

# MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

## AMANI AFRICA

Media and Research Services

December, 2025

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
	<div>2</div> <div>12th High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa - Oran Process, Algiers, Algeria</div> <div></div>	<div>3</div>	<div>4</div>	<div>5</div>	<div>6</div>	
<div>7</div> <div>Situation in the Republic of Benin</div> <div></div>	<div>8</div>	<div>9</div>	<div>10</div>	<div>11</div>	<div>12</div>	<div>13</div>
<div>14</div>	<div>15</div> <div>Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM Operations</div> <div></div>	<div>16</div> <div>Situation in Sudan</div> <div></div>	<div>17</div> <div>Informal consultations with countries in transition</div>	<div>18</div>	<div>19</div>	<div>20</div>
<div>21</div>	<div>22</div> <div>Adoption of the Conclusions of the 17th Annual Retreat of the PSC on the Review of its Working Methods</div>	<div>23</div>	<div>24</div>	<div>25</div>	<div>26</div>	<div>27</div> <div>Consideration of the Conclusions of the 12th High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa</div>
<div>28</div>	<div>29</div> <div>Situation in Eastern DRC</div> <div></div>	<div>30</div>	<div>31</div>			

DECEMBER  
2 0 2 5



TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE MONTH AT A GLANCE.....1

THE PSC KEEPS MUM ON DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS IN BENIN  
AS IT BARKS LOUDLY AGAINST THE ATTEMPTED MILITARY COUP.....2

PSC PONDERES ON THE THREE OPTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF AUSSOM AS THE PILLING  
FINANCIAL SHORTFALL DEEPENS THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE MISSION’S FUTURE.....3

PSC CALLS FOR APPLICAITON OF UNSC RESOLUTION 2719 TO  
THE MNJTF AS IT RENEWS THE MISISON’S MANDATE .....6

THE PSC WELCOMES THE ‘QUINTET’, AS IT ENVISAGES A MINISTERIAL MEETING  
ON SUDAN AT THE MARGINS OF THE AU ASSEMBLY.....9


AU TO MONITOR DIGITAL RADICALISATION AND FINANCIAL CRIMES  
IN LATEST EXPANSION OF EARLY WARNING COVERAGE.....13

PSC STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE M23 AND CALLS FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM UVIRA.....16

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES DURING THE MONTH.....21

## THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In December, under the chairship of Côte d'Ivoire, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled [provisional programme of work](#) (PPoW) consisting of four substantive sessions covering five agenda items. After the revision of the programme, five sessions were held, covering eight agenda items and an informal consultation with countries in transition, as well as the 12<sup>th</sup> High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa.



Out of the eight agenda items, five focused on country- or region-specific situations, while the rest addressed thematic issues and the Council's meetings on its working

methods. Apart from the High-Level Seminar and one other session held at the ministerial level, the rest were held at the level of permanent representatives.

Over the course of the month, the PSC PPoW underwent three revisions. The first revision saw the rescheduling of the session on the 'Consideration of the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM Operations' from 8 December to 15 December, to accommodate the AU Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) meeting, which was added to the calendar, covering the period of 8 to 11 December. The revision also led to the rescheduling of the 'Briefing on the Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook (by CISSA, AFRIPOL, AUCTC)' from 9 December to 15 December and the 'Informal consultations with countries in transition' was also rescheduled from 11 December to 17 December. Additionally, the session on 'Consideration of the Draft Conclusions of the 12<sup>th</sup> High-Level Seminar', which was planned for 9 December, was postponed. On 7 December, an agenda item was added to the programme. Council considered, via email exchange, the 'emergency situation in the Republic of Benin,' although no physical/virtual meeting took place. Only the adoption of a Press Statement.

The second revision added an agenda item titled 'Consideration of the situation in Eastern DRC,' prompted by the M23's seizure of the city of Uvira, further expanding its territorial control and escalating the situation. Although this session was initially scheduled to take place on 17 December, it was rescheduled to take place on 29 December at the ministerial level.

The third revision of the programme saw the addition of the 'Adoption of the Conclusions of the 17<sup>th</sup> Annual Retreat of the PSC on the

Review of its Working Methods.’ There was no physical or virtual convening. The final update on the programme of work was the addition of the ‘Consideration of the Conclusions of the 12<sup>th</sup> High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa (Oran Process).’ Just like the previous agenda item, there was similarly no physical or virtual convening.

## THE PSC KEEPS MUM ON DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS IN BENIN AS IT BARKS LOUDLY AGAINST THE ATTEMPTED MILITARY COUP

On 7 December, the PSC, after email exchanges, released a [Press Statement](#) on the emergency situation in the Republic of Benin, following the attempted unconstitutional change of government in the country on 7 December 2025.

The PSC condemned ‘in the strongest possible terms’ the attempted military seizure of power by what it called ‘rogue soldiers’, characterising it as ‘blatant violation of the principles, norms and values of the AU’ and ‘a direct attack against the general will of the Beninese (sic) people.’ The PSC also reaffirmed ‘the AU zero-tolerance principle against any form of unconstitutional change of government, as stipulated in Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act.’ Yet, as recent practices of the AU (including its inaction against civilian coups, election rigging that amount to what the PSC in this instance calls ‘direct attacks against the general will’ of people and violations of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Elections and Governance on non-eligibility of coup makers for elections) show, its reiteration of zero-tolerance policy rings hollow. Most notably as a recent [article](#) pointed out, it has become ‘more like a comforting narrative the organisation tells about itself than a binding commitment

that shapes behaviour.’

Signaling AU’s orientation of recent years to prop up and side with incumbents, despite their disregard for or even serious breaches of AU norms, the PSC ‘expressed the AU solidarity with, and full support to, President Patrice Talon, the legitimate authorities and the people of the Republic of Benin.’ This seems to suggest that AU policy actors bent on prioritising a problematic conception of stability are engaging in a policy of see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil when it comes to serious democratic governance deficits and unconstitutional practices of incumbents. Benin is not an exception. ‘Benin’s real coup,’ as an author aptly put it, already happened under President Talon. This was accomplished through constitutional revision entrenching his role and ‘legal engineering, judicial capture, and electoral rules rewritten to exclude (the opposition from contesting for power).’

Highlighting the tension that PSC outcome documents often carry, if a generous interpretation is applied, the only nod (cannot be more than a nod) the PSC gave to the need for addressing constitutional and democratic governance issues (in Benin) was when it underscored the importance of ‘upholding democracy, good governance, constitutionalism and the rule of law in Member States as fundamental pillars for durable peace, security, stability and development, which constitute the prerequisites for the realisation of AU Agenda 2063.’ Needless to say, this call is not even directed at Benin as it addresses ‘Member States’ in general.

While the PSC is silent on the civilian coup in Benin under President Talon beyond the evasive nod to such matters referenced above, it was strong in expressing itself on those who attempted the military coup. It thus urged ‘the Beninese authorities to hold

the perpetrators of the attempted coup d'état in Benin accountable for their actions in line with the national laws governing the country.' As captured in a December 2025 [Ideas Indaba article](#), such a response is 'emblematic of the deeply flawed policy approach that has become characteristic of both the AU and regional bodies like ECOWAS: react to the symptom (coup) while remaining silent to the democratic regressions that underly the coup.'

### Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

[Consideration of the half-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 20 January 2026.

[Guinea-Bissau, not Benin, the real test of the efficacy of ECOWAS's response to coups](#), *Ideas Indaba*, 31 December 2025.

## PSC PONDERES ON THE THREE OPTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF AUSSOM AS THE PILLING FINANCIAL SHORTFALL DEEPENS THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE MISSION'S FUTURE

On 15 December, at its 1317<sup>th</sup> session, the PSC considered the situation in Somalia and the operations of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).<sup>1</sup> The discussion was informed by a half-year report submitted by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, highlighting key developments in Somalia and progress in the implementation of AUSSOM's mandate during the period from July to December 2025. A [communiqué](#) was adopted as an

<sup>1</sup> EL Hadji Ibrahim Diene, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia and Head of AUSSOM briefed the Council, while statements were delivered by the representatives of Somalia, IGAD, and UNOAU.

outcome document of the session.

With regard to the political situation in Somalia, the Council, acknowledging what it called recent 'positive developments,' highlighted the persistence of political discord between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and some Federal Member States (FMS)—particularly Puntland and Jubaland—as well as other political actors, notably on key national issues such as the election modality. In this context, the Council underscored the need for all stakeholders to commit to, and remain open to, inclusive political dialogue.

On the security situation, the Council underscored the need for consolidating the milestones achieved in the fight against Al-Shabaab, including through the establishment of effective state presence in areas liberated from the group. The Chairperson's report highlighted security advances following the launch of Operation Silent Storm in response to Al-Shabaab's 30-day offensive in March – April 2025, including the joint recapture of Awdheegle town in Lower Shabelle by AUSSOM and the Somali Security Forces (SSF). While the report also underscored Al-Shabaab's continued capacity to infiltrate and conduct serious attacks, as it has demonstrated during the reporting period, no reference was made in the PSC communiqué on the serious threat that the group continues to pose to Somalia and the region at large. The Report also highlights the ongoing challenges posed by localised clan disputes in Hirshabelle and Lower Shabelle in respect of which the PSC expressed appreciation to the 'ongoing initiatives of addressing inter-communal conflicts.'

In recognition of the persistence of lack of progress on the part of Somalia security forces, the Council further emphasised 'the need for rapid force generation,

regeneration, and integration, including the recruitment of community and local defence forces, as well as mobile units, to hold liberated areas and undertake operations as part of the 'clear, hold and build' strategy.'

### Relevant previous PSC decisions

1287<sup>th</sup> Session, [[PSC/MIN/COMM.1287 \(2025\)](#)], 3 July 2025:

The PSC:

- Requested the Chiefs of Defence Forces of the TCCS plus Somalia to work out a comprehensive plan to deter, degrade and eliminate Al Shabaab;
- Requested the Commission to update the CONOPS with regard to the increased number and location of Forward Operating Bases, and their logistical support and aviation requirements of the operation, and submit these new requirements to Council within six (6) weeks for consideration and transmission to the UN Security Council.

Much of the focus of the session and the deliberation was on the operations of AUSSOM, primarily on progress toward the operationalisation of the mission by finalising the transition from ATMIS and perhaps more significantly, the financial and logistical challenges it faces, and the way forward.

With respect to operationalisation, the mission has experienced delays. As envisaged in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), the realignment of AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM was expected to be completed by the end of June 2025, requiring the repatriation of Burundian troops and the deployment of Egyptian forces. This did not materialise, prompting the Council, at its [1287<sup>th</sup>](#) session in July, to extend the realignment phase by an

additional six months.

At the [1317<sup>th</sup>](#) session, the PSC signaled that the finalisation of the transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM will extend into 2026. It thus requested 'the AU Commission to temporarily suspend the repatriation of Burundi troops, Ghana and Sierra Leone Formed Police Units (FPUs), until the Arab Republic of Egypt deploys its forces, to prevent the creation of a security vacuum in the Area of Responsibility.' While neither the report nor the communiqué specified a precise timeline for the deployment of Egyptian forces, it is expected to take place before the end of UNSOS's financial year on 30 June 2026.

On the implementation of the decisions of the [Kampala Summit](#) of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) held on 25 April 2025, which, inter alia, resolved to augment AUSSOM's troop strength by an additional 8,000 personnel through bilateral arrangements, the PSC commended the countries who took steps for its implementation. Against this backdrop, the Council acknowledged Uganda and Ethiopia, as countries which deployed additional troops within that framework, for their continued commitment and sacrifices in addressing the prevailing security situation in Somalia.

The Council also discussed the mission's persistent financial challenges. The Chairperson's [report](#) highlighted the compounding financial constraints facing AUSSOM. The estimated budget for the period from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 stands at approximately USD 190 million. In addition, the mission has inherited substantial financial liabilities from ATMIS, including unpaid troop allowances and reimbursements for contingent-owned equipment (COE). Despite efforts to mobilise funding, the gap between the mission's requirements and available resources



remains enormous. In this regard, it was recalled that the AU decided to allocate USD 20 million from the Peace Fund's Crisis Reserve Facility for 2025. The accumulation of arrears, as noted in the report, has adversely affected the confidence of TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs), with potential implications for morale and operational readiness.

On a more positive note, the European Union appears poised to provide hybrid support, comprising in-kind assistance—estimated at 15 per cent in the form of non-lethal equipment—and financial support covering 85 per cent of stipends. While this contribution is significant, addressing accumulated arrears and ensuring multi-year, predictable, and adequate funding remains a major challenge.

Compounding these challenges, the UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS)—funded through the UN peacekeeping assessed budget and mandated to provide logistical and related support to AUSSOM—has faced a 25 per cent budget cut (approximately USD 130 million) from its approved USD 520 million budget for the current financial year (June 2025 to July 2026), due to the UN's liquidity crisis. This reduction is expected to have serious implications for AUSSOM's core capabilities, particularly in relation to aviation support, management of contingent-owned equipment, force sustainment, and logistical support.

Against the backdrop of these financial, logistical, operational, and political constraints, the Chairperson of the AU Commission outlined three options for the PSC's strategic guidance on the future of AUSSOM.

The first option involves **maintaining the status quo with respect to AUSSOM and UN support structures**, under which the

AU and UN would continue implementing the UNSOS contingency plan and absorb the mandated USD 130 million reductions, resulting in the continued accumulation of deficits with no certainty regarding resource predictability. The second option entails **transforming the AU mission into a regional cooperation framework based on bilateral deployments**, whereby some military or police components currently under AUSSOM would be replaced or supplemented by regional or bilateral arrangements between the FGS and its partners. The third option proposes an organised mission withdrawal and transition to full Somali ownership, involving a jointly planned and orderly withdrawal of AUSSOM at the end of the CONOPS lifespan (in 2029), supported by a detailed exit framework, clear timelines, and close coordination with TCCs and PCCs.

It was within this context that the Council addressed the challenges confronting AUSSOM. First, the Council emphasised that any decision regarding the future of the mission should be based on an objective assessment of the prevailing security situation on the ground, implying that financial considerations alone may not determine the mission's future (a problematic proposition given the implicit recognition apparent in the Chairperson's report that the financial status quo is unsustainable. )Second, the PSC tasked 'the AU Commission to continue its engagements with the UN Security Council on the application of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) on AUSSOM' and urged 'the UN Security Council to honour its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.' Third, with regard to the three options proposed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the Council, instead of making decisions at this stage, seemed to feel the need for further details and engagement. In this regard,

the Council requested the Commission to submit to the Council a detailed report on the proposed options, including their implications for the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations. The Council further requested the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces to discuss the three options and submit their recommendations for the Council's consideration.

Finally, noting that the mission's mandate was due to expire on 31 December 2025 pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2767, the Council decided to renew AUSSOM's mandate and deployment for an additional 12 months, effective from 1 January 2026, and requested the UN Security Council to endorse this decision.

#### Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up

The PSC:

- Requested The AU Commission to temporarily suspend the repatriation of Burundi troops, Ghana and Sierra Leone Formed Police Units (FPU), until Egypt deploys its forces;
- Directed the AU Commission to fast track the immediate release of the USD 20 million allocated funds from the Peace Fund to AUSSOM and to report on its implementation to the next meeting of the Council;
- Requested the AU Commission to submit to this Council a detailed report on the proposed options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations;
- Requested the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss the three options, and submit their recommendations for Council's consideration; and

- Decided to renew the deployment and the mandate of AUSSOM for 12 months, effective from 1 January 2026; and requested the UN Security Council to endorse this decision.

#### Recent Relevant Amani Africa publication

- [Consideration of the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM Operations, Insights on the PSC](#), 14 December 2025.

## PSC CALLS FOR APPLICATION OF UNSC RESOLUTION 2719 TO THE MNJTF AS IT RENEWS THE MISSION'S MANDATE

On 15 December 2025, during its 1318<sup>th</sup> session, the PSC considered the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against the Boko Haram terrorist group and Renewal of its Mandate.<sup>2</sup>

The [communiqué](#), adopted as an outcome document of the meeting represents a procedurally orthodox and normatively consistent reaffirmation of the AU's long-standing support for the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). The Council follows a familiar script: endorsement of the

<sup>2</sup> The Council took note of the opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of Cote d'Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for the month of December 2025, and the introductory statement by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for PAPS, read on his behalf by Ms. Patience Zanelie Chiradza, Director for Governance and Conflict Prevention; also noted the briefings by Ambassador. Mamman Nuhu, the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Head of MNJTF, and by Major General Saidu Tanko Audu, the MNJTF Force Commander; as well as the statements by the Representatives of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroon in their capacity as MNJTF troop contributing countries (TCCs).



Chairperson's report, commendation of TCCs, condemnation of terrorist violence and renewal of the MNJTF mandate for a further twelve months. In this sense, the document demonstrates institutional continuity and a ritualised approach, even as the situation remains stuck.

However, the communiqué's celebratory tone sits uneasily with its own acknowledgment of persistent operational deficiencies. While it 'acknowledges achievements,' it does not specify measurable outcomes, benchmarks or strategic shifts that would allow an independent assessment of whether the MNJTF is moving closer to its stated objective of 'complete defeat' of Boko Haram. In the absence of clear indicators, the notion of 'progress' risks functioning as a rhetorical device for the continuity of the mission. Similarly, despite emphatic language such as 'strongly condemns' in response to terrorist attacks, the communiqué again reproduces the PSC's chronic gap between robust declaratory positions and the absence of detailed enforcement or accountability mechanisms.

Then the Council openly acknowledges chronic capacity gaps, particularly in funding, logistics, air and amphibious assets, counter drone and anti IED capabilities, concerns repeatedly raised in earlier sessions such as the [1282<sup>nd</sup>](#) meeting in 2025. These are part of the issues that hugely constrain registration of further progress by the mission and indications are that neither the AU nor the LCBC actually have any strategy for addressing these gaps comprehensively. This underscores a structural constraint of the AU security regime whereby the PSC can diagnose deficiencies with precision but does not adopt targeted policy action going beyond calling for addressing such constraint. As a result, mandate renewals risk becoming cyclical exercises increasingly

detached from the material conditions required for operational effectiveness.

The deliberation during the session and the request to explore the application of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 for financing MNJTF activities is one of the communiqué's more forward-looking and new elements, signaling an awareness of the limits of ad hoc partner support. However, without a clearer roadmap, this provision functions more as a strategic aspiration than an actionable financing solution. As such, it needs to be backed up by a strategy and roadmap for unlocking the application of Resolution 2719 having regard to the terms of the resolution.

Reflecting the inputs during the session, the communiqué continues with an important broadening of the Council's analytical lens beyond purely military considerations by explicitly recognizing the humanitarian and climate-related drivers of instability in the LCB, notably mass displacement and the chronic underfunding of relief efforts. As underscored in Amani Africa's [Insights](#) on the PSC prepared for the session, the humanitarian situation remains severe, with insecurity, attacks and violence continuing to affect millions, while, as noted in the analysis, 'recurrent flooding is devastating the region, exacerbating existing humanitarian challenges and forcing counterterrorism assets to be diverted to relief operations,' as reflected in the deployment of MNJTF canoes and army drones to support evacuations. This acknowledgement is significant in that it situates counter-terrorism operations within a wider human security and climate context and reflects a growing AU awareness of the security-humanitarian nexus. The adoption and operationalization of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience 2.0 (RS-SRR2.0) offers an avenue for deepening the link between MNJTF operations and

the wider governance, development and humanitarian policy actions required for addressing the challenges facing the LCB.

The communiqué also highlights the planned commencement of 'Operation Lake Sanity III aimed at degrading the activities of Boko Haram in the LCB.' It is [recalled](#) that the Force last undertook Operation Lake Sanity II between April and July 2024, following its postponement from 2023. That operation focused on degrading the capacity of terrorists along the fringes of the Lake Chad Islands while enhancing local support to isolate them and induce more surrender. Viewed against this operational history, the reference underscores the relevance of Lake Sanity III as the next major operation planned after nearly two years without a comparable coordinated offensive.

Another issue that featured in the session was the acknowledgement in the [report](#) itself of the unresolved structural weaknesses, including notably that the 'non participation of the Republic of Niger in MNJTF operations continues to present a strategic and operational gap' in the fight against Boko Haram, with only general assurances that efforts are ongoing for Niger to resume operations.' The communiqué reiterates resolve, yet it does not interrogate whether the current MNJTF model remains fit for purpose in an evolving threat environment marked by insurgent adaptation, cross border criminality and heightened civilian vulnerability, leaving critical questions of effectiveness and sustainability unaddressed.

### Relevant Previous Decisions

1282<sup>nd</sup> Meeting, 10 June 2025 [[PSC/PR/COMM.1282 \(2025\)](#)]

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission and international partners to support MNJTF with modern knowledge and

equipment relevant to Boko Haram Terrorists' current capabilities, including modern drone detection and jamming equipment, combat and reconnaissance drones, combat boats, armoured vehicles, and demining equipment.

1254<sup>th</sup> Meeting, 13 Jan 2025 [[PSC/PR/COMM.1254 \(2025\)](#)]

The PSC:

- Called on the Lake Chad Basin Commission to continue engaging Niger to ensure its full return and cooperation with the Force and to promote a comprehensive, multi-sectoral and inclusive approach and civil-military cooperation for creating conditions for return of displaced persons.

### Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up

The PSC requested the AU Commission:

- and the international community to continue supporting the MNJTF with to enable the Mission to more effectively discharge its mandate including sustaining and consolidating the milestones registered thus far.
- to support the mobilisation of resources that include air, amphibious assets, anti-drones and anti-IEDs before the commencement of Operation Lake Sanity III.
- in consultation with the UN to consider the application of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 to fund the MNJTF activities.
- and the LCBC to renew the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) that guides the provision of the AU's additional support to the MNJTF for a period of one year, starting from 1 February 2026 to 31 January 2027.

- to maintain institutional collaboration and support in the implementation of the adjusted Regional Strategy for Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience 2.0 (RS-SRR2.0).

## Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Consideration of the Report of the Commission on the MNJTF Mandate, Insights on the PSC](#), 14 December 2025.
- [Update on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin Area, Insights on the PSC](#), 18 November 2025.
- [Update on the activities of the Multi-national Joint Task Force \(MNJTF\) and consideration of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience \(RS-SRR\)](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 9 June 2025.

## THE PSC WELCOMES THE 'QUINTET', AS IT ENVISAGES A MINISTERIAL MEETING ON SUDAN AT THE MARGINS OF THE AU ASSEMBLY

On 16 December 2025, at its 1319<sup>th</sup> meeting, the PSC considered an update on the situation in Sudan.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The Council took note of the opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC of the AU for December 2025; and the Introductory Statement by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Briefings by Adama Dieng, AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities; Mohammed Belaiche, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Sudan; as well as the statements by Lawrence Korbandy, Special Envoy of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the Representative of the League of Arab States and by Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the UN Office to the AU.

The PSC meeting took place against the backdrop of Sudan's deepening conflict and humanitarian collapse, with the Council reiterating long-standing AU principles, including the rejection of military solutions, respect for sovereignty, condemnation of external interference and commitment to civilian-led democratic governance, through the [communiqué](#), adopted as an outcome document, which also underscores the AU's asserted leadership role in coordinating mediation efforts and preventing atrocities. While normatively robust, the communiqué reveals persistent structural weaknesses in the PSC's approach to complex, protracted conflicts, chief among them the absence of a sequenced political strategy, limited operationalization of enforcement tools and weak linkage between protection, accountability and political transition pathways.

The communiqué opens with necessary but familiar affirmations, reiterating that 'there can be no viable and sustainable military solution' and calling for an 'immediate, permanent and unconditional ceasefire' as the basis for political dialogue, a position that is analytically sound given the military stalemate, the scale of civilian suffering and the continued belief by both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that battlefield gains can yield decisive victory. The reaffirmation of the need to restore a 'democratically elected, civilian-led government' aligns the PSC with the AU's democratic governance framework, yet the communiqué lacks a clear theory of change linking ceasefire demands to political outcomes. It provides no clear outline of how a ceasefire would be achieved, monitored or enforced or how dialogue would translate into an interim governance arrangement.

In the absence of milestones, benchmarks or conditionalities, these demands remain

declaratory rather than operational, as PSC outcomes are increasingly becoming. While the text 'demands' a ceasefire and 'strongly urges' the parties to prioritize peace, it says little on what role the AU itself plays in this respect and how these can be achieved.

The communiqué emphasises AU leadership and coordination by reaffirming that political dialogue should be AU led, with support from the 'UN, IGAD, and other regional and international partners.' It welcome the establishment of a 'Quintet' under AU leadership and urges close collaboration with the Quad to avoid duplication and fragmentation. The creation of the 'Quintet' as a coordination mechanism bringing together the AU, IGAD, the League of Arab States, the EU and the UN, alongside an explicit call for synergy with the Quad, reflects hard-learned lessons from the shortcomings of fragmented mediation efforts that characterised the mediation landscape on the situation in Sudan. Centralising AU leadership while drawing on Gulf and Western diplomatic influence is presented as a pragmatic response to the widely acknowledged diagnosis that disjointed mediation has weakened peace efforts in Sudan.

However, without a clear strategy of how AU's coordination role will be different and marks a departure from the failed coordination under the Expanded Coordination Mechanism and the AU maintaining a more credible and sustained engagement including through implementing the policy actions outlined in a [recent policy brief](#) by prominent AU policy gurus, it remains unclear how the policy affirmation of AU's leading role would actually translate into the AU actually playing that role. Similarly, while it commendably calls for an 'inclusive approach' and an 'inter-Sudanese dialogue' under AU leadership, it offers no guidance on participation criteria or strategies to overcome entrenched

mistrust, a deficit highlighted by the failures of previous rounds of preparatory meetings for political dialogue and the collapse of the planned such meeting last October. In the absence of such institutional clarity, the assertion and attribution of lead role to the AU in coordination and political dialogue risks dispersing responsibility rather than consolidating it, rendering repeated assertions of AU leadership more rhetorical than operational.

The communiqué adopts a firm political posture reiterating its condemnation and rejection of the establishment of 'parallel government' by the Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis) led by the RSF.' By 'strongly condemning' this move, the PSC affirms its refusal to acquiesce in the erosion of Sudan's sovereignty, a stance that is normatively defensible given the risks such recognition would pose to territorial integrity and the precedent it would establish for violent fragmentation. Yet the communiqué offers no guidance on the operational consequences of this position for mediation. With the RSF remaining a central military actor, categorical delegitimation absent a clarified framework for engagement narrows the AU's diplomatic space. While effective mediation often requires interaction with armed actors without conferring political legitimacy, the communiqué does not delineate this distinction, leaving unresolved how inclusive dialogue and de-escalation can be pursued in practice.

Similarly, and as already signalled in the previous communiqué, the Council's posture on external involvement reflects a gradual but discernible hardening. As underscored in Amani Africa's recent [Policy Brief](#), 'the context today is different,' with the AU Commission and the PSC operating in an environment marked by intensified non-African involvement and rivalries that further constrain the AU's room for maneuver.

Against this backdrop, the communiqué reiterates and reinforces earlier language through its 'strong condemnation of external interference,' its call for the suspension of military, technical and logistical support to belligerents. It is however striking that in a departure from the responsibility it rightly assumed to contribute to addressing this dimension of the conflict by designating a mechanism, the PSC requested that 'the UN track and trace all illicit weapon suppliers,' suggesting that it is retreating from or reducing the responsibility it assumed in previous communiqués it adopted. Under the circumstances, the explicit re invocation of the PSC Sub Committee on Sanctions, together with CISSA and AFRIPOL as investigative actors suggests an acknowledgement of lack of progress. Thus, despite the fact that there is no indication of possibility of progress, the PSC renewed tasking of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions in coordination with CISSA and AFRIPOL suggests that PSC did so without much expectation on results.

The PSC expresses grave concern over Sudan's humanitarian catastrophe, explicitly citing famine risks in El-Fasher, demanding 'unhindered humanitarian access', protection of 'humanitarian agencies'. In a positive development, it requested the AU Commission to 'establish an inter departmental taskforce to coordinate humanitarian and post conflict recovery' efforts, reflecting an appropriately serious humanitarian focus aligned with the AU's growing emphasis on the security-humanitarian nexus and its expanding humanitarian agency role.' The creation of an Inter Departmental Task Force is among the communiqué's more operationally concrete elements, yet the overall humanitarian response remains institutionally weak.

On atrocity documentation and reporting, the PSC once again failed to consider and

even give recognition to the work done by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, acting on the request of the PSC itself. While playing ignorant to the publication on 21 October of the African Commission's report, that among others call on the AU to invoke Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act due to the gravity of the violations perpetrated in the course of the war since its outbreak in April 2020<sup>3</sup>, the PSC talks of the need for intensification of documentation of atrocities and for the AU commission to regularly monitor and report. In failing to discharging its responsibility for advancing civilian protection through following up on the report of the African Commission while expressing commitment to addressing atrocities, the PSC shows that it has no will and commitment to do more on addressing mass atrocities in Sudan than virtue signaling.

### Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1308<sup>th</sup> emergency meeting, 28 October 2025; [[PSC/PR/COMM.1308 \(2025\)](#)]

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to:
  - regularly monitor and report such heinous crimes committed throughout Sudan.
  - develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation.
  - develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations to the PSC within three weeks.
  - urgently convene a meeting of the AU, UN, IGAD and Quad on the situation in Sudan, to ensure co-ordination of efforts, and to put in place a coordination mechanism.
- Reiterated its call for the PSC sub-committee on Sanctions, in collaboration with CISSA and AFRIPOL, to identify all external Actors supporting the



warring factions militarily, financially and politically, and recommend measures to be taken by the PSC within three weeks.

- Directed the Chairperson of the AU Commission to urgently engage with the Members of the PSC Presidential Ad-hoc Committee to facilitate the negotiation process between the leaders of the SAF and the paramilitary RSF, including the holding of an AU Special Summit on Sudan.
- Requested the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities to urgently undertake a fact-finding mission to Sudan and report back to the Council with recommendations within three weeks.

It is not also clear why the PSC expects results through repeated reiteration without clarifying why its repeated request for 'a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations for consideration by the Council' is not followed through.

What make the PSC's lack of seriousness on mass atrocities problematic is underscored by the reality captured in a recent [Ideas Indaba](#) that 'In Sudan today, violence is not a breakdown of order—it is the order. Atrocity is not accidental—it is how control is exercised. Fear, hunger, and displacement are tools of power.'

Finally, the PSC agreed to 'hold a Ministerial meeting on Sudan, on the margins of the 39<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly.' Addressing conflicts like Sudan at the highest levels, even at the level of heads of state and government, in the context of the AU summit is not uncommon.

### Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission:

- through the Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, as an African humanitarian actor to fully fulfil its mission in Sudan;
- to establish an Inter-Departmental Task Force, to coordinate humanitarian efforts and related activities such as post-conflict recovery, leveraging existing AU structures and inviting key regional partners.
- IGAD and the neighbouring countries to continue engaging civilian actors towards an inclusive inter-Sudanese dialogue process.

- Reiterated the call for the resumption of inter-Sudanese dialogue based on an inclusive approach and within the spirit of reconciliation and search for an amicable political solution, through AU-led process and supported, as appropriate, by coordinated international efforts, including through the UN, IGAD, and other regional and international peace-support tracks, including Quad, in support of de-escalation, a humanitarian truce, a cessation of hostilities, towards restoration of peace and stability in Sudan.
- Reiterated its call for the Members of Quintet and the Quad to closely work together in synergising mediation efforts, prevent overlap and ensure a coherent approach, with a view to concluding a negotiated and lasting solution to the current conflict in Sudan.
- Reiterated the request for the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions, working in collaboration with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), to identify all actors fuel-



ling the conflict in Sudan and to recommend measures to be taken by the PSC.

- Reiterated the request for the AU Commission to regularly monitor and report on crimes being committed throughout Sudan, in order to put in place preventive measures and reduce the risk of recurrence; as well as to develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations for consideration by the Council.
- Requested the UN to track and trace all illicit weapon suppliers to the belligerents investigate and track all weapons being used in Sudan, with particular attention to their countries of origin, manufacture and supply routes, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2750.
- Reiterated the need to expedite the implementation of the Council's decision on the reopening of the AU Liaison Office to Sudan, in Port Sudan.
- Agreed to hold a Ministerial meeting on Sudan, on the margins of the 39<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, scheduled to be held in February 2026, in Addis Ababa.

### Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Sudan's Crisis is Africa's Crisis - And Its Responsibility](#), *Policy Brief*, 22 January 2025.
- [Sudan At The Zero Point: Why Seventy Years of Independence Demand New Political Thinking](#), *Ideas Indaba*, 2 January 2026.
- [Briefing on the situation in Sudan](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 15 December 2025.
- [Update on the Situation in South Sudan](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 27 October 2025.
- [Briefing on the situation in Sudan](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 3 August 2025.

## AU TO MONITOR DIGITAL RADICALISATION AND FINANCIAL CRIMES IN LATEST EXPANSION OF EARLY WARNING COVERAGE

On 16 December, the PSC convened for its 1320<sup>th</sup> meeting, which focused on the 'Continental Early Warning System and Security Outlook.' The meeting had a [communiqué](#) as an outcome.

From the outcome, Council commended the collaborative efforts of the AUCTC, AFRIPOL and CISSA and their continued provision of technical capacity building support to Member States in identifying early warning signs of potential conflict and crisis situations as well as other threats to peace, security and stability in the Continent, and requested the AU Commission to continue providing necessary support to these AU specialised agencies.<sup>4</sup> In this vein, the Council further requested the AU Commission to accelerate the introduction of a new statute of the AUCTC, welcoming the decision of the 17<sup>th</sup> STCDSS on the adoption of the statute of AFRIPOL and the proposal for its restructuring, as well as its call on the AUC to submit them to the AU organs, in line with the rules and procedures.

With regard to addressing structural root causes and governance issues, the PSC continues with its generic repetitive

<sup>4</sup> Speakers in the meeting included Ms. Patience Chiradza, Director, Governance and Conflict Prevention, who made the introductory statement on behalf of Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Presentations were then made by Mr. Jackson Victor Hamata, Executive Secretary of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA); Lallali Idris Lakhdar, Acting Director, African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AU CTC); and a Representative of the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL)

reference to addressing root cause. It thus underscored the urgent need for a coordinated approach that addresses both security responses and the underlying structural drivers of instability. This included tackling socio-economic and governance deficits that continued to fuel and sustain violent conflicts across the continent. As usual, Member States, RECs/RMs were encouraged to adopt inclusive, multi-dimensional, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches. The importance of redoubling efforts to promote good governance, accountability, and the rule of law was underscored as a critical factor in conflict prevention. In this regard, the Council stressed that Member States needed to strengthen public institutions and foster social inclusion by being more responsive to legitimate grievances, particularly through socio-economic empowerment programmes targeting women and youth.

### Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1298<sup>th</sup> Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1298 \(2025\)](#)], 27 August 2025:

The PSC:

- Stressed the need to establish a CEWS–AUCTC Joint Analytical Cell (JAC) to fuse political-governance analysis with operational intelligence, which would include:
  - I. Quarterly Continental Security Outlooks with geo-visuals;
  - II. Convergence Alerts when multi-risk thresholds are crossed; and
  - III. Concise Crisis Decision Notes formatted for PSC action.
- Tasked the AU Commission to work closely with the RECs/RMs and the APRM in developing a clear protocol on Integrated Preventive Diplomacy and Action addressing the subsidiarity principle paradox, which will clarify the roles and sequencing of action,

fulfilling the spirit of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU and the RECs/RMs.

- Requested the AU Commission to coordinate the operationalisation within existing resources and structures of a Continental Illicit-Finance Task Force in partnership with all relevant regional institutions and mechanisms to:
  - I. Map hawala/mobile-money nodes exploited by terrorist extremist groups and networks;
  - II. Set crypto-VASP compliance baselines;
  - III. Run joint financial-intelligence operations on extractives smuggling; and
  - IV. Launch a rapid cross-border alert protocol for suspicious transfers tied to convergence zones.
- Assigned the AU Commission, together with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM, to establish and institutionalise, by December 2025, a dynamic and continuously updated risk mapping tool to allow the PSC to strengthen its ability to engage in early warning for early action, by providing a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities and potential triggers, including colour-coded risk levels linked to a pre-authorised menu of diplomatic, security and stabilisation tools; an annual review of acted/missed alerts with lessons-learned.

1247<sup>th</sup> Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1247 \(2024\)](#)], 27 November 2024:

The PSC:

- Requested the AUCTC, CISSA, AFRIPOL, other specialised AU agencies and Member States to work together towards the establishment of a joint Cybersecurity Task Force focusing

on preventing the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and emerging technologies by terrorist groups for radicalisation, recruitment, training and funding.

Most significant of PSC's session on early warning is its posture towards early action. It reaffirmed the centrality of early responses to early warning in enhancing its conflict prevention mandate and emphasised that the Continental Security Outlook had to trigger timely preventive, diplomatic, and humanitarian interventions to contain conflict escalation. To support this, the Council underscored the need for enhanced engagement with AUCTC, CISSA, and AFRIPOL, specifically regarding information-sharing and the alignment of national early-warning systems with continental mechanisms. Furthermore, the AU Commission was requested to ensure that Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) products were systematically used to guide agenda-setting and preventive diplomacy efforts in coordination with the RECs/RMs. Conversely, there are growing concerns regarding implementation delays. Although the Council had [previously](#) mandated the launch of a dynamic, colour-coded risk mapping tool by December 2025, the communiqué merely reiterates this request, suggesting that a consolidated, actionable picture of continental threats remains elusive.




Figure 1: The 1298<sup>th</sup> meeting of the PSC on the 'Continental Early Warning System (CEWS): Mapping Risks and Threats,' held on 27 August 2025.

On regional and international coordination, Council encouraged RECs/RMs to reinforce their early-warning capacities and deepen their coordination with the AU Commission based on the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity. There was an underlined need to strengthen analytical convergence between various security bodies and regional mechanisms. On a global scale, the AU Commission was encouraged to bolster its collaboration with the UN to develop harmonised early-warning frameworks and joint scenario planning, ensuring that African assessments were fully reflected in global analyses.

Finally, and drawing on the inputs the briefers presented during the session, the PSC addressed the emerging digital and financial threats. Deep concern was expressed regarding the exploitation of digital platforms by terrorist and extremist groups for radicalisation and recruitment. To counter these threats, the Council underlined the necessity for enhanced collaboration and intelligence-sharing between Member States and international partners, including technology firms.

Simultaneously, the Council highlighted the growing challenge of illicit financial flows and financial crimes, such as cryptocurrency thefts by malicious cyber actors. In light of this, the AU Commission was requested to thoroughly investigate the networks behind these illicit flows to better protect the continent's stability.

### Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up

The PSC:

- Directed AUCTC, CISSA, and AFRIPOL to submit to Council regular horizon-scanning briefings, covering emerging and escalating risks; indicators requiring preventive action; cross-border contagion dynamics; and scenario options requiring the guidance of Council.
- Reiterated the request to the AU Commission to collaborate with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM to introduce and institutionalise a dynamic tool for mapping risks and threats to peace and security in Africa, as adopted by the PSC through its communiqué [[PSC/PR/COMM.1298 \(2025\)](#)] of 27 August 2025, to enable the Council to enhance its conflict prevention efforts.
- Tasked the AU Commission to thoroughly investigate the scourge of illicit financial flows, highlighting the networks and to report to the Council as soon as possible.
- Tasked the AU Commission to establish a continental working group on illicit financing, which will ensure the mapping of hawala/mobile money networks used by extremist terrorist groups and networks and the launch of a cross-border early warning protocol for suspicious transfers linked to convergence zones.
- Stressed the need to finalise the African Arrest Warrant and the AU Data

Bank of terrorist groups and individuals supporting or facilitating the activities of terrorist groups/organisations to enhance judicial cooperation further, cut terrorist lifelines and deny safe havens to terrorist actors who exploit jurisdictional gaps across borders.

- Emphasised the need to activate the PSC Sub-Committee on Counterterrorism and the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions.
- Requested the AU Commission to circulate monthly reports on early warning to Member States in order to initiate and inform early responses.

### Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Briefing on Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 15 December 2025.
- [Briefing on the early warning system and its role in mapping risks and threats across Africa](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 26 August 2025.
- [Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 13 May 2025.
- [Briefing on Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook](#), *Insights of the PSC*, 26 November 2024.
- [Towards a New Agenda for Peace and Security in Africa: New Security Threats and the Future of the Peace and Security Council](#), *Special Research Report*, 25 September 2024.

## PSC STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE M23 AND CALLS FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM UVIRA

On 29 December, the PSC held its 1323<sup>rd</sup> session at a ministerial level on the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)<sup>5</sup>, culminating in the adoption



of a [communiqué](#). Convened against the backdrop of the seizure of Uvira by the AFC/M23 and the heightened risk of regional destabilisation, the session sought to respond both to the immediate deterioration of the security situation and to the persistent fragmentation of peace efforts. As captured in the edition of [Insight on the PSC](#) for the session, the meeting was not initially included in the Provisional Programme of Work, but was convened in response to the rapidly unfolding developments that necessitated urgent Council attention.



Figure 2: 1323<sup>rd</sup> Meeting of the PSC on ‘Situation in the Eastern DRC’; 29 December 2025. (Source: X [@AUC\\_PAPS](#)).

The communiqué strongly condemned the escalation of violence by the AFC/M23, ADF, FDLR, and other armed groups, as well as the grave humanitarian consequences for civilians, particularly women and children. Humanitarian concerns featured prominently, with demands for unconditional humanitarian access, the reopening of trade routes, and increased support for affected

*remarks by Kacou Houadja Léon Adom, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Côte d'Ivoire and Chairperson of the PSC for December 2025, and the introductory statement by Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission. Statements were delivered by Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Francophonie of DRC; Olivier Jean Patrick Nduhungirehe, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Rwanda; and by the representative of Robert Dussey, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, African Integration, and Togolese Abroad, who represented the AU Mediator for the Conflict in Eastern DRC.*

populations and refugee-hosting countries. Yet, as with previous PSC decisions, including the January communiqué, humanitarian imperatives are not linked to compliance incentives or protective enforcement measures. This recurring omission limits the practical effect of humanitarian demands in an environment where armed actors have repeatedly ignored Council decisions without consequence.

The Council also noted, with unusual frankness, the growing tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, urging both states to recommit to peaceful dispute resolution and to implement existing agreements in good faith. However, this formulation mirrors earlier PSC outcomes in which the Council acknowledged bilateral tensions while avoiding attribution of responsibility. As in the January ministerial session (1256<sup>th</sup>) that followed the M23's capture of Minova, Sake, and Goma, the Council again refrained from explicitly naming state actors allegedly supporting armed groups, instead relying on the familiar reference to ‘foreign and/or other military support.’

A notable feature of the communiqué is the Council's expanded normative framing of the conflict. Beyond reiterating condemnation of violations of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, the PSC explicitly addressed the use of hate speech and genocidal ideologies, mandating the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities to investigate and report back. This represents a normative deepening compared to earlier sessions, including the January meeting that focused overwhelmingly on territorial occupation and ceasefire demands.

The communiqué places strong emphasis on ceasefire compliance and territorial withdrawal, demanding the immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities

and the withdrawal of all uninvited foreign forces and armed groups from eastern DRC. In particular, the Council demanded the full withdrawal of the AFC/M23 from Uvira and calls for such steps to be verifiable and sustained. Yet these demands closely mirror those issued in previous PSC communiqués, most notably the 1256<sup>th</sup> session, which called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the M23 from Minova, Sake, and Goma, demands that were not implemented and were followed instead by further territorial expansion. The repetition of identical withdrawal demands that are not accompanied by enforcement instruments, or mechanisms for follow through, or timelines, reinforces a pattern in which the Council articulates clear expectations without establishing consequences for non-compliance, highlighting a growing gap between the Council's declaratory authority and its practical leverage.

With regard to process consolidation and African ownership, the PSC's recent session marks a significant affirmation of continental leadership while simultaneously refining the coordination arrangements first articulated in its 1261<sup>st</sup> session decisions. By highly commending the engagements of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, including his outreach in Kinshasa, and endorsing the consolidation of African-led mediation in coordination with the EAC and SADC, the Council reaffirmed its preference for a unified continental-regional approach rather than parallel or competing tracks. The merger of the Nairobi and Luanda Processes, the appointment of the AU Mediator, Togo's President Faure Gnassingbé, and the establishment of a Five-Member Panel of Facilitators comprising former Heads of State were explicitly framed as corrective measures aimed at restoring African ownership, coherence, and strategic sequencing within an otherwise fragmented mediation landscape. Yet, it remains unclear

how this consolidated mechanism shares responsibility with and what its roles are vis-à-vis the lead role taken by the US and Qatar on the Eastern DRC file.

The PSC further sought to structure political authority and reporting lines by requesting the Panel of Facilitators to propose urgent de-escalation measures and to report to the AU Mediator, who will, in turn, present these proposals to the February 2026 Ordinary Session of the Assembly. It seems that this configuration reflects an attempt to balance collective regional facilitation with centralised political oversight at the continental level. However, while the Council commended the AU Mediator, the Panel of Facilitators, and the Joint EAC-SADC Summit for enhancing coordination, particularly through the establishment of the Independent Joint Secretariat (IJS) coordinated by the AU Commission, EAC, and SADC, the decision remains less explicit on how this structure interfaces with earlier PSC calls for broader coordination mechanisms involving other regional actors such as ECCAS and the ICGLR. The PSC's current approach, therefore, represents an important step toward coherence and African ownership, but its effectiveness will ultimately hinge on whether the operational arrangements underpinning the IJS and the facilitation architecture can translate high-level political alignment into sustained, coordinated, and accountable mediation outcomes on the ground.

### Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1261<sup>st</sup> Session, [\[PSC/MIN/COMM.1261\]](#), 14 February 2025:

To enhance coordination and effectiveness, the AU PSC requested the AU Commission, EAC, and SADC Secretariats to:

- Develop a framework to strengthen coordination and complementarity between the Luanda and Nairobi Processes, ensuring a more integrated



and effective peace process.

- Establish a Joint AU/EAC/SADC Coordination Mechanism to provide technical support, facilitate collaboration with other relevant regional economic communities and mechanisms (ECCAS and ICGLR), and harmonize efforts.
- Create sustainable funding mechanisms to support AU/EAC/SADC peace initiatives in eastern DRC, including the establishment of regular reporting mechanisms to ensure effective decision-making and accountability.

1256<sup>th</sup> Session, [\[PSC/MIN/COMM.1256\]](#), 28 January 2025:

The PSC:

- Requested the UN and the AU Commission to continue to provide support to the SAMIDRC.
- Mandated the AU Commission to immediately deploy a fact-finding mission on the ongoing crisis in eastern DRC within the context of the quadripartite framework and report back to the Council soonest.
- Proposed the holding of the PSC Meeting on the situation in eastern DRC at Heads of State and Government level, on the margins of the upcoming AU Assembly in February 2025.

The PSC's engagement with international and extra-African initiatives reflects a calibrated effort to accommodate external diplomatic momentum while safeguarding African leadership over the peace process. In welcoming the Washington DC and Doha processes, and commending the signing of both the Washington Accords and the Doha Framework, the Council acknowledges the political utility of international facilitation in advancing dialogue among key parties. At the same time, by underscoring the imperative of full implementation, alignment, and complementarity with the consolidated

African-led process, the PSC reasserts its long-standing position that external initiatives must be subordinated to, rather than operate in parallel with, continental and regional mediation frameworks. This formulation echoes earlier PSC practice of recognising extra-African engagements without ceding strategic direction.

Nevertheless, as in previous decisions, the communiqué stops short of articulating concrete coordination mechanisms to operationalize such alignment. The absence of clearly defined interfaces between international tracks and the AU-led architecture risks perpetuating forum-shopping and selective compliance by the parties, thereby undermining coherence and weakening prospects for a durable peace despite the proliferation of signed agreements.

On monitoring and verification, the Council explicitly recognised persistent implementation gaps and calls for the operationalisation of the ICGLR Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), alongside a strengthened AU presence on the ground. This acknowledgement is notable, as earlier PSC sessions on the DRC placed similar reliance on verification mechanisms without addressing their structural weaknesses, including limited access, resource constraints, and uneven political cooperation. The renewed emphasis on EJVM+, therefore, raises questions about whether the Council is recalibrating expectations or merely reasserting confidence in mechanisms that have historically struggled to constrain violations.

The communiqué also addressed the regionalisation of the conflict, encouraging renewed regional collective security dialogue and calling for bilateral consultations, particularly between Burundi and Rwanda. While this reflects continuity with earlier

PSC approaches that privileged presidential diplomacy and confidence-building, it again relies heavily on voluntary de-escalation, despite repeated failures of such measures to prevent cross-border escalation.

In addressing root causes, the PSC reiterated concerns over the illegal exploitation of natural and mineral resources and supports the implementation of the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism. These issues were similarly raised in earlier PSC engagements but have remained largely decoupled from immediate conflict-management tools. Their continued treatment as long-term structural concerns, rather than as leverage points within the current crisis, reinforces the perception of parallel rather than integrated strategies.

### Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up

The PSC:

- Requested the Commission, through the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, to investigate these trends and report back to Council.
- Reaffirmed its demand for the immediate cessation of such support by all external parties/forces.
- Demanded an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of all uninvited foreign forces, armed groups and terrorist groups from all occupied areas and from the territory of the DRC.
- Requested the Panel of Facilitators to propose urgent measures aimed at de-escalating the situation in eastern DRC, and to report to the AU Mediator, who will present the said proposals to the next Ordinary session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in February 2026.
- Requested the Panel of Facilitators to propose urgent measures aimed at

de-escalating the situation in eastern DRC, and to report to the AU Mediator, who will present the said proposals to the next Ordinary session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in February 2026.

- Requested the AU Commission to further strengthen its support to existing monitoring and verification mechanisms, including the ICGLR - EJVM+, and to explore practical options for further enhancing the presence of the AU on the ground in supporting ceasefire compliance, coordination and more impactful political engagement.
- Demanded unconditional, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all populations in need and the (re-) opening of trade routes in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region.
- Requested the AU Commission, through its PCRDC Centre, to intensify efforts in developing PCRDC activities in eastern DRC.

### Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Ministerial Session on the 'Situation in the DRC,' Insights on the PSC](#), 27 December 2025.
- ['PSC summit on the situation in Eastern DRC,' Insights on the PSC](#), 13 February 2025.
- ['Emergency ministerial meeting on the current escalation of the conflict in Eastern DRC,' Insights on the PSC](#), 27 January 2025.
- ['Amani Africa Director Spoke to CGTN on the Qatar led talks between DRC and M23,' Media](#), 29 July 2025.

## OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES DURING THE MONTH

### Informal consultations with countries in transition

On 17 December, the PSC had an informal consultation with countries in transition namely Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Sudan. As captured in our [analysis](#) of the session, this was the fourth such informal consultation since the PSC introduced this format into its working methods in April 2023, following its 14<sup>th</sup> Retreat on Working Methods in November 2022. The informal consultation was established to enable direct engagement with representatives of countries suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government.

### PSC's Annual High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa

The PSC convened the 12<sup>th</sup> High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, also known as the Oran Process, held at the ministerial level, in Algiers, Algeria, on 1 and 2 December. This led to the adoption of the Conclusions of the Seminar through a [communiqué](#), in which it applauded the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Liberia on their election as Non-Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and expressed Africa's hope for their contribution and unwavering commitment to champion the common African positions and interests within the UN Security Council.



Figure 3: 12<sup>th</sup> High-level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, held on 1 and 2 December, Algiers, Algeria. (Source X: [@Algeria\\_MFA](#))

As a tradition, this 12<sup>th</sup> edition of the High-Level Seminar was meant to contribute towards further strengthening the capacity of the A3+ to more effectively promote and defend common African positions on peace and security issues within the UN Security Council, as well as to further strengthen coordination between the AU PSC and the A3 Plus to foster coherence between the two entities. The Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination Between the PSC of the African Union and the African Members of the UNSC was launched during this seminar.

From the [Conclusions](#), the agenda of the High-Level Seminar (Oran Process) was structured around the following four main thematic sessions:

- I. Global Landscape of Peace and Security in Africa: Current Dynamics;
- II. AU and UN Concerted Action on Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism;
- III. Taking Stock of A3+ Activities: Lessons Learned and Way Forward;

and

#### IV. AUPSC and A3+: A Stronger Voice for UNSC Reform.

In the **first session**, the discussions highlighted a precarious global landscape where a weakening multilateral system and external conflicts are destabilising the continent. The participants observed that global peace is at a critical low, further strained by donor fatigue, shifting financial priorities, and the dangerous proliferation of illicit weapons and foreign fighters.<sup>6</sup> To counter these threats, participants emphasised the urgent need to enhance the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by strengthening democratic governance, state institutions, and constitutionalism. They called for a unified African voice to ensure collective security responses and underscored the importance of democratising the UNSC. Specifically, they reaffirmed the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, advocating for two permanent and two additional rotational seats for Africa to better represent the continent's interests on the global stage.



Figure 4: Session one presenters on 'Global Landscape of Peace and Security in Africa: Current Dynamics.' (Source: X [@AUC\\_PAPS](#))

<sup>6</sup> Apart from the presentation from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the Panelists during the first session included Tete Antonio, Minister of External Relations of Angola. Selma Ndeapo Ashipala, Minister of International Relations of Namibia. Mohamed Ali Nafti, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Migration, and Tunisians Abroad. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, AU High Representative on Silencing the Guns. Jean-Pierre Francois Renaud Lacroix, UN Under Secretary-General for Peace Operations.

Addressing the financial and structural roots of instability, the session highlighted the need for alternative funding, including engagement with the private sector and the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 2719 for sustainable financing. Beyond military solutions, the meeting stressed the nexus between peace, security, and development, pointing to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as a vital tool for eradicating poverty. They further advocated for the inclusion of women and youth in peace agendas, the study of links between organised crime and unconstitutional government changes, and the fair management of natural resources to eliminate the grievances that fuel armed conflict.

During the **second session** on concerted AU-UN action, participants in the seminar reviewed a presentation by the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre and insights from ministers representing Botswana, Sierra Leone, Egypt, and CISSA.<sup>7</sup> The discussion centred on the escalating threat of terrorism across Africa, specifically the alarming integration of sophisticated technologies like drones and artificial intelligence by extremist groups.



Figure 5: Session two presenters on 'AU and UN Concerted Action on Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism.' (Source: X [@AUC\\_PAPS](#))

<sup>7</sup> The second session got a presentation from Idris Lalal Lahkder, Acting Director of the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre. It was followed by insights from panellists consisting of Phenyo Butale, Minister of International Relations of Botswana, Frances Piagie Alghali, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Sierra Leone, Abu Bakr Hefny, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Jackson Victor Hamata, Executive Secretary of CISSA.



To counter these threats, participants emphasised the urgent need to harmonise AU and UN frameworks, calling on the AU Commission to finalise a new Continental Strategic Plan of Action by February 2026. The group stressed that military 'kinetic' responses must be balanced with 'non-kinetic' strategies that address the structural root causes of extremism. This includes launching socioeconomic programmes to empower women and youth, thereby shifting the focus from the politics of identity to the politics of common interest.

Logistically, the session called for fast-tracking the Malabo and Abuja Declarations and enhancing regional intelligence platforms like the Djibouti and Nouakchott Processes. Key priorities include developing an AU watchlist of terrorist organisations, operationalising the Africa Arrest Warrant System, and establishing a specialised Counter-Terrorism Unit within the African Standby Force. A call which was made during Council's 1320<sup>th</sup> session on the 'Continental Early Warning System and Security Outlook.' Member States were also urged to secure sustainable funding - utilising mechanisms like UNSCR 2719 - to strengthen national defence institutions and eliminate 'ungoverned spaces' often exploited by militants.

Finally, the meeting highlighted the importance of community-level resilience through inter-faith dialogue and the promotion of pan-Africanist ideologies within national security forces. By disrupting terrorism financing, tackling the illegal exploitation of natural resources, and investing in counter-narratives to prevent radicalisation, the AU aims to foster a comprehensive, 'whole-of-society' approach to human security.

During the **third session**, which was held in a closed format, participants took stock of the

activities of the A3+, noting presentations by the Algerian Secretary of State, Selma Bakhta Mansouri - as the A3+ Coordinator - and Guyana's Permanent Representative to the UN, Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett. The discussion highlighted the Oran Process as a vital catalyst for strengthening the A3+ capacity to fulfill its continental mandate within the UNSC since 2013. Members specifically commended outgoing representatives from Algeria, Sierra Leone, and Guyana for amplifying Africa's voice and welcomed the incoming members, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia, encouraging them to maintain the group's current momentum and cohesion.



Figure 6: Session three presenters, Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, Guyana's Permanent Representative to the UN (left), and Selma Bakhta Mansouri, Secretary of State to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in charge of African Affairs, of Algeria - as the A3+ Coordinator, on 'Taking Stock of A3+ Activities: Lessons Learned and Way Forward.' (Source: X [@Presse\\_Express](#).)

To further institutionalise this influence, participants emphasised the need for systematic synchronisation between the PSC and the UNSC. This includes regularising interactions at the expert and ambassadorial levels to ensure the A3+ can effectively champion common African positions. The session underscored the importance of the A3+ taking leadership as 'penholders' on African files and urged the creation of a dedicated coordination platform between the PSC Committee of Experts and A3+ political coordinators. Additionally, the AU Permanent Observer Mission was praised for its support, though members

stressed the necessity of strengthening the Mission's capacity through continued staff secondments to better protect Africa's interests at the UN.

Looking ahead, the group resolved to enhance public diplomacy through joint media stakeouts and 'Arria-Formula' meetings while preserving institutional memory via the new 'Africa at the UN Security Council' documentary and repository. The session concluded with a commitment to deepening solidarity between Africa and the Caribbean, ensuring that the A3+ mechanism remains a resilient and unified force. To facilitate this, participants called for the accelerated implementation of the coordination manual and the inclusion of the A3+ in annual PSC retreats to refine working methods and ensure that AUPSC decisions are fully reflected in global security outcomes.

During the **fourth session**, which was also a closed segment, presentation was made by Mohamed Fathi Ahmed Idrees, AU Permanent Observer to the UN in New York, and Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU), regarding the ongoing efforts to reform the UNSC. The discussion focused on commending the C-10's leadership, steered by Sierra Leone, in championing the Common African Position. Participants emphasised that achieving this reform requires seamless, predictable coordination between the AUPSC, the A3+, and the C-10. This alignment ensures that Africa's priorities are integrated into all A3+ initiatives, strengthening the continent's permanent influence while continuing the push for full permanent representation and additional rotating seats.



Figure 7: Session four presenters, Mohamed Fathi Ahmed Idrees, AU Permanent Observer to the UN in New York (left), and Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU), on 'AUPSC and A3+: A Stronger Voice for UNSC Reform.'

Beyond internal coordination, the session highlighted the importance of the A3+ collaborating with the wider E-10 and other like-minded groups. By building on the momentum of recent joint statements regarding Council working methods, African representatives can effectively advocate for reform principles from within the institution. This external outreach is balanced by a need to deepen internal cohesion among AU Member States, ensuring a unified voice that resonates across all diplomatic channels.

To sustain this momentum, participants underscored the necessity of bridging the strategic gap between Addis Ababa and New York through shared messaging and reinforced linkages. By enhancing cross-regional partnerships and leveraging the growing global support for equitable representation, Africa can better assert its agency. Ultimately, the seminar concluded that African Heads of State must keep UNSC reform at the forefront of the continent's global diplomatic agenda to ensure lasting structural change.

### Adoption of the Conclusions of the 17<sup>th</sup> Annual Retreat of the PSC on the Review of its Working Methods

On 22 December, the PSC adopted the [Conclusions](#) of its 17<sup>th</sup> Annual Retreat on the Review of its Working Methods though a



[communiqué](#). The retreat was held in Abuja, Nigeria on 6 and 7 November 2025.

As a tradition, the Annual Retreat was organised as part of the ongoing efforts to continue to further strengthen the PSC working methods with a view to enabling the PSC to more effectively and more efficiently deliver on its mandate of promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and African Governance Architecture (AGA). The Retreat focused on PSC Working Methods including the PSC 2025 Budget performance and the Approved Budget for 2026; the Report on the Study on the Structural Root Causes and Impact of Unconstitutional Changes of Government; the Report of the Workshop of the PSC Committee of Experts held from 4 to 5 November 2025; Highlights of the High-Level Review of AU Governance, Peace and Security Frameworks held in Nairobi: Next Steps; and an Open Debate on Geopolitical Shifts and the Global Governance Reset Imperative. The Retreat also included a PSC simulation exercise that was aimed at contributing towards popularising and raising public awareness on the PSC and its work.

To improve efficiency and discharge its mandate more effectively, the PSC reviewed its **working methods and budget for 2025 - 2026**. Key priorities include streamlining the 2026 Annual Indicative Programme of Work by removing outdated items and merging similar thematic topics to prevent duplication. To ensure a more focused approach, the Council called for 'lean and light' monthly agendas that prioritise urgent, country-specific peace and security matters over broad thematic discussions.

Operational efficiency remained a core focus, with the Council emphasising the need for synchronised calendars between

the PSC and PRC and the timely circulation of working documents. To facilitate informed decision-making, it was agreed that briefing notes must be accompanied by a matrix of previous decisions. The PSC also underscored the importance of member state accountability, urging full compliance with Article 5 of the Protocol regarding high-level attendance and requesting a new ethical charter to protect the confidentiality and integrity of PSC deliberations.

Regrading strategic partnerships, the Conclusions highlighted that partnerships will be expanded through quarterly coordination meetings with the A3 and regularised consultations with all RECs/RMs. To enhance conflict prevention, the Council advocated for the regular submission of early warning reports and an increased Crisis Reserve Facility. Furthermore, the Council requested an urgent review of the AU Sanctions Regime to improve effectiveness while minimising humanitarian impact, alongside a new mandate to include symbolic humanitarian gestures during field missions to conflict zones.

Finally, the PSC committed to institutional growth by calling for the full operationalisation of its sub-committees and increased resource mobilisation to support all official AU languages. The Secretariat was directed to strengthen its internal capacity through regular training and to amend the Draft Annual Indicative Programme of Work for 2026 and to re-submit it for consideration by the Committee of Experts for consideration before its subsequent submission to the PSC at Ambassadorial level for consideration, by February 2026.

Regarding the **report on the structural root causes and impact of unconstitutional changes of government**, the PSC noted the presentation by the Governance and Conflict

Prevention Directorate. Emphasising a shift from reactive to proactive engagement, the Council stressed the importance of utilising early warning reports from bodies like CISSA, AFRIPOL, and the APRM to facilitate timely preventive diplomacy and mediation.

To ensure the study's effectiveness, the PSC deferred its final consideration to the Committee of Experts for a technical review. This review aims to address methodological gaps and integrate critical factors such as foreign interference in internal affairs of Member States, including electoral processes, as well as the peculiar characteristics of democracy in various parts of the Continent.

Regarding the open debate on Geopolitical Shifts and Global Governance Reset Imperative, the PSC expressed deep concern over how intensifying great-power competition and shifting geopolitical dynamics are debilitating the multilateral system. Tensions which have specifically impacted the AU's peace and security agenda by diverting the financial priorities of strategic partners. In response, the PSC underscored the imperative to adapt by diversifying funding sources and forging new partnerships to ensure African peace efforts remain resilient and well-resourced. To address these systemic challenges, the PSC called for a fundamental reform of the global governance architecture, specifically advocating for the UNSC reform aligned with the Ezulwini Consensus and the work of the C-10. Simultaneously, the Council urged Member States to strengthen the APSA by accelerating democratic transitions, empowering youth and women, and maximising the potential of the AfCFTA. Key to this strategy is securing predictable financing via UNSC Resolution 2719, recalibrating strategic partnerships, and enhancing early warning synergies with the RECs to proactively manage emerging

threats.

**AUPSC Model: 'Shared Solutions for Sustainable Peace in the Sahel':** The retreat included a PSC Model simulation exercise to raise public awareness of the Council's mandate among African youth. Featuring students from various Nigerian universities, the session was highly praised by the Council. Moving forward, the PSC has called for the Secretariat to integrate this model into all future annual retreats, ensuring consistent interaction with young people across the continent.



## MEDIA AND RESEARCH SERVICES


### ABOUT AMANI AFRICA

Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research; training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African Union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Amani Africa wishes to express its gratitude to the Government of Switzerland, the Embassy of Ireland, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland for the support in the production of this Monthly Digest.



Ambasáid na hÉireann  
Embassy of Ireland



Norwegian Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs



Ministry for Foreign  
Affairs of Finland

### ADDRESS

On the Corner of Equatorial Guinea St. and ECA Road,  
Zequala Complex, 7th Floor, Addis Ababa  
Tel: +251118678809  
Mobile: +251944723204 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia