise of a distinct institutional competence. The

requests that are linked to the regulation of NGOs by the ACHPR therefore raise a question about institutional boundaries.

The decision to institutionalise a biennial meeting among the PSC, ACHPR, AfCHPR, AUCIL and ACERWC risks **institutional duplication rather than necessarily strengthening the 'One AU approach,'** particularly given that the PSC had, only one week earlier, reaffirmed an already institutionalised annual engagement with the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG) and the AGA-APSA Platform. The 1361st session consultation called for the PSC, HRDG and AGA-APSA Platform to undertake joint analysis, information sharing, policy dialogue and coordinated responses beyond their annual engagement; the 1362nd communiqué then creates a new biennial forum whose stated purpose, harmonising and ensuring complementarity of common actions, substantially overlaps with that existing arrangement. While the proposed forum adds value by bringing together AU judicial, legal and child-rights institutions, its current formulation does not establish what functions these institutions would perform that cannot already be pursued through the PSC–HRDG–AGA-APSA framework, nor how the two mechanisms would divide responsibilities, exchange outcomes or coordinate follow-up.

The juxtaposition of the two decisions raises a more fundamental concern: **the proliferation of coordination platforms may become a substitute for effective implementation,** particularly when the 1362nd communiqué itself calls for dedicated focal points, implementation matrices, timelines and reporting mechanisms. Unless the proposed biennial meeting is deliberately designed as a higher-level mechanism for resolving cross-institutional issues or reviewing implementation of decisions emanating

from the existing structures, it risks adding another layer to an already crowded architecture, potentially weakening rather than advancing the very coherence that the 'One AU approach' is intended to achieve.

There are also elements that featured in previous PSC-ACHPR consultations that do not appear to have carried through into this communiqué. The ACHPR's Special Rapporteurs, Working Groups and other thematic special mechanisms, repeatedly identified as underused channels for translating human rights monitoring into preventive political engagement and flagged as a missed opportunity in the post-session analysis of the 1284th session, again go unmentioned. Similarly, transitional justice, accountability for perpetrators, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence, which featured in the 1284th session through the PSC's acknowledgement of the ACHPR's advisory role on the AU Continental Transitional Justice Policy, are absent from the present communiqué. The treatment of findings of the Sudan Joint Fact-Finding Mission is particularly limited. Although the communiqué refers to the Mission, it does not build on the Mission's extensive documentation of violations or indicate how its findings could inform the PSC's preventive engagement, protection of civilians, or broader efforts to advance accountability in Sudan. The reference remains largely passive, without translating the ACHPR's fact-finding and documentation into concrete avenues for political follow-up by the PSC.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the ACHPR to provide regular updates on the human rights situation in Africa through credible and verified sources, in order to guide targeted humanitarian assistance.
- Requested that human rights compli-

ance frameworks, including pre-deployment training, on-the-ground human rights monitoring units and clear accountability mechanisms for civilian protection, be mandatorily embedded into the mandate, design and execution of all current and future AU-mandated or authorised PSOs.

- Requested the ACHPR to implement and ensure effective follow-up on the implementation of human rights decisions adopted by relevant AU Organs and provide regular updates to the PSC and the AU Executive Council.
- Requested the ACHPR to enhance its collaboration with National Human Rights Institutions of Member States through capacity-building initiatives and knowledge exchange and support national-owned peacebuilding initiatives.
- Requested the ACHPR to undertake a periodic review and updating of the roster of NGOs holding observer status, noting that nearly 600 NGOs currently hold this status. In contrast, a number of them have ceased to exist. Others violate the provisions of the ACHPR Resolution on the Criteria for Granting and Maintaining Observer Status to Non-Governmental Organisations working on Human and Peoples' Rights in Africa - ACHPR/Res.572 (LXXVII).
- Requested the ACHPR to withdraw observer status from any NGO that violates one of the principles of the AU or the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the provisions of Resolution 572.
- Requested the AU Commission to integrate human rights indicators into the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).
- Requested the AU Commission and ACHPR Secretariat to explore innovative funding streams to finance joint human rights monitoring and rapid de-

ployment activities in conflict-affected Member States or regions.

- Requested the AU Commission to continue providing technical assistance to enable Member States to take full advantage of emerging technologies, including Artificial Intelligence, while ensuring that such technologies are not abused or misused to perpetrate human rights violations.
- Directed the AU Commission, in consultation with the Secretariat of the ACHPR, to develop clear timelines, responsibility matrices and annual reporting mechanisms to evaluate progress on joint AU human rights and security mandates, while ensuring that the Implementation Matrix remains a living document.
- Requested the AU Commission and the ACHPR to develop practical modalities for structured engagement with national human rights institutions in early warning, mediation, peace-building, reconciliation and promotion of social cohesion.
- Decided, within the framework of the 'One AU approach', to institutionalise and regularise a biennial meeting on human rights, bringing together the PSC, the ACHPR, and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (AfCHPR), the African Union Commission on International Law (AUCIL), the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) to be convened alternatively in Addis Ababa, Arusha, Banjul and Maseru, on the margins of the annual session of each of these AU Organs, with a view to harmonising and ensuring complementarity of common actions.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- [PSC-ACHPR Consultation](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 20 August 2026.

PSC ADVANCES ITS PREVIOUS CALL FOR A CONTINENTAL DYNAMIC TOOL FOR MAPPING RISKS AND THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY

On 24 August 2026, the PSC convened its 1363rd meeting focusing on the coordination between the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) - African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) - Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) on Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning System.⁶ The outcome of the session was a [communiqué](#).




Figure 8: 1363rd Meeting of the PSC on the 'Coordination between AUCTC-APRM-CISSA and AFRIPOL on Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning System,' 24 August 2026. (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

⁶ The meeting received opening remarks from Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2026, followed by introductory remarks from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Presentations were then made by Mohamed Lamine Nait Youcef, Expert of Algeria and Chairperson of the Committee of Experts for August 2026, and by Lallal Idriss Lakhdar, Acting Director AUCTC. Further statements were made by Batlokoa Makong, Advisor to the APRM CEO (Marie-Antoinette Rose-Quatre). Jackson Victor Hamata, Executive Secretary, CISSA, and Jalel Chelba, Acting Director, AFRIPOL also made statements.

As highlighted in our pre-analysis of the session on the [Insights of the PSC](#) edition, the PSC session built on its [1320th meeting](#) held in December 2025 in which, among other things, it underlined the need to strengthen the analytical convergence between AUCTC, CISSA, AFRIPOL and the RECs/RMs, and in which it further reiterated its request for the AU Commission 'to collaborate with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM to introduce and institutionalise a dynamic tool for mapping risks and threats to peace and security in Africa.' The call was adopted at its 1298th meeting on 27 August 2025, with the objective of enabling the Council to enhance its conflict prevention efforts.

The Council began by commending the AU Commission, particularly the PAPS Department, along with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM, for their inter-institutional collaboration in streamlining data, intelligence and risk indicators to present a unified early warning perspective. Building on this collaborative foundation, it validated the prototype of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool as an institutionalised decision-support tool designed to strengthen proactive conflict prevention, rapid risk detection and response capabilities across the continent, stressing that the tool would enhance the effectiveness of AU action response, the Early Warning System (EWS) and conflict prevention efforts more broadly. In this regard, it requested the AU Commission to proceed with the remaining steps of the tool's finalisation process and to present the finalised version to the PSC for consideration prior to its launch. Relatedly, the Council validated the AU Trigger Model for Early Warning and Early Response, taking into account amendments proposed by PSC Member States, and called on the AU Commission to expedite finalisation of the Implementation Framework protocol and submit it to the Council for consideration before its official

launch.

With regard to the trigger model, it is worth recalling that in July 2026, the PSC Committee of Experts [held](#) consultations on the 'Proposed AU Model on Trigger Mechanism for Early Warning and Early Action.' The proposed model 'seeks to strengthen timely and proportionate AU responses by establishing clear triggers, thresholds and response options to address emerging risks before they escalate into violent conflict.' It is expected to serve as a decision-support tool for the PSC, connecting early warning analysis with preventive action through existing AU governance and peace and security mechanisms.

Turning to APRM, the Council recalled its role and mandate as an intergovernmental, independent mechanism centred on peer learning and the sharing of experiences. In this context, it welcomed and validated the prototype of the APRM Early Warning System on Governance, requested the APRM to prioritise its finalisation and launch it as an internal early warning system on governance and underlined the critical necessity of interconnecting the APRM EWS with both the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool. It also took note with appreciation of the APRM's proactive initiative in developing peace agreement mapping and, in this regard, requested the APRM, working in close collaboration with the AU Commission, particularly the PAPS, to refine, finalise and technically validate the report, relying mainly on primary and official AU sources, before submitting it to the PSC for consideration and adoption. Tying these tools together, the Council requested the AU Commission to fully interface them with Regional Early Warning Systems (REWS) to ensure continental-to-regional data sharing, and in this respect directed the Commission, through AUCTC, APRM and AFRIPOL, and

in collaboration with CISSA, to 'further refine, finalise and fully operationalise the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool, ensuring its seamless technological and functional integration within the CEWS framework prior to their official joint continental launch.'

On the substance of early warning analysis, the Council underscored that it needed to incorporate governance indicators, illicit financial flows, transborder organised crime and terror-financing networks alongside conventional conflict metrics and emphasised that risk mapping had to explicitly link clear early warning indicators with concrete early action triggers to prompt timely intervention by the Council and Member States. To sustain this work institutionally, it endorsed the institutionalisation of the **Technical Working Group, comprising PAPS Department, AUCTC, APRM, CISSA and AFRIPOL, as a 'permanent inter-departmental and inter-agency technical coordination mechanism for the continued development, implementation and periodic review of the tool,'** and requested the AU Commission to expand its composition as needed to incorporate other relevant AU organs, departments, institutions and specialised bodies dealing with security, governance, economic, health, environmental, climate and other transnational risks, while establishing appropriate working arrangements, standard operating procedures and information- and data-sharing protocols.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1320th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1320 \(2025\)](#)], held on 16 December 2025:

The PSC:

- Directed AUCTC, CISSA and AFRIPOL to submit to Council regular horizon-scanning briefings, covering emerging and escalating risks; indicators requiring preventive action; cross-border contagion dynamics;

and scenario options requiring the guidance of Council.

- Reiterated the request to the AU Commission to collaborate with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM to introduce and institutionalise a dynamic tool for mapping risks and threats to peace and security in Africa, as adopted by the PSC through its communiqué [[PSC/PR/COMM.1298 \(2025\)](#)] of 27 August 2025, to enable the Council to enhance its conflict prevention efforts.
- Tasked the AU Commission to thoroughly investigate the scourge of illicit financial flows, highlighting the networks and to report to the Council as soon as possible.
- Tasked the AU Commission to establish a continental working group on illicit financing, which will ensure the mapping of hawala/mobile money networks used by extremist terrorist groups and networks and the launch of a cross-border early warning protocol for suspicious transfers linked to convergence zones.
- Stressed the need to finalise the African Arrest Warrant and the AU Data Bank of terrorist groups and individuals supporting or facilitating the activities of terrorist groups/organisations to enhance judicial cooperation further, cut terrorist lifelines and deny safe havens to terrorist actors who exploit jurisdictional gaps across borders.
- Emphasised the need to activate the PSC Sub-Committee on Counterterrorism and the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions.
- Requested the AU Commission to circulate monthly reports on early warning to Member States in order to initiate and inform early responses.

1298th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1298 \(2025\)](#)] held on 27 August 2025:

The PSC:

- Stressed the need to establish a CEWS–AUCTC Joint Analytical Cell (JAC) to fuse political-governance analysis with operational intelligence, which would include:
 - i. Quarterly Continental Security Outlooks with geo-visuals;
 - ii. Convergence Alerts when multi-risk thresholds are crossed; and
 - iii. Concise Crisis Decision Notes formatted for PSC action.
- Tasked the AU Commission to work closely with the RECs/RMs and the APRM in developing a clear protocol on Integrated Preventive Diplomacy and Action addressing the subsidiarity principle paradox, which will clarify the roles and sequencing of action, fulfilling the spirit of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU and the RECs/RMs.
- Requested the AU Commission to coordinate the operationalisation within existing resources and structures of a Continental Illicit-Finance Task Force in partnership with all relevant regional institutions and mechanisms to:
 - i. Map hawala/mobile-money nodes exploited by terrorist extremist groups and networks;
 - ii. Set crypto-VASP compliance baselines;
 - iii. Run joint financial-intelligence operations on extractive smuggling; and
 - iv. Launch a rapid cross-border alert protocol for suspicious transfers tied to convergence zones.
- Assigned the AU Commission, together with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM, to establish and institutionalise, by December 2025, a

dynamic and continuously updated risk mapping tool to allow the PSC to strengthen its ability to engage in early warning for early action, by providing a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities and potential triggers, including colour-coded risk levels linked to a pre-authorised menu of diplomatic, security and stabilisation tools; an annual review of acted/missed alerts with lessons learned.

The Council placed particular emphasis on trust and national ownership, reaffirming the fundamental necessity of maintaining the trust and confidence of Member States in the operationalisation of the CEWS, and underscoring that the integrated analytical tools, namely the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and the APRM Early Warning System, had to operate strictly as collaborative, intra-African mechanisms rooted in national ownership and transparency. It stressed that these coordinated mechanisms, under the custodianship of AUCTC, APRM, CISSA and AFRIPOL, were designed to ‘complement national capacities for structural conflict prevention rather than act as an external monitoring or punitive instrument,’ and in this context directed the AU Commission, in close collaboration with AUCTC, APRM, CISSA and AFRIPOL, to ‘finalise the continuous matrix of risks and threats and present annual consolidated continental threat assessments to the Council.’

Reinforcing this theme, it reiterated the centrality of consultation with, and full participation of, Member States in implementing all aspects of the tools and models, as well as the need to maintain the integrity of information and independence of analysis in order to improve credibility. It urged the AU Commission to ensure transparency and a consultative approach guided by Pan-African solidarity. It further requested the

AU Commission and collaborating organs and institutions to ‘ensure continuous consultation with Member States to dispel any perceptions of external oversight and to uphold the sovereignty and primary responsibility of states in safeguarding peace and security.’

To operationalise this consultative approach, the Council mandated the Commission to ‘establish a structured, institutionalised and regular consultation framework with all AU Member States to facilitate continuous information-sharing and feedback on early warning outputs,’ and urged ‘Member States to designate dedicated national focal points within their respective competent authorities to coordinate directly with the joint AUCTC-APRM-CISSA-AFRIPOL technical committee and to guarantee effective two-way communication.’ It also recalled previous initiatives that had yielded substantive results and requested the resumption of ‘both the monthly informal breakfast meetings between the Commissioner for PAPS and PSC Ambassadors, and the briefings by the Panel of the Wise to the PSC, both focused exclusively on the Early Warning System.’ Finally, the Council called upon Member States to provide the technical, financial and human resources needed to sustain, update and operationalise these dynamic threat-mapping tools.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AUC to proceed with the remaining steps of its finalisation process of the prototype of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and to present the finalised tool to the PSC for consideration prior to its launch.
- Tasked the AU Commission to expedite the finalisation of the Implementation Framework protocol of the AU Trigger

Model for Early Warning and Early Response, and submit it prior to the official launch to the Council.

- Requested the APRM to prioritise the finalisation of the prototype of the APRM EWS on Governance and launch it as an internal Early Warning system on Governance.
- Requested the APRM and PAPS to work towards the refinement, finalisation and technical validation of the peace agreement mapping tool report relying mainly on primary and official AU sources, and to subsequently submit to the PSC for consideration and adoption.
- Directed the AUCTC, APRM, AFRIPOL and CISSA to further refine, finalise, and fully operationalise the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool, ensuring its seamless technological and functional integration within the CEWS framework prior to their official joint continental launch.
- Directed the AU Commission, AUCTC, APRM, CISSA and AFRIPOL to finalise the continuous matrix of risks and threats and present annual consolidated continental threat assessments to Council.
- Mandated the Commission to establish a structured, institutionalised, and regular consultation framework with all AU Member States to facilitate continuous information-sharing and feedback on early warning outputs.
- Requested the resumption of both the monthly informal breakfast meeting between the Commissioner for PAPS and PSC Ambassadors and the briefings by the Panel of the Wise to the PSC, both focused exclusively on the Early Warning System.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Coordination between AUCTC-APRM-CISSA-AFRIPOL on](#)

[Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning Systems](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 23 August 2026.

- [Briefing on Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 15 December 2025.
- [Briefing on the early warning system and its role in mapping risks and threats across Africa](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 26 August 2025.
- [Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 13 May 2025.
- [Briefing on Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook](#), *Insights of the PSC*, 26 November 2024.
- [Towards a New Agenda for Peace and Security in Africa: New Security Threats and the Future of the Peace and Security Council](#), *Special Research Report*, 25 September 2024.

PSC RULES OUT ANOTHER EXTENSION OF SOUTH SUDAN'S TRANSITION DESPITE DOUBTS OVER ELECTION READINESS AND RISK OF FURTHER VIOLENCE

On 26 August, the PSC convened its 1364th session to receive a briefing on the latest developments in South Sudan. Algeria, the chair of the PSC during the month and a member of the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5), convened the session to obtain first-hand assessments from officials who had recently engaged with stakeholders in the country. The discussion focused on the political, security and humanitarian situation; preparations for the elections scheduled for December 2026; ongoing mediation efforts; and the implementation of the Revitalised

Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).




Figure 9: 1364th Meeting of the PSC on the 'latest developments in South Sudan,' 26 August 2026.

(Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

The briefing followed important AU engagements: the Pre-Election and Needs Assessment Mission led by former Nigerian Foreign Minister Geoffrey Onyeama in August; the June diplomatic engagements of the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, Jakaya Kikwete; and the July visit of the C5 delegation led by South Africa's Minister of International Relations and Cooperation. In this regard, the effort to draw directly on these recent field engagements and enable the Council to hold a more informed and substantive discussion is commendable.

The [communiqué](#) adopted at the session is notable in three respects. First, it offers a broadly accurate assessment of the gravity of the situation. Second, it is structured around three areas that make follow-up easier: recent developments, implementation of previous decisions and priority actions. Third, despite questions about the soundness of some of its pronouncements, the communiqué identifies concrete, time-bound measures. On recent developments, the PSC rightly expressed concern over the 'significant' financial and administrative shortfalls confronting the electoral institutions, the deterioration of the political environment, continuing security fragility and the escalating humanitarian crisis. These concerns align with our [pre-session analysis](#),

which highlighted the absence of several conditions necessary for credible, peaceful and inclusive elections.

A range of national and international actors have warned that pressing ahead with elections without addressing the prevailing challenges could deepen instability and potentially return the country to large-scale conflict. As highlighted in our [pre-session analysis](#), the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), for example, has indicated that critical electoral prerequisites remain uncertain. Similarly, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of UNMISS has identified unresolved challenges relating to political trust, civic and political space, transitional security arrangements, electoral financing, constituency delimitation and institutional preparedness. During the PSC's April field mission, the Troika, the European Union, the IGAD Partners Forum, civil society organisations, faith-based actors and research institutions reportedly conveyed similar warnings. Their central concern was that a unilateral or inadequately prepared electoral process could become a trigger for renewed conflict rather than a mechanism for completing the transition. The government's failure to provide the electoral institutions with the required resources further compounds these concerns.

With only three months remaining before the scheduled elections, it remains highly uncertain whether South Sudan can organise a credible electoral process. The challenges extend well beyond technical matters such as financing, electoral legislation and operational preparedness. More fundamentally, the political and security environment has deteriorated, trust among the parties has eroded, and the civic and political space required for meaningful electoral competition remains severely constrained. Against this backdrop,

the communiqué reveals a tension between the Council's diagnosis and its prescription. While the PSC accurately recognises the financial, political, security and humanitarian impediments to credible elections, it nevertheless reiterates that the transitional period must end conclusively in February 2027, without any further extension. This position echoes the C5's February [declaration](#). Still, it raises an important question: is the insistence on ending the transition grounded in an objective assessment that the conditions for credible elections either exist or can realistically be established between September and December? Or does it primarily reflect political exhaustion with a repeatedly extended transition—and, consequently, a determination to bring that transition to an end regardless of the attendant risks?

The inclination to bring the transition to an end is understandable. Successive extensions have produced little progress towards the full implementation of the R-ARCSS; if anything, conditions in the country have deteriorated. The parties should therefore not be permitted to invoke the lack of electoral preparedness as justification for an indefinite transition. Indeed, President Salva Kiir's government appears determined to proceed with the elections and conclude the transition, characterising the remaining electoral challenges as '[manageable](#)'. Yet rejecting another extension does not, in itself, remove the structural and political impediments to credible elections—particularly in circumstances in which a unilateral or inadequately prepared process carries a serious risk of triggering further violence.

The choice facing South Sudan is therefore not simply between holding elections and extending the transition once again. The central test is whether the political process offers a credible and peaceful pathway out

of the transition or instead becomes a route back to war. The PSC should carefully assess this question before categorically ruling out any further extension. In particular, it must consider what holding elections under prevailing conditions would mean for South Sudan's peace and stability and its people, and whether adequate safeguards exist to prevent further bloodshed. Although South Sudan would not be the first African country to conduct elections under difficult political and security circumstances, the depth of its unresolved divisions and the attendant risk of violence demand particular caution.

The PSC should consequently avoid treating the holding of elections on 22 December as an end in itself. Its engagement should focus on whether the minimum political, security, institutional and humanitarian conditions necessary for a sufficiently inclusive, credible and peaceful process can be established. This will require clearly defined benchmarks, sustained high-level diplomacy, accountability for continued non-implementation and contingency planning grounded in an objective assessment of conditions on the ground. The objective should be neither the indefinite prolongation of the transition nor rigid adherence to an electoral timetable at any cost, but the prevention of renewed conflict and the establishment of a legitimate pathway towards stable and accountable government.

Under 'Actions to be Undertaken,' the communiqué calls for a dedicated session on electoral preparedness in October 2026. It also requests the AU Commission to submit a detailed fact sheet on election readiness ahead of that session, drawing on the findings of the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, the C5, and the AU Assessment Mission to South Sudan. These are specific measures that warrant follow-up, although it remains to be seen whether the session will take place as

envisaged. The communiqué also calls on the RTGoNU to publish 'a realistic, consensual electoral roadmap.' It appeals to AU member states, international partners, and donors to submit concrete contributions to the AU Commission by October 2026 to help close the election funding gap. It is unlikely that these external contributions would resolve the severe shortfall. Financing the process is primarily the responsibility of the South Sudanese state, and the RTGoNU should demonstrate its commitment by allocating adequate funds. More importantly, the challenge is not just technical but also political: the question is whether elections held under the current conditions would advance peace or fuel further violence.

Meanwhile, although the PSC urged South Sudan's leadership to release all political detainees and engage in inclusive, consensus-driven dialogue, its language is less pointed than in previous communiqués. Those communiqués specifically expressed concern over the continued detention of First Vice President Riek Machar and called for his release, alongside that of other political detainees.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Called upon the RTGoNU leadership and all R-ARCSS signatories to immediately resume direct, good faith political dialogue without preconditions, supported by the AU High Representative, the C5, and IGAD, to address the implementation deficit of key transitional benchmarks.
- Urged that the RTGoNU collaborate with the AU Commission to fast-track the formal establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) and the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH).
- Called upon all parties to urgently

complete the unification, training, and deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF).

- Demanded an immediate, unconditional cessation of all hostilities, military mobilisation, and inflammatory rhetoric.
- Called upon the leadership, with respect to the national law, to release all political detainees and engage in inclusive, consensus-driven dialogue as the only path to national reconciliation.
- Called upon the RTGoNU to urgently allocate predictable domestic funding to the National Elections Commission (NEC), National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), and Political Parties Council (PPC).
- Requested the publication by the RTGoNU of a realistic, consensual electoral roadmap.
- Appealed to AU Member States, international partners, and donors in a position to do so to close the funding gap for the elections by submitting their concrete contributions to the AUC by October 2026.
- Requested the AU Commission, in consultation with IGAD, C5, R-JMEC, and the UN, to develop a coordinated political strategy for South Sudan with measurable priorities and a regular reporting mechanism to the PSC.
- Decided to hold a dedicated session on electoral preparedness in October 2026, and requested the AU Commission to submit a detailed fact sheet on election readiness ahead of this meeting, based on the findings of the missions of the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, C5, as well as the AU Assessment Mission to South Sudan.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- [Briefing on the Situation in South Sudan](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 25 August 2026.

PSC AND THE PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT INSTITUTIONALISE THE 'PSC-PAP PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY MECHANISM' TO ADVANCE 'COMMON AGENDA FOR PEACE'

On 24 August 2026, the PSC convened for its 1365th meeting to consider the Conclusions of its 2nd Joint Consultative Meeting with the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), which was held on 19 August 2026 at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the theme 'Leveraging Parliamentary Diplomacy to Promote Peace and Security in Africa.' The [Conclusions](#) were adopted through a [communiqué](#).⁷

The communiqué reflects a broader effort to deepen and formalise the institutional relationship between the PSC and PAP, moving the partnership from an ad hoc consultation toward a structured, accountable mechanism, and agreeing on a realistic, ownership-based collaboration roadmap with clear benchmarks for collaboration between the two organs. The primary focus of the meeting was to review the strategy established by the new Bureau and evaluate the progress made in the implementation of the outcomes of the Inaugural Joint Consultative meeting

⁷ Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2026 made the opening statement followed by a presentation by Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner PAPS. A statement and presentation were then made by Fateh Boutbig, President of the Pan-African Parliament, on the strategy of the new PAP Bureau to promote peace and security in Africa.

between the two organs.



Figure 10: 1365th Meeting of the PSC held on 24 August 2026 to consider the 'Conclusions of its 2nd Joint Consultative Meeting with the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), which was held on 19 August 2026 at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.' (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

Council welcomed the successful election of the new PAP Bureau during the Extraordinary Session of the 7th Legislature, held on 30 April 2026, and congratulated the newly elected leadership on assuming their mandates and used it as an opportunity to renew its commitment to institutional collaboration. Council viewed the PAP's new leadership transition not merely as a procedural event to be acknowledged, but as a strategic moment to reinvest in parliamentary diplomacy as a vital tool for fostering institutional sustainability and addressing the shared challenges facing Africa.

The Joint Consultative Meeting agenda had three major sessions, with the fourth being the consideration of the joint conclusions. Specifically, the sessions were on:

- How can PSC-PAP leverage parliamentary diplomacy to promote peace and security in Africa?
- Presentation by the new bureau of its strategy to promote peace and security in Africa.
- Review of the matrix for implementing previous decisions and the way forward.

iv. Consideration and adoption of the Joint Conclusion.

The most consequential discussion was in session one, where the structured partnership between the PSC and PAP to enhance parliamentary diplomacy as a non-duplicative and complementary pillar of the APSA was discussed. Key discussions focused on implementing an operational PSC-PAP Mechanism backed by annual work plans, linking parliamentary networks to early warning systems, and advancing peacebuilding initiatives through women, youth and expedited ratification of AU treaties. The dialogue also addressed aligning legislative agendas on emerging issues like AI governance, joint advocacy for global governance reform and securing sustainable financing to reinforce continental peace, security and stability.

This saw the two bodies agreeing to institutionalise the 'PSC-PAP Parliamentary Diplomacy Mechanism,' anchored in respective mandates as a dynamic tool to promote the 'PSC-PAP Common Agenda for Peace.'⁸ In this regard, the two Secretariats were tasked to translate this into an annual work plan with clear deliverables, designated focal points and measurable indicators of implementation.

⁸ The PSC-PAP Parliamentary Diplomacy Mechanism, aimed to operate in full compliance with the respective mandates of the two organs and the decisions of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, will facilitate: joint preventive diplomacy missions; parliamentary engagement in countries experiencing political transitions; joint fact-finding and assessment missions, where appropriate; structured engagement with national and regional parliaments; exchange of early-warning information, subject to appropriate confidentiality and credible sources of information; capacity-building in mediation and preventive diplomacy; parliamentary advocacy for ratification and domestication of AU peace and security instruments; and joint public communication on matters of continental peace and security.

This same preoccupation with translating principle into mechanism recurred in the decision to strengthen linkages between PAP's parliamentary networks and the AU Continental Early Warning System, which sought to close the gap between early warning and early action, and in the emphasis on building the capacity of PAP's Standing Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution, positioning it as the legislative bridge for harmonising Member States' conflict-resolution policies.

The meeting further requested the AU Commission, through PAPS, to continue engaging with PAP Plenary Sessions as provided under Article 18 of the PSC Protocol, while noting with appreciation the existing cooperation and commending the Commission Chairperson's leadership, including his video briefing to the First Ordinary Session of the Seventh Parliament. This logic of embedding parliamentary diplomacy into established frameworks extended further to PAP's commitment to harmonise legislative responses to transnational threats and to work through the Inter-Parliamentary Union and national and regional legislatures, signalling that the Parliament saw its comparative advantage in translating continental consensus into domestic legislative action.

Two thematic priorities stood out as emerging legislative frontiers rather than routine cooperation items: the recognition of 'women and youth as agents and partners' rather than mere beneficiaries of peacebuilding, mediation and conflict prevention and resolution reflected in anticipation of PAP's Women's and Youth Conferences, and the accelerated push on AI governance, evidenced by the convergence of the 'PAP Legislative Agenda for Peace,' the Model Law on AI, the PSC's Communiqué 1339(2026), and the AU-RECs/RMs AI Early Warning Roadmap. The repeated call to align

the Model Law on AI with the Early Warning Roadmap indicated that the two organs viewed AI governance not as an abstract regulatory concern but as a direct extension of the peace and security agenda, requiring urgent legislative-executive coordination. Similarly, the call for accelerated ratification and domestication of instruments like ACDEG, paired with the request for the PSC to keep PAP updated on ratification status, pointed to a recurring implementation gap between continental norm-setting and national legal adoption.

Moreover, the meeting's attention to financing and reporting exposed the practical constraints underlying these ambitions: the acknowledgement of PAP's financial limitations, and the corresponding push for greater African ownership through the AU Peace Fund, suggested that the Mechanism's success would depend as much on resource mobilisation as on institutional design. The decision to institute twice-yearly PAP reporting to the PSC, alongside calls for regional parliamentarians' participation in PSC-RECs/RMs consultations, reflected a broader pattern across the session: an attempt to lock in accountability and continuity mechanisms so that the ambitious normative and institutional commitments made would not lapse into rhetorical intent but be tracked, resourced, and sustained over time.

Session two, on the other hand, featured a presentation by the new PAP Bureau on its strategy to promote peace and security, structured around eight strategic priorities.⁹ Session three then provided an opportunity

⁹ The eight strategic priorities for the new PAP Bureau are: parliamentary diplomacy; early warning and preventive action; democracy, constitutionalism and good governance; inclusive political participation; peace-security-development nexus; combating terrorism and transnational organised crime; legislative implementation of AU decisions; and a stronger PSC-PAP partnership.

to review progress on the outcomes of the first Joint Consultative Meeting and the way forward. The segment reviewed the [implementation Matrix](#) of the previous decisions taken during the first consultative meeting and the Matrix of Priority Actions for Implementation as the proposed baseline for PSC-PAP cooperation for 2026–2027. Taking note of the draft PSC-PAP Collaboration Roadmap 2026–2028, the two bodies directed the two Secretariats to finalise the Roadmap and share it with the Member States of the PSC and the Bureau of the PAP for adoption through the silence procedure. As a follow-up and monitoring mechanism, the two bodies agreed to ‘introduce biannual implementation reporting on the Implementation Matrix, in addition to review at each Annual Joint Consultative Meeting’ and, in this vein, requested both Secretariats ‘to designate focal points for this purpose by December 2026.’

Finally, the fourth session adopted the Joint Conclusions, with the agreement that ‘the PSC-PAP Collaboration Roadmap (2026 - 2028) shall be considered as an instrument under the PSC-PAP Parliamentary Diplomacy Mechanism.’

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

- PSC and PAP Secretariats to develop an annual work plan with clear deliverables, designated focal points, and measurable indicators of implementation of the institutionalised ‘PSC-PAP Parliamentary Diplomacy Mechanism.’
- PSC to regularly update PAP on the status of ratification of relevant AU legal instruments to support this advocacy.
- PAP to submit reports to the PSC twice a year on its activities related to peace and security.

- The PSC and PAP Secretariats to finalise the draft PSC-PAP Collaboration Roadmap 2026–2028 and to share it with the Member States of the PSC and the Bureau of the PAP to adopt it through the silence procedure.
- PSC and PAP agreed to introduce bi-annual implementation reporting on the Implementation Matrix, in addition to review at each Annual Joint Consultative Meeting and requested both Secretariats to designate focal points for this purpose by December 2026.
- The PSC and PAP Secretariats to transmit the Conclusions to their respective Plenary/Council for information and formal adoption through a PSC communique, and to PAP Members for dissemination to national and regional parliaments.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- [Second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between PSC and PAP](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 18 August 2026.

PSC REQUESTS THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE AU COMMISSION TO UNDERTAKE A FIELD MISSION TO SUDAN

The PSC's [1366th session](#), held on 28 August, considered and adopted the report of its field mission to Sudan, conducted from 15 to 17 August 2026. In Khartoum, the PSC delegation engaged with Prime Minister Kamil El-Tayeb Idris and his cabinet, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, President of the Transitional Sovereign Council, and representatives of political parties and civil society organisations.

The [report](#) of the field mission outlines Sudan's deteriorating political, security, socio-economic and humanitarian conditions, which informed some of the PSC decisions. Sudanese authorities informed the delegation of plans to launch a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue intended to lead to a new constitution, national elections and the restoration of state institutions. At the end of August, the SAF-backed Preparatory Committee for the dialogue was launched, an initiative [welcomed](#) by the Chairperson of the AU Commission. Although the authorities described the proposed process as inclusive, they indicated that groups like the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) would not participate. The Civil Democratic Alliance for Revolutionary Forces (Somoud), for its part, [rejected](#) the initiative, warning that conducting a political process in military-controlled territory could formalise Sudan's de facto territorial division.



Figure 11: PSC field mission to Sudan, held from 15 to 17 August 2026. (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

The authorities also called on the AU to lift Sudan's suspension from participation in AU activities and designate the RSF as a terrorist group. They set out several red lines, including opposition to equating the SAF and the RSF, determining Sudan's future without representatives of the Sudanese people, convening negotiations outside Sudan, and adopting peace arrangements that reward those responsible for initiating

or perpetrating the war.

Sudanese interlocutors also accused the United Arab Emirates and other African and non-African countries of supporting the RSF and urged the AU to condemn external interference. On the socio-economic and humanitarian conditions, according to the authorities, the war has contracted the economy by 40 per cent, destroyed approximately 90 per cent of the country's industrial and manufacturing capacity, left more than 70 per cent of the population without electricity, and rendered 70 per cent of healthcare facilities in active conflict areas inoperable. The education system has also suffered extensive physical and institutional damage. Against this background, Sudanese authorities appealed for AU assistance in mobilising humanitarian support and rebuilding the country's health, education and intellectual infrastructure.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1218th meeting [[PSC/HoSG/ COMM.1218 \(2024\)](#)], held on 21 June 2024:

The PSC:

- Mandated the AU and its relevant Organs, in collaboration with the High-Level Panel on Sudan and IGAD, to regularly monitor and report heinous crimes committed throughout Sudan, develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation, as well as develop a plan for the protection of civilians.
- Proposed the convening of an extraordinary summit of the AU to consider the situation in Sudan.
- Requested the AU Commission, in consultation with the Chairperson of the Union, to consult on the date and venue of the aforementioned extraordinary summit.

1308th emergency meeting [[PSC/PR/ COMM.1308 \(2025\)](#)], held on 28 October 2025:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to:
 - Regularly monitor and report such heinous crimes committed throughout Sudan.
 - Develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation.
 - Develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations to the PSC within three weeks.
 - Urgently convene a meeting of the AU, UN, IGAD and the Quad on the situation in Sudan, to ensure coordination of efforts, and to put in place a coordination mechanism.
- Directed the Chairperson of the AU Commission to urgently engage with the Members of the PSC Presidential Ad-hoc Committee to facilitate the negotiation process between the leaders of the SAF and the paramilitary RSF, including the holding of an AU Special Summit on Sudan.

1319th meeting [[PSC/PR/ COMM.1319 \(2025\)](#)], held on 16 December 2025:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to establish an Inter-Departmental Task Force to coordinate humanitarian efforts and related activities such as post-conflict recovery, leveraging existing AU structures and inviting key regional partners.

1330th meeting [[PSC/MIN/COMM.1330.1 \(2026\)](#)], held on 12 February 2026:

The PSC:

- Requested the PSC Sub-committee on Sanctions, to expedite the implementation of the PSC Communiqué [[PSC/AHG/COMM.1218 \(2024\)](#)] adopt-

ed on 21 June 2024, working in collaboration with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), to identify all external actors supporting the parties to the armed conflict militarily, financially and politically, and make proposals on how to contain each of them within a stipulated timeframe, not exceeding three months from February 2026.

Against this background, the [communiqué](#) went beyond reiterating demands for an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a humanitarian truce by outlining three concrete measures of solidarity with the Sudanese people.

First, the PSC requested the AU Commission's Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, jointly with the PRC Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, to provide Sudan with a donation of USD 500,000 in 2027 and 2028. Second, it requested the launch, in coordination with Africa CDC and the African Medicines Agency, of an 'AU Health Support for Sudan' programme involving the provision of medical equipment and pharmaceutical products. Third, it called on the Department of Education, Science, Technology and Innovation, in collaboration with AUDA-NEPAD, to establish an 'AU Education Support for Sudan' programme to sustain and rebuild the country's education system.

As an Amani Africa [Special Research Report](#) observed, Africa's response to the Sudanese people in their hour of need will be an important measure of continental solidarity. Although modest in relation to the scale of the devastation, these initiatives constitute concrete and practical steps through which the AU can demonstrate its relevance to

Sudanese civilians. They mark a welcome departure from the repeated adoption of similar decisions that receive little or no implementation. Their significance, however, will ultimately depend on timely follow-up, adequate resourcing and effective delivery. Another notable decision was the PSC's request for the Chairperson of the AU Commission to undertake a field mission to Sudan to engage with civilian actors, the transitional authorities, and all political forces, as well as all stakeholders, with a view to developing a joint AU-Sudan roadmap aimed at ending the conflict and restoring peace. Such direct engagement is important. The Chairperson should undertake more regular visits to conflict-affected countries to obtain first-hand information, mobilise appropriate responses and provide the Council with comprehensive reports that would guide its deliberations and decisions.

The communiqué's pronouncements on political dialogue and the transition to civilian-led governance also warrant close attention. It called for a 'genuinely inclusive, transparent and credible inter-Sudanese dialogue' that would lay the foundation for restoring constitutional order through elections. It similarly expressed strong support for an inclusive political transition towards civilian-led governance, emphasising the centrality of a genuine, all-Sudanese dialogue. What remains unclear is whether such an inclusive and credible process can be conducted while the war continues to rage and the country remains under de facto partition. The communiqué does not adequately address whether a cessation of hostilities, or at least an effective ceasefire, must precede a national dialogue and electoral process. If the authorities pursue the dialogue and subsequent elections only in SAF-controlled territory, the process may not establish legitimate civilian-led governance. Instead, it risks consolidating competing centres of authority and further entrenching Sudan's

fragmentation.

Sudanese anti-war groups have raised this concern. They [reportedly](#) objected to the AU Commission Chairperson's statement welcoming the launch of the dialogue, arguing that endorsing a process organised in military-controlled territory and in the absence of a ceasefire risks legitimising Sudan's de facto partition. The Commission's position on the dialogue initiated by the Sudanese authorities may therefore place the AU in a difficult position, undermine perceptions of its impartiality and further complicate the already struggling AU-led Quintet's efforts to facilitate an inclusive political process.

On external interference, it is notable that the PSC neither recalled nor followed up on its [earlier decision](#) mandating the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions to identify all external actors supporting the warring parties and submit a report, which was due in May. The communiqué merely condemned external interference and urged the countries concerned to end it. The communiqué also condemned support for terrorist and insurgent elements and movements hosted, trained or provided logistical support to undermine the territorial integrity and security of neighbouring countries and the region.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC requested:

- AUC PAPS Department to include Sudan as a systematic beneficiary of the AFSIT program until the re-establishment of peace in the continent.
- Chairperson of the AU Commission to undertake a field mission to Sudan to engage with the civilian actors, the transitional authorities, and all political forces, as well as all stakeholders, with a view to developing a joint

AU-Sudan roadmap aimed at ending the conflict and restoring peace.

- AUC Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development (HHS), jointly with the PRC Sub-Committee on Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons, to offer a donation of USD 500,000 to Sudan in 2027 and 2028 as a gesture of solidarity, in order to support the Sudanese people—who are facing a severe humanitarian crisis and destruction of their essential infrastructure.
- HHS Department, in close coordination with Africa CDC and AMA, to launch a support programme for Sudan titled 'AU Health Support for Sudan,' comprising the provision of medical equipment and pharmaceutical products.
- ESTI Department, through its relevant mechanisms and in close collaboration with AUDA-NEPAD, to launch a programme dedicated to Sudan titled 'AU Education Support for Sudan,' aimed at sustaining and rebuilding the Sudanese education system.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Briefing on the Situation in Sudan](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 11 February 2026.
- [Sudan's Crisis is Africa's Crisis and its Responsibility](#), Said Djinnit and El-Ghassim Wane, *Amani Africa Policy Brief*, January 2026.
- [Prioritising Protection of Civilians in Peace and Security Diplomacy in Sudan: Challenges and Options](#), *Amani Africa Special Research Report*, 18 November 2024.

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES DURING THE MONTH

5th AU Continental Dialogue on Youth, Peace and Security and Women, Peace and Security to Promote Inclusive Resource Governance and Peacebuilding in Africa

The PSC Chairperson participated in the opening ceremony of the 5th AU Continental Dialogue on Youth, Peace and Security and Women, Peace and Security to Promote Inclusive Resource Governance and Peacebuilding in Africa held from 10 to 12 August 2026 in Bujumbura, Burundi.

Convened with the AU and the Government of the Republic of Burundi, as the chair of the AU, the Dialogue was held under the theme 'Water, Peace and Inclusive Leadership in Africa: Institutionalising the strategic role of youth and women in conflict prevention, crisis management and sustainable peacebuilding through responsible resource governance.' It aimed to assess progress in implementing the YPS and WPS Agendas while promoting synergy and intergenerational exchange. It also provided an update on the peace and security landscape in Africa, focusing on climate- and water-related risks, and examined the nexus between water, conflict, and peacebuilding, including emerging trends and policy implications. It also aimed to identify challenges and opportunities for institutionalising youth and women's roles in resource governance and peace processes, promote inclusive leadership models that integrate youth and women into decision-making structures, and strengthen partnerships and coordination mechanisms among stakeholders at continental, regional and national levels.



Figure 12: PSC Chairperson of August 2026 at the opening ceremony of the 5th AU Continental Dialogue on Youth, Peace and Security, 10 August 2026, Bujumbura, Burundi. (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

Military Staff Committee (MSC) Meeting

The PSC subsidiary bodies also had engagements during the month. On 6 August, the MSC convened a meeting, chaired by Colonel Bekkar Soltane, Defence Attaché of Algeria and Chairperson of the MSC for August 2026, to consider implementing the Memorandum of Understanding on the African Standby Force (ASF). The MoU signing ceremony is planned to take place on the margins of the 8th AU Mid-Year Coordination Meeting, to be held in Egypt on 4 October 2026. The Committee also received a briefing from the Peace Support Operations Division.

It is worth noting that this session preceded the PSC's 1360th session held on 12 August, in which the outcome of this MSC meeting was presented.



Figure 13: MSC meeting on 'Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding on the African Standby Force,' 6 August 2026. (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

Committee of Experts (CoE) Meeting

The CoE met on 10 August for its 91st session to consider the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool, as a follow-up to PSC's decision at its 1298th meeting held on 27 August 2025, specifically paragraph 17. The Mapping Tool is intended to strengthen further Africa's capacity for integrated risk analysis, early warning, and timely and appropriate preventive action. The meeting, chaired by Mohammed Lamine Nait Youcef, Expert of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of CoE for August 2026, also received a presentation by Richard Apua from the AU Counter Terrorism Centre.

The proposed Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool will harmonise how the AU identifies and assesses interconnected threats from terrorism and armed conflict to governance, climate and cyber risks—thereby strengthening Early Warning for Early Response across Africa.




Figure 14: 91st Meeting of the CoE on 'Consideration of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool,' 10 August 2026. (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

Sub-Committee on Counterterrorism Meeting

On 31 August, the sub-committee on Counterterrorism held its second meeting

to consider the 'Guidelines on listing and delisting.' Mohammed Lamine Nait Youcef, Expert of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Counterterrorism for August 2026, chaired the meeting.

The meeting noted presentations by Idriss Mounir Lallali, AUCTC Ag. Director and by Colin Smith, Coordinator of the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. The meeting considered the preliminary AU Draft Guidelines on Listing and Delisting of terrorist groups and individuals and organisations supporting them. The discussion centred on advancing a legally defensible, institutionally coherent and operationally realistic framework that significantly strengthens Continental counterterrorism efforts while upholding the rule of law, human rights, humanitarian space and Member State confidence.




Figure 15: 2nd Meeting of the Sub-committee on Counterterrorism on the 'Consideration of the guidelines on listing and delisting,' 31 August 2026. (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))



MEDIA AND RESEARCH SERVICES


ABOUT AMANI AFRICA

Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research; training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African Union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Amani Africa wishes to express its gratitude to the Government of Switzerland, the Embassy of Ireland, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland for the support in the production of this Monthly Digest.



Ambasáid na hÉireann
Embassy of Ireland



Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs



Ministry for Foreign
Affairs of Finland

ADDRESS

On the Corner of Equatorial Guinea St. and ECA Road,
Zequala Complex, 7th Floor, Addis Ababa
Tel: +251118678809
Mobile: +251944723204 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia